Conflict Summary

General Conflict Information
Conflict name:	Sri Lanka
Type of incompatibility:	Government
Interstate/intrastate dimension:	Intrastate
Conflict status:	Terminated: 31 December, 1990
Date of first stated goals of incompatibility:	1 August, 1970
Date of first use of armed force:	10 March, 1971
Date of first battle-related death:	5 April, 1971
Date when conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths:	30 April, 1971

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	Conflict intensity	Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	JVP

1990	Minor
Side A:Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Side B1:JVP
1989	War
Side A:Government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Side B1:JVP

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Conflict Summary Click for help

The Sinhalese, Maoist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) emerged as a political movement in 1965. Under the leadership of Rohana Wijeweera it subsequently grew into an organised political party and took on an increasingly public role from the mid-1970s. At the time of JVP's early mobilisation, several other parties already existed in Sri Lanka politics, which described themselves as leftist and socialist. Initially identified as simply the "new left," the JVP was popular primarily among the unemployed and rural youth, capitalizing on the alleged "class betrayal" of the existing leftist-coalition in their collaboration with the government, and on its lack of a revolutionary purpose. The first political "classes of indoctrination" were conducted in 1969, and included discussions of Indian Imperialism, the failure of the old left and Sri Lanka's revolutionary path. In the 1970 elections the JVP supported the United Front coalition, but soon after the new government's inauguration to power, JVP intensified its violent rhetoric in a public campaign. Government measures to curb the mounting insurrection involved the detention of 4 000 suspected JVP members, among them Wijeweera, in March 1971. The tension culminated on 5 April 1971 in a coordinated attack on police stations and government buildings by JVP members, in an attempt to seize power from the United Front government. A state of emergency was imposed and the government forces had within a few weeks ruthlessly repressed the insurrection. The estimated number of casualties varies between 1 200 and 10 000 - the majority of them suspected JVP-associates.

The JVP re-emerged as a dissident force within the Sinhala community in early 1987. It gained considerable strength in the months following the Indo-Sri Lanka accord, which it claimed conceded too much authority to the Tamil minority in the north. The core incompatibility remained that of governmental power, but the call for a socialist revolution was cloaked in a more nationalist rhetoric than in the early 1970s. The violent campaign led by the JVP and its military wing (the Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya) against the accord accelerated sharply in the run up to the presidential elections in late 1988, with a series of disruptive strikes, violent riots and acts of sabotage. Violence escalated further in connection with the general elections in early 1989, and the period was marked by some of the worst fighting to date. In August the JVP adopted the strategy of deliberately targeting families of the Sri Lankan army, triggering a ferocious counter-offensive from the government that effectively crushed the JVP rebellion by the end of the year. The most serious setback for the JVP insurgency was the killing of Wijeweera and his principal deputy in November 1989 while in custody. By February 1990 the security forces had killed or detained 7 of the 8-member JVP politburo and over 25 area and districts leaders, 6 700 suspected JVP members were also allegedly held in detention and the JVP was virtually destroyed as a political force.

The power relation between the primary parties has been highly asymmetrical. Little is known about the military capacity and organisational structure of the JVP cadres, but the number of armed troops was estimated to be between 1 200-3 000. The government of Sri Lanka commanded an active army of about 22 000. The large presence of Indian troops fighting the Tamil insurgency in the north during the late 1980s implied that Sri Lanka should have been about to focus on fighting the JVP insurgency in the south.

Despite its military advantage, it was, however, the government that demonstrated the most willingness to try to find a political solution to the conflict. As a conciliatory gesture to the JVP and LTTE alike the government in January 1989 repealed the state of emergency that had been in force since the riots of May 1983, but re-imposed it as the JVP's renewed campaign of violence peaked in June. The government's invitation to political talks, accompanied by unilateral ceasefire declarations on 12 April and 21 September were rejected by the JVP.

The conflict ended in 1990 with what must be termed an unconditional military victory by the government. The JVP did, however, reappear as a credible political force in provincial elections in 1999, and retained a crucial political position as a supporting party to the PA government in 2001. It has been one of the fiercest resistors within the Sinhala community of a peace agreement with the LTTE.

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