Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall?
Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups

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There is a commonly expressed concern that granting territorial concessions to separatist groups may create “domino effects.” However, although this statement is largely undisputed within political rhetoric, no firm conclusions have been provided in previous research. The purpose of this study is to systematically examine whether the granting of territorial concessions to an ethnic group does indeed spur new separatist conflicts. I suggest that such domino effects may be generated by two processes. First, the accommodation of an ethnic group’s separatist demands may trigger a general inspiration process among other groups within and across borders. Second, by acquiescing to separatist demands, a government signals that it may also yield to the demands of other groups it confronts, making it more likely that other groups choose to pursue secessionism. Statistical analysis of data on territorial concessions globally 1989-2004 provides no evidence of domino effects. This holds true both within and across borders.

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There is a widespread and largely undisputed concern that granting autonomy or separate statehood to ethnic groups may set in motion a “domino effect.” The claim is that the success of one separatist movement may in turn trigger other ethnic groups to also promote separate statehood violently, threatening to disintegrate the whole country and spread across borders. The fear of such processes is evident in the rhetoric used by many politicians as well as in journalistic accounts. For instance, the reluctance to recognize the independence of Kosovo was often motivated out of a concern of setting a dangerous precedent in international law; a precedent that would legitimize the calls for secession by so many other ethnic movements that countries would balkanize. For instance, Serbian newspaper Glas javnosti (cited in BBC) warned that Kosovo’s independence could trigger a domino effect sweeping through much of Europe, Russia, and extending into the Asian continent, even including separatist Xinjiang in China (BBC Monitoring European, 2006).

Yet another example of the fear of domino effects is the policy promoted by the African Union (AU) and its predecessor Organization of African Unity (OAU), which consistently prioritizes the territorial integrity of states rather than the promotion of peoples’ right to self-determination (Kamanu, 1974, Panter-Brick, 1968, Trzcinski, 2004). In their view, successful secession in one part of Africa constitutes a threat to the goal of African unity and may create demonstration effects that make the whole continent crumble (Kamanu, 1974).

However, systematic research on domino effects is insufficient. Previous research has not generated any firm conclusions regarding if, when, and why domino effects operate. Neither is it clear between which groups domino effects are supposed to occur. Some evidence has been presented in support of domino effects taking place between ethnic groups within the same country (Hale, 2000, Saideman, 1998, Walter, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). However, it is unclear whether these findings also relate to potential domino effects across borders.

The present study addresses this research gap by empirically examining domino effects between ethnic groups within and across country borders. Do territorial concessions to one separatist group spur similar demands by other ethnic groups? I suggest that domino effects may be generated by two distinct processes. The first is a general inspiration process suggesting that the accommodation of one group’s separatist aspirations may encourage other groups to pursue similar demands. This general inspiration process may work both domestically and internationally. The second explanation of domino effects builds on a more specific logic. If a government grants autonomy or independent statehood to one of the state’s ethnic groups this can be viewed by other ethnic groups in the state as a signal that it may yield to their demands as well. Other ethnic groups may, consequently, perceive that their likelihood of success has been enhanced. This explanation of domino effects is only applicable to ethnic groups that face the same government, that is reside in the same country.

The lacuna in previous research is partly explained by a lack of data. Through combining information from two new datasets, a systematic novel examination of domino effects operating between ethnic groups is rendered possible. First, I employ data from the EPR (Ethnic Power Relations) dataset, which provides global time-series data on ethnic groups (Cederman et al., 2010). Second, I use the IMPACT (Implementation of Pacts) dataset, which offers unique data on the granting and implementation of concessions to rebel groups involved in conflict (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). Taken together, these data greatly augment the prospects of empirically assessing the claim that accommodating the territorial demands forwarded by one ethnic group may prompt other groups to violently pursue similar demands. The present study utilizes this data to examine the potential for domino effects by examining whether ethnic groups are more inclined to violently pursue separatist goals if
other ethnic groups nearby successfully gain territorial concessions. The empirical analysis applies the distinction made above between two processes generating domino effects. Hence, I start by analyzing the general inspiration process, which is applicable both within and across borders, and proceed with examining whether domino effects primarily operate between groups in the same country.

The empirical analysis of this study does not find any evidence in support of a domino effect of granting territorial concessions. Contrary to the common expectation, ethnic groups do not appear to be more inclined to initiate conflict when nearby ethnic groups have been successful in their struggles for greater territorial self-determination. Several alternative tests yield the same result, including when the relevant domain is restricted to the domestic arena. Instead, the empirical analysis consistently finds that ethnic groups are significantly more likely to end up in conflict if other ethnic groups fight in the same country or if kin members are involved in ethnic conflict in a neighboring country. Hence, this essay concludes that while territorial concessions do not seem to create inspiration from one ethnic group to another, the involvement in conflict may create such inspiration effects.

This essay starts out by reviewing previous research on domino effects, distinguishing between domino effects as a general inspiration process and domino effects restricted to ethnic groups confronting the same government. It proceeds by presenting the data and research design used to empirically analyze whether territorial concessions may ignite domino effects. This is followed by a presentation and discussion of the statistical findings. By way of conclusion, the findings and implications are summarized.

Research on Domino Effects

Conceptualizing Domino Effects

The term “domino effect” is generally used to suggest that a particular change will result in a similar change nearby. This change will in turn cause another similar change, hence the analogy to a row of standing dominoes that starts collapsing. In a well-known application, former US president Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the term “domino theory” to illustrate that if Vietnam were to come under communist influence, then neighboring countries would follow suit. By viewing the countries in Southeast Asia as a row of dominoes, which would all fall (that is, fall to communism) if the first domino fell, the US administration motivated the preventive necessity of intervention (Silverman, 1975). US policy towards Latin America during Reagan’s presidency was similarly motivated by domino logic (Slater, 1987).

The term “domino effect” is also used to illustrate the process whereby the successful secession of one ethnic group is suggested to lead other, and yet other, ethnic groups to pursue separatist aims. While the term domino effect is preferred by policy-makers and the media, researchers tend to use the term “demonstration effect.” Demonstration effects relate to changes in preferences and indicate a process where political action by one group stimulates other groups to promote their own cause (see, among others, Gurr, 1993a, Hale, 2000, Kuran, 1998, Lake and Rothchild, 1998). Demonstration effects may make a group perceive a decreased risk with a particular action and provide a blueprint of how the process may develop. The collective action problems that often hamper political action (Olson, 1965) may be outweighed by the external stimuli that demonstration effects produce. An external stimulus—such as another ethnic group in a similar situation being successful—may thus set in motion a process that provides the critical mass required to support a particular cause
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992, Kuran, 1987, 1989, 1998). In sum, successful secession by one group may set an example, that is create a demonstration effect, and encourage other groups to attempt to secede as well.

In this study I primarily use the term domino effect, as this study addresses the concern about domino effects prevalent in policy: that the accommodation of one ethnic group’s territorial claims will prompt other groups to pursue similar separatist goals. The domino effects examined in this study are specified to the process whereby the granting of territorial concessions to one ethnic group may encourage other ethnic groups into violently pursuing similar aspirations. This specification of domino effects excludes the related process of concessions leading to more extreme demands by the same group. In many statements on domino effects, the phenomenon is discussed in general terms whereby separatism in one location is supposed to spur similar movements “elsewhere.” However, I demonstrate that it is fruitful to distinguish between domino effects as a general inspiration process and domino effects operating between ethnic groups confronting the same government.

**Domino Effects as a General Inspiration Process**

Several researchers suggest that the granting of extensive concessions to a separatist ethnic group may trigger domino effects by causing other ethnic groups to update their beliefs about the usefulness of resorting to violence and by providing strategic cues to learn from. For instance, a number of studies within the ethnic-conflict literature discuss the general tendency whereby successful ethnic conflict may prompt similar demands by other groups. The success by one ethnic group, for example being granted greater territorial self-determination, may lead another group, under similar circumstances, to update its beliefs, making it believe that similar concessions can be gained if using violence. These studies discuss such processes theoretically, but apart from providing illustrative examples, they generally make no empirical assessment regarding under what conditions domino effects are expected. Also, with few exceptions, they do not generally distinguish between domino effects operating between groups in the same country or transcending across borders. For instance, Horowitz claims that a separatist movement can incite new separatists into violence by showing that such struggles may be successful or, if not fully successful, they can lead to concessions being granted (Horowitz, 1985: 279). Gurr and associates have noted that if an ethnic group successfully mobilizes for rebellion and other types of political action, it may enhance other ethnic groups’ incentives to also mobilize politically. Political action by one group may also spawn strategic advice on how to successfully pursue group aspiration elsewhere (Gurr, 2000, see also Hill and Rothchild, 1986). In empirical analyses, Gurr and colleagues have demonstrated that the likelihood of an ethnic group rebelling is increased by similar rebellions elsewhere (Gurr, 1993b, Gurr and Moore, 1997). However, it remains unclear whether this is indeed a case of inspiration due to conflict ending successfully on the part of the challenger side or a case of inspiration emanating from ongoing conflict. Also, neither Gurr nor Horowitz makes clear the difference between domestic and cross-border domino effects.

In a cross-sectional study of ethnic groups, Ayres and Saideman (2000) discuss the consequences of separatism both within and outside a state for the inclination of a given ethnic group to choose a separatist strategy. They do not explicitly discuss the distinct processes that may trigger domino effects of ethnic separatism within and/or across borders but propose hypotheses that to some extent assess domino effects. They analyze these hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset (2005). Measures relating to conflict and separatism in
the neighborhood are initially supported, but appear to be driven mainly by events in the early 1990s as their significance expires once cases from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are excluded. The results also indicate that successful separatism of any group in the neighborhood, as entailed by for example provisions for territorial concessions, does not influence the probability of separatism involving a given ethnic group. Thus, the results of their study do not support the general notion of domino effects, whereby successful separatism inspires ethnic groups within and across country borders.

In a comparative study, Saideman (1998) examines the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, asking whether the disintegration of these countries was the consequence of a domino effect. The results of his study suggest that one successful secession generated conditions that favored more secessions. However, this was mainly a case of spatial reinforcement of secessionism within each state; Saideman finds no conclusive evidence for domino effects operating across borders, whereby the secessions from the Soviet Union exacerbated the fragmentation of former Yugoslavia, and so on (Saideman, 1998). He offers an argument explaining why domino effects across borders in general should not be expected: even cases that are predominantly successful may produce contradictory lessons as processes of learning are highly individual. It is therefore inaccurate to assume that groups that observe an event (such as successful secession) are always encouraged into taking similar action (Saideman, 1998).

In addition to Saideman’s argument, I suggest two more reasons why domino effects across borders should not be expected to take place. First, the fact that a foreign government has accepted the demands for greater territorial self-determination raised by an ethnic challenger in a neighboring country, says little about the inclination of one’s own government to accommodate such demands. Hence, the general inspiration process that is suggested to generate domino effects between ethnic groups across borders cannot hinge on a perceived increase in the likelihood of success. Domino effects that transcend borders cannot be explained by concessions revealing information about the strength and resolve of the adversary, that is, the government of the country in which the ethnic group resides. Such concessions therefore contribute little to a neighboring group’s calculated probability of successfully pursuing separatist demands, beyond setting an example and providing general inspiration and strategic advice. In much of the literature cited so far, there is an assumption that concessions granted to one ethnic group may inspire ethnic groups in other countries to raise similar demands because the group believes that its likelihood of succeeding has been enhanced. However, we have no evidence that this is the case.

Second, a group is not likely to become secessionist simply because it perceives a greater chance of succeeding or because an ethnic group in another country provides strategic guidance to learn from. Domestic conditions must make the group want to pursue a secessionist option. Ethnic groups residing in different countries typically face diverse structural conditions. These conditions affect each group’s overall probability of initiating violent separatism, and of being influenced by territorial concessions in a neighboring country. The potential for domino effects hence hinges on local conditions being conducive to conflict.

To sum up, proponents of the domino effects as a general inspiration process suggest that the success of one ethnic group in itself may trigger other groups into raising similar demands. Empirical evidence, however, is inconclusive.
Domino Effects within Countries

Much of the criticism raised above does not, however, apply to the assertion that domino effects may operate within countries. Since ethnic groups residing in the same country all face the same adversary—the government of that country—they can learn much from the actions taken by that government, and from the success (or failure) of other ethnic groups in the same country who are pursuing greater territorial control. If a regime gives in to one group’s demands, this is highly relevant information for other ethnic groups in the country and may increase the perception that territorial concessions are attainable. By acquiescing to demands made by one ethnic group, the government signals to other groups in the same country that it may be worthwhile to raise similar demands. Such accommodation of group demands provides information that an ethnic challenger can use to gauge the government’s strength and resolve and, consequently, also its likelihood of successfully pursuing demands for greater territorial control. Hence, beyond the indirect effect of setting an example and providing inspiration for separatist struggle, such concessions may directly influence a group’s perceived likelihood of success. There are thus theoretical reasons why domino effects may be expected within a country when the demands of one ethnic challenger are met. Most systematic applications conducted in previous studies on domino effects indeed limit their empirical domain to ethnic groups within countries. And, as this review demonstrates, these empirical analyses of domestic dominoes have generated several noteworthy findings.

In research on the role of territory in ethnic conflict, Toft suggests that while ethnic groups view territory as indivisible when it has a homeland attachment to it, states view territory as indivisible when there is a risk of precedent-setting (Toft, 2002/2003, 2003). Such effects operate when a state faces several ethnic groups that have the capacity and willingness to potentially opt for a secessionist strategy. If the state accommodates the demands of one secessionist group, it signals that such demands are legitimate and serves as an example to other groups.

The claim that granting territorial concessions to one group signals that a government may give in to the demands of other groups has an evident corollary: refusing to do so is likely to deter other groups from raising secessionist claims. This reputation argument is developed by Walter, both from the point of view of the government (Walter, 2003, 2006a) and the ethnic group (Walter, 2006b). She argues that governments are reluctant to grant territorial concessions to ethnic groups because it is likely to encourage other groups into demanding similar benefits. Given that territory is a limited resource, a government will cease to exist if too many territorial concessions are granted. By analyzing a sample of ethnic self-determination movements, she suggests that the decision of the government to acquiesce or fight separatist demands is highly strategic, rather than strictly being a function of how highly the government values the disputed territory and the parties’ relative capabilities. Hence, the government will take into account the number of potential future challengers. If many such groups exist, the government is likely to invest in reputation building and actively fight an early challenger in order to deter future, perhaps stronger, separatist challengers down the road (Walter, 2003). Walter’s hypothesis is supported in empirical analyses: governments are indeed less likely to accommodate separatist demands if they face a large number of potential future challengers (Walter, 2003). This finding is also reproduced in a recent study by Cunningham (2011).

In Walter (2006a), it is suggested that in addition to taking into account the number of potential future separatist challengers, the government also considers the potential long-term
territorial losses (its combined value) when deciding whether to grant concessions or fight a separatist group. She also examines whether the suggested logic of reputation building is an efficient strategy whereby the refusal to accommodate one separatist group deters future challengers. She finds support for this suggested link to subsequent separatist challenges.

In addition to explaining strategies used by governments, Walter aims to predict the decision of an ethnic group to seek separation; again using the logic of reputation building (Walter, 2006b). She argues that an ethnic group decides to pursue separatism when it perceives that the government may be willing to acquiesce to such demands. By observing the government accommodating similar demands posed by ethnic groups in the past and the number of separatist challengers the government may encounter in the future, the ethnic group can estimate the most likely government response to group demands. Thus, she suggests, and empirically supports, that ethnic groups are more likely to pose separatist demands if the government has yielded to other separatist groups.

Taken together, Walter’s studies suggest that when attempting to predict the onset of ethnically advanced demands for self-determination, and whether the government will acquiesce or not, it is important to consider a widened notion of the strategic setting of actors, both temporally (earlier challengers and potential future challenges) and spatially (other potential challengers present within a state at the same time). If the government has acquiesced to previous challengers, and if it is likely to do so in the future, it is thus likely that ethnic groups choose to violently raise demands for greater territorial self-determination. This may explain domino effects operating between ethnic groups in the same country.

Lastly, in a study of secession in the former Soviet Union, Hale (2000) claims that separatist success by one group may provide demonstration effects and precipitate other groups into attempting to secede. Prior success both makes ethnic groups perceive a reduced risk of making separatist demands and provide inspiration by showing that such struggles are practically attainable. In a statistical analysis of forty-five ethnic regions, Hale finds that a measure for Russia’s declaration of independence correlated with other republics’ calls for independence shortly after. He interprets this finding as evidence of the suggested demonstration effect (Hale, 2000).

To summarize, the few empirical studies that do exist on domino effects within countries suggest that the success of one ethnic group in gaining territorial concessions may indeed trigger other ethnic groups into raising separatist demands.

**Designing the Empirical Test**

**Dataset**

To investigate whether an ethnic group is more likely to violently pursue group demands if other ethnic groups are accommodated on their territorial demands, a cross-sectional time-series dataset is constructed. It consists of a global sample of ethnic groups regarded as politically relevant by the EPR (Ethnic Power Relations) dataset (Cederman, et al., 2010). 647 of the ethnic groups of the EPR dataset constitute the cross-sections in this study and are re-organized into time-series format. Due to constraints on the temporal dimension on the main covariate (territorial concessions), the time-series are restricted to the period from 1989 to 2004.
Dependent Variables

The analysis includes two dependent variables. First, I coded a dichotomous dependent variable for the onset of internal armed conflict involving each ethnic group included in the dataset. The aim is to include only ethnic challenges that are armed and organized in pursuit of group aspirations and where violence is directed against the government in order to achieve these goals. To do so I link the EPR groups to the onsets of conflicts identified by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which defines intrastate armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” in one year (Pettersson and Themnér, 2011: 29). Some of the ethnic groups included in the dataset are mobilized in several different opposition movements, with separate onsets of conflict. For example, Tuaregs in Mali constitute the main basis for mobilization in three organizations pursuing greater territorial self-determination for Azawad (MPA, FIAA and ATNMC).7 Whenever a given ethnic group is involved in the onset of a new intrastate conflict or its re-initiation after at least three years of inactivity it is coded (1); all other observations are coded (0). The models are estimated using logit regression.

The second dependent variable separates between onsets over governments, coded (1), and onsets relating to territory, coded (2); other observations are coded (0). When this variable is analyzed, I employ multinomial regression.8

Independent Variables

Territorial Concessions

This study aims to examine whether territorial concessions granted to one or more ethnic groups in the proximity of a given ethnic group, make that group more conflict prone. The granting of complete independence to an ethnic group, as a consequence of violent conflict, is an atypical event. However, territorial concessions short of independence, including autonomy, are more common and also have the potential of generating inspiration and domino effects. In this study, proximity is an important element delimiting the relevant strategic environment of ethnic groups.9 Ethnic groups are thus considered more likely to respond to domino effects if the distance to the group being granted a concession is relatively small. This notion is adhered to when identifying which concessions are relevant for a study of domino effects. In addition, the analytical distinction between ethnic dominoes as a general inspiration process and those restricted to the domestic arena is observed in the empirical analysis. Hence, when examining whether a particular ethnic group responds to territorial concessions granted to other ethnic groups, due to a general inspiration process, I include concessions granted to other ethnic groups within the same country or to other ethnic groups residing in countries that directly border the country where the coded ethnic group lives.10 When restricted to within-country domino effects, concerning groups in the same country confronting the same government, only concessions granted to other ethnic groups in the same state are included.

The data on concessions is obtained from the IMPACT (Implementation of Pacts) dataset (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008), which builds on the TOPAD (Terms of Peace Agreements) dataset (Nilsson et al., 2006).11 The IMPACT dataset lists all peace agreements reached in intrastate armed conflicts, as defined by the UCDP. This totals 83 agreements in the period from 1989 to 2004. It offers detailed information on provisions for political, military,
territorial power-sharing pacts outlined in those agreements. For each type of power-sharing pact, IMPACT provides information about the extent to which it was implemented, on several different dimensions, and the timing of implementation (Jarstad et al., 2007). In all, 74 of the 83 peace agreements were signed to end internal armed conflicts categorized as ethnic. Of these 74 agreements, 29 included territorial concessions. These concessions include, for instance, the establishment of local self-government, such as for the Bodos in India; federal arrangements, such as that outlined by the Dayton Agreement regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the creation of autonomous government as in Bougainville. Based on this data, I construct measures to evaluate the impact of territorial concessions.

First, the variable *Territorial concession* codes whether an ethnic group, which resides in the proximity of a given ethnic group, gains territorial concessions formalized in a peace accord by stipulating a “guarantee that offers a provision for some form of regional autonomy” (Jarstad, et al., 2007: 2). I model the variable as a decay function to allow for the possibility that the effect of a concession is strongest in the beginning and then decreases over time. Thus, the variable is assigned the value of (1) the year following a concession; then it decays with a half-life of three years. Second, it may not be the signing of an accord stipulating territorial power-sharing that causes inspiration, but the fact that the concessions are realized. Accordingly, a measure of *Implemented territorial concession* is also analyzed using a decay function starting the year after a territorial concession is implemented for one or more proximate ethnic groups. A concession is considered implemented if the rebel side either retained control over a specific piece of territory or efforts made to implement decentralization came into force (Jarstad, et al., 2007: 5-6). In Table 2, a subset of these concessions is included in order to assess whether domino effects mainly operate between ethnic groups within the same country.

**Controlling for the Strategic Environment**

The proposed explanations of domino effects suggest that ethnic groups are outward-looking, hence being affected by events involving other ethnic groups, both within the same country and in the immediate surroundings. Therefore, when estimating the impact of nearby groups being granted territorial concessions, it is important to control for other factors that relate to the strategic environment of an ethnic group. I include four such measures. First, not only concessions at the end of conflict may trigger groups into conflict; an ethnic group may also be inspired by conflict itself. Ethnic conflicts involving other groups in the same country are thus important to control for. Second, conflicts involving members of the same ethnic group, fought in neighboring countries, may be particularly relevant (Ayres and Saideman, 2000, Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Forsberg, 2008). For instance, the likelihood of ethnic conflict involvement by Saras in Central African Republic may be affected by kin members being involved in violent conflict in neighboring Chad. The variables *Conflict same country* and *Kin in conflict* are modeled as decay functions where the suggested demonstration effect decreases as the conflict is no longer active.

Third, the effect of nearby conflicts may be broader; research demonstrates that countries located in regions with ongoing civil wars are more prone to experience civil wars themselves (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Gleditsch, 2007, Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Consequently, a measure for the number of civil wars that are ongoing in the neighborhood of an ethnic group is included, using data from Gleditsch (2007). The *Neighborhood civil war* variable varies from 0 to 9 and is lagged one year.
Fourth, a control for the number of other politically relevant ethnic groups (EPR groups) in the state is added. This follows Walter and Toft who suggest that a violent outcome is contingent upon the perceived number of future challengers (Toft, 2003, Walter, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). In the results, this measure is reported as Number of EPR groups, and is log-transformed due to a few countries, in particular China and Russia, having a large number of EPR groups.

Controlling for Incentives and Capabilities
As discussed previously, not all ethnic groups are equally likely to be triggered by a domino effect. For an ethnic group to care about concessions granted to other groups and decide to pursue similar demands itself, it is a prerequisite that the group has both the willingness and ability to mobilize for violence. Two group-level measures are included to represent the willingness of an ethnic group to initiate violent conflict, using data provided by the EPR dataset (Cederman, et al., 2010). First, if a group suffers from discriminatory policies institutionalized by the regime, the group may be increasingly likely to opt out of the state by pursing a secessionist strategy (Ayres and Saideman, 2000: 98). The granting of territorial concessions to groups nearby may provide the momentum required to turn such a strategy into action. An ethnic group is hence coded (1) if it is subjected to discriminatory treatment; otherwise it is coded (0) on the variable Discrimination. Second, an ethnic group that suffers from exclusion is more likely to pursue separatism. Such exclusion sometimes denotes high perceived vulnerability: since the group exists at the mercy of the political policies promoted by other groups, it may perceive itself as having more to gain from attempting to create its own state (Ayres and Saideman, 2000: 98, Saideman, 1998: 134). Hence, if the ethnic group has no access to political power at the regional or national level it is coded as Powerless.

All estimated models also include two group measures that represent the capabilities of an ethnic group to mobilize for violent conflict, again using EPR data (Cederman, et al., 2010). First, the Group size, as the proportion of the whole country’s population, may be related to its capacity to fight an ethnic war. Small groups are more likely to be deterred since their chances for success are slim; choosing a separatist strategy may attract a brutal response (Ayres and Saideman, 2000: 99, Hill and Rothchild, 1986). The capacity to mobilize may also be contingent upon whether or not a group enjoys some extent of regional autonomy. A group is coded (1) on the variable Regional Autonomy if assigned such a status by the EPR dataset; otherwise it is coded (0).18

Finally, the regime type of the state in which the ethnic group resides may be related both to the group’s willingness and ability to pursue its goals through armed conflict. Findings generated by previous studies suggest that regime type has an inverted U-shaped relationship with intrastate armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Hegre et al., 2001, Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). I use Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) to control for the effect of regime type; in order to capture the suggested curvilinearity both the standard Polity variable and its squared term are included in the models. Polity and Polity squared are lagged one year.19

Results
The statistical analysis starts by analyzing the first way in which domino effects are suggested to operate: as a general process of inspiration that may operate between potential separatists within and across borders. It examines if ethnic groups are increasingly inclined to end up in
violent conflict if groups nearby are granted territorial concessions. The section proceeds with an analysis of a restricted set of concessions to investigate whether domino effects are present primarily among ethnic groups that live in the same state and face the same regime, followed by a discussion whether domino effects can extend beyond regions. The section ends by discussing the main implications for the research field.

**Do Territorial Concessions Inspire Groups to Rebel?**

The models reported in Table 1 assess whether ethnic groups are more likely to end up in violent conflict if nearby ethnic groups are granted territorial concessions, included as part of peace pacts. The category “nearby ethnic groups” incorporates all ethnic groups in the same country and all ethnic groups residing in neighboring countries.

[Table 1 about here]

The results are not supportive of domino effects. Models 1 and 2 show that neither the granting of territorial concessions nor its implementation to nearby groups is associated with an increased risk of ethnic conflict onset. Models 3-6, which report the multinomial regressions, point in the same direction; concessions are generally not significantly related to either onset over territory or over government. The implementation of territorial concessions, if anything, appears to decrease the risk of ethnic groups becoming involved in conflict over government, as reported in Model 6.

The results from Table 1 show that ethnic groups are significantly more likely to experience an onset of violent conflict if members of the same ethnic group are involved in insurrections in neighboring states. In the absence of a nearby conflict involving ethnic kin members, and the other variables held at mean values, the predicted probability of an onset of ethnic conflict by a given group is 0.6%. The probability is increased to approximately 1.4% when such kin-group conflict exists. Also, the involvement in conflict by other ethnic groups in the same state is an important predictor. The multinomial regression reveals that such conflicts mainly influence an ethnic group’s likelihood of separatist conflict. Other types of civil conflicts in the neighborhood do not make an ethnic group more likely to initiate violent conflict. The results further suggest that if a group is relatively large and if it is discriminated against, it is more likely to end up in conflict over government while groups that enjoy regional autonomy are more prone to territorial conflict. The decaying function is positive and significant in all models. This suggests that ethnic groups with a recent history of conflict may be especially vulnerable to additional onsets of conflict. The remaining control variables are not significant.

The results of this study so far suggest that there is no reason to believe that granting territorial concessions to ethnic groups should generally inspire other groups to raise similar demands. However, previous research has provided some evidence that ethnic dominoes operate domestically. Such effects may have been hidden in the wider inclusion of territorial concessions adapted in Table 1. The concessions included in Table 2 are thus restricted to those granted to other ethnic groups within the same country of a given ethnic group.

[Table 2 about here]

The results are quite similar to those reported in Table 1. The signing of a deal, which grants an ethnically mobilized opposition group greater territorial control, does not make other
ethnic groups in the same country more inclined to initiate violent conflict, neither over ter-
ritory nor over government control (Models 1, 3, and 5). Also, the implementation of such
territorial deals has no significant effect (Models 2, 4, and 6). The results regarding the con-
trol variables are in substance identical to those reported in Table 1.
In sum, the results of this study indicate that the granting of territorial concessions to one
separatist group has no effects on the inclination of other ethnic groups within and across
borders to pursue separatism. This result diverts both from the view held by many policy-
makers and, partly, also from previous research.22

A Closer Look at Concessions: “Air-borne” Dominoes

The results of this study provide no evidence for domino effects operating between ethnic
groups in the same country or across neighboring countries. However, do such processes
extend beyond regions? In an increasingly globalized world, aspiring separatists may learn by
example from the success of a similar movement far away. Figure 1 shows the number of
peace agreements with territorial pacts signed each year from 1989 to 2004, according to the
IMPACT dataset (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). It also shows the number of ongoing territorial
conflicts and the number of outbreaks of territorial conflicts recorded by the UCDP during
the same time period.

[Figure 1 about here]

The figure demonstrates that there are no visible trends in the relationship between territori-
al concessions and conflict globally that would support the notion of domino effects. If anything,
the figure indicates that territorial concessions increase after a period of many conflicts
in the early 1990s, perhaps because such concessions were used to end some of these con-
licts. There are no indications that a series of successful separatism is followed by an up-
surge in the number of territorial conflicts.
I have also examined the potential for domino effects from distant groups by re-
estimating all statistical models adding a set of dummy variables representing years where
ethnic groups gained independence for their homelands and years when countries disinte-
grated. These dummies control for events which may be associated with particularly strong
demonstration effects with the potential of having a global reach. This allows for the possi-
bility that ethnic groups may respond to concessions granted to groups outside of their pri-
mary strategic environment. It is unlikely, however, that groups will care much about con-
cessions to ethnic groups in remote locations if the concessions granted are small. Therefore,
years of events considered to have strong potential for inspiration, both because of their
magnitude and for being widely reported, are included in the set of dummy variables. The
dummies include 1991 (representing the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independ-
ence of Slovenia and Croatia); 1992 (the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina); 1993
(the independence of Eritrea, devolution of Czechoslovakia, and the formal acceptance of
the independence of FYR Macedonia); 1999 (East Timor voted for independence); and 2002
(East Timor is formally independent); all variables are lagged one year. Neither of these
dummies is significant; nor does their inclusion in the models substantially alter the results.23
Discussion

With comprehensive time-series data on ethnic groups and territorial concessions incorporated in peace deals, allowing for the most systematic assessment of ethnic dominoes so far, this study finds no evidence suggesting that domino effects are operating. This finding is considered solid and robust to a series of alternative tests. Ethnic groups do not appear to be inspired to use violence when concessions are granted to nearby separatist groups. Neither do I find any patterns at the global level. The finding differs from common media statements, where “separatism seems as contagious as the common cold” (Ayres and Saideman, 2000: 91). The result also diverts from common political jargon. The fear of domino effects has for a long time guided policy, both in states and in international organizations. From a research perspective, however, the finding is less surprising. There are in fact no previous studies confirming that the granting of autonomy or separate statehood should be associated with cross-border domino effects. On the contrary, there are several reasons for why international dominoes should be unlikely and examples of unique, rather than general, processes.

What is more surprising, however, is the finding in the present study that domino effects do not appear to operate within borders. Hence, if a government in a multi-ethnic country accommodates the separatist demands of one ethnic group, it does not appear to trigger additional separatism involving other ethnic groups. Previous research has indicated that this may be the case. For instance, Walter has found that ethnic groups are more prone to seek separatism from a state if the government of that state has previously accommodated similar demands (2006b). This study fails to reproduce this result.

The explanation may be empirical, as this study analyzes different data both in terms of the units of analyses (ethnic groups) and regarding the data on concessions. It also conceptualizes and measures territorial concessions differently. The data used in this study identifies 29 cases of peace agreements with provisions for territorial power-sharing in the 1989-2004 period. As a comparison, the data covered by Walter (2006b) identifies 19 cases of government accommodation of territorial demands in the 1940-2000 period. It is therefore plausible that the coding criteria used in Walter’s study are stricter and exclude some of those concessions that are included in the present study.24 In Walter’s case, each ethnic group is coded (1) on Past accommodation from the time that their government accommodates demands for self-determination by any other group in the state and for all subsequent years. In the present study, I model the potential domino effect as an effect that is strongest shortly after a state has accommodated a separatist group and then reduces over time. I believe this specification theoretically and intuitively better captures the suggested effect.25 The present study also differs from Walter (2006b) in terms of the temporal domain. The notion of domino effects is in the present study examined using a sample restricted to the post-Cold War era, while Walter’s data cover 1940-2000. The number of negotiated settlements involving concessions regarding the goals of the opposition side is higher after 1989 than before (Licklider, 1995, Wallensteen, 2002: 135); this may have biased the results. However, if domino effects are general phenomena appearing across time and space, a study of such effects for the period when they are most likely should have yielded some support for this notion.

There are also theoretical notions and intuitions in support of the present study’s finding, even in arguments forwarded by Walter. She finds that territorial conflicts are the most intractable and the least likely to be successful on the part of the challenger (Walter, 2003). Thus, even if the government has acquiesced to the demands of one separatist group, other groups may primarily perceive the great risks, and potential costs, involved in launching their
own territorial challenge. This would make domino effects less likely. The results of this study also suggest that governments not necessarily invest in its reputation by refusing to accommodate separatists, an interpretation supported by Nilsson (2010). In a study of rebel groups, she finds that governments are not less likely to sign a negotiated settlement with a rebel group in the presence of multiple challengers. In sum, there are both empirical and theoretical explanations for the finding that granting territorial concessions to a separatist group is not associated with an increased risk of secessionist challenges posed by other groups.

What then are the substantial implications of the findings regarding the control variables? In particular, the results provide further insights about what matters in an ethnic group’s strategic milieu. First, the number of other relevant ethnic groups in the same country is not related to the likelihood of conflict of a given ethnic group. This contradicts the findings by Walter; which suggest that the larger the number of ethnic groups in the country, the lower the likelihood of an ethnic group to violently seek self-determination (Walter, 2006b). However, if one or more of these groups are involved in conflict in the same country, an ethnic group is significantly more likely to pursue violent separatism. Also, the results of this study suggest that ethnic groups are more inclined to initiate conflict if a kin group is involved in conflict in a neighboring country. This corroborates the recent findings that countries (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008, Gleditsch, 2007) and ethnic groups (Cederman et al., 2009) are more likely to experience civil war in the presence of kinship ties to a neighboring conflict area and that kinship groups may explain the spread of ethnic conflict from one state to another (Forsberg, 2008). It also corroborates the result by Ayres and Saideman (2000) that kin members’ involvement in separatism nearby increases the likelihood of separatist activity by an ethnic group. Interestingly, although the results suggest that ethnic groups care about conflicts in their home state and conflicts involving kin members, there is no evidence suggesting that ethnic groups are more inclined to start conflict in the existence of intrastate armed conflicts in the neighborhood per se.

Combined with the result of the present study suggesting that concessions have no impact, what have we learnt about the propensity of ethnic groups to become inspired by other groups’ political behavior? The results of this study indicate that while ongoing conflict may trigger new conflict, successful conflict (that is, conflict coming to an end by the accommodation of separatist aims) does not appear to trigger additional conflict. Although one could expect successful conflict to have stronger demonstration effects than conflict in general, the pattern found here that ongoing conflict matters more, is in line with previous findings in research about contagion effects. A contagion effect is the process whereby an event in one location increases the probability of a similar event taking place in a nearby location at a later point in time. The idea has been applied to several political phenomena, including democratization, interstate war, and intrastate war. In common for most of this literature, is that what matters for contagion is not the outcome of the first event but the event itself. Hence, it may not be the granting of concessions to an ethnic group as part of a conflict resolution process that inspires other ethnic groups to pursue separatism, but the preceding fighting and other aspects related to conflict behavior. It may be the case that fighting and other types of conflict behavior generate more strategic guidelines and inspire new conflict to a larger extent than fighting coming to an end.
Conclusions

This study started off from the widespread assumption that concessions granted to ethnic groups involved in violent separatism may spur other ethnic groups to replicate the behavior. It examines whether concessions granted to ethnic groups may inspire not just other groups within the same state, but take on transnational dimensions. By using new data on both ethnic groups and concessions granted to separatist groups, this idea is put to a test. The empirical analysis finds no evidence of domino effects operating. Ethnic groups are not more predisposed to pursuing violent conflict when other ethnic groups in the proximity are successful in pursuit of their separatist demands. In previous research, such effects have been suggested to operate and there is empirical evidence for such effects operating between ethnic groups in the same country. This study, however, fails to replicate this finding.

The fear of precedent-setting often articulated by policy-makers may hence be unfounded. The principle promoted by AU built on the assertion that Africa, with its artificially created borders that badly correspond to the ethnic nations, should be more susceptible to separatist conflict. However, the empirical record on the contrary shows that Africa has relatively fewer territorial conflicts than the rest of the world (Harbom and Forsberg, 2012). Indeed, evidence from the African continent is in line with the findings of the present study. There is nothing to suggest that the independence of Eritrea was precedent-setting, whereby new separatist groups emerged.

The findings of this study are thus also relevant to policy-makers. Whether or not the granting of territorial concessions to ethnic groups indeed may generate new conflict and, if so, under what conditions and regarding what types of concessions, constitute important information for any policy-maker when supporting peace initiatives in countries torn by violent separatism. For instance, can autonomy provisions offered to ethnic groups with a territorial basis be regarded as a powerful conflict resolution tool or is it associated with additional, and potentially more harmful, conflicts? The results of this study suggest that there is no need for policy-makers to fear widespread domino effects when considering whether or not to accommodate territorial demands by an ethnic group involved in conflict. Autonomy may in fact be a useful conflict management strategy.
References


BBC MONITORING EUROPEAN. December 8, 2006, 2006 Kosovo’s independence to open global Pandora’s box —Serbian commentary. Glas javnosti.


## TABLE 1. Territorial Concessions and Ethnic Dominoes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All onsets</th>
<th>Territorial onsets</th>
<th>Government onsets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial concession</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
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<td>Implemented</td>
<td>-1.212</td>
<td>-0.735</td>
<td>-64.152</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict same country</td>
<td>1.098***</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>1.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin in conflict</td>
<td>0.797***</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood civil war</td>
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<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of EPRs (log)</td>
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<td>-0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.067</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>0.156</td>
<td>-1.130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional autonomy</td>
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<td>0.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
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<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.033</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity, sq</td>
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<td>-0.005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decay function</td>
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<td>3.034</td>
<td>3.801</td>
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</table>


Log pseudo-likelihood: 7,716 observations. Estimations performed using Stata 11. * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed). Models 1-2 report logit coefficients; Models 3-6 report coefficients estimated with multinomial regression. Robust standard errors, clustered on the ethnic group, reported in parentheses.)
### Table 2. Territorial Concessions and Domino Effects within Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All onsets</th>
<th>Territorial onsets</th>
<th>Government onsets</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Territorial concession</td>
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<td>0.809</td>
<td>-1.538</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(1.632)</td>
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<td>Conflict same country</td>
<td>1.087</td>
<td>1.064</td>
<td>1.494</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.346)**</td>
<td>(0.344)**</td>
<td>(0.489)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin in conflict</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.994</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.357)**</td>
<td>(0.359)**</td>
<td>(0.540)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighborhood civil war</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of EPRs (log)</td>
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<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
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<td>(0.456)**</td>
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<td>0.310</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.533)</td>
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<td>-1.131</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.887)</td>
<td>(0.883)</td>
<td>(2.247)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.412)**</td>
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<td>Policy</td>
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<td>0.015</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity, sq</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decay function</td>
<td>3.243</td>
<td>3.269</td>
<td>3.846</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.573)**</td>
<td>(0.569)**</td>
<td>(0.834)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.524</td>
<td>-6.497</td>
<td>-7.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.784)**</td>
<td>(0.778)**</td>
<td>(1.295)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudo-likelihood: -437.815 -436.930 -466.797 -467.604 -466.797 -467.604

(N obs. Estimations performed using Stata 11. * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-tailed). Models 1-2 report logit coefficients; Models 3-6 report coefficients estimated with multinomial regression. Robust standard errors, clustered on the ethnic group, reported in parentheses.)
Previous studies have typically relied on the Minorities at Risk dataset, which until recently included only those ethnic groups that either suffer from discriminatory treatment and/or are politically mobilized (Minorities at Risk Project, 2005). These selection criteria are likely endogenous to an ethnic group’s likelihood of conflict; therefore, there is a considerable risk that conclusions based on these data will be biased (Christin and Hug, 2003, Öberg, 2002: 95-97).

The EPR (Ethnic Power Relations) dataset has more wide-ranging selection criteria and, as a consequence, the sample of ethnic groups is about three times that of the Minorities at Risk project. Thus, the EPR dataset enhances our ability to draw unbiased conclusions about the suggested domino effects of granting territorial concessions.

For a conceptual overview of the domino theory and how it has been applied in foreign policy see Ninkovich (1994).

There are studies that suggest that if one group is granted autonomy, it will lead to violent separatism involving that group. In this way, accommodating territorial claims is suggested to spur the same group into posing more extreme demands (see, for example, Cornell, 2002).

A possible exception would be if the potential separatists perceived an increased probability of the government yielding due to increased support for secessionism from the international community.

The total number of EPR groups is 733. Groups listed as having monopoly or dominance by the EPR are not included in the analysis because those groups cannot initiate conflict against the regime. Some EPR groups are also excluded since they are considered politically relevant only prior to 1989.

See the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (UCDP) for further information.

Models with a dependent variable that only counts territorial onsets have also been estimated, with substantially similar results. One may consider this alternative the most appropriate specification considering that the aim is to assess whether territorial concessions spur additional separatism. However, in many cases the UCDP categorization of conflicts based on the declared incompatibility into concerning either territory or governmental does not reflect the issues involved; the claims of a rebel group do not always correspond to its aims. For instance, the declared incompatibility of all rebel groups fighting in Southern Sudan are coded by the UCDP as relating to government, although the status of Southern Sudan was clearly an important issue. Also, as evident in the IMPACT dataset, some actors involved in conflicts over government power have been grant-
ed (and sometimes appeased) by territorial deals. Excluding these cases, which potentially could create domino effects, are considered inappropriate. Thus, these models are not reported in the paper but are included in the online appendix.

9 Several studies point out that proximity matters for demonstration effects (for example, Hill and Rothchild, 1986).

Although conditioned by distance, it is plausible that the general inspiration effect of territorial concessions may have a longer reach extending beyond regions. This is discussed further in the results section.

11 The TOPAD data offers information about territorial, military, and political pacts incorporated in these peace agreements. The added feature contained in the IMPACT dataset regards the extent to which, and when, these pacts are implemented.

12 The IMPACT dataset lists all warring parties that were signatories to each agreement. By first determining which warring parties that are mobilized along ethnic lines, and if so what their primary ethnic constituency is, it is possible to determine which ethnic groups in the neighborhood of the coded ethnic group that were granted concessions.

I am grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this approach.

14 Other half-lives and other specifications yield substantially identical results; for more detail consult the online appendix.

15 The IMPACT data provides information on three aspects of implementation of territorial pacts: (1) whether the rebel side maintained control of their territory; (2) whether efforts were made to implement territorial decentralization, and (3) if the stipulated decentralization came into force (Jarstad, et al., 2007).

16 Assigning the ethnic constituency of warring parties listed as involved in internal armed conflict in the post-Cold War period according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project has been conducted by the author as part of a previous study.

The results do not change if Neighborhood civil war is dummy-coded.

Another factor relating to the capacity is the group’s regional concentration (see, e.g., Toft, 2003). Unfortunately, the EPR does not include information on this variable. In robustness tests, all models have been re-estimated using those EPR groups that also appear in the Minorities at Risk dataset, which codes these groups’ settlement patterns. Group concentration is significantly related to the probability of territorial conflict, but the theoretically relevant results remain unchanged. It is also plausible that the domino effects only operate for groups that have a strong territorial base; that is, they are regionally concentrated. I have thus re-estimated all models for the sample of groups that have such a base. Again, the theoretically relevant results remain.

Due to the inherent biases that follow from restricting the sample to MAR groups, I have less confidence in these results than in those reported in tables 1 and 2 but they are reported in the online appendix.

19 Descriptive statistics of all variables included in the empirical analysis are found in the online appendix.

20 To deal with potential temporal autocorrelation, I follow Raknerud and Hegre (1997) and include an exponential function of time since the last onset of conflict involving the ethnic group; the inertia of conflict is suggested to decay over time. In the results I call this parameter Decay function, and it has a half-life of five years. Other half-lives (of one and three years) do not alter the main results; five years is chosen since those models perform better in terms of log-likelihood. Spatial autocorrelation is also likely to be present in the data; there are both multiple observations of the same ethnic group and multiple observations from the same country. To reduce this problem, I employ robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on the ethnic group. Adjusting the standard errors for clustering on the country, did not alter the main results in any significant way.

21 Some of the control variables (Group size and Number of EPRs) are not significant in any of the models and several others are significant in only some of the models. Trimmed models, including only concessions and those control variables that are significant in the corresponding full model, do not alter the results. Concessions remain non-significant and discrimination, conflict in the same country and conflict involving kin remain significant.

22 In order to assess the robustness of this conclusion, a number of alternative tests have been carried out. These results, which did not change the conclusions of this study, are all described in the online appendix. This includes, for example, re-estimations of the models using alternative specifications of territorial concessions and the dependent variable, different estimators and approaches for dealing with spatial and temporal autocorrelation, and additional control variables.

23 Including one dummy for all of the years yields the same result.

24 As a robustness test, I analyzed restricted sets of concessions including only concessions that were fully implemented. This did not change the substantial findings of this study.

25 It is also robust to alternative functional forms.
Considering that kin groups’ involvement in conflict was considered an important predictor, perhaps it is the case that territorial concessions matter only if they are given to such groups. Thus, as an alternative test, a variable counting territorial concessions granted to nearby kin groups is analyzed. This measure is not significant in any of the models.


At the time of writing, this is the case also regarding Southern Sudan.