Mediation and Violence: Searching for third party intervention that matters


Please do not cite without permission

Mihai Croicu, Erik Melander, Marcus Nilsson, Peter Wallensteen

March 27, 2013

*Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, corresponding author: marcus.nilsson@pcr.uu.se
†Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. All authors of this paper are listed in alphabetical order.
1 Introduction

What is the impact of third party peacemaking engagement on the level of violence in intrastate armed conflict? Most previous research has focused on the termination of violence or signing of peace agreements. This paper examines instead how prevention, mediation, facilitation and other peaceful measures available to third parties impact conflict dynamics in terms of the intensity of fighting. In particular, we examine the role of regional hegemons in this regard. We argue that Africa in the post-Cold War period is a particularly relevant period for studying the peacemaking impact of regional hegemons. By combining several new or recent data sets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in a novel way we have uniquely fine-grained data on third party peacemaking episodes and fighting intensity in African intrastate conflicts in the period of 1993-2007. Using these data we test for the impact of third party peacemaking on the intensity of fighting, and complement with a series of brief case narratives that shed additional light on the patterns identified in the statistical analysis.

There are many reasons for increasing our understanding of how to better stop ongoing violence, amongst them the ability of decreasing the human suffering in armed conflict.
Empirical literature on intervention in civil wars has suggested that intervention tends to produce longer conflicts (Regan and Aydin 2006). Some scholars have taken the argument as far as claiming that it would be better to “Give War a Chance” (Luttwak, 1999). Also recent literature (e.g. Toft, 2010) has again raised the question whether a strong victor, and thus continued fighting in order to arrive at such a decisive outcome, would be beneficial for the following peace.

Peacemaking in terms of talks, fact-finding missions and direct mediation between adversaries, is an inexpensive means for third parties seeking to regulate the conflict, or at least to ease the cost in terms of human suffering. While a limited number of studies have addressed issues such as the link between short-term and long-term effects of mediation on armed conflict (Beardsley 2008), or the impact of international attention on the level of violence directed against civilians. This study expands the field by systematically analyzing the impact of third party peacemaking on a disaggregated level.

On an aggregate level we ask ourselves, what impact, if any, do these “soft” third party peacemaking efforts have on the level of violence, in terms of battle-related deaths, in intrastate armed conflict. Focusing on peacemaking in African intrastate conflicts, we look closer on this impact in relation to three questions: (1) who is the third party peacemaker?, (2) what type of initiative does the peacemaker take?, and (3) when in the conflict the measure is taken.

2 Prior research

Armed conflict, or more precisely, fighting, is a way for conflicting parties to weigh their expectations for the outcome of their dispute against each other so that the expectations converge and a settlement can be reached (Fearon, 1995). As long as there is no sign of being able to meet their expected outcomes by other means, fighting should be likely to continue. There are, however, ways of influencing parties to reconsider the possibilities of non-violent settlement. To this extent, research has shown that security guarantees for conflict parties and agreements, achieved by the deployment of a peacekeeping force, increase the chances for a negotiated settlement to last (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna, 2003, 2004, 2008). Costly as peacekeeping is, far from all cases of intrastate armed conflict see an intervening force of this kind. Instead, peacemakers often take the initiative to address parties in armed conflict and through dialogue try to persuade them to reduce the violence or find a solution to the underlying issues of the dispute.

Peacemaking initiatives share similarities with offensives in their ability to alter the warring parties’ expectations on conflict outcome (Grieg, 2012). Thus, this alleviates the need for warring parties to reach a mutually hurting stalemate (see e.g. Zartman, 1989; Zartman and Touval, 2007). A key in this regard is the third party’s ability to provide governments and rebel groups with information about the other party that they may be lacking (Regan and Aydin, 2006). Such signalling would possibly reduce the
need for further confrontation on the battlefield.

However, conflicts, and the start-up of peace processes, are riddled with reasons why belligerents would distrust the opponent’s willingness or intention to commit to any agreement made. Through constant reevaluations regarding the possibility of gain, using force or politics, a third party can serve as a guarantor for agreed processes to be held on track. Further, it has been argued that the best way for third parties to function as potent guarantors, thus having the highest chance at achieving peace, is that the guarantor is to gain something from commitments being held (Kydd, 2003).

2.1 Hegemonic relations and mediation

When regionally dominant actors view a new situation, they are likely to display an interest in stability, which often times is defined as the same as ”peace”. Thus, a hegemonic actor could be expected to act in different ways to maintain the stability of the areas it traditionally dominates. This means it aims at keeping its domination. This then relates to theories of international domination, imperialism and asymmetric relations in the international system that were prevalent in the 1970s, and, that, sometimes also observed the impact on intra-state affairs (Galtung 1971, Gilpin 1981, Wallensteen 1973, Wallerstein 1974). The theory of hegemonic action in conflict largely deals with the motives or incentives of the hegemon for acting. The hegemon is then defined not only as a powerful actor but also as an actor that is ”essentially self-interested” and operates with a combination of ‘material incentives and ”ideational” power instruments’ (Destradi 2010). Thus, for our purposes here, the hegemon then is a resourceful actor with vast interests in a particular region (whether it geographically belongs to it or not) and driven largely, but not exclusively by self-interest. For instance, van der Maat (2011) points to incentives such as security costs and security relationships for understanding when a hegemon acts as a ”third party”. Typically, action is seen to relate to rivalries between different hegemons, where some writers, for example, have pointed to the rivalry between the US and France in the 2000s (Petras and Morely 2000). At the same time it is seen as significant that the hegemonic actors have more choices, and diplomacy is only one of their options (Destradi 2010). The hegemon would primarily act with diplomatic means early in a conflict, including mediation, but later, if deemed necessary with more force, including military might. Finally, we can note that some writers also distinguish between benevolent and coercive hegemony (Kinderberger, see Destradi 2010), suggesting that the actions by the hegemon may not just serve the purpose of that actor alone, but provide greater benefits such as stability and predictability to a region or even wider area.

In the following, the actions of the hegemon are contrasted with the involvement of international organizations, that are likely to act more impartially, slower, with more transparency and with a more constrained set of instruments. The UN is a typical contrast to hegemonic actors. Much of mediation literature has focused on such unbiased actors, but findings have demonstrated that biased actors can be quite ’effective’ (Svens-
Equipped with these considerations it is possible to suggest some theories of hegemonic actors’ way of acting in intrastate conflict situations in regions of concern to the hegemonic actor. A hegemon would normally act (with whatever instrument) only in its own traditional area of operation. If there is a security threat to this area (or the hegemony of the hegemon) as perceived by the hegemon, it would be inclined also to react to matters outside this area. This would be particularly true if there was a competing hegemon acting in the adjacent area.

Overall, the hegemon would be expected to act early so as not to let a situation unravel. We would expect this to follow a scale of quick escalation: from ‘secluded’ diplomatic action to military intervention. This would be in contrast to, say, UN or regional organizations, that are more likely to enter later and with less clear steps of escalation (we largely attribute this to the different decision-making processes, but also to a different set of incentives).

Furthermore, a hegemon would have little problem in siding with one actor against another, if that serves its purpose. The overall concern is not to favor a rebel or a government, but instead to build long term ‘stability’ for its own control (and also to the benefit of other, local actors). The hegemon, in other words, would display an opportunist pattern in terms of its support to different actors. In this regard, the hegemon’s actions contrast international organizations which are more likely to take a balanced approach between the competing actors.

This also means that the hegemon prefers quick action and quick results, thus fairly early choosing military options. It would largely avoid protracted negotiations and peace processes, which, on the other hand, are typical of international organization behavior in conflict situations. Thus, we would expect few comprehensive peace agreements in situations of hegemonic action. The preference is likely to be for establishing control, ceasefires and thus a quick end to violence. The hegemon, in fact, may try to act to prevent international organizations from acting in areas of its particular concern, but possibly favor that in adjacent areas as that could be in its interest.

Alternatively, the hegemon may cooperate with a regional organization within its own traditional area, if that body is close to the hegemon (for instance, in order to demonstrate a more benevolent approach).

The ‘peace’ that is built by hegemonic action thus corresponds to a notion of stability, rather than quality peace: domination is restored, but only temporarily. Still, the stabilization may provide the predictability that is needed for economic interactions to follow. Thus, peace created through hegemonic action is likely to be more fragile than the one created through internationally driven peace processes, if seen in a longer time perspective.
3 Hypotheses

In this paper we will subject key arguments about the peacemaking role of regional hegemons to new empirical tests. We focus on peacemaking in intrastate conflicts in Africa in the time period 1993-2007, and we investigate the role of the former colonial powers as potential regional hegemons in the sense explained above. In other words, given the focus on Africa in the post-Cold War period we propose that the concept of regional hegemon can be operationalized as a former colonial power engaging in one of its former colonies. More specifically, then, we will test whether the peacemaking involvement of a former colonial power is associated with a lower subsequent risk of fighting compared to when there was no such involvement.

Thereby we will consider two different dependent variables. Our first dependent variable, called “Any Fighting”, is a dummy indicating whether any lethal fighting at all occurred in the dyad in question following a peacemaking episode in the time until a new peacemaking effort commences, or peacemaking efforts are no longer coded because the dyad has not been active for three consecutive calendar years. By active we mean, in line with UCDP’s definition, that at least 25 battle deaths are inflicted in the dyad in any single calendar year.

\[ H1: \text{Peacemaking involvement of a colonial power decreases the risk that Any Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.} \]

Our second dependent variable, called Intensive Fighting, is a dummy reflecting whether intense fighting took place or not. Our first dependent variable, Any Fighting, registers fighting even if only a single person is killed in battle related circumstances. The second dependent variable, then, only takes the value of 1 when the average number of daily battle deaths is higher than 0.2. With the alternative dependent variable - Intensive Fighting - the 19% of the post-peacemaking episodes that saw at least one battle death (and hence were assigned the value 1 for the variable Any Fighting) but that had the least intensive fighting are coded as 0 instead of 1. In other words, with the more restrictive coding of what counts as fighting, Intensive Fighting is rarer than Any Fighting.

\[ H2: \text{Peacemaking involvement of a colonial power decreases the risk that Intensive Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.} \]

In addition to the role of the colonial powers as potential hegemonic pacifiers we will also test for the effects of a number of other variables related to third party peacemaking that we have reason to believe are important for the resulting levels of violence. In particular, we will consider Regional Organizations, the United Nations, and Peacekeeping. We will also test for the potential confounding effect of a large number of additional control variables, which will be briefly introduced later.

We suspect that regional hegemons, and in particular the former colonial powers in-
tervening in their former colonies that we deal with here, generally are prone to avoiding
joining their peacemaking efforts with regional organizations. To the extent that re-
gional organizations become effective peacemakers they undermine the special status of
the colonial powers, and for these reasons there may be considerable rivalry between the
colonial powers and the regional powers when it comes to peacemaking. Of course, the
colonial powers may often be influential enough to not feel threatened by engagement by
regional organizations, perhaps because the hegemon is confident that it can influence
the organization in question. Alternatively, the colonial power may be happy to leave
particularly troublesome conflicts with low stakes to the regional organizations. We
therefore expect that colonial powers will be less likely to figure in the peacemaking role
when a regional organization also has this role. (In the empirical part we will show that
this suspicion indeed holds up.) If regional organizations have any peacemaking effect
then we need to control for their engagement when investigating the impact of colonial
powers. Otherwise we would risk underestimating the effectiveness of the hegemons be-
cause this effect is likely to be partially masked by the lower likelihood that a regional
organization also contributes to reducing the level of fighting. We will therefore include
the variable Regional Organization as a control, and we also expect that this variable
will influence the risk of fighting. Hence we formulate our third and fourth hypotheses.

**H3:** Peacemaking involvement of a Regional Organization decreases the risk that Any
Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

**H4:** Peacemaking involvement of a Regional Organization decreases the risk that In-
tensive Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

Also the involvement of the United Nations may be seen as competition by the hege-
mons. On the other hand, the former colonial powers are powerful and well-connected,
and it would then make sense for them to try to legitimize their own peacemaking ac-
tivities by teaming up with representatives of the United Nations. Granted, hegemons
may prefer to be free of the insight and possible restraint coming with UN involvement
in particularly delicate cases, but if the UN involvement can be controlled or the ac-
tivities are not so sensitive, the hegemon may well see it as advantageous. We expect
that the peacemaking involvement of the United Nations will benefit the cessation of
violence, and we also consider this type of third party peacemaking to be especially in-
teresting in the context of this study. Hence we formulate our fifth and sixth hypotheses.

**H5:** Peacemaking involvement of the United Nations decreases the risk that Any Fight-
ing will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

**H6:** Peacemaking involvement of the United Nations decreases the risk that Intensive
Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

As hegemons are deemed to be interested in creating a quick stabilization of the situa-
tion where they intervene there is reason to believe that the hegemon would be interested
in seeing a military intervention in the form of peacekeeping forces. For this reason we also consider peacekeeping to be especially relevant for our study.

**H7:** The presence of peacekeeping forces decreases the risk that Any Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

**H8:** The presence of peacekeeping forces decreases the risk that Intensive Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

A key explanatory factor when investigating the intensity of fighting following peacemaking efforts will be the preceding intensity of fighting, since all else equal conflict dyads that are already very violent are more likely to see more violence. It is also conceivable that the likelihood that colonial powers engage in peacemaking activities is related to previous level of violence. This factor may be viewed as a mere control rather than as a variable of real explanatory interest, but we nevertheless state hypotheses also for the important expected effect of battle deaths in the recent past.

**H9:** The higher the number of battle deaths in the preceding time period, the greater is the risk that Any Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

**H10:** The higher the number of battle deaths in the preceding time period, the greater is the risk that Intensive Fighting will occur in the subsequent post-peacemaking period.

### 4 Data

For the sake of this paper we operationalise a hegemony as a former colonial power operating in its own former colony. We construct an episodic dataset on third party intervention and organised violence in Africa between January 1st 1993 and December 31st 2007. For the purpose of the paper we define an episode of intervention as the period spanning between the first day of an intervention and the last day before a new intervention in the same dyad (or December 31st 2007, if no new intervention takes place). New intervention is considered to begin either after a spell of at least one unmediated day or, when substantial qualitative changes occurs (i.e. changes in the type of talks or in the mix of mediators) in the intervention. We divide each episode in two sub-periods - the first covering the active portion of the intervention (when the actual mediation took place), the other containing the post-mediation period, the boundary being the first day without mediator presence. In this paper we thus seek to explain the variation in battle intensity in the post-mediation periods.

Data on organised violence is taken from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Melander and Sundberg, 2011; Melander and Sundberg, 2013f) while data on third party intervention is extracted from the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) dataset (Melander and von Uexkull, 2012). Both are event-based datasets, the GED
coding individual incidents of organised violence, disaggregated both temporally to individual days and spatially down to the level of individual villages/towns (Sundberg et al., 2011), while MIC is an event dataset containing third party intervention (mediation, peacekeeping, fact-finding and permanent observation) in intrastate conflict, disaggregated to day level. As MIC only covers intrastate conflict, no UCDP GED interstate conflicts have been included, thus limiting the study to civil conflicts and wars. Further, all the dyads containing UCDP GED events in which no third-party intervention was observed were dropped, as these are relatively marginal cases, that would only contribute more ”non-cases” to a universe already containing substantial number of large periods with no mediation. Further, a number of potential mediation events may be missing from the UCDP MIC dataset, as the dataset only selectively coded those dyad-years that are active (plus the three year period after a conflict was inactive) basing the coding on a relatively old version of the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (version 1-2010). These coding issues may lead to selection bias - however, we argue this selection bias is minor if existent at all, as it is theoretically unlikely that mediation has occurred in the fourth or later consecutive year where a conflict generated under 25 battle related deaths per year. Moreover, a bias due to MIC’s usage of older UCDP datasets as a basis for coding is unlikely, as there are very few whole dyads added or deleted in the UCDP datasets since the coding of UCDP MIC (2 dyads have been removed from UCDP datasets; for this study they have been removed from UCDP MIC as well; 5 dyad-years have been added out of which only two are not captured by the three-years past inactivity coding rule of UCDP MIC).

The procedure above yielded 2 817 observations. The episodic dataset is automatically generated from UCDP GED and UCDP MIC using custom software specifically written for this study in PHP CLI 5 over a PostgreSQL 9.2 database. Replication scripts are made available on demand.

In order to study the impact of intervention on violence, the average number of fatalities per day is extracted from the UCDP GED for each UCDP dyad in each sub-period of each episode covered by the data. Averages are used in order to account for the different lengths of each spell of mediation. As the UCDP GED codes the date of events with various certainty scores, we have elected to solely keep those that are coded with a precision of a week or better (precision scores 1, 2 or 3), as we expect all events less precise than one week will induce significant bias towards the end of the calendar month and year. Summary events (type 2) have also been dropped as they are not wholly disaggregated.


2UCDP provides 3 fatality estimates (“best”, “high” and “low”) for every event. Throughout this paper only the best estimate has been used.

3Most events coded with a precision score above 3 are coded to have taken place between the first and thirtieth of a calendar month
Moreover, we include variables to calculate long term effects, i.e. lagged versions of the fatality estimates are included, containing the death numbers in the dyad for the 7 days and 365 days before the start of each sub-period of each episode.

All the events containing mediation of any kind in UCDP MIC are kept, irrespective of their temporal precision scores. A different treatment of the UCDP MIC data from the UCDP GED data was determined by two factors. On one hand, it is expected that mediation is a substantially longer-taking process than individual violent events (dis-aggregated deaths resulting from battles or or one-sided violence are obviously events taking seconds; talks may last for weeks or months at a time), thus making multiple-day or multiple-week mediation events more likely than violent events; thus, worse MIC precision scores may indicate data quality comparable to better GED precision scores. On the other hand the universe of UCDP MIC events (2 658 mediation events out of 3 516 total entries) is far smaller than that of UCDP GED (19 970 events are part of state-based or one-sided violence categories out of a total of 24 381 entries).

Additionally, we produce a set of variables indicating the types of actors involved in the last mediation attempt. For the purpose of the paper we distinguish between the UN, regional organisations, states, NGOs and individuals. A list of all mediators and their grouping by type is provided in the appendix.

As a control we further include two dummy variables for biased mediation: biasa and biasb, indicating whether biased mediators have been present in the most recent intervention. In operationalising biased mediation we conform with Svensson’s (2009) definition, i.e. a mediator is considered biased if it provided substantial external support to a side in conflict prior to engaging in mediation. Data on biased mediation is calculated from scratch using the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh et al, 2011). For the purpose of this article, substantial support is defined as provision of any of the following: participation as a secondary warring party by sending troops to fight alongside one of the conflict parties; providing safe heaven for conflict parties through access to territory; supplying weaponry; and providing economic support (i.e. categories X,L,W,$ in the UCDP External Support Dataset (Croicu et al, 2010)).

4.1 Descriptives
Out of 2 817 episodes of mediation, 1 802 have post-mediation periods, thus being included in the analysis. Out of these, 442 exceed the threshold set for the Intensive

\footnote{The UCDP MIC and UCDP GED precision score system is identical - 1 for exact day of the event known; 2 - for the date of the event known to be within a 2-5 day period; 3 - for the week of the event known and so on(Nilsson and Croicu, 2013f; Sundberg et. al, 2011). As MIC events are expected to last longer (multiple days to multiple weeks) than GED events (which are by definition constrained to single days, except in relatively exceptional cases), knowing the week of a MIC event will provide more information than knowing the week of a GED event.}
Fighting. The average length of a post-mediation period is slightly above 61 days, the median length being 10 days, thus confirming the short-term nature of the effects investigated in this paper.

Out of the 1,802 observations in 72 dyads, 156 observations in 35 dyads contain intervention by former colonial powers (hegemons). The United Nations is present in 492 observations in 41 dyads. 650 observations in 28 dyads have peacekeeper presence.

5 Research Design

Our two alternative dependent variables Any Fighting and Intense Fighting are binary, and hence we test our hypotheses using logistic regression with standard errors clustered on conflict dyad. We expect that there is a lot of important variation cross-sectionally between conflict dyads that did see peacemaking engagement by former colonial powers and those that did not, and that this may account for a large part of the variation in the resulting level of violence. Nevertheless, we also run our tests using dyad fixed effects as a robustness check. When using the fixed effects logistic regressions we lose 29 out of 72 dyads but we control for all unmeasured characteristics of the dyad that are constant. Another set of robustness checks concerns the risk that selection effects may drive the results. Could it be that regional hegemons systematically choose to engage in peacemaking efforts in situations that are easier (or more difficult) to deal with? If unaccounted for factors of such nature influences how colonial powers select themselves into third party peacemaking activities then we may overestimate the pacifying influence of the hegemons (or, underestimate it if they choose to engage in the cases most prone to fighting). This is admittedly an issue that is very tricky to deal with, but we use a simultaneously estimated seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model to guard against selection effects.

6 Results

Table 1 below presents the results from logistic regressions using first our less demanding indicator of fighting Any Fighting (Model 1), and then using the alternative dependent variable Intensive Fighting (Model 2).

Table 1 shows that all hypotheses H1-H10 are supported, although the support for H1 is weak since the coefficient for Hegemon is only weakly significant in Model 1 ($p=0.074$, two-sided). All the coefficients are significant (or weakly significant in one case), and have the expected signs. The effects are also strong in substantial terms. The predicted risk that any fighting will take place is 38% if the hegemon was not involved in the preceding peacemaking effort, but only 27% if the hegemon was engaged. The predicted probabilities were calculated using the software CLARIFY (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg & King, 2003), and using the median value for Battle Deaths (228) and the modal value for the other independent variables (meaning no involvement by any regional organization, no involvement by the United Nations, and no peacekeep-
Table 1: Regression table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Any Fighting</th>
<th>(2) Intensive Fighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemon</td>
<td>−0.470*</td>
<td>−0.712***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−1.78)</td>
<td>(−2.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Organization</td>
<td>−0.488***</td>
<td>−0.442***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−3.87)</td>
<td>(−3.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>−0.328**</td>
<td>−0.308**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−2.39)</td>
<td>(−2.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>−0.632**</td>
<td>−0.561**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−2.27)</td>
<td>(−2.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Deaths</td>
<td>0.000328***</td>
<td>0.000452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.26)</td>
<td>(5.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.593****</td>
<td>−1.002****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(−3.02)</td>
<td>(−5.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1802</td>
<td>1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelyhood</td>
<td>−1047.9</td>
<td>−941.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared</td>
<td>56.20</td>
<td>65.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

`t` statistics in parentheses

* `p < 0.10`, ** `p < 0.05`, *** `p < 0.01`
Similarly, the predicted risk of Intense Fighting is 29% compared to 17%, without and with colonial power involvement, respectively. The substantial effects of the other peacemaking variables are of roughly similar magnitude.

### 6.1 Additional Controls and Robustness Checks

A large number of additional control variables were added one at a time to Models 1 and 2, respectively. None of these additional controls crowded out the effects of the variables of interest included in Models 1 and 2. In most cases the coefficients and standard errors of the variables of interest remained largely unaffected, and the additional controls were not statistically significant. In a few instances a control variable was statistically significant but with very small substantial effect. Given these results, we do not show the regressions in which these additional controls were included, but instead we just list these controls, which hence turned out to be inconsequential for the purposes of this study (except, of course, in the sense that since we have controlled for the inclusion of also these additional controls we feel more confident in our findings). Table 2 lists these additional controls together with a very short explanation. For a fuller presentation, see the appendix (yet to be written).

We also tried using two alternative indicators of the intensity of preceding fighting. The first alternative control for battle deaths looks at the preceding seven days instead of the preceding 365 days. The second alternative control for battle deaths takes the natural log of Battle Deaths (after adding 0.01 to all values, so as avoid losing observations because one cannot take the natural log of 0). The results were essentially identical regardless which of the three controls for intensity of fighting was used.

We ran Models 1 and 2 using dyad fixed effects, and obtained even stronger results, with one exception: Regional Power was no longer statistically significant when using dyad fixed effects. (Results not shown, available on request.)

As a final robustness check we used a simultaneously estimated seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model to guard against selection effects. We have not derived any theoretical arguments about the conditions under which former colonial powers will engage in third party peacemaking activities in a conflict dyad (that would fall outside the scope of this study, but it is the subject of ongoing research). Instead we first simply used Battle Deaths as the predictor for involvement of colonial powers. Then we tried a range of different combinations of predictor variables in our dataset (i.e., the variables mentioned above, including those listed in Table 2). In the equation predicted fighting we used the same variables as in Models 1 and 2. We repeated all tests with both Any Fighting and Intensive Fighting. In most instances, the coefficient rho, which reflects “the correlation between the outcomes after the influence of the included factors is accounted for” (Greene 2003, p. 854) was not significant, indicating that the selection of colonial power into the role of peacemaking was probably not systematically biasing the results. In a few instances, rho was significant and positive, which means that the omitted factors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Control</th>
<th>description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>At least one NGO is involved as a mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>At least one individual is involved as a mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour</td>
<td>Mediation was carried on by at least one neighbour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias Side A</td>
<td>Mediator was biased towards the governmental side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bias Side B</td>
<td>Mediator was biased towards the rebel side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>South Africa was involved as mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egidio</td>
<td>Community of Sant’Egidio was involved as a mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>The African Union was involved as a mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>ECOWAS was involved as a mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The EU was involved as a mediator in the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact Finding</td>
<td>Fact Finding mission present during the episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Obs.</td>
<td>Permanent Observer mission present during the episode</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
simultaneously are associated with the involvement of colonial powers and subsequent fighting. In other words, to the extent that we could find indications of selection effects at work, they indicated that colonial powers engage in the most fighting-prone dyads, and that the pacifying effect if anything is underestimated. However, these results are not robust to different specifications, and hence we chose not to show the full regressions here. Instead we note that our findings hold up also to this robustness check taking into account selection effects.

We also tested for a number of interaction effects between our explanatory variables. In sum, our findings are strong and robust.

7 Going Deeper into the Empirics

Finding that our hypotheses hold in statistical analyses, an important question to ask is what contributes to this effect. As argued about colonial powers’ impact in former colonies along the lines of the hegemon literature one would expect rapid action with a focus on stability. Going deeper into a selection of cases where France was involved we demonstrate that the theoretical expectations also seem to hold when looking at individual cases of intervention. The following section is, if not otherwise stated, referenced to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Encyclopedia.

7.1 Chad

Idriss Deby’s MPS (Mouvement Patriotique du salut) seized power over the Chadian capital Ndjamena in December 1990. With a new government, there were also a number of new oppositional forces that aimed to shorten Deby’s reign. By 2000 the only remaining active rebel group opposing Deby’s regime was MDJT (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad) and with strong support of Libyan dictator Gadhafi negotiations developed between MDJT and the government of Chad. A peace agreement was signed but it broke down after only a few months with both sides claiming that the other had violated the agreement.

By 2005 the conflict had remained inactive for a couple of years even though previous peace agreements had collapsed. In June Deby held a referendum where the people decided to change the constitutional two-term limit for a president in office. The referendum did not sit well with the opposition (UCDP). Under the supervision of France, who at the time was supporting the Chadian government with direct military aid, a third peace agreement was in August 2005. The deal meant that MDJT would be allowed to form a political party and participate on all levels of civilian politics. MDJT troops were also offered to be retrained and integrated into the Chadian armed forces. (AP 2005; Global Insight Daily Analysis 2005; ARB 2005)

However, in December 2005 a new group launched attacks on the Chadian government. FUCD (Front Unique pour le Changement Démocratique) was a coalition of
different rebel groups. The conflict escalated in 2006 and new groups emerged, such as the RAFD (Rally of Democratic Forces). In October 2006 FUCD also united with a number of other rebel groups, forming UFDD (Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement).

In November, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin visited Chad and the French troops that they had stationed in the country. Following the visit France decided to add another 100 troops to its by then 1,200 strong contingent. France also sent a strong signal, taking over protection of the strategic town of Abeche in the east of Chad, a town which had recently been held for a brief period by rebels. Negotiations between the government and FUCD (note only FUCD which broke out of the UFDD alliance) were held and a peace agreement was signed in late December 2006, providing for amnesty for rebels, ceasefire and exchange of prisoners of war. FUCD was also offered a spot in government. It should be noted that Ghadafi was facilitating these negotiations.

While FUCD was no longer an oppositional force UFDD continued to fight the government of Chad for a few months into 2007. By October yet another Libyan brokered peace agreement was signed, this time with UFDD. Just a month after this agreement, new clashes took place and in early January UFDD formed an alliance with two other rebel groups.

France’s involvement in the Chadian conflicts has thus been fairly limited to pure power support for the government, either by contributing to the Chadian army or by direct engagement with French troops. Instead it was a neighbor, Libya, which was most strongly acting as a peacebroker between the conflicting parties at a number of times. While not mentioned above it should also be noted that the relationship between Chad and its neighbor in the east, The Sudan, plays a significant role in the prevalence of peace or war in the region.

7.2 Congo

When Pascal Lissouba in 1992 won the first democratic elections in Congo a turbulent period of multiparty politics ensued. In May 1993 there was a re-run of the legislative elections, again won by Lissoubas UPADS. The opposition refused to accept the results and what started as a massive campaign of civil disobedience soon turned into violence along political and ethnic lines. The three main parties all formed militias.

Already in June 1993 France officials arrived in Congo to try and mediate the political violence. This early intervention did however not create tangible results. About a month later representatives from Gabon assisted in achieving a truce, however, this truce cannot be counted as a success. While organized political violence has not been recorded until November 1993, reports say that massive unrest continued throughout the summer months possibly killing thousands of people.
France’s rapid response to the growing political violence in Congo thus made little long term impact. The violence that ensued following the French, and later Gabonese, peacemaking efforts may not match up with the organizational criteria of the UCDP’s definition and is also very difficult to trace to specific actors. However, and more relevant in this case, the intervention did not create an opportunity that led to a peaceful settlement neither at that time or later on in the conflict.

7.3 Niger

Former French colony Niger saw an outflow of people from the Tuareg ethnic group starting by the mid-1970s. Many of these migrants received military training, either in Libyan dictator Ghadafis army or in the Libyan sponsored Islamic Legion. In the late 1980s however, many of these Tuaregs found themselves in countries with economic problems and were forced to return to their country of origin. Those who originally came from Niger were promised resettlement aid from the government, aid that never materialized.

Together with historical grievances felt by many in the Tuareg group, the lack this promised aid led to increased tensions with Niger’s army. In October 1991 a Tuareg militia, FLAA (Front de libération de l’Air et l’Azaouad: Air and Azawad Liberation Front), was created and launched an armed struggle against the government. Their aim was to establish a federal system in Niger. By early 1993 the conflict had remained active but at a low level. Negotiations between FLAA and the Niger government are also reported to have been ongoing ever since they launched the uprising.

In March 1993 France managed to get secret meetings between the government and FLAA going in Paris. These meetings resulted in a truce and a few months later in the so called Paris agreement. The agreement Accords provided for a truce agreement, demilitarisation of the north, financial assistance to returning Tuareg refugees, development funds to Tuareg areas and planning of further talks concerning the Tuareg political demands.

However, the agreement caused internal tensions in FLAA and only a month after the signing FLT (Front de libération de Tamoustan: Tamoustan Liberation Front), a splinter of FLAA, was formed. Another Tuareg rebel group was also launched at the same time, ARLN (Armée révolutionnaire de liberation du Nord-Niger: Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of North Niger). FLT, ARLN and remaining parts of FLAA created an umbrella organization in September 1993, called CRA (Coordination de la résistance armée, Coordination of the Armed Resistance). The goal of the rebellion had now changed from federalism to autonomy of the northern area called Air and Azawad.

The violence between CRA and the government of Niger began in January 1994. In June France, together with Algeria and Burkina Faso were engaged in mediation with the parties. The attempts bore fruit a few months later when, in October, the Oua-
gadougou accord was signed. However, internal tensions again led to CRA falling apart but an attempt to save the organization was made when the former CRA groups formed a new coalition, ORA (Organisation de la résistance armée, Organisation of the Armed Resistance), which signed an agreement with the government in April.

While the conflict between Tuareg rebels and the government remained quiet after the April 1995 peace agreement, another part of Niger saw conflict emerging. In the eastern part of the country (Front démocratique du renouveau) launched its armed uprising almost simultaneously with the peace agreement between ORA and the government. Like the Tuaregs, FDR had clear ethnic affiliation, drawing support from the Toubou ethnic group. While this conflict seemed unrelated to the northern conflict with the Tuaregs at first this changed when another Toubou group, FARS (Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara) formed an alliance with the new Tuareg group UFRA (Union des forces de la résistance armée, Union of the Forces of the Resistance Army).

UFRA had been formed in late 1996 by a number of Tuareg rebel groups and were not satisfied with what they saw as the lack of implementation of the April 1995 peace agreement. It stepped up its military activities in the second half of 1997. In November 1997 mediation led by France, Algeria and Burkina Faso again led to a peace agreement. Both UFRA and FARS were involved in the negotiations and following the 29 November 1997 agreement both groups have ended their armed struggles. As a final note however it is worth stating that when MNJ (Mouvement Nigérien pour la justice, Niger Justice Movement) launched its armed struggle against the government in 2007, one of the main reasons for fighting is said to be the lack of implementation of the 1995 peace agreement.

The Chadian example fits the ideas of hegemonic action in armed conflict fairly well. Cooperating with states that were in no way threatening France’s role in the region, several truces were met which, at least temporarily, did create room for negotiations and attempts to politically settle the belligerents’ demands. It also suggests that France, together with the other mediators, were able to provide information and incentives enough for the parties to deem continued violence, at least in the short term, as unnecessary.

### 7.4 Senegal

The Senegalese MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance) was created as a political party already in 1947. In the early 1980s MFDC started to call for independence of the Casamance region, a region separated from the rest of Senegal by Gambia. In the early 1990s the conflict escalated with dozens, and later hundreds, of people killed annually. In particular, 1993 saw an increased deadliness of the conflict when clashes in the first months of the year left well over 250 people killed.

It was in this context MFDC called for a ceasefire and negotiations to start with France as a mediator in early April. The government, seemingly not prepared for talks carried out a number of clashes in April but by the end of the month also called for a ceasefire.
The called ceasefire was followed by a signed ceasefire, where Guinea-Bissau acted as guarantor, in July. Since the April ceasefire only one clash had occurred, taking place in June and killing 20 rebels. With the exception of a few minor clashes the conflict stayed calm after the July ceasefire agreement. The conflict re-erupted however in 1995 and the rest of the 1990s saw some intervention from neighboring countries like Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.

French involvement in the conflict as such has since been somewhat limited. When, in May 2000 France was contacted by the Senegalese government, requesting French military aid to the governments troops whose equipment was of increasingly poor quality, France agreed. The agreement however, was only to assist by giving modern weapons to the Senegalese troops stationed as peacekeepers in Congo but that these weapons were not to be used in the Casamaçe conflict. By this time the Casamaçe conflict was at a very low level of activity and the neighboring countries were still involved in trying to manage the situation.

A few years later, in 2004, France served as good offices to talks between MFDC and the Senegalese government. No breakthrough was produced during these meetings but the conflict remained at the same low level as it had been for a few years.

France’s importance for the possible settlement of the Senegalese conflict is most clearly seen in the parties’ continuous attempts to involve France. While its direct engagement has been fairly limited, stressed by the fact that they conditioned the military aid in 2000 not to be used in Casamaçe, France has assisted on several occasions. Seeing that Senegal for long periods also has had a fair stability, it is along the lines of the theories on hegemonic engagement not to see intervention.

7.5 Ivory Coast

In September 2002, following a couple of years of growing political instability in the country, a part of the Ivorian army broke off and created MPCI (Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire; Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast). Based in the north, MPCI launched coordinated attacks on the three main cities in Ivory Coast and inflicted severe damage, as well as casualties, on the government troops. In less than a month, close to 500 battle-related deaths resulted from the fighting.

It was in this high intensity conflict that Frances Foreign Minister, on October 10, contacted Ivorian President Gbagbo to urge him to open up a dialogue with the rebels. One week later an ECOWAS brokered truce, where the French had assisted with logistics for dialogue, was called. Only three days after the truce was called, French troops arrived in rebel stronghold Bouake, in northern Ivory Coast. In all, France had approximately 4000 troops in the country at the time and their presence raised large anti-France demonstrations in Abidjan. The ceasefire was respected for more than a month before new clashes occurred; the level however was far lower than before.
French Foreign Minister Villepin flew down to Ivory Coast in the end of November and met with both parties to ensure that there was no continuation of the violence. However, right after the meeting new clashes occurred. This time however it was in the western part of the country. Both groups, MPIGO (Mouvement populaire ivorian du Grand Ouest; Ivorian Movement for the Greater West) and MJP (Mouvement pour la justice et la paix; Movement for Justice and Peace) claimed that one of the reasons why they had taken to arms was to avenge the death of general Guei, who had taken power in a coup in 2000 and then opened up for elections.

With the two groups in the west launching their military efforts in the end of November, violent clashes took part through the early months of 2003, even though all primary parties had been signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis peace accord in January. A “Government of National Reconciliation” was formed in March 2003, as violence was slowly dying out. This government included ministers from all political parties and rebel groups. However, Gbagbo’s real intentions were unclear and there was lack of confidence and by September the rebels withdrew from the government. Under the newly launched umbrella organization FRCI (also known as FN or (Forces Nouvelles; New Forces)), MPIGO, MPCI and MJP re-launched their rebellion. In July 2004 a new agreement made the rebels reunite with the government, but by October the agreement had broken apart again. In late 2004 South African President Thabo Mbeki began to mediate and in 2005 yet another peace agreement led to the rebels, yet again, reentering into the government.

During the time following the entrance of French soldiers into the conflict, most of France’s interaction with conflict parties occurred via this mission. However, one particular occasion should be mentioned. It was in November 2004 when, yet again, FRCI members had left the government and there were fears for renewed violence. Following a few clashes with the rebels, Gbagbo decided for the armed forces to launch airstrikes in the north of the country where MPCI, leading group in FRCI, had its strongest support. In these airstrikes a number of French soldiers were also killed. The French reaction was fairly swift and within short French troops had destroyed all military aircrafts of the Ivory Coast’s armed forces. This meant the end of the conflict between the government and FRCI. However, a number of non-state conflicts occurring in 2005 meant that Ivory Coast was not entirely spared from violence.

France’s rapid reaction from the start and the strength of the reaction, signals France’s strong interest in stability in Ivory Coast and makes long term presence, despite continuous bums in the peace process and new emerging groups, less surprising. In the case of Ivory Coast the engagement of ECOWAS should also not be seen as a threat to French interests. The hegemon’s interest in stability was also clearly portrayed in the reaction following what can be seen as Gbagbo’s aggression which also killed French troops in November 2004.
7.6 Summing up

The above section has served as much to give a quick insight in the particular actions of France as to give a more concrete insight in the diversity of actions that are accounted for in the UCDP MIC dataset. However, even this type of brief glance gives some support for the theoretical claims of hegemonic action in peacemaking. While some could possibly claim that the difference between the cases, in type of conflict and strength of the peacemaking effort would make it difficult to compare between cases, one could also argue that the difference in strength of French action seems to correlate with the perceived strength needed in order to create the stability that a hegemon would be interested in. A clear exception to this is the case in Congo, where early intervention by France was not followed by either strong or enduring peacemaking.

Another interesting aspect that is portrayed by a quick glance into the empirics is that there is rarely one single intervening force in armed conflicts. Be it the three-headed mediation in Niger or the cooperation with ECOWAS in Ivory Coast, the engagement by a former colonial power does not seem to prevent other parties to be engaged in peacemaking as well.

However, repeated outbreaks of conflict in Niger, Ivory Coast, as well as new and old alliances in e.g. Chad, both portrayes the difficulties of peacemaking but also calls into question the quality of the peace that short term stabilization that is created by a hegemon.

8 Conclusions

In this paper we have investigated the role of several different types of third parties on the continuation and intensity of violence in civil wars. This has been possible based on the new Uppsala Conflict Data Program MIC (Managing Intra-state Conflict) data, covering Africa for 1993-2007.

Looking at peacemaking spells, based on more than 2500 events of peacemaking, we have analysed the impact of third party peacemaking using logistic regressions and a selection of minor case studies.

From a theoretical perspective we expected two different mechanisms to be operating. One, drawn from the literature on hegemony and power, suggests that countries that have formerly been dominant also will retain linkages to groups in those societies. They are likely to use them for achieving something that would normally be referred to as stability. In a sense, these are actors that are biased in the way they intervene, and their ultimate concern is with preserving their own interests in the conflict-ridden country. A second perspective emphasizes the role of international organizations in providing legitimacy, fairness and detachment to the local scene, thus accomplishing an end
to violence as well, but with different means. The international organizations are likely to be less entrenched in local situations and thus will not build on vested interests but be motivated by general principles that connect to international law, and by a desire to cultivate a reputation for being successful in peacemaking.

The statistical results show that both types of third party have a benign impact on the amount of violence after an intervention. Thus, the former colonial power, France, exhibits a pattern where its interventions will be followed by spells without violence, as well as by lower levels of intensity in cases where violence occurs. International organizations, notably the UN, demonstrate an identical pattern. Furthermore, from this information it is possible to say that a UN intervention that also incorporates the actions of such a hegemon is more likely to achieve such a reduction in violence.

However, at the same time the hegemon is likely to have this impact within the area of its domination, i.e. former colonial possessions, than outside (with the French intervention in Rwanda a notable exception, and its involvement in Sudan as a confirmation).

This finding holds up when testing for a number of alternatives, notably the impact of regional leading states, such as South Africa; neighboring states; or non-governmental organizations such as Sant'Egidio. Thus, we find that there is a special relationship between the hegemon and a set of African countries, that can be explained by the maintenance of colonially formed connections. In fact, we surmise that the interventions are geared towards keeping such relations for the future, and thus, that the overall purpose is the one of stabilizing the areas. There is an ambition of preserving the status quo.

However, international organizations and the UN in particular is able to operate with a similar impact in terms of the reduction of violence, but it does so in a larger part of Africa, and clearly with very different mechanisms. Furthermore, there is no particular ambition to create and maintain a dependency. UN actions can, in stead, be criticized for being more short-term and for the urge to withdraw as soon as possible.

It remains to consider a number of issues in our continued research on this topic:

1. First of all, we have not specified the type of interventions. The UCDP MIC dataset holds such information and this will be a continuation of this project.
2. Second, the dependent variable is one of a reduction/secession of violence. However, UCDP carries information on peace agreements that could be particularly interesting to relate to this pattern of intervention.
3. It also implies a third question, finding ways to map the quality of the peace that is created after the intervention, beyond the mere ending of violence and the (re)construction of stability.

Word Count: 9.232
References


