

The study of conflict prevention has only recently become more systematic and moved away from an exclusive reliance on case studies. With the efforts of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy, a dataset of third party measures taken in armed conflicts at low intensity has been created. The dataset, 'Managing Intrastate Low-level Conflicts' (MILC) covers all existing low-level armed conflicts for the period of 1993-2004.

There is a lingering discussion regarding whether systematically collected data based on news media sources, other current reports and general insight actually captures the events that diplomats, mediators and other actors would regard as significant. Some would even question if systematic data like the MILC dataset can generate an accurate and unbiased account of the phenomena it tries to quantify. This study is responding to these concerns by comparing news based information with information based on memoirs and historical accounts.

Analyzing the case of Burundi using both approaches, the purpose of this study is to see if different approaches will result in a similar or different understanding of third party activities in a particular crisis. Comparing the MILC dataset with data collected in other ways and using other types of material will help us understand the strengths and limitations of a systematic approach based on news reports. This in turn will provide a better foundation for interpreting and analysing this systematic data.

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Identifying Conflict Prevention Measures

Comparing Two Approaches

Frida Möller

**Identifying Conflict Prevention Measures:
Comparing Two Approaches**

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Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
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About the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) collects information on a large number of aspects of armed violence after 1946. Since the 1970s, UCDP has recorded ongoing violent conflicts. This effort continues to the present day, now coupled with the collection of information on an ever-broadening scope of aspects pertaining to organised violence, such as the resolution and dynamics of conflict. UCDP provides one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically conceptualised and studied. Data on armed conflicts has been published yearly in the report series *States in Armed Conflict* since 1987, in the *SIPRI Yearbook* since 1988, the *Journal of Peace Research* since 1993 and in the *Human Security Report* since 2005. In addition, UCDP researchers conduct theoretically and empirically based analyses of armed conflict: its causes, escalation, spread, prevention and resolution. These studies are regularly featured in international journals and books.

More details about coding rules and definitions for specific data collection efforts are available in the free online database (www.ucdp.uu.se/database).

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Preface

Can a quantitative dataset based on news reporting generate an accurate account of the phenomena it wants to describe? This question is crucial for systematic research on third party conflict management in general, and the work of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in particular. Since the 1980s UCDP has produced a large number of datasets covering an ever-broadening scope of aspects pertaining to organised violence. The UCDP data is based on news reporting, which is corroborated with the use of other sources.

In this paper, Frida Möller demonstrates how the choice of sources may affect the picture we obtain of third party conflict management efforts. Essentially, the findings of this case study of the Burundi peace process indicate that the systematic approach chosen by UCDP is the right way to go: The UCDP dataset MILC (Managing Intrastate Low-level Conflicts) appears to capture the most significant dynamics in the negotiation process, as told by sources using more qualitative approaches, but also provides more details that are not captured by such sources.

This paper also shows that the inclusion of narratives as sources in coding does not systematically improve the data. Thus, it affirms the validity of the UCDP approach when discussing choice of methods and sources.

This is the fifth issue in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Paper series. This series focuses on methodological issues and presents findings from the UCDP data.

Uppsala, November 2010

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Director of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program

1. Introduction

The study of conflict prevention has only recently become more systematic and moved away from an exclusive reliance on case studies. With the efforts of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy, both located in Sweden, a dataset of third party measures taken in armed conflicts at low intensity has been created. The dataset, 'Managing Intrastate Low-level Conflicts' (MILC) covers all existing low-level armed conflicts for the period of 1993-2004. A total of 3018 events in 122 armed conflicts are included.

The MILC dataset is based on news reporting. UCDP largely relies on the news database Factiva and uses a computer software tool that retrieves articles that fall within certain parameters. There is a lingering discussion regarding whether systematically collected data based on news media sources, other current reports and general insight actually captures the events that diplomats, mediators and other actors would regard as significant. Some would even question if systematic data like the MILC dataset can generate an accurate and unbiased account of the phenomena it tries to quantify. This study is responding to these concerns by comparing news based information with information based on memoirs and historical accounts.

In order to conduct this comparative study, one case is studied using both approaches. The case in question must have a reasonable amount of third party activity but the researcher also has to have good access to information. Furthermore, the case needs to have been the subject of scholarly attention using a more narrative descriptive analysis. One case that fits all these requirements is the armed conflict in Burundi.¹ For this armed conflict, the MILC dataset includes 357 third party events for the period 1994-2004.² Initial findings suggest that a large number

1 In MILC, Burundi was coded by a UCDP researcher other than the author. Thus, the author has not been influenced by earlier coding efforts regarding Burundi.

2 Only the period of 1994-2004 has been reviewed using new types of literature. Furthermore, only activities directed at the rebels (CNDD for the period of 1994-1998), CNDD-FDD for 1999-2004 and Palipehutu-FNL for 1997-2004) have been re-evaluated. This is done in order to compare the two approaches on the same grounds.

of third parties were active in the preventive efforts, ranging from major powers and regional countries to the Roman Catholic community of Sant'Egidio and former US President Jimmy Carter.³

Beside the academic attention, there are diplomatic, scholarly and journalistic accounts of the many shifts and turns in the efforts to prevent Burundi from becoming another large-scale civil war and genocide in Central Africa. Thus, there seems to be sufficient information and different types of material in order to conduct this study.

The purpose of this study is to see if different approaches will result in a similar or different understanding of third party activities in a particular crisis, and to evaluate the strength and limitations of such approaches. The intention is not only to assess whether a systematic approach (in this case the MILC dataset) will retrieve more information (events) than an approach that focuses on narratives (here labelled the narrative approach) or vice versa; but it is also to ask if a systematic approach actually results in the same picture as a more traditional one would do. What information on the substance of third party efforts can be extracted from different data sources? Are the same types of events encountered in both types of material? Will the overall picture in terms of action and impact vary between the two approaches? In case a narrative analysis mentions events, which are not included in the MILC dataset, what information are these events based on and why might they have been left out? In case MILC has found situations, which are not mentioned in the narrative presentations, which are they, and how can their absence in the narrative material be explained?

Comparing the MILC dataset with data collected in other ways and using other types of material will help us understand the strengths and limitations of a systematic approach based on news reports. This in turn will provide a better foundation for interpreting and analysing this systematic data. This is a unique study, trying to evaluate two different scholarly approaches

³ Many international actors were engaged in the developments in Burundi. Here we only focus on those who tried to prevent an escalation or manage the situation. Hence, the intense humanitarian efforts that were taking place are not included.

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to conflict prevention research. It will put the researchers on a more secure footing when discussing choice of methods. It will also have an impact on the policy community: how is it going to evaluate the impact of various preventive measures?

In section 2, the narrative approach will be described before it is applied to the case of Burundi. Thereafter, section 3 describes the systematic approach and the data collection procedure. Then, the systematic approach will be applied to the case of Burundi. In section 4, the two approaches will be compared in terms of content and quantity. Concluding, a few recommendations will be made on future conflict prevention research.

The Conflict In Burundi: A Short Summary

Background

The population in Burundi is made up of Hutus (majority) and Tutsis (minority). Ever since independence in 1962, the Tutsi minority has controlled all societal powers. The Hutus have been victim of brutal repression by the Tutsi army and as a consequence, extremism has flourished among Hutus. In the early 1990s, this extremism resulted in an armed struggle launched by Hutu rebels. The most basic way of viewing the parties to the conflict is as a Tutsi government fighting Hutu rebels. However, the conflict is more complex than that. In 1993-1994, several attempts at democratically governing the country were made. When Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was assassinated together with a number of his ministers in late 1993, extremism increased and turbulence ensued in the country with escalating violence as a result.

Parties to the Conflict

The resistance side in the conflict consists of a number of Hutu rebel groups. The Hutu groups have a history of factionalism and tend to be short-lived. Hence, a majority and possibly all of the groups stem from two movements - Palipehutu and CNDD. Initially, the conflict in Burundi was a purely internal affair. However, this changed drastically in the mid-1990s, when Burundi became part of a regional conflict complex together with its neighbours. Since then, the Burundian conflict cannot be meaningfully studied separately from the regional context within which it occurs.

Conflict Behaviour

The conflict is characterised by a large amount of inter-group killings, with victims oftentimes being civilians. Massacres of both Hutu and Tutsi civilians have taken place on a number of occasions, performed by both the government forces and the Hutu rebel groups. In fighting between the armed rebels and the government army,

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most Hutu rebel groups have utilised guerrilla strategies, fighting the government from rear bases in neighbouring states.

Third Party Involvement

Numerous external parties have actively participated in the conflict since the mid-1990s; some have taken side and become secondary warring parties to the conflict. Others have tried to initiate dialogue between the parties and negotiate an end to the conflict. In 1996, multiparty talks were initiated by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere as mediator. Not all parties were present in the early years of the peace talks as the government objected to the participation of the active rebel movements, who for their parts set up pre-conditions for taking part in negotiations. In late 1999, former South African President Nelson Mandela took over the role as mediator. For the first time, all active rebel groups were invited to participate in negotiations. On 28 August 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed. It provided for army reform and democratic transition. However, two of the main rebel groups – the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL – did not sign the accord.

In 2003, negotiations between the government and CNND-FDD continued and resulted in a number of agreements. Then, in 2004 the first face-to-face negotiations between the government and Palipehutu-FNL took place. They soon broke down. However, on 7 September in 2004, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the Palipehutu-FNL. (To read more about third party efforts, see Appendix)

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 2008/04/29) UCDP database: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University.

2. The Narrative Approach

The narrative approach builds on descriptions of events, made by participants and observers, who have followed the course of events and selected what is seen as important. The narrative approach does not necessarily aim to make a complete collection of information, but rather to emphasize the 'important' events. Thus, the key is to focus on the most important factors, events and processes and take less notice of the less significant ones such as day-to-day activities in *explaining* and understanding social occurrences and developments. Furthermore, in doing this, the context is imperative. Therefore, the sources used when applying this method are often very detailed, especially when describing the framework, but perhaps less specific when it comes to dates and places. This narrative approach is illustrated best by Wolpe:

"The scope of this paper does not permit a detailed story. My purpose, rather, is to identify the most significant events, decisions and factors that have helped shape the process and are most directly responsible for both its achievements and its shortcomings." (Wolpe 2003, p. 8)

Understanding Key Events

Most case-based prevention analyses are descriptions made by key actors, recording their own experiences. Such descriptions can be rich on reflections on the issues, actors and actions in the case, including personal reactions, the 'atmosphere' at meetings, tactics and strategies of opponents and third parties. Similarly, observers following the unfolding of events will make observations, based on what they experience first-hand or through interviews with actors. This is often a basic material for the data collectors, and thus, much of this is likely to be noted also by the systematic approach. However, the key difference is probably that the narrative approach will be including what is perceived to be 'significant' events. They have the drama that makes them memorable or news-worthy, and thus require attention. It is likely that the

selection here will mean that fewer events are covered, but that it builds on an understanding of what is 'important'.

Applying the Narrative Approach to the Case of Burundi

In analyzing the approach, a number of accounts were read and analysed.⁴ Based on these, what can be said about the narrative literature when it comes to describing the decade-long peace efforts in Burundi? Furthermore, what do the accounts include and what turns of events do they consider as central in the peace effort in Burundi?

Narratives in the form of books, chapters, analyses and reports have been used; some are first-hand accounts whereas others are based on interviews, UN documents or reviews of previous literature and reports. A few of the accounts are written by academics specializing on the region or on Burundi in particular. Examples of these are Maundi et al. (2006) and Weissman (1998). Some narratives focus on a particular theme or a period as the account by Bentley & Southall (2005) that focuses on the mediation by South Africa and former President Nelson Mandela, in particular on the negotiations leading up to the Arusha Accord in 2000. In general, most of the accounts used are published from 1998 to the first years of the 2000s, with a few exemptions and are often published a few years after the actual events took place. However, the reports and briefs by the International Crisis Group (ICG) are all written more or less at the time of the events and are often thematic in nature covering current affairs and topics.

Much of the material used is based on a large number of interviews with individuals who took active part in the peace efforts, e.g. the ICG Reports or the narratives by Bentley & Southall and Weissman. One of those who himself participated in the peace efforts is the former US special envoy Howard Wolpe. Wolpe has written accounts and analyses based on his participation in the international strive for averting another large scale war and a possible genocide (Wolpe 1998 and 2003). Another central mediator is the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Burundi, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,

4 For a list of the accounts and reports, see list of references.

who also shares his experiences of mediation in the mid-1990s. Wolpe and Ould-Abdallah provide first hand accounts on the peace initiatives and offer valuable details on their perceptions of the situation, which for many parts have been public knowledge. Not only are the perceptions and planning of the intermediaries portrayed. Many of these accounts also illustrate the strategic deliberations that took place among the opposing parties: how they calculated on the future turn of events and how they could adjust their strategies accordingly. In sum, the accounts provide an interesting description of the political moves behind the curtains. It is of value to describe this in some detail.

In the attempts to save democracy in the early 1990s, the former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Burundi, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah shares his own thoughts on the developments as they happened. His memoirs cover the years he spent in Burundi (1993-95) and the years that followed his departure as Special Representative. There are numerous detailed accounts of meetings where he participated, telling his recollection of what was said etc. For instance, in the hours following the death of the newly elected president Ntaryamirah on April 6, 1994, Ould-Abdallah met with several members of the Burundi government to explain to them that he feared a new political vacuum that could lead to another outbreak of violence if the situation was not appropriately handled (for more, see Ould-Abdallah 2000, p. 56). He also describes meetings and conversations he had with other third parties discussing the situation and how international actors were planning to handle the crisis that was unfolding.

Ould-Abdallah's book focuses on the domestic political situation in Burundi where attempts were made in 1994 to democratize the country. However, many of his own interactions with the parties to the conflict were with representatives of the political parties and not with the armed rebel groups. He shares many personal memories, for instance how he briefed the leaders of the political parties on the deteriorating situation within their country. He also invited political leaders to join him on trips to the countryside in order to make them observe first-hand the seriousness of the situation. However, the Tutsi politicians always declined these

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invitations. Ould-Abdallah argues that this approach helped him to weaken the opposition leaders psychologically and gave him the upper hand in the discussions with the opposition (Ould-Abdallah 2005, p. 69).

Although Ould-Abdallah gives a fascinating and detailed portrayal of the intense period in which he participated, he does not answer the questions 'when, who, where and what?' Did he meet with the warring parties to discuss the armed conflict in the country? If he did, which of the warring parties, when, where and what did they talk about? As he does not provide this information, one can only draw the conclusion that he did not meet with them as his strategy was not to include the extreme parties into the negotiations.

Ould-Abdallah was succeeded by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. In contrast to Ould-Abdallah, Nyerere brought most of the conflicting parties for talks in Arusha. All the 17 political parties were included, but not the rebel groups Palipehutu-FNL and CNDD-FDD due to the fact that these two were the result of splits in two parties already participating in the peace negotiations (Palipehutu and CNDD) and the rules of Arusha stipulated that splinter groups could not be considered as full participants (ICG No. 25, 2000). Some of the accounts illustrate this shift in the international response to Burundi when Julius Nyerere was appointed the region's mediator; how it went from supporting and including only the moderates to including all parties to the conflict including the extremists.

Howard Wolpe, the US envoy to Burundi, focuses on 'behind-the-scenes-diplomacy'; the intentions, strategies and thought process of the third parties (Wolpe 1998 and 2003). For example, he emphasises what he considers to be the key aspects a mediator needs to take into account: e.g. gaining the trust and credibility of the warring parties. He does not, however, recount his experiences of the tone or the substance of the talks and meetings.

The account by Bentley & Southall is in part concentrated on the motives, strategies and actions of the politicians and the military in Burundi. Thus, it does not describe the efforts by the third parties in detail. The narrative by Bentley & Southall is a good example of an account that is very detailed and specific when it

comes to the descriptions of an intense period of negotiations. The context is often described in detail to give the reader a deeper understanding of the situation. For instance, the authors try to explain South Africa's involvement in Burundi with South Africa's ambitions to become a major actor on the African continent (Bentley & Southall 2005, p. 194-95). The regional countries' interest in the peace process in Burundi is also elaborated on in Wolpe (2003, pp. 22-25) and in several ICG Reports (e.g. ICG No. 25, 2000 and ICG Brief on 6 August 2002). These examples provide a level of analysis that often is not present in news articles.

However, many accounts, though being very interesting, do not explicitly describe the extent of the efforts of the third parties. It is sometimes very clear that there was a high activity in the international community, but it is not obvious how often the mediators actually met with the warring parties. Did they talk once a month or several times a week? There is no way of telling based on these accounts. Instead of answering the questions where, when and who, narratives often deal with the question 'why?' – why for example did the summit in September 2003 fail (Bentley & Southall 2005, p. 108) or why was civil society largely excluded from the peace process?

Many of the narratives give examples of a range of third parties and their efforts in Burundi. Havermans (1999) for instance describes the various international NGOs and their efforts to boost peace. However, it is more of a summary of the activities of these organisations and not a detailed account of their actions. By reading his paper you get to know that the International Crisis Group (ICG) was active and among other things recommended the establishment of a Truth Commission that would look into the massacres that had taken place since independence. Still, how these recommendations and other actions by the ICG came about is not mentioned.

Other narratives portray the situations surrounding the talks in an analytical manner that is not found in news articles. The report by Weissman (1998) is one example of this approach. For instance, Weissman concludes that the initiatives by the Catholic community of Sant'Egidio were useful in getting the representatives of the government and the CNDD to talk to each

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other and that the mediators assumed and hoped that these talks would make the parties willing to sign a ceasefire agreement that would precede all-party negotiations. He continues to describe the strategic setting. However, he does not illustrate how the talks in Rome with the Sant'Egidio or with other mediators were conducted, i.e. how the mediators acted. Did the mediators shift their role from being tough and authoritarian to a role where they assisted and observed? According to Wolpe (2003, p. 29) the formula of the Sant'Egidio was to work slowly and methodically to build a relationship with the government and the CNDD in order to make them comfortable with the involvement of Sant'Egidio.

Some shifts in the mediation approaches are illustrated in the accounts. For instance, the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL were excluded from the Arusha talks led by Nyerere but were invited by Mandela to join in 2002. Also, ICG reports that the greatest difference in the strategy of the peace process with Mandela as mediator was his constant pressure on the parties as well as on international actors (ICG No. 25, 2000, pp. 5-16). For example, he was impatient and often threatened to resign as mediator in the final phase of the negotiations in the summer of 2000 when there was strong disagreement among the many parties to the negotiations. In 2003, after lengthy negotiations, a ceasefire agreement including the CNDD-FDD was finally signed. Bentley & Southall give a portrayal of this process as do ICG reports.

Lastly, it has to be noted that in general, ICG Reports are very detailed and focus either on certain periods or certain themes. Thus, some reports are very well suited for the purpose of establishing what occurred in the peace efforts. They are often very thorough and offer in depth reporting that is very informative and useful.

In sum, the variety of accounts focuses on somewhat different phases and themes. A number of these are not strictly related to third party attempts in preventing full scale war but are more focused on key political events and processes. The following

pivotal events and developments are outlined as particularly significant:

- the attempts to save democracy, stabilize the political situation and prevent political parties to rebel after the coups in 1993 and 1996,
- the mediation efforts by Nyerere in 1995-99,
- the mediation by the community of Sant'Egidio in 1996-97,
- the mediation efforts by the Facilitation Team with Nelson Mandela as the head, following the death of Julius Nyerere in October 1999,
- the intense negotiation period leading up to the signing of the Arusha Accords on 28 August 2000,
- the period following the Arusha Accord (2000-04) with attempts to consolidate the agreement,
- the surroundings of the implementation of key aspects of the Arusha Accord, such as the presidential changeover on 30 April 2003,
- attempts to include CNDD-FDD and to some extent Palipehutu-FNL in the negotiations in the early 2000s,
- the negotiations leading up to the signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement with the CNDD-FDD on 16 November 2003.

Concluding, some general points can be made. First, narratives describe the larger context and the broad approach of the international community, but also give insights into the interests and motives of some of the third parties. Second, the accounts detect a macro-level shift in the approach of the third parties such as including all parties to the conflict in the negotiations rather than just a few and Mandela's threat to resign as mediator. Third, the narratives generally do not enable the detailed documentation of the 'who, where and when' of individual preventive measures.

3. The Systematic Approach

A systematic way of collecting and analysing information attempts to quantify information into small units that can be analysed. Using a systematic approach, the context is of less importance. One of the key aspects in a systematic approach is that there should be a high level of reliability in the collection efforts. This means that a case must be treated in the same manner regardless of the coder and the character of the conflict in question. Moreover, to facilitate this, the same type of material should be used with concrete definitions and operationalizations.

Data Collection Procedures

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) created the MILC dataset using the systematic approach. The foundation of the MILC dataset is the news- and information service database *Factiva*, which contains over 8,000 sources, including general news sources like Reuters, BBC, and AFP, as well local and regional news sources. A number of search words (talks, ceasefire, mediat*, arbitrat*, fact-finding, peace agreement, proposal, negotiat*, disarm, prisoner*, pullout, observe*, withdraw*) were used to extract reports from the Factiva database for every country, using a country-specific selection of sources. For Burundi, these sources consist of all articles published by AFP, BBC, Dow Jones, Reuters, Xinhua and All Africa. It is also possible to limit the number of articles through the use of indexing that is provided by Factiva, which in this case means that only articles within the categories of armed forces, military action and politics/international relations were used.

The Factiva search conducted with these search terms and indexing generated over 2,200 news articles concerned with Burundi. These articles were read and coded by paid UCDP research assistants. The coding sheet was reviewed by at least one other researcher in order to ensure reliability. As Factiva includes regional and local news sources that are translated into English,

it is possible to retrieve articles that would not make it to the big news agencies such as Reuters or AP (Melander et al. 2009).

The rationale for creating the MILC dataset was to enable the systematic study of the effects of third party conflict management in low-level armed conflicts while they run the risk of escalating into full-scale war. To collect data on third party measures requires that we first identify the so called unit of analysis, i.e. what is it that we should focus our attention on? UCDP chose to focus on conflict dyads for the MILC dataset. A conflict dyad is defined as the two units that are parties to a conflict: in an intrastate conflict this is a government and a rebel group. In the case of Burundi, as in every civil conflict, each pair of belligerents is considered a dyad (the government vs. CNDD, the government vs. Frolina etc.). The dyadic structure makes it possible to examine how measures of third parties affect the relationship between a government and a specific rebel group. This is interesting since some dyads within a conflict escalate to war or continue on the same level of intensity while others become inactive.

For an event to be included in the dataset, a set of requirements needs to be fulfilled. Each coded episode is identified in relation to a third party, a certain type of measure and must be continuous in time. Thus, in order for an event to be coded and included in the dataset, the third party and the type of measure needs to be identified. Definitions and operationalizations are used to decide if a certain situation fits the requirements of inclusion in the dataset.

A number of key terms used by the MILC dataset needs to be explained before applying the approach to the case of Burundi. A third party is an actor that is involved in either helping the warring parties to regulate the incompatibility or to change conflict behaviour or to regulate other conflict issues, and thus works as an intermediary between the primary parties to the conflict. All types of third parties have been registered in the dataset; states, organizations, individuals etc. A third party may or may not be neutral in its relations with the warring party although it cannot be involved militarily in the conflict as a secondary warring party. It may, however, provide support for any of the warring parties

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short of sending troops while being coded as a third party in the dataset.

The MILC dataset assumes that the type of third party measure is likely to influence the effectiveness of the third party efforts independently or in interaction with other characteristics. Therefore, the MILC dataset differentiates between nine different types of third party measures: indirect, direct, unclear and bilateral talks; good offices; arbitration; fact-finding missions; permanent observers; and peacekeeping operations.

By indirect talks, the dataset means talks where the warring parties are not talking face to face, but indirectly through the third party acting as an intermediary. The intermediary is bringing information from one party to the other. In order for an event to be coded as indirect talks, there must be substantial validation that the third party is going from one warring party to the other exchanging information. Examples of indirect talks include the Egyptian and US mediation efforts that led to the signing of a number of peace deals on the expansion of Palestinian self-rule in the late 1990s, most notably the Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron, the Wye River Memorandum and the Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum.

When the combatants are meeting face to face with a third party present, it is coded as direct talks. These talks include events such as face-to-face meetings between the warring parties to the conflict in Aceh, Indonesia in Sweden in 1999 and talks with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) in 2000. Bilateral talks are defined as talks between the third party and one of the warring parties over conflict issues.

Bilateral talks differ from indirect talks in that we do not have considerable reason to believe that the third party is passing along information between the warring parties, i.e. there is no form of negotiation going on. Many times, bilateral talks include situations where the third party simply explores the positions of the parties.

Finally, when the character of the talks is uncertain, UCDP has coded the talks as unclear. This includes instances where the circumstances surrounding talks were unclear, e.g. whether the

parties talked to each other face to face or indirectly through a mediator, etc.

For each event coded as direct, indirect, bilateral or unclear talks, the topic of the talks is coded and presented in the dataset. One or several of the following subject matters are coded for each event: 1) the incompatibility, 2) conflict behavior of the warring parties (e.g., ceasefire, demilitarized zones/withdrawing troops etc.), 3) other conflict issues (e.g., refugees, preparatory talks ['talks about talks'], disarmament, and security). The topic is coded unclear when the subject matter is not stated.

Fact-finding mission are delegations with the purpose of establishing the facts of a matter, e.g., whether human rights abuses, instances of violence, or violations of ceasefires have taken place. A good office is defined as a country offering the warring parties the opportunity to meet. Here, the third party does not actively engage in the talks but only facilitates talks, i.e. provides location, facilities, etc. Arbitration is defined as a situation where a third party issues a binding decision on a matter, e.g. an international court ruling. The third party must be mandated by both warring parties to decide in the matter.

A permanent observer is defined as a mission with a permanent office, carried out by the UN, IGOs or individual states, with the stated purpose to observe and/or support a peace process or conflict situation, but without any operational duties involving uniformed personnel having an official status as military troops, military observers or civilian police. Only the deployment of the mission, not actions taken during its deployment are included.

Peacekeeping operation are defined as a third-party state intervention that: a) involves the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state, b) is, according to the mandate (as specified in multilateral agreements, peace agreements, or resolutions of the UN or regional organisations), established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the security situation (among other things) between formerly, potentially, or presently warring parties;

and c) is neutral towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behaviour (Heldt & Wallensteen 2005).

Applying the Systematic Approach to the Case of Burundi

Let me now briefly present the dynamics of the peace efforts made in Burundi 1994-2004 based on the information found in the MILC dataset. A more detailed description is found in the appendix and in section 4.

A total of 357 events in Burundi are reported in the MILC dataset. Taking a closer look at trends over time, the negotiation dynamics are characterized by a step-wise escalation in the number of talks and activities from the mid 1990s to 2004. The first years of third party activity (1994-96) were mainly concerned with the violence in general and the huge flows of refugees stemming from the fighting. A total of 82 events have been registered in the dataset for this period. These events do not refer to any rebel group, rather to the conflict in general. Several meetings were registered with the government of Burundi, but no talks were held with the CNDD rebel group. In March of 1996, Julius Nyerere was appointed mediator and attempted to initiate reforms in the country.

From late 1996 to May 1997 MILC registers a number of peace talks in Rome with CNDD, mediated by the Sant'Egidio Community, on issues such as a ceasefires, reform of the armed forces and the continuous peace process. However, in May the talks were cancelled.

In 1998, Nyerere attempted to restart the talks as he met separately with CNDD, Frolina and the government. As recorded in the MILC dataset, Nyerere arranged and participated in a number of face-to-face meetings between the parties. International and regional diplomats, in talks with the government, also linked the lifting of sanctions on Burundi to progress in getting talks started. Such talks began in June in Arusha, under Nyerere's leadership and included the government of Burundi, the CNDD and Frolina.

Talks continued through late 1998 and 1999, but without the participation of the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL. A total of

about 40 separate meetings were registered in MILC for 1998 and 1999: around 20 for each year.

When Nyerere died in 1999, he was replaced by Nelson Mandela. Under his direction the Arusha multi-party talks continued in 2000, without the participation of the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL. Finally, in August 2000 a peace agreement was signed. According to the MILC data, Mandela participated in 22 events in 2000 and another 7 events with the participation by representatives from his mediation team.

The year 2001 saw intense shuttle diplomacy and talks with rebels by the South African politician Zuma and mediator Mandela in attempts to coax the rebels to come to the negotiating table and to agree to a ceasefire. MILC has located around 25 mediation events by Mandela and/or South Africa in 2001. The same year, the government of Burundi met a few times with the CNDD-FDD - according to the MILC data, they met 5 times - and agreed on an agenda for negotiations. However, despite these efforts, no ceasefire agreement was reached.


In 2002, the mediators managed to get the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD to the negotiation table, and numerous talks under the mediation of Zuma were held. Negotiations continued in 2003 between the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD, and led to the signing of a number of peace agreements that regulated the incompatibility between the government and the CNDD-FDD. Talks with the Palipehutu-FNL saw some progress through direct talks, but no major breakthroughs.

In 2004, the Palipehutu-FNL and the government of Burundi met for the first time face-to-face for talks in Amsterdam and agreed on a ceasefire. However, no further negotiations were held, since the rebels refused to negotiate with the government as long as military activity persisted.

4. Comparing The Two Approaches

There are two aspects in comparing the two approaches: one is to apply the strict MILC coding rules on the narratives and create a dataset based on this. It means breaking down narrative information into codable events. The second aspect is to assess if important events described in the narratives and memoirs actually turn up in the systematic collection of data (MILC) or if key elements are left out. In other words: how well do the two approaches describe the period of 1994-2004 in terms of frequencies and substance of information?

Figure 1: Number of events recorded by coding narratives compared to coding news reports



Starting with the first aspect, Figure 1 shows that the systematic approach does locate more events than the narrative one: about one third of the systematic events are found also in the narrative material: 130 compared to 357. However, the narrative graph in Figure 1 is only based on 118 events as 12 events could not be linked to a specific year due to poor information. Figure 1 illustrates that the two approaches in large capture the same trend and, thus, describe the same course of events. It also emerges that

the systematic approach captures a wider set of actors and events. The increased frequency of events in MILC for certain years is a measure of intensified diplomacy, and that in turn is often the phase that narratives concentrate on. As proposed earlier in this paper we would expect fewer events with the narrative approach as it concentrates on a few qualitatively significant situations. The trend over time should however be the same as it is likely that key events are preceded and/or followed by a number of less high profile occurrences. The results illustrated in Figure 1 point in this direction. However, more research needs to look at this before one can draw definite and general conclusions.

As illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed above, the systematic approach does include a wider set of events. This is a significant result that begs the question why we can observe this difference. A first explanation is that narratives may miss events as they tend to focus on the spectacular. Second, it is possible that some of the events captured with the systematic approach are not necessarily viewed as preventive diplomacy as they may include seemingly unrelated events. MILC has coded meetings between heads of states to discuss issues such as the refugee crisis or ethnic violence in Burundi. Third, it could be that determining which events are the most important is only possible with hindsight. As narratives are typically written long after the events have occurred 'minor' events are screened out. As time goes by, only a few events will be viewed as important enough to be labelled significant and, as a consequence, make it to a descriptive account such as a book or a memoir. As a result, many incidents are left out in the narrative approach. Fourth, authors involved in peace efforts are possibly biased in the sense that they focus on 'their' experiences in terms of actors involved and efforts taken. These narratives do not provide a complete picture, and the aim of the writer may not be to do just that. As a result, more third parties are likely to be recorded by the systematic approach. The statistics speak to this: a total of 41 unique third parties were registered in the MILC dataset using the systematic approach compared to 33 with the narrative approach. This points to a selection bias in the accounts that get published. It is quite likely that descriptions and biographies that focus on high profile mediators such as Nelson

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Mandela or Ould-Abdallah do get published whereas less known ones do not. If only certain conflicts and mediators are allowed to tell their story, there will be a selection bias that in turn will affect the outcome of the research.

A final observation is that even accounts on the efforts by high profile mediators can be omitted. Nelson Mandela was central in the peace process in Burundi from year 2000. A number of biographies have been written on his life achievements. However, none of these mentions his efforts in Burundi. Consequently, even if a prominent mediator writes his or her memoirs it is not a guarantee that they will include pieces of information on all peace efforts they have ever participated in, not even the ones that made it to the headlines.

One can ask what events are captured when applying the MILC coding criteria on descriptive narratives. When attempting to code events using diplomatic and descriptive accounts into the MILC matrix, it is apparent that the narratives have difficulties standing up to the strict definitions and operationalizations. This is often due to limited information – the narratives do not provide enough information for events to pass the inclusion criteria. As a consequence, only a handful of the activities are captured when the information is put to the test. It is only for one year, 1994, that the systematic approach records fewer events than the narrative methodology. Even though 1994 saw little activity, attempts by the international community were made to control the deteriorating situation. The MILC dataset only includes one meeting in 1994; one between the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on how to stop the border violence between the Hutus and the Tutsis. This event was not captured with the narrative approach, probably because it is only viewed as a meeting between two Presidents who share a problem, and not an effort related to the conflict in Burundi. The MILC data on the other hand misses to include a meeting between the UN Special Representative and the CNDD, an event that would seem important enough to report but that probably was not common knowledge at the time.

The systematic approach picks up more low-key occasions in 1995 than the narrative one does. Among other things, MILC includes talks between regional leaders on how to solve or improve the

refugee crisis, an important factor that affected the situation in Burundi and its neighbours and vice versa. Both approaches capture the activities by former US President Jimmy Carter but MILC fails to record the fact that Archbishop Desmond Tutu also took part in these meetings, something that the narratives do include.

In 1996 Julius Nyerere, the former President of Tanzania, was appointed as an independent mediator to the conflict by regional heads of state and officially backed by the UN and the African Union. MILC registered a total of 60 events in 1996 compared to 16 based on narratives.⁵ The latter include summits in Tunis, Cairo and Dar es Salaam; meetings in Rome with the US envoy and several meetings in Arusha with regional countries present. The MILC dataset includes most of these and also a number of regional talks on the security situation where the Burundi government was represented. These talks are left out in the narratives, probably because they are not viewed as important for the peace process.

In 1997, the Sant'Egidio mediation in Rome is picked up by both approaches. However, the news articles used with the systematic approach simply stated that mediation by the Sant'Egidio in talks between the government and CNDD had been taking place in the Italian capital since last December, i.e. 1996. How many times they met during this period was not stated. The narratives are also very vague in this respect. They said that the four rounds of talks between September 1996 and May 1997 were held in Rome. For this period MILC records two events. The fact that MILC reports on fewer events with the Sant'Egidio in 1996-97 might be due to the fact that they were 'secret' meetings and thus not reported in the news.

In 1998, the narrative approach includes a number of meetings with the 'parties to Arusha', and a few regional summits. In general, all this is also recorded in the MILC dataset. For 1999, the MILC has more than twice as many events as the narrative approach. They both include several summits in Arusha led by Julius Nyerere. However, the systematic approach manages to locate a number of meetings between the President of Burundi and regional leaders

5 A number of events could possibly be added to these. The narratives give information about eight events that occurred between September, 1996 and May, 1997.

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discussing topics such as certain aspects of the peace process. These events are not picked up by the narratives.

Both approaches include the intense mediation process in Arusha in 2000 under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. However, the data picked up by the systematic approach are much more extensive. In total, 71 events are registered that year, of which Mandela participated in 22. In contrast, the narrative approach captures a total of 20 events for the same period, only 7 with Mandela. One explanation of the fact that MILC registers more events for 2000 is that the news articles include details on the location of the talks. According to the coding guidelines, if talks are held in another country than the country of the mediators, that country should be coded as good office. For instance, for talks mediated by US President Clinton in London without the participation of British mediators, USA would be coded as a mediator and Great Britain as providing a good office. Since Nyerere and Mandela did not represent Tanzania or South Africa but were independent mediators, all talks with Nyerere and Mandela held in Tanzania or South Africa had to be coded as separate good office events. Thus, in MILC there are about 20 events of good offices registered in Tanzania and South Africa. The narratives do not provide such detailed information. It only states that 'there were meetings' or 'consultations'. Since the location of these meetings is unknown, possible good offices have been missed.

For 2001, the systematic approach again records more events than the narrative one: 45 compared to 12. This difference is not explained by the high number of good offices in MILC. Rather, the systematic approach is more detailed in its accounts of the many meetings that took place. Talks between heads of states leading up to the high profile summits are registered as well as meeting with neighbours such as Tanzania to discuss the security along the border. The majority of the events located with both approaches are concerned with the negotiations led by Mandela. Furthermore, both approaches record mediation efforts by Gabon represented by President Omar Bongo in 2001. Another observation is that many of the meetings coded with the narrative approach were identified as of 'unclear character', i.e. it was not possible to determine based on the sources whether the parties

met face-to-face or if the mediator was meeting with one group at the time. The latter information is included in the MILC data where the majority of the talks are coded as bilateral. Generally the same pattern is found for the period of 2002-04 where only a fifth of the MILC events are registered using the narrative approach. Often when using the narratives it is not possible to determine the date of the events. Only one of the ten events recorded for 2002 had a definite date, the others were vague and only noted the month. This might be one explanation to the generally low number of events with the narrative approach as it probably sums up the activities instead of disaggregating them as MILC does. The result is that when narratives state that talks were held in March, there is no information on whether one or 20 meetings were held whereas the systematic approach actually records each single meeting.

5. Conclusion

Empirical validity

As demonstrated by the previous chapter, a systematic approach does in certain aspects provide a more detailed account of the dynamics as it disaggregates the third party measures. However, the fact that some events, such as the mediation efforts by Sant'Egidio, are not captured to the same extent with the systematic approach shows that the use of public information provides a restriction. Furthermore, the strict coding rules may affect the fact that some key events and phases portrayed in the narratives were not registered in the MILC dataset. For instance, the attempt to save democracy in the early 1990s, which included talks with many of the non-armed political representatives, is not captured by the MILC dataset simply because it was not relevant for its purpose, which was to locate measures directed at the parties to the armed conflict in the country. If the MILC project would have focused on the measures directed at non-armed actors, it would with all certainty have been found in news reports from this time and thus coded. It is thus possible to describe the dynamics of the peace efforts by using the MILC dataset.

The illustration in the narratives on how the international response shifted from excluding extremist parties to including all parties is also illustrated in the MILC dataset. The data shows that in the period leading up to the appointment of Julius Nyerere in March 1996 there were mostly bilateral talks with the government and only one meeting with the rebels. After the appointment, several talks were registered, however still not as many as with the government.

The MILC data also demonstrates the different strategies used by the different mediators: Ould-Abdallah seems to have focused on governmental actors, Nyerere also included some armed factions, and Mandela dealt with all actors. Such differences in approach are not likely to be pointed to in narratives and memoirs of the individual actors. They might not be easily observed without the supporting data that the systematic approach yields.

Obviously, for those who wish to get a deeper understanding of the peace process at particular junctures, accounts such as the ones by envoys involved in the process, for example Wolpe and Ould-Abdallah, are ideal. So far, however, no narrative account of the entire peace process has emerged. It is likely to come, for instance as a university dissertation. The systematic approach may, however, more quickly point to such differences in strategies.

Finally, the differences in the result obtained comparing the two approaches can to some extent be explained by what the approaches regard as the most central information. The narrative approach believes that the key characteristics of third party measures are the messages conveyed in talks and the feature of the mediator etc. Therefore, narratives do not provide details on the exact number of meetings, the date and the type of talks. The systematic approach, here represented by the MILC dataset, on the other hand assumes that these factors are important in understanding the effectiveness of third party involvement. Even if some data on these factors are unavailable, the type of measure (direct, indirect talks, good offices etc.) is believed to have an effect on the outcome.

Methodological implications

Despite the many benefits of the systematic approach this study demonstrates some challenges to it. There is a possibility that using other search words in Factiva would generate a different outcome in terms of the news articles retrieved. However, as has been showed, most of the key events portrayed in the descriptive accounts are captured with the current systematic approach so this might not be a real problem. Using media coverage as the main source of information may mean that we to a large extent only cover high level attempts by third parties. Efforts by local actors such as civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGO) are less likely to be covered in any media.

There are some methodological challenges with the narrative approach when using them as a basis for creating a dataset. The first one has to do with locating relevant and useful information. The narrative approach mainly relies on qualitative analyses and

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descriptions, often written by individuals involved in the process themselves. Finding these accounts is facilitated by knowing in advance the identity of the third parties as one can search for accounts about these or by them straight away. However, if the identity of the intermediaries is not commonly known, the researcher needs to conduct a step-by-step approach in locating this material.

In a large N pilot study on preventive efforts conducted by Öberg, Möller, and Wallensteen (2009) a similar step-by-step approach was used in order to find relevant material on third party activity in a set of ethnic disputes. First, Keesing's Contemporary Record (Keesing's) was used in order to locate third parties in each of the disputes. Second, the names of these were used as search words in Factiva, which generated a number of articles that were then read and coded. This technique did result in a number of relevant articles and generated a significant amount of data. However, besides being a very time-consuming method, this approach runs the risk of not picking up minor and less known intermediaries and their activities as they might not be considered important enough to be included in a news archive such as Keesing's. This problem and its implications were elaborated earlier.

Another challenge is that it is very difficult to separate events from each other based on narratives, in part demonstrated by the fewer events picked up by the narrative approach (see above). Due to limited information on key aspects it is difficult to come to a decision whether a particular situation should be included or not.

Often there is an important piece of information missing in order to make a well informed decision; e.g. did one or both belligerents attend a meeting/summit? Was the conflict or only trade issues discussed at the meeting etc. Examples like '*...the resumption of negotiations inaugurated a series of events which culminated in the signing of the Arusha Accord in August 2000...*' (Bentley & Southall 2005, p. 61) is typical. The citation implies that there were several meetings in the period leading up to a signing in August but since there is no information on how many meetings, when, where and with whom, it is impossible to code these events. A similar example is when the information is summarized; '*Nyerere made*

several visits from October to December'. What does this entail: how many meetings took place and did he hold meetings with primary parties or did he just talk to other intermediaries? Also, it is sometimes stated that a country such as Tanzania or South Africa has hosted talks. However, it does not say if they participated in the talks or just hosted. Sometimes it is possible to use different accounts to piece information together, one gives you the date, another the actors involved and a third one provides information on the topics of discussion. This is very time consuming but may result in complete information in the end. Still, sometimes further information gathering is necessary in order to determine if an event fits the criteria for inclusion or not. However, piecing information together is sometimes necessary when using news articles as well but news reporting is in general in chronological order, making it easier to relate information bits to each other.

Narratives, to a lower extent provide 'hard facts' in the form of dates, type of talks (direct or bilateral) etc. The information found in the accounts and reports is much better suited for case studies. Furthermore, accounts tend to focus more on the intense diplomatic periods such as the Arusha process but less or not at all on the day to day activities proceeding and/or following the intense periods as has been demonstrated. Often, many of these low key meetings between neighbours are not intended to lead to a breakthrough, but are meetings to discuss an issue of common interest like refugees that do impact the conflict dynamics and that are relevant to the peace efforts.

Despite the shortcomings, descriptive narratives do provide the researcher with valuable information that is not captured by the systematic approach. The accounts do in many ways present a very detailed portrait of the peace efforts and the setting as well as putting the actions and development into a larger perspective. They provide insights and give the reader a deeper understanding of the situation in Burundi and the international engagement. Using them as a complementary to a dataset like MILC that picks up the general dynamics and key events, descriptive narratives can provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics.⁶

6 A descriptive summary of the preventive efforts taken in Burundi for the period of 1994-2004 based on the MILC dataset and additional descriptive information from the UCDP database can be found in Appendix A.

Final Conclusion

The ambition of this study was to find optimal ways to identify conflict prevention measures in order to enable an analysis of their effectiveness. This is needed if we want to strengthen our collective ability to prevent new armed conflicts. The first step was to determine if different methodological approaches in the study of preventive measures result in similar or different descriptions of third party activities in a particular crisis. This test can form the basis for an assessment of the strengths and limitations of such approaches.

The conflict in Burundi was selected, being a conflict with considerable international attention. At the same time it was neither a conflict of global politics nor one without international concern at all. Thus, it provided a possibility of testing both a systematic data approach (presented by the MILC dataset) and a more traditional, narrative description by reporters, observers, mediators and others. The two methodological approaches to identifying crucial preventive events could be tried on the same conflict.

This study has pointed to the advantages of both approaches in identifying preventive measures. The strength of the narrative approach is two-fold: (1) It focuses on the dynamics leading up to key events, in term of why third parties intervene and what they want to do. This is an advantage as motives are difficult to identify in the systematic approach. (2) It also deals with how different levels interact, i.e. it describes how developments in the neighbouring states, within the UN or on the local level affect one another. Such interactions are more difficult to identify in a systematic events-based data collection.

The strength of the media-based systematic approach, on the other hand, is that the application of a general framework, which records similar events over time also renders possible to compare one situation to another. It also captures more events than are normally reported in narratives of a conflict situation. The risk of underreporting of some events did not turn out to be a major

problem. Secret information will not be immediately available with any of the approaches.

This study has also shown that the systematic approach does locate the events, which diplomats, mediators and other actors define as significant. The approach also picks up events that one might think would not end up in any news reports, such as the mediation by the President of Gabon. Moreover, it captures the important events and processes outlined in narrative accounts. Methodologically, the narrative approach does encounter much of the same problems that were expected using news reports. Clearly published memoirs or diplomatic accounts are selective focusing on the more spectacular and dramatic. This may be so as such descriptions face difficulties of making it into the headlines or into sufficient book sales. Some mediators' stories are published, others' are not. What is judged – in hindsight – as significant may mean that other events are underestimated or underreported with this approach.

The fear of events being systematically underreported in media-based account does not seem warranted. A conflict is either covered and subsequently it will be in the media as well as in narrative accounts, or it is not covered, meaning that none of the approaches might be useful. There are many underreported conflicts, and thus preventive actions cannot be collected by either approach. There is a temporal dimension as well. Much is reported later. The systematic approach will be more updated as events make the news, whereas narratives tend to emerge only some time after the events have taken place, thus being selective and of less immediate relevance in unfolding dynamics.

This means that there are strengths and weaknesses in both the systematic and the narrative approaches. There are also ways in which they can be joined. By including more narrative descriptions in the systematic data the perceptions of actors could be introduced, for instance. Also, the systematic data can help inform those who would like to make a thorough narrative analysis of a particular peace process or prevention situation.

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Events which may be forgotten are relocated and their 'true' value can be estimated.

Having established the mutual utility, a next step would be to design a procedure evaluating the impact of the various third party measures. The focus of research using the MILC dataset has been on the ability of third party prevention efforts to actually reduce the likelihood of an escalation to war. However, third party interventions may also have other purposes: they may also aim at inducing the parties to come to a negotiation, find an agreement, accept a particular arrangement, and implement what have been agreed upon or dealing with unexpected events (crisis) in a particular relationship. This means one would want to identify, for instance, the peak period of activity to estimate the separate and aggregate impact of particular measures. That would then give more useful advice to policy makers and demonstrate the utility of prevention studies. That remains an assignment for the future.

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Material Used In Coding The Milc Dataset:

Approximately 2,200 news articles from AFP, Reuters, All Africa, Xinhua, BBC and Dow Jones

Appendix

Burundi Preventive Diplomacy

A summary based on the information found in the MILC dataset.

Time frame

1994 – 2004. In the studied time frame a number of different dyads are coded in separate periods. The government of Burundi versus the CNDD dyad is coded 1994-1999, the government of Burundi versus Frolina for 1997-1998, the government of Burundi versus CNDD-FDD for 1999-2004 and the government of Burundi versus Palipehutu-FNL for 1997-2004.

Notes on the dataset

The dataset contains coding for a number of dyads, all in varying time periods. The government of Burundi versus the CNDD dyad is coded from 14 November 1994-1999, the government of Burundi versus Frolina for 1997-1998, the government of Burundi versus CNDD-FDD for 1999-2004; the years that these groups are active plus one additional year. The government of Burundi versus Palipehutu-FNL dyad is coded 1997-2004, with the group being active the last year.

Primary parties

The primary warring parties in the conflict in Burundi were the government of Burundi and the rebel groups CNDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie), Frolina (Front pour la libération nationale), CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense pour la démocratie) and Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu - Forces nationales de libération). The majority of talks in the studied time period take place between the government and the CNDD and CNDD-FDD. The Palipehutu-FNL, being a more extreme group, engaged in talks only in the later stages of the peace process. Frolina took part in negotiations mostly in 1998. Many secondary sup-

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porting parties were active in the conflict, but none to the extent that they were classified as secondary warring parties.

Third parties

The Burundian conflict was international in its very nature, both through external involvement in support for the primary parties' war efforts and through a large number of third parties actively taking part in preventive diplomacy activities. In addition to the international organizations and NGOs that became involved in the peace efforts a large number of regional states, embroiled in the many conflicts in this Great Lakes sub-region, were vital in the search for a negotiated solution.

However, the most active actors in the preventive diplomacy spectrum were the two sanctioned mediators (officially backed by the UN and the African Union), the Tanzanian ex-president Joseph Nyerere and South African ex-president Nelson Mandela. These two mediators engaged the warring parties in bilateral talks, shuttle diplomacy and acted as mediators in direct talks that led up to the signing of several consecutive peace agreements. Mandela supplanted Nyerere when the latter died in late 1999.

The key organizations in the conflict were the UN and the African Union (OAU before July 2002), two organizations that functioned both separately and jointly, and conducted bilateral talks with both sides as well as lending weight to the efforts of the sanctioned mediators. Both the UN and the AU sent peacekeepers and observers to Burundi, the UN deploying UNOB (United Nations Office in Burundi) and ONUB (United Nations Operation in Burundi), and the OAU/AU deploying OMIB (OAU Observer Mission in Burundi) and an OAU/AU protection force.

A notable NGO was the Sant'Egidio Community, a Roman Catholic peace organization that acted as a mediator and also held separate meetings with the warring parties.

The Burundian conflict attracted attention from a vast number of states, the most important ones from the point of view of preventive diplomacy being Tanzania, South Africa, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) and Uganda. Tanzania and South Africa, in addition to supplying the sanctioned mediators

mentioned above, gave good office for talks at several occasions, took part in negotiations in the later years of the conflict and also held bilateral talks with the warring parties. South Africa also sent troops to Burundi in 2001. Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda were engaged in bilateral talks with the government of Burundi, and also took part in conferences of the OAU/AU and were part of the Regional Peace Initiative (composed also of Tanzania, South Africa, Kenya and Malawi amongst others).

The Regional Peace Initiative grouped the states involved in the cluster of conflicts in the Great Lakes region and worked for peace through holding regular meetings and supporting the efforts of the endorsed mediators. Also notable is the good offices given by Italy on several occasions.

Talks and negotiations

The negotiation dynamics in the Burundian conflict are characterized by a step-wise escalation in the number of talks and activities from the mid 1990's to 2004. The first years of the studied time period see very little activity, whilst the later years are filled with direct and mediated talks and signings of peace agreements. Notable is also the high amount of peace conferences and similar meetings held by the UN and the surrounding regional states, yielding a high number of bilateral talks on behalf of the government of Burundi being coded in the dataset.

The first three years in the dataset (1994-1996) saw relatively little preventive diplomacy, with the focus being on UN, OAU and regional conferences on the escalating ethnic violence and the huge flows of refugees stemming from the fighting. It is notable that all of these talks and meetings addressed the violence in general, without reference to a specific dyad.

In February 1996 Julius Nyerere was appointed mediator to the conflict by regional heads of state and attempted to solve the conflict by enacting political and societal reforms through inter-party talks with the Burundian government and Hutu political parties. Several talks took place between the government and the opposition politicians, some in Tanzania, but no talks were held with the CNDD. A military coup in Burundi scuttled Nyerere's

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attempts at initiating reform and securing an international armed presence, and instead the international community imposed sanctions on Burundi.

Late 1996 to May 1997 saw secret peace talks in Rome with the CNDD rebel group, mediated by the Sant'Egidio Community, on issues such as a ceasefire, reform of the armed forces and a continuous peace process. Talks were cancelled in May due to pressure from the powerful army.

1998 saw attempts by Nyerere to restart talks, and he met separately with CNDD and Frolina and the government and managed to secure promises of new talks. International and regional diplomats, in talks with the government, also linked the lifting of sanctions on Burundi with progress in getting talks started. Such talks began in June in Arusha, under the mediation of Nyerere and included the government of Burundi, the CNDD and Frolina. Talks continued through July and focused on establishing a ceasefire and how to continue talks on political issues.

In October the parties met again and held direct talks with Nyerere as the mediator. This time the talks revolved around elections, army reform, democracy and good governance. A number of commissions were created to continuously work on these issues. Work in the commissions continued through late 1998 and 1999, but without the participation of the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL. Progress was scarce though.

Nyerere died in late 1999, and was replaced as official mediator by Nelson Mandela. Under his mediation Arusha multiparty talks continued in 2000, but the talks were marred by difficulties in getting the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL to attend. A peace agreement was signed in August 2000, but the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL were not parties to it.

2001 saw intense shuttle diplomacy and talks with rebels by South African politician Jacob Zuma and mediator Mandela in attempts to coax the rebels to come to the negotiating table and to agree to a ceasefire. The government of Burundi had a few meetings with the CNDD-FDD, and agreed on an agenda for negotiations. Mandela also held a number of regional summits, and during one

it was agreed that South African troops would be deployed in Burundi. No success was achieved regarding the ceasefire.

In 2002 the mediators managed to get the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD to the negotiation table, and numerous talks under the mediation of Zuma were held. These talks, though marred by problems, yielded a ceasefire agreement in October and a peace agreement in December. The Palipehutu-FNL was not a party to these talks. The peace agreement stipulated the integration of rebel troops into the national army, the transformation of the CNDD-FDD into a legal political party and a continuation of negotiations to create an inclusive transitional government.

Negotiations continued in 2003 between the government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD, and lead to the signing of a number of peace agreements, under which power sharing was initiated in the political, military and security spheres. (Consult the UCDP general database for more details on these agreements.) Through these agreements the incompatibility between the government and the CNDD-FDD was resolved. Talks with the Palipehutu-FNL saw some progress through direct talks, but no breakthroughs.

In 2004 the Palipehutu-FNL and the government of Burundi met for the first time face-to-face for talks in Amsterdam and agreed on a ceasefire. Zuma met at several occasions with the leaders of the Palipehutu-FNL to get talks on political issues started, but no further negotiations were held, since the rebels refused to negotiate with the government as long as military activity persisted.

Other Preventive Activities

The Burundian conflict was the object of a number of preventive activities, almost exclusively initiated and deployed by the UN and the OAU/AU. The UN established UNOB (United Nations Office in Burundi) in October 1993, with the mandate to facilitate the restoration of constitutional rule in Burundi and support peace talks. This deployment is not coded in the dataset.

The OAU/AU deployed OMIB (International Observer Mission in Burundi) in 1993, a mission that is not coded in the dataset. The

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OMIB mission is sometimes referred to as MIPROBU (Protection and Observation Mission to Re-establish Confidence in Burundi), especially after 1995 when the military contingent was expanded.

In November 2001 South Africa deployed the SAPSD (South African Protection and Support Detachment) in Burundi, consisting of approximately 1,500 troops. The deployment was a consequence of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi's decision to deploy an interim protection and security force to allow for the return of exiled political leaders and to act as a confidence-building measure to ensure progress in peace negotiations. The UN Security Council endorsed the force.

In April 2003 the OAU/AU deployed the AMIB (African Mission in Burundi), comprising around 2,600 personnel and with the mandate to verify compliance with ceasefire agreements, liaise between the parties, assist in the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration), assist the Joint Ceasefire Commission and to facilitate humanitarian assistance.

The AMIB was replaced in June 2004 by ONUB (United Nations Operation in Burundi), consisting of approximately 5,000 troops with the mandate to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement. Their tasks included DDR duty, upholding of the ceasefire, contributing to the elections process and the monitoring of borders.

A number of fact-finding missions were sent to Burundi, notably ones from the UN, the OAU and Uganda. The most frequent suppliers of good offices were Tanzania (especially when Nyerere was acting as mediator), South Africa (during Mandela's and Zuma's days as mediators) and Italy.

References

For Third parties and Talks: UCDP Database for the variables 'Negotiations and Third party involvement' + MILC dataset. For Other preventive activities: UCDP database for the variables 'Negotiations and Third party involvement' + MILC dataset + UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/onub/>) + SIPRI Yearbooks 1994, 2002, 2004, 2005 (Tables of Multilateral Peace Operations)

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