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Zambian Refugee Policy

Security, Repatriation and Local Integration

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Acronyms

AHA - Africa Humanitarian Action

AU - African Union (former OAU-Organization of African Unity)

CORD - Christian Outreach Relief and Development

DLI - Development through Local Integration

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

GRZ - Government Republic of Zambia

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

IOM - International Organisation for Migration

JRS - Jesuit Refugee Service

LDC - Local Development Communities

LWF - Lutheran World Federation

NGO (s) - Non Governmental Organisation (s)

RO - Refugee Officer

SACCORD - South African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes

UNOPS - United Nations Office for Project Service

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP - World Food Program

ZCRS - Zambian Christian Refugee Service (LWF in Zambia)

ZI - Zambian Initiative

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1. Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

From a peace and conflict perspective, the region of Southern Africa is usually characterized as an extraordinarily conflict-torn part of the world. However, an interesting exception in this region is Zambia, a nation surrounded by eight other countries and situated in the middle of this conflict plagued area. Since its 1964 independence from the United Kingdom Zambia has not, in contrast to most of its neighbours, experienced war. Still, as a country in the middle of this security complex, Zambia has been affected by regional instabilities in different ways.

One measurable consequence of war is refugee-flows across state borders. African countries have for the past thirty years experienced repeated and sustained mass influxes of refugees from neighbouring countries in conflict.¹ Some research indicates that refugee-flows create negative externalities, meaning that a conflict in one country sometimes incurs a spill-over effect to bordering countries.² Historically, Zambia has always been considered a generous host to refugees, even during colonial rule.³ Since independence the country has hosted refugees from five of its eight neighbouring countries – Angola, DR Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia.⁴ Zambia has also hosted refugees from other African countries, mainly from Rwanda, Ghana, Sudan and Somalia.⁵ Angolan refugees were the first to seek a safe haven in Zambia and they are also the largest group in actual numbers making them the most significant refugee group in Zambia.⁶

The puzzle implies that Zambia in spite of being in the middle of the Southern African security complex, and affected by regional dynamics through refugee-flows, never experienced any armed conflict within the country. Why?

We went to Zambia to find the answer.

¹ Jacobsen (2002) p. 577

² See for example Fjelde (2003)

³ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

⁴ Blakewell (2002) p. 7

⁵ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

1.2 Purpose of the paper

The purpose of this paper is to describe the Zambian refugee policy with focus on Angolan refugees using a multidimensional security perspective as a theoretical tool. Moreover, the study is an attempt to shed light on the relationship between Zambia's peaceful history as a host to refugees and the country's refugee policy. The purpose of this field study is quite broad. The ambition is to include as much unique information as possible, remaining within the framework of the wider security concept. Accordingly, as a first step the Zambian refugee policy is described and in another analyzed from a security perspective. This study is perhaps even more relevant at the moment since the termination of conflict in Angola has resulted in a broad debate on a political level in Zambia where to go from here with the refugee policy. The refugee issue is an urgent problem in many parts of the world and maybe this study can contribute to a better understanding of a most tangible security issue of our days.

2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical approach selected for this study is widely expressed security. The main theory for this paper is accordingly focused on the security perspective developed by Barry Buzan and presented in his book *People, States and Fear* from 1991. Buzan's theoretical framework does not specifically concern refugee issues. However, we argue that in a theoretical security discussion the refugee issue is highly relevant. This gap in Buzan's theory makes it interesting to apply it in a refugee context.

Security as the primary theoretical tool has been selected for this study for a number of reasons. First, the absolute power of most states in the world today has increased making them more interdependent. Consequently, the realities of the world make a security approach fruitful.⁷ Second, an important compelling argument for using security as an analytical perspective is found in one of the basic claims of Buzan's book where he states that security is a "more versatile, penetrating and useful way to approach the study of international relations than either power or peace."⁸ A focus on the security concept circumvents the traditional international relations disagreement between the Realist school that stresses power as the variable and the Idealist school that favours a peace approach. In other words, from an

⁶ UNHCR Zambia (2004) and Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

⁷ Buzan (1991) p. 368-369

⁸ Buzan (1991) p. 3

academic and intellectual perspective a security approach is appropriate since it makes it possible to link together many different theories and approaches within international relations.⁹ Third, Buzan states that security is an underdeveloped concept and for that reason meritoriously breaks down the security concept into individual, national, regional and international levels and into different general sectors as military, political, economic, societal and environmental.¹⁰ These levels enable the security concept more manageable to study and were thus another important reason to use Buzan's theoretical framework.

Finally, situating the field study in Southern Africa was partly driven by the theoretical argument of recognizing this area as a regional security complex¹¹ defined as follows:

“A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”¹²

Buzan acknowledges the idea of security complexes as simply an analytical device. In another sense, however, he claims that security complexes are an empirical phenomenon with historical and geopolitical roots. The task of identifying a security complex involves making judgements about the relative strengths of security interdependencies among different countries. In some places these will be strong, in others weak, in some places have positive effects and in others negative.¹³ However, when carrying out a field study questions arise of how to make a security complex into something measurable or what a security complex actually entails in practice. The field study method provides a unique opportunity to combine a theoretical discussion with empirical investigation.

Simultaneously, in Peace and Conflict research concerning regional security, there exists a theoretical discussion about the spread of conflicts.¹⁴ Refugee-flows over state borders can be a factor that causes conflicts to spread, but is not closely investigated within this research field. A regional security dimension implies that a conflict in one country sometimes create

⁹ Buzan (1991) p. 369-371

¹⁰ Buzan (1991) p. 3

¹¹ Buzan (1991) p. 210

¹² Buzan (1991) p. 190

¹³ Buzan (1991) p. 191

¹⁴ For a thorough investigation of this area see the Theoretical Framework section in Brosché, *The Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Three Western African States 1989-1995 - Exploring a Foreign-linked Factionalism Approach*, Uppsala University, 2004

spill-over effects to bordering countries in form of refugees.¹⁵ Thus, refugee-flows can be seen as a measurable consequence of wars in a region and is highly relevant in Africa since African countries for the past thirty years or more have experienced repeated and sustained mass influxes of refugees.¹⁶ The refugee issue can then be considered a tangible security problem that hypothetically can fit in on all security levels elaborated by Buzan. The challenge for this study is thus to apply a security perspective to the refugee issue in Zambia.

2.1 Security on different levels

The relationship between individual, national, regional and international levels of security is very complex. Buzan, however, argues that these levels should not be seen as strict categorizations or that security can be isolated for treatment at any single level. The different levels are merely a tool for managing the security conception.¹⁷

The natural starting point is the individual security level that focuses on individual human beings. Human beings are the prime source of one other's insecurity since individuals are embedded in a human environment where social, economic and political threats arise. These threats imply a great dilemma: how to balance freedom of action for the individual against the potential and actual threats that such freedom poses to others. Hence, in discussing individual security the link between personal security and security of the state soon becomes apparent. The individual citizen is confronted with many threats from the state. Buzan groups them in four general categories, threats from domestic law processes, threats arising from the administrative or political institutions of the state, threats arising from the struggles over control of the state's institutions and finally threats arising from the state's foreign policy. Individuals or sub-groups can also constitute a threat to national security in the form of for example terrorists, separatists, or political attacks. Another important aspect in the discussion about individual security is the role individuals play as leaders of the state. The leaders of a state have their own security perceptions that come to influence state policy. This is more prevalent in a centralized dictatorship than in a pluralist democracy.

The next security level, national security, is highly dependent on how one defines the nature of the state. Buzan sees the state as being built by three main components: the idea of the

¹⁵ See for example Fjelde (2003)

¹⁶ Jacobsen (2002) p. 577

¹⁷ Buzan (1991) p. 26

state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state.¹⁸ The national security of different states depends much on how these different components are interacting. Moreover, national security problem differs substantially from state to state and different components are vulnerable to different types of threats. National security is for that reason a multidimensional problem for which it is impossible to devise a universal definition.¹⁹

In structuring the discussion on national security the distinction between weak and strong states is vital. According to Buzan a “strong state” refers to a high degree of socio-political cohesion and a “strong power” to the traditional distinction between states, i.e. their military and economical strength in relation to others. Consolidation and time to mature are important factors for creating a strong state but there are many factors that can explain why a state is weak. All weak states share the problem of high levels of domestic threats towards the government. National security for strong states can be viewed as protecting the components of the state (the idea, the physical base and the institutional expression) from outside threats. In a weak state the components of the state are much more indistinctive; this makes it harder to define a clear object of national security. In a weak state it is therefore often more appropriate to discuss security issues with individuals, organisations or different contending groups as the prime object. In other words, threats to national security can be internal or external and this distinction is crucial since these threats work in different ways. Buzan concludes that the creation of stronger states is a precondition for both individual and national security. However, it is also important to be aware that the creation of strong states can threaten the security of some individuals and some groups.²⁰

Visible and well defined security threats often get higher priority than issues that are considered more complex and vague such as global warming for instance.²¹ This example is relevant on the highest analytical security level, namely the international security level. Many researchers have described the international system as one of anarchy, and that the maturity of the states living in this anarchy affects the security. An immature anarchy would be plagued by fear, distrust, envy and indifference because it has not developed any form of international society. On the other hand in a very mature anarchy would all states be strong and stability in the system would be in place regardless of the relative power within the system. A mature

¹⁸ Buzan (1991) p. 65

¹⁹ Buzan (1991) p. 96-97

²⁰ Buzan (1991) p. 96-107

²¹ Buzan (1991) p. 140

anarchy requires that the states have a strong domestic cohesion and are well defined. According to Buzan the present anarchy is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum: not calm and stable but well removed from unbridled chaos. A discussion about anarchy and maturity shows the need to analyse both the system and its separate parts. Anarchy has been said to become more mature the longer time passes. From another perspective the global security threats have increased and forced the system to mature.²²

Another way of describing the security issue is through regional security and security complexes. One benefit with this level of analysis is that it comes closer than the system-level to describe the operating environment for most national security policy-makers since almost every country can relate to at least one security complex. Security complex is a way of structuring up the security issue and can be studied both internally and between the different complexes. Security complexes deal with local rivalries between states within a region, but also include larger external powers with interests in the region. Rivalry between external powers usually compels them to support different sides in the regional security complexes and this support in turn often reinforces the existing local rivalries. According to Buzan, security complexes are a good way of analysing security since they make it possible to take into account macro level (great power interests), middle level (regional states) and micro level issues (domestic affairs). There exists mutuality between the different levels that is an important aspect to be aware of. Two important factors that have resulted in a diffusion of power are decolonisation and the ability for weaker states to possess modern weapons. This diffusion has made the states at the bottom of the power hierarchy more important for the international system as a whole than earlier. Weaker states are no longer just pawns in a game but have national interests on their own that can affect the system. The security complex attempts to take these developments into account.²³

In conclusion, since security issues are present on individual, national, regional, and system levels it is important to maintain a broad perspective while analysing security.²⁴

²² Buzan (1991) p. 175-181

²³ Buzan (1991) p. 221-225

²⁴ Buzan (1991) p. 368

3. Research Design

3.1 Case selection

Zambia was chosen for this study for a number of strategic reasons. First of all, Zambia is geographically located in Southern Africa, a region characterized by its conflicts and, accordingly, described in theoretical terms as a regional security complex by the researcher and security expert Barry Buzan.²⁵ Zambia is, moreover, in the interesting position of being situated in the centre of this complex surrounded by as many as eight countries. Zambia's location, but even more important, their encouraging and supportive politics during the struggle for independence in neighbouring countries, early on gave the country an important political role in the region. In addition, the political backing was accompanied by humanitarian support in the form of giving asylum seekers a safe haven. Since independence in 1964 Zambia has thus hosted a large numbers of refugees from predominantly neighbouring countries. Along with Malawi and Zimbabwe, Zambia is one of the three main refugee-hosting countries in Southern Africa.²⁶ Secondly, the country has, in contrast to many of its neighbouring countries in Southern Africa and in spite of its geographically exposed position, never experienced war. Zambia can therefore be considered a relatively stable and secure country for its citizenry but also for the refugees given asylum in the country.

Finally, Zambia is an interesting case to study as there are two parallel and active processes being undertaken in the refugee policy at the moment, on one hand a process of local integration of refugees, on the other, a process of helping the refugees return to their country of origin. In 2002 the government launched the local integration project, the Zambian Initiative (ZI), as an instrument to prevent approaching clashes between Zambians and the refugees. One of the ambitions of ZI is poverty reduction. An essential part is to locally integrate refugees with Zambians living in the same area by setting up joint projects.²⁷ This initiative has created an interest from other countries to initiate similar projects. The ZI pilot project has already generated a 2004 workshop where different countries participated with the purpose to replicate ZI in their own countries.²⁸ The second policy process, which works in tandem with ZI, is an extensive repatriation project enabling the return of Angolan refugees to

²⁵ Buzan (1991) p. 190, see *Theoretical Framework* in this paper

²⁶ Mijerere (1995) p. 8

²⁷ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

²⁸ Mission Report (2004) p.1 and El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

their homeland, as a consequence of the end of the war in 2002. This repatriation project has expanded since it started in 2003 and will most likely continue until 2006.²⁹

Another reason for choosing Zambia for this study is that both the *Zambian Initiative* and the repatriation project involve a vast number of different actors; from the international community through UNHCR and IOM to different Non Governmental Organisations (NGO's) with varying mandates. Taking advantage of the large number of actors involved in the actual formulation and execution of the refugee policy may enhance the possibility of obtaining a more comprehensive picture of the overall refugee situation in Zambia.

3.1.1 Case selection within Zambia

In order to cover the *Zambian Initiative* and the ongoing repatriation project, which both focus on Angolan refugees, two main regions have been selected, namely the Western Province and the North Western Province of Zambia. These provinces border on Angola and for that reason inhabit a majority of the Angolan refugees in Zambia. The choice of the Western province was obvious since *ZI* so far only has been launched in three districts, which are all situated in the Western province. Since *ZI* concerns both refugees and local Zambians, we visited a refugee settlement named *Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement* and a refugee camp called *Nangweshi Refugee Camp*, but also the surrounding areas where you find self settled refugees that are more or less integrated with Zambians. Although the main focus in the Western Province was *ZI*, the ongoing repatriation projects in the province were also considered with the objective of getting a comprehensive picture of the repatriation. This way of conducting the study made it possible to cover both the repatriation in the form of bus convoys but also the repatriation undertaken by flights on a grassroots level. However, the repatriation process was studied in more detail in the North Western province that holds the largest refugee camp in Zambia, called *Meheba Refugee Settlement*. At this camp, Angolan refugees are already decreasing in numbers since the repatriation is going on in full scale.

Further on, *Meheba Refugee Settlement*, *Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement* and *Nangweshi Refugee Camp*, to a great extent employ the same implementing and operating actors as Government Republic of Zambia (GRZ), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

²⁹ No exact policy concerning the duration of the repatriation project is formed at the moment, but according to Mrs. Chawila at Ministry of Home Affairs, Commissioner for Refugees, the repatriation is due to continue until the end of 2006, Chawila (2004) November 12, 2004

(UNHCR), Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), Christian Outreach Relief and Development (CORD) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which facilitates a comparison of similarities and differences between these three cases. Two of the selected schemes are also very old; *Meheba Refugee Settlement* was founded in 1971,³⁰ whilst *Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement* was founded in 1966, which makes it not only the oldest refugee settlement in Zambia, but in the whole of Africa.³¹ *Nangweshi Refugee Camp* on the other hand opened as late as 2000 after renewed fighting in Angola. For this reason, as a contrast to the older refugee hosting areas, *Nangweshi Refugee Camp* serves as an interesting case to study as well.³²

3.2 Time period

This field study was carried out in Zambia between September 15 and November 14 of 2004. Approximately three weeks in total were spent in the refugee camps and their surrounding areas to study ZI and the repatriation of Angolan refugees. The first two weeks were spent in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, where we gathered information and interviewed the relevant organisations and government representatives. During the third week, which was spent in the North Western province, we followed a refugee convoy to the Angolan border whereas the rest of the time was spent in the *Meheba Refugee Settlement*. The time in the Western province was spent in the *Nangweshi Refugee Camp* and the *Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement*, and in the regions outside the refugee camps to gain a comprehensive picture of ZI and the ongoing repatriation. The last period of time was spent in Lusaka for follow-up questions from our own findings in the field.

From a time perspective, the approach of this field study is the current refugee policy in Zambia. Obviously, it is natural to take advantage of the exclusive information found on the ground at that particular time. Historical references are also present, but still, the focus is on current refugee related policies.

3.3 Method and material

The methodological approach in this essay is qualitative. This implies that focus is on taking advantage of unique facts and information that can only be found in the country of

³⁰ Mijero, (1995) p. 6

³¹ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

³² Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

investigation. The focus on gathering unique information made it more or less necessary in an initial phase to look over a broad spectrum not to exclude any valuable information. The approach for this study has been concentrated to find information at different levels: a high policy authority level, a lower organisational level and a grassroots level. The last level entails meeting with the refugees themselves and the staff working with refugee-related issues on a daily basis. A starting-point for interpreting the material has been the security perspective developed in the book *People, States and Fear*, by researcher Barry Buzan.³³ Our opinion is that this theoretical security perspective is of great merit as it distinguishes between important and less important facts, and makes it possible to take all the gathered material to a higher analytical level. The intention is to let the perspective win over the narrative zest. Buzan states that:

“The concept of security can be mapped in a general sense, but it can only be given specific substance in relation to concrete cases. Ideally, theoretical and case-study work should inform and complement each other”.³⁴

This study can be seen as our contribution within this straggling field by combining a theoretical security perspective and a case study focusing on refugee issues.

Moreover, since refugees are an international issue the paper contains a section about the international legal framework concerning refugees. This allows us in a more enhanced manner to put the Zambian refugee policy into a wider perspective. The refugee policy in Zambia is very complex and involves many different actors. The purpose is to identify and interview the key actors that deal with the refugee issue in order to get the most comprehensive picture possible. The focus is on four main sectors: government officials, UN-agencies, NGO's and the university. In addition, refugees were interviewed in the refugee camps and during the repatriation. The most important department concerning the refugee policy in the government sector is the *Ministry of Home Affairs* where the *Office of Commissioner for Refugees* is located. Some refugee issues are also managed under *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, where the permits for visiting the refugee camps are approved. In the second sector, the UN-agency that has been most central for this field study is UNHCR, *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, and IOM, *International Organisation for Migration*. UNHCR has an important coordination mandate for the refugee situation in Zambia and contributes with expertise in

³³ It is worth mentioning that Buzan's book is from 1991, and that the more long-term effects of the end of the cold war were not in place at the time, which might influence the book.

³⁴ Buzan (1991) p. 97

several of the different sectors concerning refugees. Their main task, however, is to protect the refugees since their home countries are not able to do so.³⁵ IOM is also a UN-agency that deals with refugees, but unlike UNHCR they are only responsible for transportation and logistics. The third sector, or the NGO scene, is in a poor country with many refugees such as Zambia generally very diverse, with several NGO's working with different and often overlapping issues. The majority of the NGO's interviewed in this study have a relationship with UNHCR. This makes it important to acknowledge the important distinction between *implementing* and *operating* partner for UNHCR. The former get all, or part, of their funding from UNHCR in comparison to the latter who has other funding. The implementing partner that is most central for this study is *Lutheran World Federation*, since they are responsible for several sectors in the refugee camps of interest for this study. However, *Jesuit Refugee Service* and *The International Committee of the Red Cross* are two important operating partners to UNHCR.

The fourth sector we were in contact with was *The University of Zambia*, situated in Lusaka and the only university in the country. The objective was to obtain an academic view of the refugee politics in Zambia. The last target group consisted of the refugees themselves. Ideally, a fruitful approach would have been to combine quantitative and qualitative research but with the time at hand we decided to only carry out qualitative interviews. This approach entails certain validity problems since it does not cover a satisfying range of the population of refugees to obtain statistically valid results. On the other hand, the approach makes it possible to get a much greater understanding of the way in which some refugees perceive their situation.

The procedure of the interviews with the different NGO's, government officials and UN actors was conducted in three stages. At the first stage, they were contacted and interviewed in Lusaka to obtain the policy at a high level. Subsequently representatives were interviewed in the refugee camps to see how the policy was implemented at a grassroots level. Qualitative interviews were thus used to describe the implementation of the *Zambian Initiative* and the repatriation project. The purpose of these interviews was to give the study depth and to pick up sentiments and general trends within the government, UNHCR and the NGO's that are not explicitly expressed in policy-documents or official statistics. Also, this approach makes it possible to shed light on the relationship and possible discrepancies between the government

³⁵ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

policy and the assessment of the situation by the implementing parties. In the second stage, the interviews were conducted in the field. The third stage consisted of follow-up interviews. During the period after visiting the refugee schemes we contacted most of the central actors one more time. The reason for this follow-up contact was to see how the organisations at a high policy level answered the new questions that had arisen during our time in the field. At this stage we had much more detailed information about the practicalities and had been exposed to the views of some refugees, which facilitated specific questioning. Furthermore, it was possible to have a more critical approach after studying the situation on the ground.

When carrying out this study, we employed mainly one technique of collecting data: the interview. These interviews were complemented by another form of primary sources, namely government directives, policy statements, and statistics. Though primary sources have been the focal point for this field study some secondary sources, such as literature on refugee issues, have been used for a more comprehensive picture.

Finally, the role of the authors in this study has somewhat resembled that of a reporter more so than usual in academic studies. The reason for this is obvious: we see things with our own eyes and our ambition has been to take into account as much of the unique information we could find on location as possible. However, this does not mean we have lost our critical/academic glasses. Another condition worth mentioning is that we did not have a supervisor for the field study which means that all theoretical, methodological, and empirical decisions during the researching process have been done solely by the authors.

4. International Legal Framework

The refugee issue received serious attention from the international community when the UN-agency *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) was established in 1950. The first comprehensive and universal instrument for dealing with refugees and refugee protection was adopted the following year by the United Nations and is called the 1951 Refugee Convention. To this day, this convention remains the central instrument of international refugee protection, and Zambia stands as one of the countries having signed it.³⁶ This convention recognises refugees that leave their home country for another because of fear

³⁶ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

of persecution, religion, political opinion or because they belong to a certain racial or social group. In 1969 the mandate of the 1951 Convention was expanded and the Convention of 1969 was adopted. In addition to the principles included in the 1951 Convention, factors that deal with stability in the country of origin, such as foreign occupation or domination, were included. According to the 1969 Convention, refugees are granted asylum in another country because of war or other instabilities, which is the case of the Angolan refugees in Zambia.³⁷ These new paragraphs give the refugees the status of *prima facie*, and refer to the refugees as a group of people opposed to addressing them as individuals.³⁸ However, the UN Refugee Convention is not the most frequently applied convention in Zambia today. The convention that most refugees claim refugee status from is the African Union (AU)-convention from 1969. The major differences between these two conventions are that the AU-convention is broader and more relevant to the African context as it includes recognition of people fleeing from:

- Civil conflicts
- Foreign domination
- Foreign aggression
- Events seriously disturbing civil order³⁹

UNHCR's role in this situation is to protect and find durable solutions for refugees. UNHCR regards repatriation as the primary durable solution for refugees. A major reason supports their stance: the returning refugees can assist in rebuilding their own nation which enables them to start a new life as real citizens. This can be seen in a context where refugees, even with asylum, do not have political rights, as to participate in elections. The second durable solution according to UNHCR is the local integration of refugees. This implies that refugees stay in the hosting country and become assimilated and integrated: they may have the right to work, to marry, and to go to school. It is, however, difficult for the Angolan refugees, and refugees in general, to get citizenship in Zambia. An important task for UNHCR in Zambia is to work with the government to make sure the refugees are granted socio-economic rights, such as allowance to trade and to go to school.⁴⁰ Finally, the third durable solution that UNHCR recognises is resettlement, in other words that a refugee resettles in a third country. At least one of three components must be in place in considering resettlement. The first one is

³⁷ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

³⁸ Mulenga (2004) September 23, 2004

³⁹ Mulenga (2004) September 23, 2004

a security aspect: if a refugee is not safe, that UNHCR or the hosting country are not able to guarantee protection in the hosting country and the refugee does not have the option to repatriate, then resettlement is an opportunity. The Scandinavian countries, Canada, and the United States are countries that often assume responsibility for resettling refugees. Secondly, refugees can be resettled when no other durable solution is available. This can be the case for a refugee that has been in a hosting country for a very long time but still has not integrated and repatriation is not an option. The third component is family reunion. If a refugee for instance has a family member in another country, resettlement can under certain circumstances take place since it is a policy of UNHCR that families should be together. The number of resettled refugees is very low, both in comparison with refugees that repatriate and with refugees that integrate in the hosting country. Further, there exist two different conditions under which a refugee can resettle: in emergency or non-emergency situations. In the former, UNHCR is proactive whilst in the latter, foreign governments inform UNHCR how many refugees they are able to accept and from which country.⁴¹

5. Description of the Zambian refugee policy

”The government of Zambia (GRZ) has been an exemplary host to the refugees, co-operating with international humanitarian organisations and agencies and providing opportunities for the refugees, within their means, to become productive members of the community.”⁴²

This is a common view of Zambian refugee policy, but is this statement entirely accurate, or is reality more nuanced? This rhetorical question demonstrates that there is never only one way of describing a phenomenon, such as in the case of the Zambian refugee policy. People we have interviewed naturally frame reality from their own perceptions; our intention is, however, to describe the Zambian refugee policy from various points of view. In the end, this study is still a description from the perspective of the authors.

Zambia’s modern refugee situation dates back to the 1960s when the first Angolan refugees crossed the border into the western part of Zambia. At that time the Angolan refugees were

⁴⁰ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

⁴¹ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004 and Mijere (1995) p. 6-7

⁴² Zambian Initiative (2002) p. 1

fleeing from the ongoing war for independence from their Portuguese colonial masters.⁴³ Several other countries in Southern Africa also fought wars for liberation during this period. The government of Zambia, or more explicitly, Kenneth Kaunda, the first president in the country, was distinguished by his dedication and support for the independence struggles in the region and hence committed to the refugee issue that followed. Professor Mabwe at the University of Lusaka states that Zambia “paid a high price for its principals”.⁴⁴ Moreover, Zambia’s geographical position surrounded by war-torn neighbours has rendered the country an important safe haven historically. The objectives for hosting refugees have, however, changed over time. During the independence struggles the objectives for hosting refugees was based on an anti-colonial interest - to gather the freedom fighters into the country and help them get ride of colonialism. According to Mrs. Chaiwila who works for the government in Zambia, the reasons today for hosting refugees are humanitarian and not political. From her point of view Zambia has an obligation to look after the refugees. Today GRZ tries to maintain a civilian character of the camps illustrated by not granting refugee status to people considered to fight their home government. This follows from the important policy that refugees should not use Zambia as a base for involvement in the war in their home country.⁴⁵ Professor Mabwe on the other hand means that the present government does not have the same dedication and that the refugee policy is not as open as before. One possible explanation is the more indistinct line between right and wrong in today’s conflicts compared to the situation during the liberation wars. Zambia’s own experiences of being a colony was by then more present and may also have increased the understanding for their neighbouring countries and hence the dedication to come to their rescue.⁴⁶

The dominant procedure for hosting refugees has since the 1960s been to place the refugees in agricultural settlements, such as Meheba and Mayukwayukwa, the oldest settlements in Zambia. The vast availability of land in the country has always been a pre-condition for this policy. Another important factor has also been the internal migration within the country. Zambia is, as a matter of fact, one of the most urban countries in Africa as a consequence of the prevalent desire among many Zambians to live in cities. This pattern of migration has made it reasonable to locate the refugees into rural districts since these rural areas need further

⁴³ Chanda (1995) p. 24

⁴⁴ Mabwe (2004) October 21, 2004

⁴⁵ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁴⁶ Mabwe (2004) September 26, 2004

cultivation to meet the cities growing need for food.⁴⁷ In addition to Meheba and Mayukwayukwa, which are constructed for a long-term perspective, Zambia currently also has four short-term camps, namely Nangweshi, Kala, Mwanga and Ukwimi.⁴⁸

Whether a refugee lives in a settlement or a camp, it is not customary for Zambia to provide the refugees permanent citizenship. This can be contrasted to other countries in Africa also characterized by their generous refugee policies, such as Tanzania and Uganda, nations that more frequently give citizenship to their refugees. The open-door policy of these countries that have given citizenship to an extensive part of their refugees has however changed somewhat since the start to host refugees in the 1960s. In the mid 1990s, for example Tanzania experienced a mass influx of refugees from war torn countries such as Rwanda and Burundi. As a consequence Tanzania decided to close its borders to these countries to prevent any further refugee influxes.⁴⁹ According to Mrs. Chaiwila, the reason that Zambia is restrictive about citizenship is because of the bad experiences of Tanzania: when the conflict in Burundi came to an end most of the Burundi refugees in Tanzania returned to their home country and left a huge knowledge-shortage in Tanzania with bad repercussion for the society.⁵⁰

In addition to refugees there exist labour immigrants in Zambia. The Zambian policy towards non-refugee immigrants is to welcome qualified labour that Zambia has a shortage of (for example doctors), but people with other professions are not allowed to get a working permit in the country.⁵¹ However, the majority of the immigrants in Zambia are refugees from the war-torn surrounding countries and the absolute majority of these people are not granted citizenship. The issue of citizenship remains unresolved, as appeared by the many Angolans that want to stay in Zambia. Government representative Mrs. Chaiwila acknowledges that addressing the fate of the Angolan refugees that do not want to return to their home country is a problematic issue. At the moment the law prohibits these refugees to obtain citizenship in Zambia. The issue is, however, on the political agenda, and Mrs. Chaiwila emphasizes that Zambia is entering an era where it is urgent that the government looks closely at this policy.

⁴⁷ Mwanza (1995) p. 52

⁴⁸ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁴⁹ Relief Web (2002) March 11, 2002

⁵⁰ Chaiwila (2004) September 15, 2004

⁵¹ Chaiwila (2004) September 15, 2004

Since the conflict in Angola has come to an end the refugee issue, and specifically the issue of citizenship, is a most relevant one.⁵²

The tough regulations in regards to citizenship are illustrated by the fact that marriage between a Zambian and a refugee does not, automatically, lead to Zambian citizenship for the spouse. Harsh regulations such as these stem from a past of misuse. The refugees that are offered the possibility to repatriate but decline will, if no special circumstances are in place, lose their refugee status and instead get immigration status. A regulation that is important for the immigration status is the need for a work permit which enhances the chances for staying. Without the work permit the refugee has to go back to their country of origin and meet the criteria to receive an immigration permit.⁵³ Mrs. Marguerite de Lafferiere at the JRS is critical towards the high fees for especially the work permit.⁵⁴ Philip Dikunwa at CORD also express a critical view when he says that even educated refugees face a lot of problems with employment since a work permit costs a lot of money.⁵⁵ The price for this permit is 313 dollars and a permit for starting a business is 25.000 dollars. Mrs. de Lafferiere says:

“In Zambia foreigners and refugees are falling under the same regulations and this rule is for all foreigners, but this creates problems since no refugee has this kind of money or assets as in a computer or a house.”⁵⁶

Moreover, she states that refugees that have been caught without a permit can be jailed for a year, or sometimes even more.⁵⁷ This problem was also pointed out in a discussion we had with some Liberian refugees in Meheba, who had spent several months in a prison in Lusaka before going to Meheba. Their view of the Zambian prison conditions was not very elevating for GRZ. The prisoners were forced to live in a room with more than a hundred other people, a room that was so small and crowded that they were not able to lie down for months, instead they had to sit up all the time.

A professional with a more positive view of the Zambian refugee policy is the UNHCR field officer in Nangweshi. She states, after working twelve years for UNHCR, that Zambia is the best country in Africa for a refugee seeking asylum in. She bases her claim on the argument

⁵² Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁵³ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁵⁴ de Lafferiere (2004) September 24, 2004

⁵⁵ Dikunwa (2004) October 15, 2004

⁵⁶ de Lafferiere (2004) September 24, 2004

⁵⁷ de Lafferiere (2004) September 24, 2004

that the nationals are friendly, that the refugees receive land when it is possible, and that there exists social and economic integration.⁵⁸ In an attempt to discern the underlying causes for this generosity Mrs. Chaiwila answers that GRZ never has taken benefits into account for their refugee policy and that the reasons for hosting refugees are strictly humanitarian. She also rejects the assertion that economical objectives are a possible cause for having a generous refugee policy. Although the presence of the international community, which follows from hosting refugees, generates money in the country Mrs. Chaiwila rejects the argument since the costs for hosting refugees are higher than the incomes of doing so.⁵⁹ Mrs Chaiwila develops this argument by claiming that although some parts of the implementation of the refugee policies in Zambia are funded by UNHCR (exemplified by her workplace - Office of Commissioner for Refugees at Ministry of Home Affairs) the funding is not sufficient to cover the costs for the GRZ.⁶⁰

The researcher Allast Mwanza offers another perspective in the book *African Refugees and Human Rights in Host Countries – The Long-Term Demographic, Environmental, Economic, Social, and Psychological Impacts of Angolan Refugees in Zambia* and elaborates his view in the chapter “The Economic Contribution of Angolan Refugees to Zambia”. He asserts that the presence of refugees leads to an increased influx of resources from foreign donors, especially in the case of scheme-settled refugees, and that these resources will trickle down to the local host population over time.⁶¹ Another aspect is that Zambians are able to benefit from refugees by sharing the facilities that in the first place were built for the refugees, especially in the sectors of education, health, roads, and clean water. Hosting refugees also involves costs and one of these costs is the rising defence expenditure as a consequence of the higher risks from hosting refugees. Mwanza’s conclusion is that as the refugee programs mainly have been financed by UNHCR and other agencies, Zambia has benefited from their presence. Another beneficial factor for Zambia is the agricultural productivity of Angolan refugees in Meheba.⁶²

In conclusion, these different perspectives in the discussion about refugees from an economic viewpoint show the complexities of the issue.

⁵⁸ Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

⁵⁹ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁶⁰ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁶¹ Mwanza (1995) p. 50

⁶² Mwanza (1995) p. 73-75

5.1 Security and Zambian Refugee Policy

Security is the theoretical approach in this paper and is therefore considered to permeate all of its parts. However, under this headline we will focus on factors regarding Zambian refugee policy that more explicitly are security related and do not accurately belong under the other sections in chapter five.

To begin with, one imperative factor to keep in mind in the discussion about regional security in Southern Africa is that these countries were the last countries in the world to get their independence after colonial rule. The fact that these countries are relatively young as a consequence of being colonised is hence considered to affect their situation today. One visible repercussion is the amount of arms in the region that were left after the independence struggles. The resulting flow of arms, which is especially high from Congo, has created a significant degree of insecurity in the region. According to a representative from, South African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) cross border trade aggravates the situation and thus make the presence of arms the most tangible regional security problem in Southern Africa.⁶³ Further on, this problem is also relevant in the discussion about refugees, since weapons also exist in the refugee camps. This is illustrated by the fact that some firearms have been confiscated in Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement. However, the number of arms confiscated is not that extensive. One reason is that the control over arms starts when the refugees cross the border, a procedure which reduces the number of arms.⁶⁴

The security issue connected to refugees in the Western Province that has created most publicity, with start in 2002, is the issue of the Karavinas - the name for AK47 in a local Angolan language. The Karavinas neither refers to an organisation nor is it connected to actions that are co-ordinated in some way, but is just a name that has been put on some murder cases blamed on the refugees by the locals. The victims for the Karavinas are people suspected of being wizards and the procedure is that some locals pay a person to execute the suspected wizard, most of the time with an AK47. According to the head of the Police Department in Mayukwayukwa, Mr. Kashweka, local politicians exaggerate the Karavina issue as they try to gain popularity and win political points by using the refugees as an

⁶³ Habasonda (2004) October 21, 2004

⁶⁴ Maskeke (2004) October 19, 2004

insecurity issue.⁶⁵ This view is also supported by Professor Phiri at the University of Zambia. He claims that local politicians blame the refugees in order to find a reason for sending them back, but the politicians do not have any proof for their accusations, according to Professor Phiri.⁶⁶ This view of some of the politicians can partly be explained by tribalism, which is an important factor in the politics in the region. Mr. Kashweka means that since some politicians use this issue to gain political support, the refugees should not solely be blamed for the Karavina problem. He sees the Karavina issue as other crimes; it is not really that special. But he still recognises that there exist a lot of uncontrollable weapons in the country. However, an interesting aspect is that the crime rate is not higher in the district or along the borders, compared to other parts of Zambia. He concludes that the general situation in Mayukwayukwa and surroundings is fairly good and that the crimes in the settlement are committed both by refugees and locals, and once again emphasizes that the crimes are not more frequent here than in other communities. This makes the Zambian refugee policy a success concerning the security issue, as Mr. Kashweka sees it.⁶⁷

A crucial reason for seeing the refugee policy as a success from a security perspective is the government management of the refugees, according to Mrs. Chaiwila. With management she means to confront the issue and deal with it in its right context, and to set up mechanisms and to have resources. Moreover, she highlights the good relationship between GRZ and UNHCR as an important factor. The relationship has from her point of view been really good from the beginning and UNHCR has had a very clear policy from the start.⁶⁸ One government policy in order to decrease the security risks is to deny refugee status to refugees who are considered to fight their home government. The refugees are hence not allowed to use Zambia as a base for involvement in the war in their home country.⁶⁹ Another important policy is identification of refugees. The objective for screening the refugees is for GRZ to have more control over them with regard to their purpose for entering the country. If a refugee is identified as an ex-combatant he is moved to a special camp solely for ex-combatants, namely *Ukwimi Refugee Camp* in the South-Eastern part of Zambia. Ukwimi consists of a mix of nationalities but at the same time the refugees have a common background as ex-combatants. The ex-combatants

⁶⁵ Kashweka (2004) October 19, 2004

⁶⁶ Phiri (2004) September 26, 2004

⁶⁷ Kashweka (2004) October 19, 2004

⁶⁸ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁶⁹ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

are also surrounded by harder regulations compared to other refugees. An example is that they have to wait for one year as asylum seekers before they can get refugee-status.⁷⁰

Another important security measurement taken with regard to refugees and arms is to disarm and demobilise the refugees immediately when they arrive in Zambia. Further on, the refugee camps are strategically located to enhance security: hence they are not placed near the border to the countries where the refugees came from or close to each other. The refugees are also forbidden to practice politics in the camps. If they however want to act politically they need to leave Zambia and act via the democratic process in their own country.⁷¹ Another security feature is the attempt to place different sides in a conflict in different schemes. This policy is illustrated by the differing prospects of Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement and Nangweshi Refugee Camp. A representative for UNHCR believes that the ongoing repatriation eventually will lead to all facilities in Nangweshi being handed over to the government since the camp is solely inhabited of Angolan refugees.⁷² According to the vice-RO in Mayukwayukwa, Mr. Sibaleya Chikuba, this settlement will however continue to play a role even after the repatriation is completed. The reason for this is that some of the non-Angolan refugees can not be placed in other schemes as this would create an imminent risk of conflict with other refugees from their country, but from the opposite side in the war. For example, Rwandans in Mayukwayukwa are mostly Tutsis, or people of Hutu-Tutsi mixed heritage, in contrast to the domination of Hutus in the other schemes. A similar argument is also valid for the Congolese refugees. Hence, since GRZ has the policy of keeping groups from different sides in a conflict in separate camps, there is still a role to be played by Mayukwayukwa.⁷³

Despite these security measurements by GRZ, some security problems do exist. For instance we met some Congolese refugees in Meheba who said that they were afraid of some of the Rwandans they were living with and hence feared for their own security. These Congolese alleged that they dreaded to go out during night-time and talked about fights among different refugee groups in Meheba where people had even been killed. However, it is important to say that we have not been able to verify this information from any independent source. It is obviously a bit problematic to draw any clear conclusions in this issue due to the limited number of Congolese refugees we came in contact with. But still, most of the refugees who

⁷⁰ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

⁷¹ Chaiwila (2004) September 15, 2004

⁷² Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

⁷³ Chikuba (2004) October 19, 2004

approached us and asked us to assist them to get out of Meheba were Congolese. Maybe this was a sign that the Congolese did face the most desperate situation in the settlement. However, another way of interpreting the situation is that they exaggerated their fear in order to enhance their chances for resettlement. A criterion for being qualified for resettlement is a genuine fear for your personal security.⁷⁴ The head of the police office in Mayukwayukwa emphasizes that many Congolese refugees tend to exaggerate their fear. He claims that every time the police have received an alarm about this issue and investigated the situation no real threat has been present. Still, they take every alarm seriously to ensure the security of the refugees.⁷⁵

The applications for resettlement tend to follow country lines and in the refugee schemes we visited, the Congolese are heavily overrepresented. Remarkable, no Angolans have applied for resettlement.⁷⁶ Beside the explanation that Congolese refugees feel more threatened in the schemes than other refugees, another explanation can be that a majority of the Congolese have an urban background and hence have a harder time to adjusting to the rural life in the schemes than the Angolans, where a huge majority have a rural background.⁷⁷

Lastly with relevance to security, in Mayukwayukwa and the surrounding areas the locals and refugees are well integrated but still some problems exist in the aspect. One of these problems is that the Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) clinic in the settlement provides better services than the GRZ hospital. The AHA clinic is only open for refugees and not locals, a fact which has made some locals feel neglected. Further problems that the locals in an increasing extent have made complaints about are the presence of arms in the region brought to the area by refugees, the cutting down of trees and the killing of animals, also caused by the refugees. These complaints have increased with the large influx of refugees in 1999 and a reason for that was that the large influx forced some locals to move as a consequence of the new extension of the refugee camp. The new extension was placed to affect as few locals as possible, but still some of them had to move. The reason for giving the refugees more attention and concentrating the efforts on this target group is explained by the fact that refugees are more vulnerable than ordinary Zambians. This policy has unfortunately created tensions between refugees and locals as described above. The launching of ZI shall thus be

⁷⁴ Maskeke (2004) October 19, 2004

⁷⁵ Kashweka (2004) October 19, 2004

⁷⁶ Maskeke (2004) October 19, 2004

⁷⁷ Mwanza (1995) p. 52

seen in this security context. Mr. Mulenga Chilando, working for LWF in Mayukwayukwa, with ZI as a partner, emphasizes that ZI has helped to bridge the gap and greatly decreased the potential for the mistrust among the locals to develop into clashes. He states that ZI has tried to bring two communities closer and that the risk of clashes has “definitely reduced” since ZI started their programs in the region.⁷⁸

5.2 Description and comparison of Meheba, Mayukwayukwa and Nangweshi

The first refugee settlement we visited was Meheba, the largest refugee settlement in Zambia, situated in the North-western province and founded in 1971. The settlement area is very vast 820 km² (which is larger than the whole country of Rwanda), and divided into eight different zones from A-H. Zones A-E are mainly inhabited by Angolan refugees, zone F mostly by Congolese and G mainly by Rwandans and Burundians. The last zone, H, is solely occupied of Angolans. However, the structure of the settlement is experiencing major change at the moment due to the ongoing repatriation. The Angolans who repatriate are leaving space in the centre of the settlement (Zone D) and creating migration to this area in Meheba. The repatriation has also brought a greater intermingling of nationalities within the settlement.⁷⁹

The second refugee settlement we visited was Mayukwayukwa, the oldest refugee settlement in Africa, founded in 1966. Mayukwayukwa resembles Meheba in structure and organisation. One striking difference between the two is that the domination of Angolan refugees is greater in Mayukwayukwa; a total 99 % of the refugees are Angolans. The final percent of refugees originate from Sudan, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda.⁸⁰ In contrast to Meheba and Mayukwayukwa the third refugee camp we visited, Nangweshi, does not provide any land for their refugees and is thus, considered a camp. Nangweshi was founded in 2000 as a way of dealing with the large new influxes of Angolan refugees which naturally implies that all refugees in the camp are Angolans.⁸¹ Exact statistics on the populations in the different schemes are problematic due to the repatriation in progress, but according to the UNHCR Newsletter, issue 4, 2004, Meheba hosts 28,704 refugees, Mayukwayukwa 19,683 and Nangweshi 26,529.⁸²

⁷⁸ Chilando (2004) October 19, 2004. ZI is fully elaborated in chapter 5.4.

⁷⁹ Mulenga (2004) October 7, 2004

⁸⁰ Maskeke (2004) October 19, 2004

⁸¹ Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

⁸² UNHCR Zambia (2004)

The government in Zambia (GRZ) has a regulation ruling that an international actor cannot directly operate in a refugee scheme. This policy implies that UNHCR has to go through a local implementing partner to run the schemes.⁸³ The management of the settlement is thus performed by the implementing partners on behalf of GRZ and UNHCR. In Meheba LWF/ZCRS (Zambian Christian Refugee Service) is the name of the organisation that has the overall responsibility for the camp and organizes most of the different actions provided for the refugees.⁸⁴ In Nangweshi the organisation CORD is the main implementing partner, whilst UNHCR in Mayukwayukwa has three different major implementing partners, namely AHA, LWF/ZCRS and CORD.⁸⁵ To exemplify the responsibilities of an implementing partner one can look at AHA which is responsible for health, sanitation and nutrition; the funding for which largely (90%) is provided by UNHCR.⁸⁶ There is an important distinction between implementing partners and operating partners. The implementing partners get their funding from UNHCR while the operating partners do not. JRS is one of the major operating partners that we came in contact with. JRS is not funded by UNHCR which facilitates an independent watchdog rule. JRS are trying to fill the gaps where the other organisations have failed.⁸⁷ Another independent organisation with activities in all the refugee settlements and camps in Zambia is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has operated in the country for two years. Their work consists of tracing missing persons and is mainly conducted by two employed tracing officers stationed in Lusaka and sent out to the different refugee areas. The humanitarian mission is to create family links, a sort of social service for refugees who themselves do not possess their own tools of communication.⁸⁸ Lastly, GRZ are present in the schemes in the form of a Refugee Officer (RO) in each of these locations. One important responsibility of the governmental staff in the settlements is the provision of gate passes, without which the refugees are not allowed to leave the settlements.⁸⁹

To provide a comprehensive picture of the activities in the refugee settlements one has to include food distribution, one of the main responsibilities among the organisations in the refugee schemes. In Meheba, LWF is responsible for supervising the monthly distribution of food from World Food Program (WFP) to the refugees which includes maize, oil, salt and

⁸³ Chilando (2004) October 19, 2004

⁸⁴ Manda (2004) October 7, 2004

⁸⁵ Maskeke (2004) October 19, 2004

⁸⁶ Wamulwange (2004) October 19, 2004

⁸⁷ Mulenga (2004) September 16, 2004

⁸⁸ Zulu & Mungongi (2004) September 30, 2004

⁸⁹ Manda (2004) October 6, 2004

beans or peas.⁹⁰ First, the government prepares the distribution lists and then the actual distribution is carried out with the help of elected refugees within the different communities.⁹¹ According to a WFP representative in Meheba, this refugee involvement facilitates and guarantees a fair distribution process by identifying the people that are trying to exploit the system to get more food than what they are qualified for. In addition, as we learned from a discussion with a refugee working for WFP in zone G in Meheba, new food distributors are elected if the current ones do not do their work properly. The food distribution follows a similar process in Nangweshi and Mayukwayukwa as in Meheba.⁹²

The food distribution in Meheba and Mayukwayukwa is, however, restricted to a limited period of time. This is not the case in Nangweshi where the refugees lack their own land. LWF is the organisation that takes care of the newly arrived refugees in both Meheba and Mayukwayukwa. When the refugees have spent one week in a transit centre they are provided a piece of land to cultivate. The agricultural skill of the refugees, and the labour they put into the land, is central since they are supposed to be independent and non-reliant on the food distribution programs after two years.⁹³ People that are exempted from this two-year-rule in Meheba and Mayukwayukwa are vulnerable persons who are not able to provide for themselves including mentally or physically disabled, or orphans and elders that lack any family links within the settlement.⁹⁴

The refugee schemes we visited are all located in rural areas far away from larger cities. This location implies that the refugees are expected to adopt an agricultural lifestyle. During our visits to the settlements we experienced that refugees with varying backgrounds have different views of their situation. Meheba seems to be a fairly good place for people with an agricultural background since they have the opportunity to farm a section of land and the soil is good. However, for people with an alternative background the situation seems to be much more difficult since the possibilities of other employment are very limited. These differences in background tend to follow country lines, for example, a big portion of the Congolese have urban backgrounds whilst the number of urban-based Angolan are very few, illustrated by

⁹⁰ Manda (2004) October 6, 2004 and Kalelemba (2004) October 7, 2004

⁹¹ Kalelemba (2004) October 7, 2004

⁹² Meebeld (2004) October 16, 2004

⁹³ Manda (2004) October 6, 2004 and Meebeld (2004) October 16, 2004

⁹⁴ Kalelemba (2004) October 7, 2004

figures from UNHCR.⁹⁵ These differences are not as prevalent in Nangweshi or Mayukwayukwa since those schemes almost only inhabit Angolans. The agricultural production in Meheba is considered fairly successful since most people are self-reliant in food and because they even produce a food surplus. One explanation for this is geography, because of good soil and reliable rainfall. Other point to social factors in that the mix of people creates a skill-sharing which leads to good production. Also, since the alternatives for occupation for the refugees in Meheba is very limited they all have to work hard on the field.⁹⁶

In addition to food and land distribution, LWF is also responsible for other activities such as providing shelters, social and cultural activities, gender issues, HIV/AIDS prevention and education.⁹⁷ The government runs schools in the different schemes but since these are insufficient the implementing partners also provide some.⁹⁸ One problem that refugee children face when they repatriate is the language barrier. The schools in Zambia teach in English which makes it hard to follow the education in Angola, as Portuguese is the educational language there.⁹⁹

Help to self-help is a guiding principle that runs through the different schemes we visited. One extension of this principle is to provide suitable education that is helpful for the refugees both in their present situation but also when returning back to their home country. Some examples of such education are tailoring, reparation of bicycles and carpentry. Another benefit with this is that many of the refugees carry with them skills that they can teach other refugees and sometimes even the locals.¹⁰⁰ Projects of this type are present in all three schemes run by different NGO's sometimes partly sponsored by ZI.¹⁰¹

Clashes between refugees and locals are rare in Zambia. One possible explanation is that refugees and Zambians are separated and do not compete over the same land resources. The separation is carried out through permits. Refugees need a permit to leave the scheme and Zambians to legally enter. A pre-condition for Zambians to get the appropriate permit is to have a work or a business in the scheme. However, some problems do exist. The situation in

⁹⁵ Mwanza (1995) p. 52

⁹⁶ Mwanza (1995) p. 67-70

⁹⁷ Manda (2004) October 6, 2004

⁹⁸ Manda (2004) October 6, 2004

⁹⁹ Mulenga (2004) October 7, 2004

¹⁰⁰ Kalelemba (2004) October 7, 2004

¹⁰¹ Sinanga & Mwiya (2004) October 15, 2004 and Mumba (2004) October 16, 2004

Meheba with surroundings, for example, is problematic in that it creates jealousy among the locals. The reason is that the supply of water, schools and health institutions is better in Meheba than in the surrounding local villages and that locals were relocated to make place for the camp.¹⁰² Even though they mainly live separated, there still exist some integration due to business and marriages between refugees and Zambians.¹⁰³ The situation is similar in the other schemes and some problems arose in Mayukwayukwa in 1999 when locals were forced to move to make room for the extension of the settlement.¹⁰⁴ Despite this, officials at the different schemes agree that the relationship between locals and refugees is still very good and that ZI is going to make it even better.¹⁰⁵

5.3 The Zambian Initiative

The Zambian Initiative is a Development through Local Integration (DLI) project led by the Zambian Government and started in 2002.¹⁰⁶ The overall ambition with ZI is to recognize refugees as a positive force for alleviating poverty in refugee hosting areas and ultimately contributing to social integration, poverty reduction, security and stability in the region. The goal of the program is in a first phase to include 456,000 beneficiaries of whom 150,000 are refugees.¹⁰⁷ At the moment, however, ZI involves around 80,000 people divided into 14,000 households, where 60% are refugees and 40% are Zambians.¹⁰⁸ An important aspect of ZI is to improve relations between refugees and their host communities. The rural communities have had difficulties to fully accept the refugees and a reason is that GRZ did not give any warnings to the local rural host communities when confiscating land to the refugee schemes.¹⁰⁹

The ZI administration is classified as a small entity under the planning unit at the Provincial Administration. The government can, however, be regarded as the real employer of ZI. UNHCR also contributes to the program with for example fuel and logistics. The implementation of ZI is carried out in cooperation with various governmental departments, such as the departments of Education, Agriculture, Environment and Building.¹¹⁰ The vision

¹⁰² Mulenga (2004) October 7, 2004

¹⁰³ Ayuak (2004) October 8, 2004

¹⁰⁴ Chilando (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁰⁵ Mulenga (2004) October 7, 2004 and Chilando (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁰⁶ Mission Report (2004) p. 1

¹⁰⁷ The Zambian Initiative (2004) p. 3

¹⁰⁸ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

¹⁰⁹ Mijere (1995) p. 8

¹¹⁰ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

from the start has been to initially implement ZI in the Western Province and then expand to the North-Western Province and in a later stage also incorporate the Northern Province. The Zambian Initiative Programme Coordinator, Mr Ferjani, is however sceptical towards the fulfilment of this development. The reason for this scepticism is that the project is dependent on the international community, and even in an initial phase ZI did not receive the money estimated for the projects.¹¹¹

The frame of ZI existed for a couple of years, but it was first in April 2003 that the money reached the province and the actual implementation started.¹¹² The Western province was deliberately chosen for the initial implementation of ZI for a number of reasons. Firstly, this region is the poorest part of Zambia and many refugees live here. In addition, many self-settled Angolan refugees live along the border between Zambia and Angola, which make them a well suited group for a local integration program. Another key factor for launching the project in this area was the lack of sufficient occupation possibilities which made many refugees idle.¹¹³ Finally, the Western Province has hosted refugees for the longest period of time. Immigrants and refugees have come from Angola even before the country gained independence and the burden on resources has thus affected the long-time development of the region.¹¹⁴

The refugee issue must be seen in a context where people move to a poor area and thus create an extra burden on a service system that is already under heavy pressure. Self-settled refugees can even extend the problem since they are invisible in the system, and since the authorities provide services there only to cover the locals and not the refugees need.¹¹⁵ This is the reason for ZI to correspond with the national poverty reduction. According to the Provincial Coordinator at the Zambian Initiative, Mr. Walusiku, ZI started when resistance towards refugees from the local Zambians came into the open. In 2000 there was a large influx of new refugees from Angola and as a result a new refugee camp, namely Nangweshi, was founded. This created a sort of jealousy on behalf of the locals towards the refugees, and the situation created a potential risk for conflict between these two groups. Mr Walusiku says that the locals started to ask themselves how they benefited from the refugees and why the refugees

¹¹¹ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

¹¹² Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹¹³ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004 and The Zambian Initiative (2004) p. 5-6

¹¹⁴ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

¹¹⁵ Mwendapole (2004) September 28, 2004

were not placed somewhere else.¹¹⁶ At the same time, GRZ and UNHCR observed the emerging poverty and started to think about strategies on how to attack the problem of Zambians and refugees competing for the same resources. In this context, ZI was a most welcomed government initiative and right in time to prevent clashes between locals and refugees.¹¹⁷

ZI operates in three different districts in the Western province. Every district holds a number of LDC's -Local Development Communities, which is the basic operating unit in the field. Each LDC consists of between eight and ten villages. The current districts are Kauma with 10 LDC's (near Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement), Shangombo with 6 LDC's and Senanga also with 6 LDC's. Both Shangombo and Senanga are located in the Nangweshi Refugee Camp area. The overall ambition of the LDC's work is poverty reduction and to reduce the potentially negative impacts of refugees in the area.¹¹⁸ Each LDC makes up one constituency and six persons are elected as their representatives.¹¹⁹ There exist two different types of LDC. The first type is located in the refugee camps or near the camps and here, three refugees and three locals are elected, the chairman is a Zambian and the treasurer a refugee. The other type of LDC usually consists of only six Zambians, but exception exists since outspoken self-settled refugees are part of some of the LDC's. In total, five out of the 22 LDC's are of the first type where the refugees hold 50% of the posts. The refugee representation might however be higher in reality since most of the self-settled refugees are not considered to be refugees, neither by themselves nor by the locals. The self-settled refugees tend though to fall outside the LDC as a consequence of not being as politically active as the Zambians in the same LDC.¹²⁰ An interesting aspect in the discussion on LDC's is that in spite of being the representatives of a community, their work does not include politics (according to the definition they used at Zambian Initiative, Ministry of Home Affairs) but is only comprised of social economic activities.¹²¹ The responsible staff in the Zambian Initiative moreover asked the representatives in each LDC to write down their priorities:

1. Agricultural development
2. Health

¹¹⁶ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

¹¹⁷ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

¹¹⁸ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹¹⁹ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

¹²⁰ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹²¹ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

3. Education
4. Infrastructure¹²²

These priorities were employed as important guidelines when the implementation of ZI started in April of 2003 and are now visible in the projects that are supported by ZI in the Western Province. This is illustrated by the fact that agricultural programs are in place in all LDC's.¹²³ Previously, the main problem for increasing agricultural productivity in the Western Province was the uncertainty about inputs. The old system was a centrally managed credit system where the farmers could lend money from different governmental banks. The repayment of these loans were very low and caused many of the banks to collapse. In addition, these banks also suffered from mismanagement and corruption. The new system introduced by ZI made the LDC's themselves responsible for the loan applications. The availability of loans for farmers is necessary to secure inputs. The payback rates have, after the implementation of the new system, increased from around 20 percent to 97-98 percent. A major reason is that the LDC's themselves are responsible for whoever becomes a beneficiary of the system. In addition, since ZI made it clear that the money provided was a one-time contribution, it was important for the LDC's to have reliable lenders which, in turn created sensitiveness in the system. A positive consequence is thus that the capital of the LDC's has increased, which has created possibilities to invest the surplus in other community projects. In fact, the productivity within the agricultural sector has increased to such a large extent that WFP currently is buying some ZI produced food for distribution in the refugee camps. The positive consequences for the farmers are elevating: the agricultural inputs for the first year were seeds and fertilizers for half a hector but since the system has worked out well and the capital has grown, this second year more inputs have been supplied.¹²⁴

A problem that all farmers in this region face is the short rain-season which makes the improvement of wells an important part of ZI. The significance of this issue is illustrated by the fact that the greatest fear for ZI, according to the Provincial Coordinator, is a draught.¹²⁵ A successful way of decreasing the risks of water shortage has proven to be the ZI sponsored project of using hand-dug wells, realized in for example Nkenga LDC. Mr Walusiku informed us that a hand dug well costs less than 2,000 dollars compared with the cost of a bore hole that

¹²² El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

¹²³ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹²⁴ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹²⁵ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

is over 6,000 dollars. In addition, a hand-dug well also has higher durability. Another factor that has previously lead to shortage of food and, hence, to poverty is the mismanagement of the harvest storage. Every year up to 45 percent of the harvest was spoiled, which triggered ZI to start a project where new silos are built by bricks instead of grass.¹²⁶ These projects have successfully been introduced in for example Nkenga LDC where the villagers were very happy with the new silos that increased their food security significantly, and with the new hand-dug well that made the water supply more reliable. All LDC's have active agricultural projects in their community, but not all of them have other projects within their LDC. ZI receives many applications for different projects but do not have the funding to finance all of them. The final decision on which projects to support is made by the donors.¹²⁷ A positive aspect of this decision-making process is that the donors feel involved in the projects, which will hopefully increase the inclination to make donations. The current procedure is also consistent with the transparency aspect, a key concept within ZI.¹²⁸ However, there exist some drawbacks with this system. Some LDC's have for example been unaware of the decision procedure and wondered why other LDC's receives funds for their projects and not them. Further on, the elected members of the LDC where several projects are run get a monthly salary because of the heavy workload, which is not the case in LDC's conducting only agricultural projects.¹²⁹

From the aforementioned examples it may be concluded that a guiding principle for ZI is to aggregate responsibility to the locals, as a manner of assuring projects efficiency and sustainability. The dedicated people working for ZI that we came in contact with are careful to send the message to the communities that the ZI mandate is limited in time and that it is risky to misuse this fleeting chance for development. This local responsibility has also led to competitiveness among the different LDC's, which pushes the program further forward.¹³⁰ Another central objective of ZI is to work for the capital to stay in the region and to trickle down into the community, hence contributing to poverty reduction. With this perspective in mind it is obvious that ZI buys all building materials such as timber and bricks from the locals. Instead of using expensive cement, most of the buildings that are built by ZI are made of local brick burned both by Zambians and refugees. Further on, the skill-sharing process

¹²⁶ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹²⁷ Mkandawire (2004) October 16, 2004

¹²⁸ El Ferjani (2004) September 29, 2004

¹²⁹ Mwale (2004) October 16, 2004

¹³⁰ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

between refugees and locals is important both for moving towards closer integration and for making the projects efficient.¹³¹

One problem in the policy of local integration is that ZI subcontracts approximately 40 percent of its projects. This is illustrated by the HIV/AIDS drop-in center in Nangweshi, sponsored by the Swedish government. ZI subcontracted this project to Shangombo District Health Management Board, which in turn subcontracted the project to a building company in Mungo. This building company did not involve the local community, even though ZI lobbied for that, which illustrates a problem that may occur when projects are subcontracted. In these circumstances, when ZI no longer is in full control of the projects, the ZI principles are sometimes hard to follow. In order to decrease this problem and to maintain transparency ZI does not hand out the whole capital to the subcontracted firms at one time, but successively in three steps. The reason for continuing to subcontract projects, despite its negative implications, is that ZI with its small staff does not have the possibility to manage all projects on their own.¹³²

Naturally, there is also a downside of using locals for building instead of a professional building company: the projects often move slower and sometimes the lack of expertise causes problems. These problems often cause frustration among people involved with ZI. However, it is still important, according the provincial coordinator, to have this approach since it is a prerequisite to create real development. In a situation where an external building company is contracted the positive side effects do not stay in the community and the money does not trickle down the system as ZI prescribes. Enabling the locals to do their own building also educates them, and this skill is something they later can use in other projects.¹³³

According to Mr. Walusiku, one of the biggest challenges with ZI is to change the attitudes among the locals and try to influence cultural habits related to poverty. As an alternative to the traditional habit of using grass ZI has introduced bricks which makes it possible to build one hut for a lifetime instead of one every year. The people then come to understand the value of another way of doing things and, alter their traditional thinking. Another potential area where ZI can help to decrease poverty in the region is in food processing. To exemplify, there are a lot of mangos in the Western province of which 40 percent are wasted as a consequence

¹³¹ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹³² Makandawire (2004) October 16, 2004

of the inability to preserve the fruit and to bring it out on the wider Zambian market. ZI has been thinking about how to preserve mango and to make juice out of it and can be seen as an example where ZI works towards expanding their activities. The will-power and the good results of ZI have, however, worried some NGO's in the region. ZI and the different NGO's are both dependent on funding from donors and this situation has made some NGO's to regard ZI as their competitor. The NGO perspective is that they might lose funds if ZI shows a higher efficiency. Some coordination meetings have thus taken place between these actors in order to try to solve the upcoming problems.¹³⁴

5.3.1 Ngundi

During our time in the Western Province we visited several different LDC's and studied many different projects within the ZI framework, but since time and space is limited in this paper we have chosen to focus on one LDC, namely the Ngundi LDC. Ngundi is one of the most active LDC's in the Western Province and, in addition, we thought Ngundi was of extra interest since Sweden through SIDA has sponsored various projects in this LDC.

Ngundi LDC consists of two elected women and four elected men – a normal distribution among the LDC's – that have been in power for two years out of the five year electoral period. There exist no quotation in the LDC's in terms of gender, but the gender equality is still fairly good, although there is some overweight of men. The Ngundi LDC consists of nine larger villages and the total number of inhabitants is over 1000. The workload for the members of the LDC in Ngundi is heavy as they work between 6 am to 5 pm Monday to Friday, and between 6 am to noon on Saturdays. The workload in the LDC's differs though, due to how many projects that are going on. The workload also determines the salary of a LDC member. In Ngundi, and other LDC's with several ongoing projects, the LDC representative gets a monthly payment (since the time spent is extensive). The salary is between 20-30 dollars per month dependent on their responsibilities. In contrast, the salary for members of LDC's that only have an agricultural project is 10 percent of the surplus of the sold harvest. That surplus is divided between the six members dependent on how much time each has worked.¹³⁵

¹³³ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

¹³⁴ Walusiku (2004) October 14, 2004

¹³⁵ Cibaruleengelibati & Akabeswa (2004) October 14, 2004

The Chairman and the Treasurer from Ngundi gave us the impression that ZI functions accurately. According to them ZI has brought a lot of positive changes for their village, for example contributed with a school building and a hospital. They expressed their gratitude to the refugees in their community for creating positive externalities such as skill-sharing since the Angolans inherit skills that the Zambians do not possess themselves. From a repatriation aspect ZI may have worked out too well: according to these two representatives, $\frac{3}{4}$ of the refugees in their community do not want to repatriate.¹³⁶

Two different building projects are under way in Ngundi at the moment, the first is a school funded by the Danish government and the other is a health post funded by the Swedish government. In Ngundi we discussed ZI with the chairman of the school and the vice-chairman of the LDC. They informed us that the school will hold 250 pupils from grades one to seven, and will entail distinctive improvements in facilities compared with the former school. The school is meant to cover a wide area where the distances are great, and for that reason most children will have to stay in the school for the whole week. It is simply not feasibly for a child to walk for three hours twice a day just to get to and from school. This is especially true for the youngest children who are seven years old. For this reason, this group of children currently reside in a hut near the school-building. In the future, all children will be able to attend this school since the government in 1999 changed their policy from a system with school fees to a system with free education for everyone. Today, up to 35 percent of the children do not go to school in the refugee camps due to lack of space. A problem for Ngundi is to attract teachers to a village located so far away from urban centres. The solution has been to build good houses for the teachers as an incentive for them to leave the more urban areas.

The other project, the health post, was planned to open late 2004 and will have a significant impact on health services in Ngundi and its surroundings. The distance to the nearest health post, situated in Nangweshi Refugee Camp, is an extremely long and requires that you cross three rivers. This was especially a problem for pregnant women due to the bad quality of the canoes available for transportation and the fact that the rivers are filled with crocodiles. The representatives of the Ngundi LDC told us a heartbreaking story about a pregnant woman and her unborn child that died not long ago on their way to the distant health post. Finally, it was a very emotional experience to see the villagers' gratitude to us, as Swedes, because of the difference the SIDA project would do.

¹³⁶ Cibaruleengelibati & Akabeswa (2004) October 14, 2004

5.4 Repatriation

The ongoing repatriation of Angolan refugees from Zambia is a process that involves many actors. The decision-making power falls under a tripartite constellation consisting of the Zambian government, the Angolan government, and UNHCR.¹³⁷ The actual transport of the refugees is the responsibility of IOM. Other responsibilities, such as the transit centres that are used in the repatriation process fall under different implementing partners to UNHCR.¹³⁸ The main actors working with the refugee repatriation are the same in the different schemes, thus assuring a similar procedure overall. The repatriation project started in 2003 and 18,000 refugees were repatriated during that very year. At the end of September of 2004, 10,000 refugees had already been repatriated, but the ambition was to repatriate an additional 20,000 before the start of the rain season in the middle of November, which makes further repatriation too risky due to, for example, poor road condition. The tripartite constellation still thought this goal was feasible during a meeting in the middle of September.¹³⁹ In the end, the goal was not met: 25,785 had been repatriated on November 10, which although a huge amount of people, did not live up to the ambition of repatriating 30,000 this year. However, this is not the final figure since a few more refugee convoys will leave before the year comes to an end. The numbers of refugees included in the convoys will, on the other hand, not be that significant since statistics show that only one more convoy or two at the most, would leave this year.¹⁴⁰

The most common way to carry out the repatriations has been by bus-convoys. The sizes of the convoys differ from a few hundred up to more than one thousand refugees, depending on how many refugees sign up that week. During our time in Meheba Refugee Settlement we had the possibility of following one of the convoys, with 274 refugees, a relatively small number of people, due to leave Meheba in Zambia for Cazombo in Angola on October 5. It was an interesting experience to travel with the refugees in one of the buses and it gave us the possibility to see repatriation from the perspective of the refugees. Our impression was that the refugees were humanely treated at all times and we were impressed by the people working (mostly IOM and UNHCR staff) with the repatriation. One specific situation of humanity was when the UNHCR officer in charge helped to reunite a family who had been separated by their own mistake during the convoy procedure. The UNHCR officer made the decision,

¹³⁷ Chawila (2004) November 12, 2004

¹³⁸ Villaflores (2004) September 21, 2004

¹³⁹ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

¹⁴⁰ IOM, Voluntary Repatriation - Angolan Refugees Statistic (Convoys and Airlifts), 10 November 2004

against the regulations, to reunite the family even though this could become problematic for him personally.

The convoy left around 9 a.m. and after a few brief stops on the way we reached a transit centre at around 3 p.m. At the transit centre the refugees were provided with food and offered to sleep in rather Spartan dorms. The language barrier made it difficult for us to communicate with many of the refugees but yet we came in close contact with some. The situation of spending several hours with the refugees gave us a chance to witness how they experienced the repatriation. The overall impression was that most of the refugees were very excited to return to their home country, which was for example illustrated by them singing in the bus. At the same time, there were also noticeable feelings of uncertainty and nervousness among the refugees. UNHCR is responsible for giving objective information about the country of origin but still there existed some uncertainty among the refugees about what to expect.¹⁴¹ We spoke, for instance, with a seventeen-year old boy that joined the convoy on his own and who was going to his home-country where he had never been before. His father was killed in the Angolan war and his mother had returned some months earlier in order to inspect the situation on the ground. Our overall impression was very positive; it appears UNHCR lives up to their principle of repatriating refugees in safety and dignity and it would be difficult to criticize something specific with the process.¹⁴² Initially, we considered co-ordination as a potential problematic issue since several different actors are part of the repatriation, but it seemed to work out very well. A reason may have been that routines were in place as this was the second year of the repatriation project.

Besides the repatriation by bus-convoys, a parallel flight repatriation was in place, where also IOM was responsible for the transports. The flight repatriation project started in August 2004 and during the first two months just over 11,000 refugees were repatriated from Mungo in the Western Province to Angola. The reason that IOM started repatriation by plane was that many parts of Angola are unreachable as a consequence of the war, through the lack of roads and the presence of landmines. The refugees that repatriate from Mungo come from Nangweshi Refugee Camp and Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement both located in the Western province. The numbers repatriated from Nangweshi fall somewhere between three and four thousand, whereas nearly eight thousand have returned home from Mayukwayukwa. The

¹⁴¹ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

¹⁴² Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

plane used for this repatriation is an old cargo plane with the capacity of 90 adults, though the number could rise up to 130 with many small children included. The procedure at the airport was very efficient. There were two to three flights per day and the procedure for the plane to land, to be filled with new refugees and to take off again only took 30 minutes. The plane travelled to two destinations in Angola: Luambala Nguimbo (35 minutes flight) and Huambo (2 hours flight). Simultaneously, the repatriation from Meheba went to other places in Angola, such as Cozombo. Refugees from Meheba that wished to go to Luambala Nguimbo and Huambo were in a first step taken to Mungo. There they stayed one or two days in a transit centre by the airport, and in a second step taken to the place they preferred in Angola. According to the IOM Coordinator, Erkan Zeybek, the most problematic issue in this process is to get the refugees to the airport, since many of them change their plans in the last minute and decide not to go.¹⁴³ Indecision among the refugees is a recurrent problem for the staff working within the different sectors of the repatriation process.¹⁴⁴ Sometimes it even happens that refugees return to Zambia after having spent some time in Angola and having been repatriated.¹⁴⁵ Another problem connected to the repatriation figures is that the high child rate makes the holding of statistic problematic. In Nangweshi, for example, the average woman gives birth to eight children, which means that 200-230 children are born every month.¹⁴⁶ At the Mungo airport we met several extraordinary personal fates. Laurinclo Antonio José, a teacher from Angola, was repatriating for the second time. He came to Zambia for the first time in 1976 and returned to Angola in 1983, but the war in Angola forced him to flee again in 2001 and that day we met him in October 2004 he was on his way back to Angola again for the second time.

The willingness of refugees to repatriate is a very interesting issue. According to vice RO in Mayukwayukwa, Mr. Chikuba, more than 95 percent of the Angolans in Mayukwayukwa want to go back at some point. The wish of the refugees to repatriate is higher the shorter time spent in Zambia.¹⁴⁷ That refugees that have been in Zambia for a long time were less willing to repatriate was further emphasized by refugees we spoke with in Mayukwayukwa.¹⁴⁸ The picture became even clearer by reports that showed that a majority of the refugees who

¹⁴³ Zeybek (2004) October 14, 2004

¹⁴⁴ Chikuba (2004) October 19, 2004 and Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

¹⁴⁵ Zeybek (2004) October 14, 2004

¹⁴⁶ Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

¹⁴⁷ Chikuba (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁴⁸ Kasoka & Hayanda (2004) October 18, 2004

arrived at Mayukwayukwa between 1999 and 2001 already have repatriated.¹⁴⁹ In the Nangweshi Refugee Camp the refugees were asked by UNHCR in February 2004 about the willingness to repatriate. The refugees that wanted to repatriate that time were asked again in July and if they still wanted to go back to Angola they were targeted for repatriation during the fall of 2004.¹⁵⁰

Some refugees are not interested in participating in the organized repatriation under UNHCR's mandate but want to return on their own. This is referred to as spontaneous repatriation. The ones that choose to inform the authorities are provided with a *spontaneous repatriation form*, from GRZ and UNHCR.¹⁵¹ Refugees that repatriate the organized way also need to fill out a form, called a *returning form*. UNHCR is responsible for both these forms, which has to include a photo, finger print, the location where the person is going to in Angola, and a list of family members. A valid form has to be cleared by three instances, namely UNHCR, GRZ and AHA, where the latter is responsible for the medical part of the repatriation. An important purpose with the form is for it to serve as a helping instrument for the receiving authorities in Angola. The refugees stay in a transit centre at their receiving location in Angola for two to three days and during that time they, for example, get information about HIV/AIDS.¹⁵² This information is crucial because the HIV/AIDS rate is much higher in Zambia than in Angola.¹⁵³ According to Mr. Lee M. Habasonda, Executive Director at SACCORD, HIV/AIDS is the second largest regional security problem, after the spread of arms.¹⁵⁴ After the HIV/AIDS information is provided at the transit centres the refugees get further transport to their final destination. IOM are responsible for the transports within Angola as well.¹⁵⁵

Some refugees have, as mentioned, never set their foot in Angola whereas some lack relatives in the country. For these reasons, it is not always evident where in Angola a refugee should return to. However, it is always the decision of the refugee where to go in Angola and neither UNHCR nor IOM have any decision-making power in this issue. UNHCR creates a checklist over where the refugees wish to go.

¹⁴⁹ Maskeke (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁵⁰ Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

¹⁵¹ Chikuba (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁵² Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

¹⁵³ Lingwabo (2004) September 21, 2004

¹⁵⁴ Habasonda (2004) October 21, 2004

¹⁵⁵ Thomas (2004) October 16, 2004

Simultaneously, there are also refugees that return on their own and not through any UN-sanctioned way.¹⁵⁶ These spontaneously repatriated refugees create some problems by sneaking back to Angola without informing any authorities. Refugees that repatriate this way can return to Zambia while keeping their refugee status since no officials know they have left the country, which is a major reason for individuals to repatriate on their own. In contrast, refugees that repatriate the normal way lose their refugee status.¹⁵⁷

The repatriation process in Zambia goes under the motto “voluntary repatriation” and an ambition of the authors has been to examine the actual implementation of this. This became a difficult task since the opinion on this issue was very varying. Some organisation representatives working in the refugee camps argue that there is hidden pressure from the authorities on the refugees in the camps to repatriate, but not on the self-settled.¹⁵⁸ Registration of the self-settled is, however, planned for next year, 2005, and this might affect their situation.¹⁵⁹ To discern the opinion of the self-settled refugees in this issue was really hard as they are “invisible”. But according to two members of Ngundi LDC, ¾ of the refugees in their community are unwilling to repatriate.¹⁶⁰ The responses we received from the refugees in the schemes regarding this issue varied. Some of them said repatriation was entirely voluntary, but others, for example a refugee employed by UNHCR in Meheba, said that sooner or later he would be forced to go back to Angola no matter his wish to stay. He expressed a concern for the war to break out again in Angola, and if he repatriated, this would force him to flee again. In sum, it is difficult to find a clear-cut answer to how extensive this alleged hidden pressure is. However, it is no secret that UNHCR sees repatriation as the most preferred durable solution and that GRZ shares this view.¹⁶¹ An important reason for GRZ to take this stand is that it would be much more difficult to obtain support from the Zambian population for their generous refugee policy if the Angolans did not eventually repatriate.¹⁶²

A vast majority of the Angolan refugees in Zambia are UNITA-supporters but there also exist refugees who support MPLA. The number of UNITA supporters is so high that GRZ previously has been accused by the Angolan government of supporting UNITA.¹⁶³ Even

¹⁵⁶ Zeybek (2004) October 14, 2004

¹⁵⁷ Wamulwange (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁵⁸ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

¹⁵⁹ Chikuba (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁶⁰ Cibaruleengelibati & Akabeswa (2004) October 14, 2004

¹⁶¹ Mgbangson (2004) September 20, 2004

¹⁶² Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

¹⁶³ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

though these accusations are not present anymore it is still an interesting issue which side the refugees support, since this influence the motivation to return. Many refugees wish to postpone their repatriation until after the election in Angola, which is to be held sometime in 2005, to see the result and if the process is fair. We have been in contact with UNITA-supporters who fear victimization because of their political view, if the current president Dos Santos is still in power when they return to Angola.¹⁶⁴ Another important factor in discussing repatriation willingness is which Angolan region the refugee is from. The regional aspect is essential because support for a party is regional, but also since the safety situation on the ground differs over regions. Concerning the latter, landmines, for example, are much more prevalent in some areas in Angola than in others. Concerning political support, you can most of the time tell which side a refugee supported in the war after the region this refugee fled from. Huambo is for example an UNITA-stronghold and many refugees from this area stay in Nangweshi.¹⁶⁵ In conclusion, the time a refugee has spent in Zambia, political view and regional background altogether affect the willingness of the refugee to repatriate. It is, though, difficult to distinguish the single most important factor, especially since they tend to reciprocate.

Another aspect with relevance to this context is the compliance of the Angolan government to welcome their population. Intuitively, it seems like the Angolan authorities wish as many refugees as possible to return and Mrs. Chaiwila at the Office of Commissioner for Refugees, has not seen any signs of the opposite.¹⁶⁶ There are, however, some people who suspect that the Angolan government would prefer not to receive all parts of the population instantly. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, there will probably be an election in Angola in 2005 and if supporters of the opposition return it could result in the government losing their power. Secondly, most people that repatriate settle in poor areas and that entails a heavy future burden on the Angolan economy.¹⁶⁷

Aside from all the positive sides of refugee repatriation there obviously exist some more negative sides. One striking example is the situation for the newly arrived refugees in Meheba. Since the start of the repatriation of Angolans from Meheba, the situation for the new arrivals to Meheba has worsened. The reason is that many donors have specified that

¹⁶⁴ Kasoka & Hayanda (2004) October 18, 2004

¹⁶⁵ Kasoka & Hayanda (2004) October 18, 2004

¹⁶⁶ Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

¹⁶⁷ Walusiku (2004) October 15, 2004

their donations should go to refugees that are part of the repatriation. There are, for example, 6,000 blankets that have been in a warehouse in Meheba for six months, and at the same time there are refugees within the settlement in need of these blankets. However, LWF does not have the mandate to distribute them to the refugees, although people are in need of them, since the donor has specified that these blankets should only be used for the repatriation process. The focus on the repatriation implies that not enough attention is paid to the refugees in the settlement, such as those from the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, who will probably stay in Meheba for quite some time. The situation today is therefore much more difficult for new arrivals in Meheba than it was a couple of years ago.¹⁶⁸

Further on, refugees from Rwanda are also being repatriated. This process is interesting to observe because it could affect the policy towards the Angolan refugees. The Rwandans who live in Meheba are from the Hutu tribe and many of them fear to return to Rwanda since the Tutsis are currently in power. The president of Rwanda is a Hutu, but the government and the military consist only of Tutsis. In spite of the fear among the Hutus in Meheba, the GRZ and UNHCR try to make the refugees return to Rwanda. A reason for this can be that the current government in Kigali is supported by the United States, which implies, according to Mr Ayuak a JRS-Advocate and Peace Education Co-Coordinator, that UNHCR also takes the same stance. The GRZ and UNHCR have pressured the Rwandans to return through stating that they might lose their refugee status if they do not repatriate now when they have the chance.¹⁶⁹ Mr. Nkula Mulenga, JRS National Policy Officer, offers a critical view of how this repatriation is undertaken by claiming that UNHCR does everything they can to get the Rwandan refugees to return home. The procedure is forced in a sense: some of these Rwandans might have participated in the genocide and because of that fear victimization if they return. JRS considers this as an example where the voluntariness of the refugees is not in place.¹⁷⁰ On the other hand, Mrs. Chawila at the Office of Commissioner for Refugees, claims that the reason for the unwillingness among the Rwandan refugees to repatriate are not uncomplicated. She says that there are no reports of violence against returning Hutus, which makes it troublesome to see the Hutus' fear as genuine.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Mulenga (2004) October 7, 2004

¹⁶⁹ Ayuak (2004) October 8, 2004

¹⁷⁰ Mulenga (2004) September 23, 2004

¹⁷¹ Chawila (2004) November 12, 2004

Finally, in a context where the overall Zambian refugee policy is discussed it is important to keep in mind that ZI and repatriation do not contradict each other. ZI and the repatriation project are part of the same refugee policy: if the refugees that have been involved in ZI later decide to repatriate, they carry their skills with them that they earned during the local integration program, and this knowledge remains a resource for the refugees.¹⁷² Moreover, UNHCR works after the motto *durable solutions*, and since both repatriation and local integration are seen as durable solutions, UNHCR also classifies the relationship between ZI and the ongoing repatriation of Angolan refugees as harmonious.¹⁷³

6. Analysis

It is important to keep in mind that the refugee situation in Zambia is very complex, which aggravates an analysis but simultaneously creates a deeper need for the same.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, as discussed earlier, security is a very diverse concept divided into different levels and different sectors. The descriptive material of this paper is at the same time extensive, which enables an analysis of all possible aspects of security. Here follows an assortment of the most essential parts.

6.1 Zambian Refugee Policy

At the individual security level the overall Zambian refugee policy obviously affects individuals in different ways. The presence of the international community primarily increases the security of the refugees themselves, but create, at the same time, a safer environment for the whole Zambian community. The government in Zambia has undertaken strategies to enhance the security for the individuals, through, for example, demilitarization and demobilisation of refugees, which increases the individual security among both refugees and Zambians. These measures also increase the national security in regard to external threats. An important policy is to ensure that the refugees not use Zambia as a base to attack their country of origin, which implies prevention from possible external threats against the national security.

¹⁷² Mumba (2004) October 16, 2004

¹⁷³ The Zambian Initiative (2004) p. 7

¹⁷⁴ One example that shows upon this complexity is the contradicting conclusions in Mijerries *African Refugees and Human Rights in Host Countries – The Long-Term Demographic, Environmental, Economic, Social, and Psychological Impacts of Angolan Refugees in Zambia*.

It can be argued that Zambians lose some of their individual economic security as a consequence of the resources GRZ is investing in the refugees instead of on the native population. Buzan discusses threats from the process of domestic law as one of the threats the state constitutes towards the individual security, which highlights various problems in the Zambian refugee policy. The high costs of working permits, the law that prescribes jail for a refugee lacking the permit, and, perhaps most important of all, the poor conditions in Zambian prisons, are all problematic from an individual security perspective.

Another important aspect of the Zambian refugee policy is that the refugees are not allowed to be politically active. GRZ argues that if refugees want to influence the politics in the home country they have to return to the country of origin and act democratically. This policy is probably effective from a national security perspective since it decreases the risks for attacks from the refugees' home country. Studied from an individual security level the situation becomes more complex. A type of threat that the citizens can face from the state is connected to the government's foreign policy and from this approach the policy of not letting the refugees be politically active can be considered adequate. On the other hand, this policy can be problematic from an individual political security angle. Historically, Zambia has been a place where refugees have had a political safe haven and have been given the possibility to gather political strength, a possibility that does not exist anymore. This change of policy is understandable since it was easier to let the refugees be politically active during their struggle for independence. However, this policy is still a curtailment of the refugees' individual political security caused by domestic law.

In an attempt to discover the national security of a state it is necessary to locate the interests of the state as well.¹⁷⁵ In the discussion about state interests it can be fruitful to classify these interests in different dimensions, such as humanitarian, political, economic, and social interests. Regarding the Zambian refugee policy it is possible to discern a variety of interests. An economic interest may be found in Zambia's willingness to maintain the international presence in the country since the varying NGO's and UN-agencies bring resources to the country. The reason for the extensive international presence can also be explained by political interests, as this creates an international political focus on Zambia with potential positive externalities, like good diplomatic relations. In the context of the current world system with

¹⁷⁵ For a more elaborated discussion about state interests see Nilsson, *Varför medla – medlares intressen i Mellanöstern*, Uppsala University 2004

the United States as the single superpower it can be harmful for a small state such as Zambia to offend the United States. Maintaining good relations with the United States could therefore be a reason for Zambia to support the current government in Rwanda. This stance can possibly affect the repatriation policy of Rwandan refugees from Zambia. Obviously, economical and political state interests are present but the humanitarian interest of Zambia to host refugees should not be diminished. It is perhaps the most important reason of all. Zambia's historical past as a politically active force in the region and their dedication to help their neighbours in the independence struggle is a heritage, which permeates the Zambian society. The professional Zambians we came in contact with emphasized this aspect, and generally we perceived the Zambians as a genuinely generous and kind people.

From a regional security perspective, one can claim that several measures taken by GRZ have had an impact on the risks for conflicts to spread to Zambia. This can be illustrated by the location of the refugee schemes inside the country, the fact they are not located close to the border, and there is a special camp for ex-combatants. However, one central factor in this context, that GRZ can not influence, is the ethnic structure of the country. Refugee-flows can create conflict in the receiving country by influencing the ethnic balance negatively. However, since Zambia is an ethnically very mixed country, with 72 different tribes, no single main minority at risk exists within Zambia.¹⁷⁶ The population is so mixed that the influence of refugees from a certain ethnic group decreases, which implies that the risk of an armed ethnic conflict is much lower.¹⁷⁷ Buzan speculates about whether cultural and racial ties should be a factor in identifying security complexes.¹⁷⁸ This is an interesting aspect regarding Zambia's relation to Angola since the same ethnic groups exist on both sides of the border. Surely, this plays a role concerning the welcoming attitude among Zambians towards the Angolan refugees.

A threat that could potentially arise, and hence influence the security on all three security levels mentioned above, is a considerable inversion of the policy of the leadership in Zambia. Some local politicians have used the refugee issue to gain political power and one can imagine a scenario implying that this trend continues to a national level, with significant consequences. If a radical leader comes to power and enforces a much more restrictive

¹⁷⁶ Phiri (2004) September 26, 2004

¹⁷⁷ For a more evolved discussion about this see Brosché (2004)

¹⁷⁸ Buzan (1991) p. 196

refugee policy it could lead to increased insecurity of individuals, specifically refugees - both those that are currently in the country but also potential future refugees. The national security could also be influenced in the way that the three main components of the state, namely the idea of the state, the physical base of the state, and the institutional expression of the state, change.¹⁷⁹ As mentioned, we have the impression that many Zambians are proud over the country's generosity towards refugees and of its historical dedication to the development of the region. A more restrictive refugee policy might entail a threat to one of the corner stones of Zambian identity. Parallels can be drawn to the Swedish identity, which is influenced by its modern peaceful history and the fact that many Swedes see their country as a human and moral power in the world today. In a regional context, a political change could also influence the Zambian position in the region since the country has gained much of its respect by its political dedication and peaceful history. The positive view of Zambia could thus be harmed by a new type of leadership that drastically changed the political course planted by Zambia's first president Kenneth Kaunda.

The insecurity that some Congolese refugees expressed in Meheba Refugee Settlement is a most relevant security issue. Whether their security in the camp is seriously threatened or not is very difficult to determine. Even if their insecurity was not exaggerated, our opinion is that the Zambian refugee policy is not to blame for this problem. We claim that GRZ and UNHCR continuously take all the necessary precautions for making the situation as secure as possible for the refugees. Nevertheless, this possible threat to the physical security of the individual refugee is still important to take seriously, since it is the base of the individual security and to neglect it would be especially serious.

6.2 The Zambian Initiative

ZI is a project where the individual security dimension is evident for both refugees and locals: economic security in a pure form increases through the improvement of food security, physical security is enhanced since more health posts are provided, and, political security spreads since ZI is an initiative that encourages grassroots politics. How ZI could be negative from an individual security perspective is difficult to distinguish. One possible factor is that, since ZI only is in place in the Western Province, it can imply a threat for individuals living in other regions since their donor support might decrease as a consequence of ZI. An important aspect of ZI is that the initiative was introduced as an instrument to prevent clashes between

¹⁷⁹ Buzan (1991) p. 65

Zambians and refugees. The approaching clashes were thus a tangible security problem that the authorities felt compelled to handle. ZI was an answer to these security concerns, and the results are thus far successful.

The benefits of ZI are also obvious from a national security perspective. The introduction of ZI can, as a matter of fact, be regarded as a response to threats against national security, more so than individual security. The approaching clashes between Zambians and refugees could, hypothetically, develop to a threat towards the national security. The settlement manager for Mayukwayukwa states in this regard that ZI tried to bring two communities closer and the risk of clashes has “definitely reduced” since ZI started their programs in the region.¹⁸⁰ An imaginary threat of ZI towards national security is if the project does not spread to the other provinces affected by refugees, as this might create some kind of jealousy in the other regions. In a discussion about national security it is also crucial to make a distinction between internal and external security threats. The threats, to which ZI responded to, were internal, since it was future clashes within the country that were threatening. There are no apparent external threats towards the Zambian national security that is relevant regarding ZI.

Is it possible that ZI, that is present in merely one of the provinces in Zambia, could affect the regional security? With a short time perspective in mind it is difficult to imagine, but in a longer perspective ZI can be seen as a very promising program that can influence the region. The reason for our positive view about the program is mainly the fact that it involves a wide range of problems connected to development and deals with them in a constructively way. This project approach makes it not only a success today, but also a possible future success. If this future success is realised, ZI could be a path to help Zambia to become a stronger state. This would imply positive consequences for the security at individual, national, and regional levels. As ZI is a pilot project it has gained interests from other countries, implying that ZI can spread the principles of the initiative in the region and by that enhancing the regional security. A ZI success can also affect the inner cohesion of Zambia in a positive way since it reduces poverty and narrows the gap between refugees and locals. If the inner cohesion gets stronger, this bears consequences at levels of individual, national, and regional security since this is a pre-condition to create strong states, an important security factor according to Buzan. At the moment, Southern Africa is a region where the international anarchy is relatively immature, which entails a variety of security problems. The escape from this immaturity is

both by creating strong individual states, but also by creating a decent environment for these states to exist in. It is obviously a difficult process, but the ambition must be to try to create stable states and to improve the co-operation between the states so they together can grow stronger.¹⁸¹

Moreover, we believe that ZI is beneficial from an environmental security perspective since local materials are selected and resources appear to be used in a preservative way. By now it should be obvious to the reader that our view of ZI is very positive and that our experiences of ZI compel us to suggest that all potential donors have every reason to stake money in this project. Aside from the reasons already listed ZI is also, unlike many other projects, a governmental project, and not run by different NGO's. We see this as a significant benefit of the program as it contributes to increasing the citizens' trust in the government, which can be an important step to create a stronger state with positive consequences for all three security levels.

6.3 Repatriation

The repatriation process touches upon the different levels of security, however, the regional aspect is more obvious within repatriation than within ZI since two countries and, hence, two governments are taking part in the process. The fact that the co-operation between the governments in Angola and in Zambia seems to go smoothly has positive consequences for the overall political security. Firstly in that sense that it is good for the relations between the two countries, secondly, that the end of the war in Angola and a successful repatriation process can send out positive signals throughout the region. In a conflict-torn region such as Southern Africa, with several extended refugee-flows, the need for positive examples is much needed. This can create reliability in the region and, if Zambia continue to handle the refugee issue in a good way, the country is likely to maintain their reputation of being friendly.

At the individual level, the repatriation could be either a success or a disaster. The most decisive factor is the situation that the repatriated refugees will face when they arrive back in Angola. If landmines, political repression, and an economy in chaos are factors that take forefront, this could annihilate the optimism in a process that should be characterized by hope. This uncertainty makes the spread of information extremely important for all different sectors

¹⁸⁰ Chilando (2004) October 19, 2004

¹⁸¹ For a discussion about the international anarchy system see *Theoretical Framework* in this essay.

of security such as the physical, economical, political, and societal sectors. Since we did not see the conditions on the ground in Angola it is hard to make a judgement about the situation. The statements on behalf of refugees and officials about the circumstances were very varying. However, the individual security in the actual repatriation process is easier to assess since we had the opportunity to follow one of the convoys and to study the preparations in the schemes. Our opinion is very positive. We were impressed by the treatment of the refugees both in the convoy and at the airport in Mungo. Distribution of food, co-ordinating between different actors, health screening, and information about landmines were all conducted in a respectful manner. The procedures at the different transit centres followed a similar pattern, which is a sign of well-working high policy level decisions, and perhaps the main reason that the individual security was prominent in this process.

A successful repatriation process is also important in regards to the dedication to the refugee issue among the Zambian population. It is easier to get support for a generous refugee policy if you can show some positive results.¹⁸² A successful repatriation of the Angolan refugees could thus imply positive consequences for the individual security of other refugees since it makes the Zambian population more willing to maintain a generous refugee policy.

A possible threat that the repatriating of Angolan refugees can constitute towards its home communities are through HIV/AIDS. The rates of HIV/AIDS are much higher in Zambia than in Angola and in order to prevent this threat at the individual level, information programs about HIV/AIDS are in place at the transit centers. HIV/AIDS is also a huge threat to the regional security since it disseminates and spreads over borders.¹⁸³ Finally, the fear of victimization that we met among some UNITA-supporters is an interesting aspect to analyse from a security perspective. This fear makes it hard to see how UNHCR and GRZ are able to grant the security for many Angolans after repatriation. If this fear is legitimate, it entails a significant problem with the pro-repatriation policy among the actors involved.

¹⁸² Chaiwila (2004) November 12, 2004

¹⁸³ Habasonda (2004) October 21, 2004

7. Summary and Future Research

7.1 Summary

We went to Zambia to investigate the Zambian refugee policy. Before going there our comprehension of this phenomenon was positive. The ambition was to visit the country to find out if this view was correct, through an exposition of the Zambian refugee policy. In spite of the positive picture we held of the refugee policy, we were a bit sceptical that it would hold up to examination and we thought that an investigation of the policy might affect our view in a more negative way. However, after spending two months in Zambia we substantiated the initial view rather than altered it. Of course there are problems connected to the Zambian refugee policy, but as a whole our view is clearly positive. The overall policy is reasonable, the repatriation is carried out in a decent way, and, last but not least, ZI is a truly impressive project that really takes into account essential parts of development and deals with the most difficult problems connected to aid.

It is, however, important to find the motives for such a generous refugee policy. Firstly, Zambia is situated in an exposed geographical position right in the middle of Southern Africa, which puts the country close to some of the world's most severe refugee problems. Naturally, the location of Zambia has had a deep impact on the refugee policy. Secondly, the vast country with its dispersed population has had an impact on being a host for refugees in the sense that it has enabled land for the refugees. Thirdly, the assistance from the international community should not be underestimated. These three factors are together strong reasons for the generous refugee policy. But it is important to make clear that the proximity to the refugees, the availability of land, and the assistance by the international community would not have been much worth if Zambia did not held a genuine dedication for hosting refugees. This devotion becomes even more impressive when considering that Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world.

The theoretical security approach of this essay worked well, and the different processes that were investigated could ultimately be analysed from the different levels of security elaborated by Buzan. In this context, one can see that the implementation of the Zambian refugee policy works to prohibit many possibly threats towards the Zambian national security. This is, for example, illustrated by the policy that makes sure that the refugees do not use Zambia as a base to attack their country of origin. This is a preventive action towards a potential external

threat against national security. Another example is the introduction of ZI that was a response to an internal threat towards the Zambian national security. Finally, a successful repatriation process could influence the different levels of security in a positive way. For instance, this is essential at a national level since it increases the willingness among the Zambian population to maintain a generous refugee policy.

7.2 Future Research

The security concept presented by Buzan and used in this study is broad and incorporates a variety of different levels and sections. The critics might argue that the concept is too wide and include everything, which in the end would imply that it does not explain much at all. Obviously, there are problems with this approach, but at the same time the security concept facilitates an open-minded thinking about these complex factors, which suits this extensive study. The critics may also argue that this paper not only lacks specificity in theory, but also in the gathered information. This choice is, however, deliberate since the purpose of this field study was not to find a small gap in this research field and fill it. The ambition was instead to include as much unique information as possible, remaining within the framework of the wider security concept. The refugee phenomenon is a complex issue, it is however the complexity of the subject that makes the factors so interesting to analyze. The all-embracing purpose with this study has been to take advantage of the unique possibility to find specific information, which characterizes field studies. However, the possibilities to generalize are restricted since the number of cases is limited. Our opinion is, however, that a field study can designate factors that in a next step can be studied with a statistical approach. The combination of field studies and more structured quantitative studies can thus be very advantageous from a cumulative point of view.

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