The Puzzle of Violence Against Civilians:
The Radicalisation Process in The Palestinian and Algerian Conflicts

Author: Kadija Bedoui
Supervisor: Mats Hammarström
Abstract

Violence against civilians is something that has occurred at “all” times. The last decade violence against civilians, carried out by different organisations, has become something that most of us are aware of. In some conflicts violence against civilians have become features hence some states as well as others are aiming to find the implications concerning this as well as to find a widespread policy on how to handle violence against civilians. Currently organisations that do target civilians are not recognised in the sense that dialog with them is not desirable by their opponents, nor are finding the causes that lie behind their actions. The opponents’ of organisations that do carry out violence against civilians rather respond with violent means that in many cases further violates human rights.

This essay focuses on why some organisations target civilians, while others within the same context do not. In connection to this essay I have made a journey to the Occupied Palestinian territories and a Minor Field Study to Algeria. The purpose of this essay is to identify various indicators in order to increase the understanding of this phenomenon. In the opening sections of this essay I discuss violence against civilians and explain the variables that will in later sections be used as analysing tools (the radicalisation mechanisms) within the field of case studies made of four organisations.

The conclusions of this essay are; when violent means are used to curb grievances the respond is likely to be violent. If the opponent uses a large extent of brutal means as an answer to differences the organisation tend to respond in the same way. Rebellious organisations, which are created in this environment and have an autocratic leadership with a background in warfare, tend to use violence against civilians. Furthermore, if the organisation is not recognised by their opponent and is exposed to methods to eliminate differences the will to solve the problems with non-violent means ceases to exist.
Preface

This essay is a result of a Minor Field Study made to Algeria in the autumn of 2004 and a journey to the Occupied Palestinian territories during the summer of 2004. It was presented as a D-level essay at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, Sweden, in June 2004. There are many persons who I would like to express my gratitude to: everyone who I interviewed, for their trust, Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) for financing the Minor Field Study and my supervisor at Uppsala University, Mats Hammarström, for his academic advise, support and encouragement.

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Introduction

The common perception of what we consider is terrorism today entail events where violence against civilians occurs. Today there is a myriad of research about the field; however there is a gap in the previous research concerning the radicalisation process from which different organisations go from attacking so called legitimised targets to targeting civilians. The gap consists in that there has not been any research comparing organisations within the same conflict facing the same “situation” and differ in their actions in the sense that one organisation targets civilians while the other organisation does not.

My purpose with this essay is to bring forth causes, which lie behind organisations’ usage of violent attacks against civilians in to focus. I will look at the radicalisation process that has led to violent attacks against civilians. I believe that it is important to understand why some organisations carry out violent attacks against civilians, and to seek possible common denominators regarding their motivations to do so. This essay seeks to explain why some organisations carry out violent attacks against civilians, while others do not.

I will seek to explain the variation in the dependent variable, violent attacks against civilians vs. non-violent attacks against civilians, by applying five different independent variables to two conflicts and four different organisations. The independent variables are; group discrimination, strength of the group identity, level of group cohesiveness and the political leadership, political environment and state/the opponents’ conflict regulation method and the extent of state/opponents brutality. The organisations at hand are active in Palestine/Israel and in Algeria. This essay is a combined D-level essay and Minor field study. The Minor field study was implemented in Algeria. I have also made a journey to the occupied Palestinian territories where I conducted interviews that are used in this essay. I have chosen to title this research’s dependent variable violence against civilians and not terrorism to be more precise about the subject at hand and to avoid confusion, as the term “terrorism” does not have a general definition. I have chosen to limit this research to a more clear terminology. Therefore I have chosen to look at violent attacks against civilians.

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1 There are over 120 accepted definitions of the term terrorism. None of these are general.
The case studies involved have been used to improve the scope of the research through a systematic and theoretical deductive procedure. The cases are to be seen as disciplined configurative case studies, with distinguishing quality that "...describes and analyses the case in terms of theoretically relevant general variables."² Through these procedures a possibility to make structured comparisons is formed. Within the frame of comparison the possibility to understand the differences in the outcome within the case studies is created. The dependent variable will contain two different results: violent attacks against civilians and non-violent attacks against civilians thereby, I will let the dependent variable vary. With these variables I will to try to identify the differences in the contrasting cases within the independent variables (which are held "constant") that may generate in and effect on the differences in the independent variable. A method of difference will therefore be important since the purpose of this essay is also to sustain covariance as well as the causal mechanism and their directions.

To be able to understand why these cases have developed differently and taken on different expressions I will carry out a comparison of four different qualitative case studies (four organisations). These organisations are active in conflict-ridden environments and can be seen as "alike" in the context of their situation. However, their behaviour is different in the sense that two of these organisations do not carry out violent attacks against civilians, while the other two do. I have chosen to look into four cases to be able to compare them in a more thorough manner - more thorough because I am examining violent attacks against civilians in general and not violent attacks against civilians within a specific conflict. The organisations that I am studying are active in Algeria and Palestine/Israel.

I have chosen these conflicts for the following reasons; from the beginning I was looking for organisations that carried out violent attacks against civilians, and as my research progressed I searched for organisations with the same goal as the previous group but did not carry out violent attacks against civilians³. At the end of this process very few conflicts with organisations that operate within these criteria remained. Practical possibilities to realize this essay, such as information about the organisations, led to the final selection of conflicts as well as organisations. The Palestinian organisations I examined are Popular Front for the

³ At least organisations’ that have not committed any violent attacks against civilians for at least five years. This gives the advantage (in at least one case) to look at possible changes that caused the organisation to stop carrying out violent attacks against civilians.
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The Algerian organisations I examined are; Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA).

In the case of Palestine I have chosen to examine the PFLP because I am examining the causes of violent attacks against civilians in general, and not specifically at violent attacks against civilian carried out by "Islamic" organisations.

Some of the material that I have used contains second-hand material such as books and articles. The use of second-hand material can be problematic in the sense that the same events can be described in many different ways. The criticism of the source is not about its being or the origin of the source, but about whether the authors have been writing with a tendency or if there is a certain form of bias; the differences are not necessarily merely objective perceptions. Therefore, it has been very important to look up the author’s primary material as much as possible, especially since this essay is attempting to present the actual perceptions of the organisations themselves.

Many of the primary sources I have used are interviews that I have made both in Algeria and in Palestine, along with the organisations and their opponent’s websites, and videotapes made by some of the organisations. The interviews that I have made are "low level analysis" in individual form – as an intense research to attain good validity. The purpose is to come as close to the "truth" as possible and not to prefix the perspectives. To achieve this I have made deep interviews with a few persons in analogy with the criteria of centrality, consequently these persons are either central to the matter or have good knowledge about the subject. The selection of who to interview has differed in the two cases. In the case of Algeria the choice was mainly based on practical possibilities and on significant choices. The selection of who to interview in Palestine was mainly based on the criteria of centrality. All of those interviewed in the case of Palestine and the majority of those interviewed in Algeria wish to remain anonymous, due to fear of reprisals. I have therefore chosen to categorically keep the identity of all the interviewed confidential. For this reason I will refer to information from the interviews as interview in Palestine or in Algeria. An additional source of information is based on events I encountered during my stay in the two regions.

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4 Available at the homepage of the organisations’, in the case of Palestine.
5 Since the nature of the subject as well as the theory have been very sensitive to all parts.
Some of the websites of the organisations’, that I have collected information from, are frequently shut down. This has created problems since it may become next to impossible for the reader to follow up on a particular source that I have referred to in some cases. It has also given the consequence that I have, in some cases, not been able to research any current changes. In most cases I have been able to locate the new site for the homepage. If some of the websites that I have referred to no longer exist I can only recommend patience in the search for the new websites.

**Theoretical framework**

My primary analysing tool for this analysis is a model designed by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff in their book *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. The model attempts to explain the extension of ethnic mobilisation and the character of the ethno-political conflict. This model originally contains seven different independent variables that together explain the dependent variable – extension of ethno-political violence – that can be seen in a near analogy with what this essay is trying to explain: violent attacks against civilians/ non-violent attacks against civilians.

Gurr and Harff examine the level of discrimination, anger, common features, cohesiveness, leadership and how long the group has been exposed to the injustice. Their hypothesis is that the longer and stronger these aspects are present the more likely it is that the group mobilises. The more discrimination and violence there is against the expressions of grievance from mobilising groups, the greater probability there is that the group will respond in a violent way. If, on the contrary, the opposition takes a more restrained line of action the greater possibility there is that the response from the discriminated group is non-violent.

In this essay only five of Gurr and Harff’s independent variables are considered. While these five constitute what we can call the internal process, the other two variables – external support and the international status of the regime – can be understood as the external factors. The internal process can be viewed as divided into two analytical levels: the "group level" and the "state level." The model can moreover be understood as containing two steps. The two first independent variables are those that contribute to mobilisation, while the rest are

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7 I have excluded Gurr and Harff’s “external” variables since I will focus on the perspectives of the organizations’ at hand and not because I believe that they are deficient in explanations.
those that trigger political actions and affect what kind of actions as well as conflicts are most likely to come.\(^8\)

This study is not about ethno-political violence even though the ethnic dimension is relevant to parts of this study as well as to the theme. Therefore, I have separated the ethnic terms from the theory as much as possible and integrated other theories with Gurr and Harff’s model so that it fits with my study more effectively.

Since I assume that there is relevance in the way that the state handles differences as well as potential or real conflict dynamics I have added John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary’s book *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*\(^9\). The book has been laid as a foundation for what could have been formed as another independent variable – state policy/conflict regulation method. Instead of creating an additional independent variable I have chosen to attach this to the variable “political environment.” I have also added parts of Castels and Davidson’s theories since they look at the significance of culture regarding the group dynamic\(^10\). Before I give an account for respective variables I want to point out that the theories in many parts overlap each other; what "belongs" to one variable can be relevant to another, and significant parts for one variable can be so for another without having to be dealt with in the field of one specific variable. Therefore, repetition will occur. I have not graded this research’s independent variables since I do not believe that it would provide any additional information. Nor have I given any one of the independent variables a superior position over another, since I believe that it could possibly make the answers of this research distorted. Rather I let the research give empirically founded answers.

In the following section (2) the theory will be presented; within this section I will also define the essential terms for this study, as well as introduce previous research in this field. In section 3 the history of the Palestine/Israel conflict\(^11\) as well as the history of the organisations in relevant parts, will be presented. Thereafter, the empirical research will be made in co-operation with the radicalisation mechanisms. The section will end with an analysis summary. In section 4, the history of Algeria will be presented. Thereafter, the

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8 Gurr and Harff, p. 77-79.
11 The history may be seen as an overflow though it is important since it gives the background to the current situation.
radicalisation mechanisms will be made in the same way as in the previous section; the section will be ended with an analysis summary. In the following section 5, a general analysis will be made where similarities as well as differences will be compared and a summary as well as conclusions will follow.

The Radicalisation Mechanisms

(i) Group discrimination

Gurr and Harff uphold that grievance can follow as a result of discrimination, which can initiate that the discriminated group to organise themselves and begin to mobilise against the discriminating party. The stronger discrimination, the more likely there is that mobilisation occurs. The discrimination can be economical, political and social, as well as a non-institutionalised form of discrimination that is more of a subtle and structured form of discrimination.

The culture has a prominent role in the construction of groups’ especially ethnic groups. The significance of the culture is upheld by Anthony D. Smith as well as by Castels and Davidson who emphasize the importance of cultural rights; they write that the membership "must take account both of their equal rights as individuals and their needs, interests and values as member of...cultural collectives." Also very important are the perceptions of discrimination, the subjectively experienced or figurative discrimination, as well as the "factual" or objective ones. To be able to look at perceptions I will use the "visual angle" of the organisations.

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12 The discrimination should be understood as extends of socially emerged inequality for members of one group regarding material standard and/or political asset in relation to other groups.
13 Institutionalized discrimination in the meaning that regulations or praxis in a social system intentional or unintentional emits discriminating consequences, where the discrimination is part of the formal as well as the informal routines of the institutions.
16 Castels and Davidson, p. 24.
17 The moral conflict school actualizes this, see section 2.2.
(ii) **Strength of the group identity**

The discrimination has to be something that is experienced collectively by the group; it is not sufficient if only a few individuals are discriminated against. With an increased number exposed to discrimination and consider themselves discriminated against, the grievance along with the will to react intensifies. Gurr and Harff uphold that the more strongly a person identifies himself with a group and is subjected to discrimination, the more likely it is that the person is motivated to react. In this sense it is more likely that mobilisation and reaction arise if the group-identification is strong. According to the authors this in addition to whether the discrimination is apparent and sensed by the group stands in relation to the number of identifying marks shared by the group. The shared marks are; language, religion, history and culture as well as a joint territory\(^\text{18}\). The greater number of common traits a group share, the stronger group identity. It is important not to only understand this as a creation within the bounds of the group as a result of due to the count of marks, the result should also be understood as something externally assigned. It is also highly probable that people are reminded about "who you are" as well as "who they are" when a political, social, economic or cultural discrimination occurs. Castels and Davidson consider the actual discrimination as something that normally provokes a reaction where the group’s culture becomes a foundation for survival and resistance.\(^\text{19}\)

(iii) **The cohesiveness of the group and their political leadership**

Cohesion within a group, a strong and unified leadership as well as a unity between the elite and the collective is significant to whether a conflict can escalate to violence. A cohesive group is a group in which the political elite and the collective are linked together and where the unification and cohesion exists within the population, the political leadership and between the leadership and the people. The more fractions there are within a group, the less cohesive it is. Gurr and Harff maintain that a strong political leadership generates a climate where individuals willingly subordinate their personal preferences for the benefit of the group. Furthermore, an accepted authoritarian leadership tends to more efficiently mobilise a group then a democratic one, as democratic procedures places individual rights as well as responsibilities over the collective ones. The authors also uphold that cohesive groups under

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\(^{18}\) Gurr and Harff, p. 84 and 88f.
\(^{19}\) Castels and Davidson, p. 79.
an authoritarian leadership do not encounter internal shattering relating to decisions about whether they should execute violence or not. Democratically organized groups are rarely as cohesive as the authoritarian ones, and this implies an apparent nuance regarding which means should be used.

According to Gurr and Harff, the cohesiveness of a group increase when the group is concentrated in a certain region, shares the same marks, accepts and supports an authoritarian leadership, has been exposed to discrimination, and suffers a grievance for a longer duration of time. Therefore, according to the authors, a group with a history marked with discrimination that supports an authoritarian leadership is more likely to resort to violence to liberate themselves.\(^\text{20}\)

(iv) Political environment and state policy/conflict regulation method

Gurr and Harff uphold that it is more likely that conflicts take non-violent expressions in democratic states because democratic societies imply tolerance, civil-, political- and social rights (cultural rights in many cases) and equality within the legal framework. Furthermore, there is a forum for interests that encapsulate the opinions. Oppositional powers will therefore most likely be outlined in a democratically associated form. Since these rights are not present in non-democratic states, the opposite is demonstrated; the less democratic a state is, the more likely it is that a opposition will use different form, that are in democratic states, labelled as extra-parliamentary methods.\(^\text{21}\) In this sense, it is also important to look at whether the opponents have tried to better the situation. It should be plausible that whether violent attacks against civilians arise or not can depend on whether the opponents have listened to the criticism directed at them from the opposition (in this case the organisations) and have attempted to better the situation of the groups. In the same way, it can be expected that the opposition adopt more violent expressions if the criticism is neglected.

States have had different understandings about how to best handle situations regarding oppositional groups. McGarry and O’Leary divide the conflict regulation method into two groups: methods to eliminate differences and methods to handle differences. Under the first category, eliminating differences subordinates genocide, large-scale expelling and integration/assimilation. The second category, handling with differences subordinates

\(^{20}\) Gurr and Harff p. 84f and 89f.

\(^{21}\) Gurr and Harff p. 84 and 89f.
hegemonic control, third-part intervention, canonisation/ federalisation as well as other forms of consocialism.\footnote{22 McGarry and O’Leary, p. 4-38.}

Castels and Davidson convey that the choices of methods taken by the state/opponent are significant when it comes to the situation that faces a group, their self-understanding, and the stance of the state as well as their strategic choices.\footnote{23 Castels and Davidson, p. 60, 62f, 69, 82, 138, 154 and 160.} In addition, with what can be called a "global mental wave of democracy,"\footnote{24 With this I mean that people in a larger extent expects democracy, human rights and self-determination. That many societies have entered an era marked by post-material values and the fact that almost all states today claims to be a democracy.} it is reasonable to assume that the methods that are compatible with democratic values in an inferior extent give more ground to violence than methods that are incompatible with democratic values.

(v) Extent of brutality by the state/opponent

States (as well as other actors), that use brutal methods as an answer to differences and grievance, run a higher risk to be responded to by use of similar methods. The more violence the state uses the more likely it is that the group exposed to the violence will respond in the same way. If the brutality is "far too rough" and extensive, such as in situations of massacre, holocaust and systematic terror, the result may be that the group will not use methods of violence. A possible explanation may be that it is more difficult to organise one self as a consequence of a far too totalitarian and penetrating state; another explanation is that the group fears retaliation. State brutality does not only include flagrant violence but also imprisonment without trial or on non-juridical killings, as well as expulsion of members of the group.\footnote{25 Gurr and Harff, p. 85 and 90f.}

Definitions

As I stated earlier, this essay is about violent attacks against civilians and nothing else. Violent attacks against civilians are in a close analogy with what many label as terrorism. Since there is no clear or commonly accepted definition of what terrorism is, I have chosen to label this essay “violent attacks against civilians” to avoid confusion and to be clear about the
subject at hand. The definitions that are important to define in this essay are civilians, violence, and attacks.

Combatants must distinguish between civilian and military objects and attack only military targets since attacks, reprisals and/or indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. In order to distinguish between "combatants" and “civilians” international law has stipulated laws that defines who is to be understood as a combatant and who is to be understood as a civilian. I have chosen to use definitions from the Geneva Convention since these both are neutral and most widely accepted.

In Chapter II of the Geneva Protocol, the definition of a civilian is composed: "A civilian is any person who does not belong to any of the following categories: members of the armed forces, militias or volunteer corps, organized resistance movements, and residents of an occupied territory who spontaneously take up arms. If there is any doubt whether a person is civilian, then he or she is to be considered a civilian."26

The term violence is defined as:

"...the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."27

The definitions of attack is defined as; "Attacks’ means acts of violence against the opponent, whether in offence or in defence."28 Indiscriminate attacks which are prohibited according to international law and means:

"... (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a

nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.\textsuperscript{29}

Previous Research

I began my research with the C-level essay I wrote in the autumn of 2002, though I labelled the research then as terrorism. I examined at the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Kashmir\textsuperscript{30} and my conclusion was that when group discrimination is broad, the discriminated group mobilises in a form of an opposition. If then the counterpart, the discriminating part, uses aggressive forms to undermine the opposition, the risk for escalation of violence arises and might take extreme forms such as violent attacks against civilians. Furthermore, a strong group identity is also significant; the identity tends to grow stronger when discrimination is a reality. Whether the counterpart includes or excludes, the opposition also seems to have significance on the uprising of violence as well as the form that the violence will take (such as violent attacks against civilians for example). Moreover, the form of management (militant or political) that the organisation is under seems to affect the path that the organisation chooses to take. According to my previous research, organisations lead by military used violence against civilians while organisations lead by people with different background did not use violent attacks against civilians.

Martha Crenshaw is one of the leading researchers in the field of terrorism. She claims in \textit{The Logic of Terrorism} that terrorism can be understood as a political strategy, and she argues that organisations choose terrorism as a course of action because they have values or preferences that allow terrorism. Strategic reasoning is a possible motivation to terrorism, according to Crenshaw.\textsuperscript{31}

Ihekoaba D. Onwudiwe writes in his book \textit{The Globalisation of Terrorism}, that terrorism is more common in periphery-states since their regimes tend to oppress their population (or at

least parts of the population) which in turn often lead the population to use violent method against the regime.32

Many other writers have written about this field, among these we find two separated tendencies. One tendency focuses on inequalities as well as injustice to explain why certain organisations target civilians. Hence, these writers conclude that to restrain inequalities and injustice you will prevent the rising of violent attacks against civilians.33

The other tendency focuses on culture and religion; among these we find Samuel Huntington (Clash of Civilisation) and Benjamin R. Barber (Jihad vs. McWorld). Huntington claims that in order to restrain violence as well as terrorism we have to increase the knowledge and dialog between different groups.

Those who see poverty and injustice as the motivation of “extreme violence” consider that the solution lays within the same aspects, while those that see cultures as the motivation consider that change lays within the culture and its’ attitude toward violence. These above mentioned answers given by these different tendencies are problematic, since I believe that they in many senses are "single-tracked" or give simplified answers and in many cases the given solution is not always easy to realise. For example, how does one change a culture34 especially if one is not part of it? What kind of injustice and what kind of poverty give the motivation for "extreme violence”? And furthermore, how does one restrain poverty and injustice in the long-term35? I do not believe these questions have one answer in the same way that I do not believe that the problem is "single-tracked." I believe that what motivates violent attacks against civilians is a combination of several aspects.

There is one other direction of tendencies in this field that understands these types of conflicts as moral conflicts. This means in regard to this subject, that the focus is on the organisations/groups that conduct violent attacks against civilians and their perceptions when it comes to discrimination, poverty, social and economic inequalities as well as their political structure that creates these inequalities and injustice. According to this "moral conflict

33 Stephen Owen, Lloyd Axworthy and Catherine McKinnon are some authors that uphold this.
34 Even if you regard a culture as well as other group identification marks as social constructions a change is not simple. I believe that it can create even more problems by “approaching” a group and ask/demand them to change parts of their culture or beliefs it probably creates a further motivation to hold on to the culture or religion even stronger. Another justified question is whether one has knowledge about the culture/religion at hand?
35 Should this be made in the actual region or overall?
school" this perception creates a sense of victimisation and of hopelessness.\textsuperscript{36} Consequentially this sense takes the form of anger and flows out into a will to change the situation that can rise as political violence. In connection with a "morally" inclination to accept violence as a legitimate means the possibility of violent attacks against civilians arises.\textsuperscript{37} This perspective is close to the theory that is used in this essay. Gurr and Harff can be seen as part of this perspective.

\textsuperscript{36} This sense does not always have to reflect the reality.

\textsuperscript{37} Barnet W. Pearce, Stephen W. Littlejohn (\textit{When Social World Collide}), Alisdair McIntyre (\textit{After Virtue in Moral Theory}), David W Ausburger (\textit{Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Patterns}) are some authors that upholds this.
The Palestine/Israel Conflict

In 1917 British forces occupied Jerusalem and thereafter, Palestine. Between 1920 and 1948 Palestine was under a British mandate. In 1922 the Balfour Declaration became formal. The declaration stipulated that Palestine should become a national home for the Jewish people though without prejudicing the civil and religious right of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. At this time 92% of the population were Arabs (Palestinians) and they owned 98% of the land. By 1946 the numbers had change to 35% Jews (608 000) and 65% Arabs (1 237 000). The UN made a proposal a year later that Palestine should be divided in to two states where 55% of the land should belong to the Jewish population. In 1948, the Israeli state was established on 78% of "historic Palestine," 700 000 Palestinians were expelled and no Palestinian state was established. The declaration of the establishment of the Israeli state refers to the Balfour Declaration and says that the most important parts of it is the establishment of a Jewish state, but acknowledges that all inhabitants have equal rights. The second paragraph of the manifesto in the Israeli Basic-law annulled all legal provisions of what is seen as an anti-Zionist policy that limited land ownership and restricted Jewish immigration. The Israeli goal was stated as a Jewish National-home and as a Zionist movement. The Basic-law of Israel does not mention any borders that limit the state of Israel.

Shortly after the establishment of Israel the first "Arab-Israeli War" took place, five Arab states Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq collectively attacked Israel. The Israeli forces resisted the attack and annexed several Arab towns during the process. As a result hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled and/or were expelled from their homes. A truce between the parts was achieved in 1949 by the UN which allowed Israel to retain almost all the land that was annexed during the war.

In 1956 a second war was fought, the "Suez Crises," where Israel along with Britain and France attacked Egypt. For France and Britain this was an opportunity to occupy the "Canal Zone" that had been nationalised by the Egyptian leader Nasser. After pressure from the UN,

39 www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/History_June2002.htm
41 www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00hb0.
the three countries had to withdraw from Egypt and a UN peacekeeping force was placed on the border of Egypt and Israel.

In 1967 a third war occurred, the "Six Day War." The Gulf of Aqaba along with the straits of Tiran (leading to the Red Sea) were closed for Israeli traffic which was a violation against one of the conditions made out in the agreement of the withdrawal in 1956. Israel regarded this as an act of war and carried out a surprise attack against Egypt's airfields. Jordan and Syria, who had a mutual defence pact with Egypt they became engaged in the war. Israel forced the Egyptian forces to retreat from the Sinai and the Syrian forces from the Golan Heights, as well as the Jordanian forces from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. After the war, Israel announced that they would withdraw from the land taken in the Six Day War if the Arab states would recognise the state of Israel and establish a long lasting peace agreement with them. The Arab countries did not accept the offer and at the same time voices against "land for peace" inside Israel pressured the Israeli government to withdraw the peace offer. Israel had become an occupying power of legally Palestinian territories. After the Six Day war the number of Palestinian refugees had increased to over 200 000.

In 1973 the fourth Arab-Israeli war, the "Yom Kippur War" took place, following a public peace offer made by the new Egyptian president Al-Sadat that was declined by Israel. Egypt approached Syria and arranged to make a coordinated attack on Israel in order to reclaim the land lost in the Six Day War. The attack, which was launched on the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, was victorious in the beginning for the "Arab coalition." However, the US flew in military material to Israel that opened further possibilities for the Israelis to strike back. The Israeli troops pressured the Arab forces back, who once again crossed the Sinai and the Golan Heights, and were in position to threaten both Cairo and Damascus. The UN called for an immediate ceasefire and an agreement was made for Egypt to retain a substantial section in the front of the Suez Canal. Israeli troops remained in Sinai and the Golan Heights. Peace talks between Israel and Egypt began in 1978 and a peace agreement was signed in 1979 – The Camp David Agreement. The agreement was two folded and stipulated that Israel should withdraw from Sinai and make moves toward Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

In 1970 the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) began its armed struggle first from Jordan from where they were expelled and moved to Lebanon from where the PLO carried out attacks on Israel. As a response to the killing of eleven Israeli athletes in The Olympic
Games of 1972, Israel raided Beirut and killed three Palestinian leaders. Two years later a
civil war in Lebanon broke out, Beirut had become divided between a Christian and a
Muslim part, on one side the Phalangist militia and on the other a Muslim coalition including
Palestinians. The Phalangist leader Gemayel requested help from Israel and resaved it, in
forms of weapon, supplies and other military equipment. In 1982 Israel accused the PLO of
being behind the attempt to kill the Israeli ambassador in London and launched a flight attack
over PLO controlled parts in and around Beirut. The Palestinian response was an
unsuccessful attack on an Israeli settlement in Galilee, where they were forced to withdraw
from, and instead a 70-day siege of Beirut begun. After mediation from the US, the PLO
agreed to leave Lebanon and move to Tunisia; the agreement also specified that the US
would guarantee the safety of non-combatant Palestinians who remained in Beirut. The
Israeli defence minister, Ariel Sharon, disbelieved at the time that the entire PLO had left
Lebanon. When the Phalangist leader Gemayel was killed in a bomb attack, Sharon allowed
the Phalangist militia to enter Sabra and Shatila refugee camps resulted with massacres of
800 Palestinian men, women of all ages. An agreement was made in 1983 that all foreign
forces were to leave Lebanon. This agreement was not kept and a new agreement was made
in 1996 in order to avoid civilian casualties; this agreement, like the former, was not upheld.
During these years Israel pulled back to the south of Lebanon where the violence carried on,
this time between Israeli forces, the PFLP, and the Hezbollah. The full withdrawal came after
many Israelis opposed their presence in Lebanon as over 1, 500 Israelis in their military
services had been killed there.
In 1987 the Palestinian anger and frustration reached a boiling point; non-organised
demonstrations increased because the presence of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) was more
frequent, along with increased settlements that increased discrimination as well as violence.
Another factor was that the leaders of the Palestinians, the PLO, operated from Tunisia far
from the Palestinian population, which increased the sense of hopelessness. In Gaza, during a
funeral of four young Palestinian boys who had been killed in a car accident involving an
Israeli truck driver, rumours spread that the accident was intentional. A young man threw a
stone at an Israeli solider and the solider killed the man and riots broke out. The uprising
spread in both Gaza and the West Bank. Within days, Palestinian men and women of all ages
filled the streets demonstrating in what became an unorganised rebellion – The first
Intifada. The discontent and despair of the Palestinians that had been a reality during the ongoing occupation had its first widespread popular expression as a rebellion. After a while more coordinated forms of disobedience took place as a liberation strategy; the Palestinians refused to pay taxes, became engaged in strikes, and stopped trading with Israeli goods in large extensions. Israel put heavy fines against the boycott while seizing and disposing equipment, furnishings, and goods from local stores, factories, and homes.

The Intifada escalated and in 1988 after an Israeli commando team killed Abu Jihad, the leader of the Fatah in Tunisia. The Israeli part imposed zero tolerance; if a Palestinian flag was raised it was immediately torn down, storekeepers that were on strike were forced to reopen their stores if someone threw a Molotov cocktail the soldiers would shoot to kill. The IDF would shoot at the crowds with live bullets. After receiving massive criticism, the IDF began using a tactic called "breaking their bones," which meant that the IDF literally used clubs and rifflie-butt’s to break the Palestinians arms and bones. Again, Israel received massive criticism after TV-broadcastings showing soldiers chasing down and beating and breaking the bone of youths. After a while the idea of collective punishment became the new strategy to manage the situation. Curfews were implemented with "shoot to kill" orders if the where disobeyed, and any form of disobedience or violence against soldiers or settlers was punished. Mass detentions, house demolitions, deportations, indiscriminate violence, torture and external-judicial killings were carried out during this time. In 1992, when Rabin once again became Prime Minister, the IDF started to ignore non-violent resistance but continued with the collective punishments in the form of expelling of members of different organisations such as Hamas.

Eventually the Israelis managed to enclose the Intifada in 1993 since the Palestinians were inferior in relation to the well-equipped and trained IDF, as a result of the Oslo Accord. The PLO had expressed a clear willingness to recognise Israel since Arafat spoke of a new Palestinian state. The first Intifada had illustrated that the Palestinians were not able to defeat Israel since the IDF was better equipped and trained than the Palestinians who, in most cases, did not have any sufficient weapons to defend themselves with. Tough consequences for the

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42 The word Intifada actually means "shake off."
43 This comprised demonstrations or any form of illustrated grievance.
46 415 members of the Hamas were expelled to Lebanon.
Israeli side came after the Intifada in form of criticism from the international community for a long lasting occupation. And emerged the birth of some Israeli peace movements working against the occupation inside Israel. A large number of armed attacks were thereafter launched on the Israeli part, some of these targeted civilians.

During the first Intifada more than 1 240 Palestinians were killed and 130 787 injured, between 33 233 and 35 027 were arrested. On the Israeli side 179 Israelis were killed\(^{47}\). After the first Intifada the Palestinian militancy increased partly as a result of the strong offensive carried out by the Israeli part during the Intifada but mainly as an objection to the DOP\(^{48}\).

A second Intifada the Al-Aqsa Intifada started in the 29/9-2000 and is still ongoing. Just like the previous Intifada, the Al-Aqsa Intifada does not have any leaders and is once again the uprising of the people. This Intifada have though some different features than the previous one since armed resistance is utilised in larger extent compared to the previous one, as well as the usage of violence by the Israeli part.

**The Palestinian Liberation Organisation – PLO**

The PLO was founded in 1964 after the Arab Summit Conference. A Palestinian National Charter (PNC) was approved. The founding of the PLO marked a change for the Palestinians, since they earlier believed that an “Arab-unification” would be the solution for the problems\(^{49}\). But, as a direct result of the PLO, more and more Palestinians started to believe the solution to be an independent state, as in the case of Algeria\(^{50}\). These opinions intensified after the defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967.

The PLO is a secular and nationalistic organisation since it is for all Palestinians independent of beliefs and it avoids all strictly ideological lines regarding economic and social polity. Arafat, who became the leader of the organisation in 1969, has always made it clear that the liberation should come first and that divisions over ideologies only weakens the organisation.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{47}\) I have not found any data on the amount of wounded.

\(^{48}\) According to the organizations behind the violence.

\(^{49}\) This was the “era” of Arabism.

\(^{50}\) See section 4.

In 1988’s PNC meeting in Algiers Arafat pushed for acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338 which would recognise Israel and a partition of Palestine as well for a renunciation of terrorism; the PFLP tried to stop the acceptance and the renunciation but lost. In connection to the acceptance for the resolutions, the PNC declared the independence of the Arab State of Palestine. After repeatedly stating that the PLO wanted peace and would recognise Israel as well as that they would renounce violence and terrorism, the Israeli government recognised the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people. The DOP was signed after this; the agreement gives guidelines for coming negotiations and lays the foundation for a regime of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza during a five-year timetable. The Palestinian National Authority (PA) was established in 1993 as a result of the DOP and is the administrative entity with the purpose to govern Palestine. The Oslo Accords (DOP) divided Palestine into three categories; one under PA control, one under Israeli control, and one under divided responsibility.

The largest fraction of the PLO is the Fateh (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini) which is allegedly supported by 35% of the Palestinians and was founded in 1957 by Yasser Arafat among others. After 1967 Fateh joined the PLO and at this time Arafat was the spokesman of the organisation. The movement has only one goal and that is to liberate Palestine and create a Palestinian state containing the West Bank and the Gaza stripe with East-Jerusalem as the capital. Further, the Fateh does not have any other program. The movement is divided into a political and a military section, this can be described as the PA an expansion from the Fateh leadership with “grassroots organisations” upholding armed struggle in both Gaza and the West Bank – among others the PFLP. For Fateh, the armed struggle is a strategy not a tactic, a strategy to liberate Palestine. Both the divisions work within their directions, the PA believes in negotiations (at the moment the Roadmap to Peace) while the armed divisions believes in an armed struggle. In reality, the two divisions of Fateh are completely separated and have no links to each other.

The primary aims for the PLO was stipulated in the PNC and declared the Zionist and imperialistic forces as the opponents of the Palestinian people and their freedom. Their goals

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52 DOP also states that after the period of five years a permanent settlement based UN resolutions 242 and 338 should enter into force, also managing the questions of; Jerusalem, security, refuges, borders, settlements and other concerns. See [www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/resolutions_new_qpal.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/resolutions_new_qpal.htm).

53 Oslo II that was signed in Washington 1996.

were to liberate Palestine; article 9 states the means as an armed struggle and article 10 states that “Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian Popular liberation war.”

Before the DOP, the PLO saw a Palestine within the borders that existed during the British Mandate. Since the PLO recognised Israel, they accepted a Palestine in accordance with the UN resolutions as well as the DOP within the boarders of 1967. In the PNC, it is also stated that Jews who had a normal residence in Palestine pre-1948 will be considered as Palestinians. Although the PLO is the organisation that has conducted the negotiations the PNC still recognises armed struggle as a way to liberate Palestine. In 1996, the PNC cancelled all articles that denied the existence of Israel.

The Radicalisation Mechanisms in the Case of the PLO

(i) Group discrimination of the Palestinians and the PLO

Discrimination of the Palestinians has been a fact since the establishment of the Israeli state. Since the defeat in the Six Day War in 1967, discrimination has increased. The Palestinians lack full political rights as well as other basic rights as a result of the occupation. The discrimination is both subjectively experienced and “factual.” It was the discrimination that led to the outbreak of the first Intifada. Discrimination is apparent in all aspects of Palestinian life. The discrimination is experienced not only by the PLO and their sympathisers but also by all Palestinians in a broad context. Palestinian homes may be searched without warrants, Palestinians can be arrested without warrant or charge, they can be held in prison for up to six month without charge or trial, torture is common during interrogation and they can be expelled at any time. In the 1990’s the land confiscation’s were made merely build and expand settlements. Since 2002, a majority part of land confiscation’s are made within the process of constructing a wall that the Israelis are building on Palestinian territories. In order to build the wall uprooting of trees are made, inhibiting the ability of the farmers to provide for themselves. Beyond that, many families have become homeless and in some cases completely cut out, surrounded by settlements on one side and the wall on the other. Palestinians are not allowed to enter the Israeli settlements or use the “better” roads.

57 Six month at the time, the longest administrative detained remained in prison for eight years without charge. See www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet//Palestinian_Prisoners.htm
Since 1993, the OPT has been under a general closure, meaning that Palestinians as well as Palestinian goods may not enter Israel unless they obtain a permit to do so. Consequentially there is no freedom of movement between Gaza and the West Bank, and isolation exists within these territories since it is next to impossible to obtain a permit. Total curfew began being applied frequently from 1993, meaning that Palestinians are not allowed to go out. During curfews of long periods, the Palestinians are allowed to buy supplies every five to eight days during a window of two to four hours. In 1993-1996, there were 348 days of closure in the OPT. During the period 1997- September 2000 there were 146 days of closure in the OPT. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the OPT have been under internal closure as well as under total closure continuously for the entire period, with very few exceptions. Within a year after the DOP was signed, at least 56 permanent roadblocks were placed. In 1996, Israel began with the usage of “internal closure,” meaning that there are restrictions of all movement within and between cities, villages, refugee camps and so forth, consequently imprisoning all Palestinians within their communities.58

Since the Al-Aqsa Intifada began many of the roads have been closed down to Palestinians, making the timetable for journeys at least ten times longer. This is preventing students from getting to school, visiting relatives and friends, as well as paralysing the Palestinian economy. Water and food trucks as well as medical aid are being affected by this policy. Humanitarian aid has been prevented from entering the OPT, along with human rights workers. In April 2000, 3 773 trucks brought goods in to Gaza; this has declined since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and in April 2002 there where 979 trucks bringing goods into Gaza.59 The role of checkpoints increases this during a day people from a village can be allowed to enter the city and a couple of hours later they are not allowed to return to the village. Travelling between Gaza and the West Bank is next to impossible. Checkpoints are also placed between villages and their fields making it impossible to harvest.60 Since May 2002, Israel requires that Palestinians must carry an Israeli issued permit to move between the different regions in the West Bank. This permit differs from the permits that Palestinians have been obliged to use for a long time in the way that they have to have permit to go from a "suburb" to the city and so on. Israel control over 82% of the OPT over the borders,

59 Rubenberg, pp. 359-360.
regulating all movement in the areas. Israel diverts 88% of the water resources of the OPT. In Gaza, Palestinians are forbidden to dig any agricultural wells while the settlers are allowed to do so, resulting in the water consumption for the settlers being 1000 cubic meters per settler compared to 172 per Palestinian. In Gaza, there are approximately 7 000 settlers controlling the water supply of the entire strip.

Economic discrimination is also visible. Between 1995 and 1996 the percent of the population living in poverty increased from 14 percent to 26.9 percent. During the period 1997-1999, the number of people living in poverty was around 20 percent. In 2000-2002, there has been an increase of Palestinians living in poverty; in 2000 35 percent, in 2001 50 percent, and in 2002 64 percent. Unemployment in 1995-1996 was 18-21 percent, and in the period of 1997-1999 unemployment declined from 21 percent to 12. In 2000, the unemployment was 10-28 percent, in 2001 37 percent and in 2002, 46-70 percent. From 1993 to 1995 the value of Palestinian agriculture declined by 40 percent. Since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 through January 2003 the estimation of damage to Palestinian agriculture is 877 million dollars, including the uprooting of 748 815 trees. During the first phase of the construction of the wall, it is estimated that the building of the wall will affect 12 000 Palestinians in 15 villages. 3 669 square km of agricultural land have also been destroyed since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Settler violence is very frequent, which is especially noticeable during the harvesting period, since the Palestinians are prevented by force to reach their harvests. The settlers are usually protected by the IDF or carrying their own arms. If tension arises between Palestinians and settlers, the Palestinians are usually placed under curfew. One example of this was in 1994 when a settler killed 29 Palestinians during a prayer in Hebron. A demonstration by the

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64 www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=950&CategoryId=8.
65 This is why organisations like The International Solidarity Movement have campaigns such as the Olive harvest campaign in order to help the Palestinians harvesting. See www.palsolidarity.org.
Palestinians followed where 27 Palestinians were killed, seven mosques where closed and a 29 days long curfew was enacted for the Palestinians.66 Since 1970, Israel has periodically seen the PLO as a “terrorist organisation.” Before the signing of the DOP, members of the PLO were frequently arrested and even at times assassinated. Since the DOP, a membership in the PLO is not used as a pretext to an arrest; this has altered to other organisations such as the PFLP. Though today this have scaled back some, Arafat is in large part seen as the root of the problem and there have been discussions about the “elimination of Arafat,” however, members of the PLO are not exposed to further discriminations in relation to the other Palestinians.

Gurr and Harff wrote an article about early warning systems in the Journal of Peace Research in 1998. Their conclusion concerning this aspect was that the Israeli retreat from the DOP as well as the continuing discrimination is “highly likely to trigger a renewed rebellion among the Palestinians in the West Bank.”67 In 2001 the second uprising began. In the beginning the protests were focused on Jerusalem but eventually spread to all Palestinian areas. Israel closed the boarders of Gaza and the West Bank and the Palestinian protesters threw stones at the heavily armed IDF that used rockets, tanks, and helicopters against them. Arafat’s attempts to stop the violence failed so he called for international forces to intervene and halt the violence. The US halted UN resolutions twice that would have made it possible to intervene. Israeli strikes increased, attacking police stations and other administrative buildings.

(ii) Strength of the Palestinian Group Identity and of the PLO

There is a distinct identity, culture, and nationality that define the Palestinians. They share a common history, language and a joint territory. They also share the same culture in general, which differs in some cases since the Palestinians are not originally one cohesive group; there are nomads and other groups within the Palestinians. Furthermore, the Palestinians do not fully share the same religion. The majority of the Palestinians are Muslims, the second largest religious group are Christians, and the smallest group are Bahai. Although they can be seen

as divided in terms of where they live – in the West Bank/Gaza strip, refugee camps and in Israel – the group identity as Palestinians is very strong. They see themselves as Palestinians first (not Arabs); their perception of themselves as Palestinians is above all other perception. As Castels and Davidson claim that when you are reminded of who you are and are treated in a discriminating way because of that you will hold on to your “identity” that grows even stronger. The Palestinians feel threatened as Palestinians, not as Arabs, Muslims, Christians or Bahai and therefore their identity as Palestinians grows stronger.

(iii) Group Cohesiveness and the Political Leadership of the Palestinians and the PLO

When Yasser Arafat returned in 1994 from exile in Tunisia he was welcomed by most of the Palestinians. He was the leader of the PLO since 1969 and a symbol for the Palestinian nationalism and identity as well as the “personification” of the Palestinian hope. His return was seen as a success for the Palestinian cause because a lot of the Palestinians believed that the DOP would lead to an independent Palestinian state. He returned also as the head of a new non-military Palestinian Authority (PA).

The elections first took place in 1996, according to the PA 73% of registered voters in the West Bank and 88% of voters in the Gaza Strip participated in the elections. Yasser Arafat was elected President with 88.2% of the votes. After time, without any changes for the better, the non-implementation of the DOP, Arafat’s “autocratic style,” and corruption his popularity started to decline. The power is centralised under the leadership of Arafat while the people want a democratic leadership and not a non-transparent one, especially since there are many competent Palestinians willing to be apart of the Palestinian leadership. Arafat’s leadership became more and more independent from Fateh and other parties since his return one of the reasons being was that some of the other leaders had been assassinated. Another reason for this was that some organisations such as the PFLP and the DFLP had left the PNC as a result of the differences between the organisations.

In June 2000 “only” 31.8% of the Palestinians in the occupied territories supported Arafat. In the beginning of the year 2002, the support for the PLO declined further mainly because

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many Palestinians did not see any changes being made for the better. Local PLO leaders in Gaza began to resign from the PLO, believing that the situation there was getting even more frustrated and the PLO could not do anything. Some have also resigned in protest against the PA arrests of Palestinians.²²

Gurr and Harff uphold that the more fractions there are within a group, the less cohesive it is. Even though many fractions exist within the Palestinians and within their organisations, there is a strong cohesion within the Palestinians as a group, since the primary aim for all the fractions is to liberate Palestine from occupation.

It is not the strong political leadership that generates a climate of self-organisation amongst the Palestinians. This is shown in the both Intifada where there have not been any clear leaders; in both Intifada it has been the uprising of the people. The cohesion is also shown in form of a society where “what effects one effects the whole group,” a culture is developed where the streets are filled with people mourning a “martyrs” death” whether they were a member of any specific organisation, religion, etc or not.

iv) Political Environment and the Israeli Conflict Regulation Method

Even though Israel is classified as a democracy and has the procedures of a basic democracy, the form of occupation can not be classified as democratic. The Palestinians have almost no political rights. They pay taxes but are not allowed to enjoy equal rights within the law, they face zero-tolerance, civil-, political- and social rights are suppressed in the case of Palestinians in the OPT. Because this is what the Palestinians see and experience in this case Israel can not be seen as a democracy. Gurr and Harff uphold that the less democratic a state is, the more likely it is that their opponents use non-parliamentary methods. Israel uses brutal means to suppress the Palestinian grievance. Criticisms of the means used by the Israeli part have been condemned not only by the Palestinians but also by human rights organisations as well as the international arena. Many resolutions, binding as well as non-binding, have been taken by the UN about the situation.

When Yitzhak Shamir lost the Israeli elections in 1992 he admitted that he was deliberately letting the Madrid negotiations “go in circles” while he fully implemented the plans for

²³ A martyr is anyone killed by the Israeli side, not only during an violent operation against the Israeli side.
expanding settlements in the OPT, making it impossible to give them up.\(^{74}\) This is something that the Israeli part has been accused of doing throughout all the negotiations since they began in the 1990’s. Accepting a Palestinian state within the DOP is also seen as a colossal diplomatic defeat for Israel, since for many Israelis it means that Israel has given up everything without getting anything in return, leaving many questions open such as the right to return, settlements, Jerusalem and security arrangements. "Luckily there it seems we won’t get there because there’s no Palestinian partner on the horizon ready to eradicate the terror infrastructure. Which brings us back to the unilateral separation."\(^{75}\) After 1989, there is a clear political will to improve the situation for the Palestinians through negotiations for the PLO. It was through this political will that the DOP was formed. The PLO has thereafter mainly attempted to solve the conflict through negotiations since the DOP was never implemented.

Throughout the political career of Ariel Sharon, the leader of the leading Israeli party the Likud Party and the Prime Minister of Israel a classical Jewish-Zionist idea\(^{76}\) is visible especially when it comes to the expansion of the settlements. The ambition of the Likud party is to unite the Jewish people in the Land of Israel\(^{77}\). When Sharon was the Minister of Agriculture (1977-1981) he started to expand the settlements in the Palestinian territories. In 1990, when he was the Minister of Housing and Construction, he started once again to expand the settlements, during this time the constructions of new settlements as well as

\(^{74}\) Friedman, Robert, Zealots for Zion: Inside Israels West Bank Settlement Movement, New York: Random House, pp. 246-249.


\(^{76}\) Zionism – The core of Zionism is stated in the Declaration of Independence of Israel and is an idea that the Jewish people and their land shall be connected – Eretz Israel.\(^{76}\) Zionism is the foundation of the gathering of the Jewish people to what is seen as their national home that this is preserved is very important for the Israeli state since “...there can be no doubt on the day when Jews cease to be a majority in Israel, Israel cease to be Jewish.”\(^{76}\) The meaning of Zionism changed in 1977 under the Likud coalition, with Menachem Begin as the leader; God led the Jews to Israel therefore it would be a violation against the unity between God and Jews to return to the pre-1967 borders. This meaning of Zionism is what Likud upholds and is the primary reason why Israel won’t recognise a Palestinian statehood. See Friedman, Robert, Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement, New York: Random House, 1992, p. 4. And www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHo1080.

houses accelerated.\textsuperscript{78} Since 2001, it has become even more clear that Israel has plans to give the Palestinians no more than 42\% of the OPT with a semiautonomous entity\textsuperscript{79}

As a response to the ongoing peace negotiations in 1995, the Israeli leader Rabin was assassinated by a right wing Israeli who wanted to derail the negotiations. The replacement for Rabin was Simon Perez, until there were elections held again in 1996. The outcome of the elections was a coalition of six different parties with Binyamin Netanyahu, the leader of Likud, as the Israeli Prime Minister. Netanyahu refused to meet with Arafat until 1997. Under Netanyahu, the settlements expanded and he refused to hand over the power to the PA in agreed areas, such as in Hebron where he only turned over power of 80\% of the city, still controlling an area where 500 settlers and 20 000 Palestinians lived. He also authorised to start building a new settlement that would accomplish a circle of Jewish settlements surrounding East-Jerusalem. This set off a new phase of protests by the Palestinians as well as attacks conducted by organisations such as the PFLP and the Hamas. As a response, the withdrawal of Israeli troops was halted and later on sealed.\textsuperscript{80} The settlements affect the conflict in many ways; they provide the IDF with a reason to stay in Palestinian territories, they are steps toward the creation of a greater Israel, and have made attaining a peace process more difficult. The expanding of the illegal settlements has been rapid, in 1977 there were 3 876 and in 1999 there were 193 000 settlements in the OPT.

In 1998 after pressure from the US, there was a restart of the peace process. The sides signed the “Wye River Memorandum” that stipulated that the Israeli withdraw from 13\% of the West Bank in three phases. Moreover, the PA should take security obligations to arrest the members of Islamic Jihad and Hamas, as well as the removal of all clauses in the PNC concerning the destruction of Israel. Under the agreement Israel would also remove some of the illegal settlements. Following these negotiations a 50 day seal was ended. Later the Israeli part wanted to add six additional requirements, which was declined by the Palestinian part and the peace negotiations were over.

In 1999 the Labour Party led by Ehud Barak was elected in Israel. Barak started by promising the Palestinians a bridge between Gaza and the West Bank and froze the plans for new Jewish

\textsuperscript{78} www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jsp?itemNo=231945&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&shSu bContrassID=0&listSrc=Y.

\textsuperscript{79} Hass, Amira, ”All the way from the Sea to the River”, Ha’aretz, 30/5-2001. www.haaretz.com.

\textsuperscript{80} Ciment, James, (1997:1), pp. 217-220.
settlements around Jerusalem. Barak also signed an agreement based on the “Wye River Memorandum” with a timetable promising that 38.9% of the West Bank would be controlled by the PA by March 2000. In May 2000 there were negotiations between the two sides in Stockholm, Sweden, at the same time Palestinians were demonstrating against the imprisonment of 1 650 long held political prisoners as a support to the prisoners who were on hunger strike. Along with the protests violence broke out and Barak pulled out his representatives from the peace negotiations.

In July 2000 the parts restarted the peace negotiations which were held at Camp David. The two sides could not come to an agreement concerning; the question of the refugees, the shape and extent of the Palestinian state, and Jerusalem which both parts claim as their capital. By now the question of Jerusalem had become a burning issue and the parts could not reach an agreement.  

Sharon, who at this had become the leader of the right-wing party Likud, wanted to declare the Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem. He along with 1 200 heavily armed riot policemen led a tour for Likud officials to Al-Aqsa Mosque on Friday the 29/9-2000. Protests started at once; the Palestinians threw stones at the Israeli police forces that fired back with rubber bullets and teargas. 24 were seriously injured and the second Intifada arose – the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The Israeli part responded to the protests by invading the OPT; during these invasions many homes where destroyed. An agreement for a cease-fire was made but the continuance of violence undermined these agreements. The settlers pressed the Sharon government stating that they were not protected and that the reprisals on the Palestinians were not sufficient. Sharon ordered further strikes on the Palestinians as well as on the PA and Palestinian security headquarters. He stated that the Jordan Valley was Israeli and that the expansion of settlements would continue. Within weeks after this statement at least 15 new settlements in the West Bank were built. The IDF attacked PA head quarters in Ramallah forcing Arafat to take refuge underground. The days that followed the invasion

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81 Rubenberg, C, pp. 76-86.
82 Friday is the Muslim day of communal prayers; the mosques are usually full on Fridays.
83 Rubenberg, C, p.95.
85 Since the end of 2000 there have been discussions about Arafat as the person who constitute a threat to the state of Israel and that the damage following his disappearance would be less then the damage caused by him. Furthermore, the rapport was conducted where it was set that the Intifada was seen as a crime orchestrated by Arafat. Reinhart, Tanya, “Evil Unleashed, Tikkun: A Biminyhely Jewish Critique of Politics, Culture and Society 17, no. 2 (March/April 2002), pp. 14-15.
continued, Arafat was held as a prisoner in Ramallah surrounded by Israeli tanks, but was able to make some statements condemning and banning attacks on Israelis, saying that this is what gives the Israelis the excuse to escalate aggressions against Palestinians.\(^8\)

As illustrated above there has been a numerous of negotiations between the parts but not much has done to improve the situation for the Palestinians. The conflict regulation methods have been of mixed character but foremost a method to eliminate differences have been implemented, although during the negotiations the Israeli part has used a hegemonic control, “listening” to parts of the criticism but maintaining that the PLO and PA first must handle with the Palestinian militancy. As Castels and Davidson uphold, the choice of methods taken by (in this case) Israel have effected the situation facing the Palestinians. Negotiations have been imposed by third-parties and have created a further forum for the PLO and PA as the representatives of the Palestinian people in negotiations both within the Palestinian arena (PLO foremost) and for the conflict negotiations (PA foremost).

(v) **Extent of The Israeli State Brutality**

Violence according to the definition at hand is directed at the Palestinians in everyday life as an expression of the occupation.

After the signing of the DOP through the beginning of 1996 Israel had detained over 6 000 Palestinians, many of who where held up to 30 days without seeing a lawyer and nearly five month before visiting rights were granted. There where also frequent reports of torture.\(^8\)

From 1967 to 1999 prisoners were tortured, torture were also used during investigations, during the first Intifada the General Security Service – GSS (now the Israeli Security Agency ISA) interrogated approximately 23 000 Palestinians. The Public Committee Against Torture (PCAT) estimates that almost all of them were exposed to some form of torture. The methods used were;

> “tying up detainees in painful positions for hours or days, solitary confinement, confinement in tiny and cramped cubicles, beatings, covering the detainee’s head with a sack, violent ‘shaking’, deprivation of sleep and food, exposure to extreme cold or heat, verbal, sexual and psychological abuse, threats against the individual’s life or family

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\(^8\) [www.ppu.org.uk/war/countries/mideast/israel6.html](http://www.ppu.org.uk/war/countries/mideast/israel6.html)

\(^8\) [www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org), Summary of concerns and recommendations in Israel and the occupied territories 1996.
Confessions given as a result of torture are used to convict the person making the confession as well as evidence against anyone named by the detainee. Convictions cannot be appealed. The torture is also used on children, mainly beatings, deprivation of food and psychological torture. Since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada there have been over 2000 child arrests. A child between the ages of 12-14 can be sentenced to six month in jail for throwing a stone. After the age of 14, Palestinian children are tried as adults. In 1999 the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that torture was only allowed in “exceptional cases” where the officers had reason to believe that they can prevent a crime by using torture. Still human rights groups report that more than 85% of the Palestinian detainees are exposed to torture or ill treatments under the interrogations.

During 2001-2003 house demolitions were more common since this was done not solely on the bases that the Palestinians were building “without” a permit but also as a punishment to the family of anyone who has been part of carrying out an attack on Israel and in the process of building the wall. 1209 housing units have been demolished between the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and 29/7-2003. The IDF have pledged that they will use all means in their search for “terrorists” as well as those who assist them. Incursions have also caused house.

Since Israel implemented boarder closures by placing checkpoints, there exists approximately 250 checkpoints in the Palestinian territories; there is no freedom of movement for the Palestinians. Since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 63 persons have died at the checkpoints and women have given birth at checkpoints, at least five of these have resulted in stillbirths. The daily life of the Palestinians involves standing and waiting to pass a checkpoint. Another

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88 http://www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/factsheet_on_torture.htm
89 Rubenberg, C, p.133.
91 www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/Palestinian_Prisoners.htm.
93 The wall will be three times as long and twice as high as the Berlin wall, in large parts.
www.palestinemonitor.org.
96 The source states that the sum of both checkpoints and roadblocks to 400. www.palestinemonitor.org.
aspect of the discrimination is that the Palestinians have nowhere to report or complain when crimes against them occur. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000 to 23/7-03 the military police (MP) have conducted 55 investigations followed by two indictments.

The IDF uses non-judicial killings affecting not only the targeted persons but also others, since most of these killings are carried out by air force bombardments. Through the period 9/11-2000 to 25/6-2003, Israel carried out 107 non-judicial killings; besides the targeted they killed 72 civilians in these attacks, many of the civilians were children. The argument IDF made concerning the cause of so many civilians deaths when they carry out their non-judicial killings is that the targeted settled next to civilian populated areas, in order to make it harder for the air force to hit them without loss of life or property of civilians.

The IDF used human shields during the invasions of Jenin and Nablus. Palestinians where forced to go in front of the soldiers, opening doors in to houses that the IDF believed could be booby-trapped. In May 2002 the IDF issued a statement claiming that they would no longer use civilians as human shields. Curfew has become more frequently used by the IDF. During 2002 inhabitants of Hebron, Nablus and Tulkarem spent approximately half of their time under curfew.

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97 According to international law the occupying part is responsible for the people, in reality there is nowhere to report a crime when the perpetrator is a soldier or a settler. I visited a Palestinian village called Azmud close to Nablu, in the West Bank, together with some peace-activists that took samples of the water since a lot of the inhabitants suddenly had become ill. The water was controlled from a settlement in a hill above the village. Later on results of the water-test showed that the water contained poison. The group of peace-activists together with the villagers tried to report this to the Israel authority and the military police with no luck. www.palsolidarity.org, www.palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/water_use_and_distribution.hmt.

102 Children of the Second Intifada, p. 76.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

The PFLP was created in 1967 by George Habbash as a part of the Arab National Movement (ANM) as a response to the massive expelling of Palestinians. The organisation is based on a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is an organisation for the working class that is dedicated to liberating Palestine. From 1968 to the end of 1970 the organisation was involved and responsible for several hijackings of aircrafts and attacks outside the disputed areas. The organisation is an anti-imperialistic organisation and refuses to work with organisations or regimes that are under “western-influence.” The PFLP believes that they have the right to question any political measure taken to liberate Palestine that is not based on enmity towards “reaction and imperialism.” The PFLP sees the creation of Israel as an act of imperialism and views a popular liberation war as the sole mean of liberation. Therefore, they have opposed all negotiations with Israel. The organisation believes in a guerrilla war as a “peoples’ war.”103

The PFLP primary goal is to defend the Palestinian right to establish a democratic, sovereign, and independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital. They stress the refugees’ right to return104 and uphold that peace cannot be achieved unless it comprises this right, since it is the most important part of the schedule of the liberation as well as a legitimate right. Any solution that ignores this may produce a short period of peace but will not eliminate the objectives that lead to a conflict; to implement this right is the only way to create a permanent peace in and around Palestine according to the PFLP. This is also the main reason why the organisation opposes the DOP which they see as a betrayal against the refugees. When the PLO signed the DOP agreement the PFLP left the PLO and joined the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) which they though left in 1999 due to differences between them; they reconciliated however with the PLO the same year. In the beginning the organisations aim was against a one-state solution, a secular state, for Jews and Arabs. This is still the official long-term goal but the organisation’s “political goal” is to create a Palestinian democratic state in the currently occupied Palestinian territories along the 1967 borders.

The PFLP aims to mobilize the Palestinian masses and lead the struggle for their return to Palestine, allow self-determination, and establish a Palestinian state. These, in turn, are steps

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104 That is the refugees (the Palestinian Diaspora) right to return.
along the path of defeating the Zionist entity, liberating all of Palestine, and establishing a
democratic Palestinian state where all citizens enjoy equal rights, free from discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, or religious belief.\(^{105}\)

The political platform of the PFLP is that the Palestinian peoples struggles were all means are
allowed including armed violence. The imbalance of power between the Palestinian and the
Israeli part is seen as an incitement to use radical methods such as violent attacks on
civilians\(^{106}\). Throughout the statements that are given by the PFLP it is clear that they do not
see the victims of their attacks as civilians,\(^{107}\) whether the targeting is in a civilian or a
military area. Since Israel provides settler with automatic weapons and the IDF trains many
of them in shooting the PFLP sees them as legitimate targets.\(^{108}\) The struggle against Israel is
strategic; the Palestinian people of both the Diaspora and those under occupation have a right
to struggle using all means necessary, including the usage of violence, because the conflict is
constant and the means and tactics are the variables for the organisation. The PFLP was one
of the first organisations that used violent attacks against civilians.

The Radicalisation Mechanisms in the Case of The PFLP

(i) The Group discrimination of the Palestinians and of the PFLP

The discrimination is principally the same as it is for all Palestinians though the PFLP is also
exposed to a further discrimination within the Palestinian society implemented by the PA.
The PFLP focuses on the right to return and therefore have a further perception of
discrimination; that is, the further discrimination exposed to the refugees outside the OPT and
Israel as a result of the DOP. They see the group discrimination as an humiliation since it
embody conditions that deprive the Palestinians of the most basic human rights: children are
prevented from going to school, the sick from going to hospital, many can not provide for

\(^{105}\) www.fightbacknews.org/2003-3-summer/pflp.htm. Interview: PFLP leader Ahmar Saadat, From
Occupied Palestine, 2003-05-02.

\(^{106}\) This was an answer was given by all of the interviewed people, most of those interviewed stated that
they would use other means if the, had the possibility. Furthermore they did not see adult male settlers as
civilians since most of them carry arms and are engaged in violent attacks against Palestinians and are
opponents to any form of peace in general.

\(^{107}\) On the contrary to the Hamas, who normally states that civilians are not intended to get hurt.

their families, and farmers have great difficulty tending their fields. Homes and agricultural areas are destroyed and water resources are unequally distributed. The humiliation that the Palestinians live under is a result of the occupation and the discrimination. Humiliation is intrinsic to every aspect of the life; children “have not role models” since their parents are humiliated by twenty years old soldiers in many cases everyday. A will to end the discrimination is created since many Palestinians do not see the discrimination or the humiliation coming to an end. Another aspect of the differences when it comes to the discrimination between the PFLP and the PLO is that many of the members of the PLO live in the Ramallah area where there has not been as many invasions compared with the refugee camps, creating an increased feeling of discrimination for the Palestinians in the refugee camps. Furthermore, there are fewer possibilities to work for the Palestinians in the refugee areas.

(ii) Strength of the Palestinian and the PFLP Group Identity
The PFLP group identity is mainly a Palestinian one as they share the same common traits as the previous organisation in the history, language, and joint territory. Furthermore, the PFLP consider themselves as socialists/anti-imperialists which can be seen as a further common trait. The organisation does not have a religious identity and the members are mainly atheists with Marxist ideology though some members are Christians and Muslims with the same ideology. Many members of the PFLP are imprisoned while many others are expelled and are part of the Palestinian Diaspora. This has affected the identity of the organisation; since they are in large extent engaged in these aspects the members of the organisation identify themselves as representatives of the Palestinian people at the grassroots level, as a part of their Marxist identity. Gurr and Harff uphold that if many members of a group sense the discrimination and identify themselves as part of the discriminated group, the will to react intensifies. And so is the case for the PFLP as well as for many other organisations and individuals.

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109 The aspect of humiliation was stated to be a result of discrimination by most people whom I interviewed.
110 The loss of hope is wide spread among the Palestinians. This is upheld by the NGO Defence for Children International and Iyad Sarraj, a leading psychologist in Gaza.
(iii) Group Cohesiveness and the Political leadership within the Palestinians and the PFLP

The PFLP have condemned the DOP since it “gave the approval” of settlers, allowing them to carry arms and giving Israel an eternal foothold in Palestine. The result of the DOP is that it turned the desire for peace into a life in despair as they see it. During the first Intifada, the organisation strongly criticised Arafat, claiming that the way to liberation was through mass protest. The PLFP called for the resignation of Arafat after he signed the DOP because they see it as further concession to Israel. The PLO is seen as a bourgeois authority that either “immaturely exploit” resistance or negotiate on the same old reference – DOP – that is their legacy. In the eyes of the PFLP the current Intifada is a popular resistance and a result of the collapse of the earlier accords. In 1998 the PFLP made a joint statement with nine other Palestinian organisations111 opposing the course of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) that they viewed as submitted to Zionist and imperialistic demands. The PFLP rejected the PA, making it clear that they would never work with the PA since there are too many differences between them and furthermore they see the PA as something closely connected with the DOP, which is rejected by the PFLP. However they do believe that the PLO, even though it is paralysed, can serve as an instrument for the political unification of the Palestinian people and is a Palestinian national achievement. The organisation did reconsolidate with the “grassroots division” of Fateh in 1999. Nevertheless they still criticise the PLO and see Arafat as someone who delivers security to Israel rather than to the Palestinian people. “…the Israeli deceleration on continuing to build the Apartheid racist wall, the establishment of hundreds of new settlement units, and the continuation of assassinations and invasions across Palestinian areas.”112 With this statement the organisation also opposed the formation of an emergency government since it did not meet the immediate needs of the Palestinians nor did it strengthen the resistance or represent the people. In 1999 the organisation restated their support for an armed struggle against the occupation and conducted several attacks against Israeli targets. The PFLP does not believe that the political leadership (PA) reflects the Palestinians or their preferences. This was shown in both of the Intifada and according to Gurr and Harff this demonstrates a weakening of the group cohesiveness in addition to the fractions within the Palestinian group. The fact that the popularity of Arafat and the PLO

111 The Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF).
have declined, and that the leadership within the PA is more of an external creation than emanating from the Palestinian population shows a gap between the political leadership and the population. A cohesive group is a group in which the political elite and the collective are linked together and where the unification and cohesion exists within the population.

The former leader of the PFLP, Abu Ali Mustafa, was elected as the general secretary after Habash resigned. Mustafa had helped start the organisation and led the first PFLP commando troops from Jordan to the West Bank where he started to form the “underground body” of the organisation. In August of 2001 Mustafa was assassinated by the IDF; the assassination was ordered by Sharon. The PFLP statements following the assassination promised to continue the Intifada and other forms of activity until the occupation is ended.\footnote{Press Release of the PFLP on the Death of Abu Ali Mustafa.}

The “current leader”\footnote{Saadat is in prison and is still the leader of the PFLP formally, though they have a substitute leader – Maher al-Taher.} of the PFLP is Ahmed Saadat, who succeeded Mustafa in October 2001. During the leadership of Saadat the organisation has become more radical. Since Saadat became the leader of the PFLP violent attacks against civilians as well as other attacks have increased. As maintained by the interviews I made, the PFLP has a strong political leadership even though some leaders have been killed and others imprisoned. According to Gurr and Harff, this generates a climate where individuals willingly subordinate their personal preferences for the benefit of the group. Although there is some weakening in the cohesiveness of the Palestinian group, the group is still cohesive and in the case of the PFLP, the group cohesiveness is strong. Gurr and Harff maintain that cohesive groups with an authoritarian leadership do not encounter internal shattering in relation to making decisions concerning whether they should use violence or not. In the case of the PFLP, this is strengthened.

Since the killing of Mustafa the support for the PFLP has grown from approximately 3% to 10% in the West Bank. Most of the attacks carried out by the organisation are either attacks on settlements or infiltrations of the IDF. The members of the PFLP usually belong to the lower class and are typically refugees who endured the expelling in both 1948 and 1967. They usually share a frustration towards the “leaders” (PA) that they view as submissive under the Israelis.
(iv) Political Environment and the Israeli Conflict Regulation Method

The PFLP sees themselves as an organisation that is fighting an entity that they reject and view the conflict is an open one, and does not make deals or truces with Israel. Again, a Palestinian state that does not include the right to return will not be accepted and Israel will never agree to the right of return since it would threaten the existence of a Zionist Israel. Israel is seen as a plundering and aggressive entity on Palestinian land that has a further determination to expand since where Israel exists today is not the final goal for this Zionist power. The Likud Party is the largest party at the moment in Israel holding 40 of 120 seats in Knesset and has stated its ambition as the concentration of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel without stating the borders; the Likud party is a Zionist party.

The Israeli part uses methods to eliminate differences when it comes to the PFLP. The Israeli goal when it comes to "terrorism" is to reduce the number of attacks and minimize both direct and secondary damage. Since Israel says that the OPT is outside the control of Israel, classic military actions are impossible to carry out. Instead, the IDF attacks "terrorist squads" in their "...training camps, during terrorist activities, on their way to Israeli territory, during their border crossing or even during their stay in Israel itself." A further strategy is to strike against leaders of "terrorist organisations" as well as others engaged in planning or who are responsible for the execution of an attack. Strikes against the infrastructure of the "terrorist organisations" are an additional strategy. The measures taken do this are by way of air force bombardments, ground incursions, naval attacks, and strikes against the leaders of the "terrorist organisations." The elimination of leaders is believed to hurt the organisations stability as well as the moral of the members in the organisation and furthermore sabotage planned attacks. Moreover, the leaders of the organisations are seen as "proper targets for elimination." The policy of targeting leaders was made in the 1980’s by the late Yitzhak Rabin:

"My understanding of terror is simple: there is no solution based on a single blow, there is no campaign that can solve the problem. What is needed, using preventative strikes and other methods, is to reduce vulnerability. The second element is to mete out the maximum punishment to perpetrators and their handlers. I am not referring here to personal terror against someone, but rather to a viewpoint. We must

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117 www.ict.org.il. (Israeli counter terrorism activity)
Throughout the history of the PFLP, many of its members have been imprisoned. In the years 1991-1995 Israel attacked the PFLP forcefully. The Israeli assumption that by killing the leader Mustafa the organisation would lead the PFLP to a “intensive care unit,” lead instead to a similar counter-attack on Israel. The current leader Saadat is imprisoned along with other mid-level leaders, while other leaders have been killed. Other measures taken in order to realise the above-mentioned goals are "defensive operations." Which are divided into "legal system" inside the OPT and inside Israel. The measures taken inside OPT are "… an extensive punitive system against terrorism, which includes arrest, administrative detention, exile, and sealing and destroying the houses of proven terrorists.” Since 2002 there have been open discussions in Israel about expelling the Palestinians from OPT as a solution to the conflict.

The “militant” organisations such as the PFLP claimed that they would stop the suicide bombings and other attacks if Israel would stop killing civilians; the Israeli response was that they would enter a cease-fire if the Palestinian violence would stop. In July 2001, Israel voted in favour of giving the IDF freedom to kill anyone suspected of terrorist activity. Sharon added that there would be reprisals for every Palestinian attack. The organisations responded saying that as long as there is occupation the resistance will continue. In December of 2001 the PFLP, along with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fateh made a joint truce offer to Israel stating that they would stop all attacks inside Israel only if Israel stopped the invasions and assassinations. A couple of hours later two Palestinian children were killed and the offer were withdrawn immediately. Instead, Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched an attack, which killed ten Israelis. The PFLP and the other armed organisations claimed that Israel was not serious about the cease-fire so there was no reason why they should be either.

In September 2001 the IDF surrounded Jenin with tanks, the electricity, water and telephone-lines were cut of. Shortly after, Jericho and Ramallah were entered in the same way. Following international pressure the Israeli part agreed to a ceasefire if the Palestinians did

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118 [www.ict.org.il](http://www.ict.org.il) (Israeli counter terrorism activity)
119 [www.ict.org.il](http://www.ict.org.il) (Israeli counter terrorism activity)
not launch an attack within 48 hours. Arafat instructed the Palestinians to hold back even in self-defence and agreed to make efforts to improve the security. Israel drew back from Jenin, Jericho, Ramallah and Hebron but remained outside the cities, crossing them frequently. At the ending of September, non-violent demonstrations were held in Gaza and the West Bank, the IDF responded with firing rubber-bullets, tear-gas, sound grenades and in some cases, live ammunition. As a response to the ongoing protests the IDF resumed the offensive; tanks, bulldozers, helicopters moved in to Hebron and the truce was officially over. The PA began to arrest Palestinians that were wanted by Israel. The Palestinians began to protest again although this time the protests were primarily against the PA: riots between the Palestinian population and the Palestinian police broke out resulting in two Palestinian deaths. For the PFLP this illustrated that the goals of the PA are prioritised above the rights of the Palestinian people. The PLO as well as Arafat has been accused of corruption repeated times, which is not accepted and highly criticised by the PFLP. Furthermore, they criticise the fact that there is no Palestinian strategy given by the PLO when it comes to the issue of resistance.

As retaliation for the murder of Mustafa the organisation assassinated the Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehevam Ze’evi, who was known for promoting the killings of Palestinians as well as expelling them.

After his death Israel froze all contacts with the PA and held Arafat responsible since he had failed to arrest over 100 Palestinian militants. Within 10 days, 30 Palestinian civilians were killed by the IDF. By the end of October over 1000 people had been killed (over 800 of them were Palestinians) and thousands wounded. In December 2001 the Palestinian leadership had arrested over 100 “militants” and groups that had refused to disarm were banned. In the beginning of both Intifada, the Israeli part responded with violence and extra-parliamentary means in order to curb the protests, hence, methods to eliminate differences were used by the Israeli part rather than handling with the differences that lead to the uprising of both Intifada.

The PFLP refused to sign a three months joint truce that was on the agenda in July 2003 because it was based on the Road-map plan. They although announced that they would “not launch any activity that might carry negative impacts on national unity or grant the Sharon government the pretext to ignite internal Palestinian strife.” Even though this is the official stance for the organisation, they have participated in internal Palestinian negotiations. They

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122 [www.palestine-info.uk](www.palestine-info.uk), PFLP denies approving truce, popular committees join. 2003-07-07.
have also made open statements that can be seen as truce offers to the Israeli part but have always been abandoned for different reasons.

In the beginning of December of 2003 the PFLP along with other Palestinian organisations (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) meet in Cairo to consider and, if possible, agree on a yearlong truce. This was rejected since the PFLP did not want to agree to anything when the Israelis did not offer anything in return. The outcome of these talks was that the organisation would consider sparing civilian life. Later on they agreed to enter a truce if the Israeli part would stop its attacks on the Palestinian people. The PFLP also demanded that their leader Saadat would be released from prison as well as the leader of Palestinian Liberation Front Party Mohammad Zeidan who is detained in Iraq. These discussions are ongoing even though Israel has rejected a limited truce.

(v) Extent of the Israeli State Brutality

The Israeli part has mostly carried out the brutality against the Palestinian people, but in the case of the PFLP the PA have carried out further brutality. The PA has carried out arrests and detention of Palestinians without charge or trial under pressure from the Israeli part or the US. Torture has been used and the death penalty has been carried out, as well as deaths in custody. Accordingly to the Wye River Memorandum the PA should take all measures necessarily in order to prevent “terrorist acts,” this is the reason why Palestinians were/are charged and convicted for “damaging Palestinian interests,” “disturbing the peace,” and “disturbing political pamphlets.” Freedom of expression is also suppressed by the PA in the form of media censorship and banning of books written by Palestinians that criticize the PA and Arafat. People that have been arrested are part of organisations such as the PFLP and the Hamas as well as human rights activists, academics and others. In 1996 the Palestinian police had arrested 350 Palestinians; among them thirteen of the most wanted persons by Israel.

126 Rubenberg, C, pp. 263-268.
During the first days of the Al-Aqsa Intifada the IDF fired about one million bullets and other projectiles in the OPT; on the first evening four Palestinians were dead and 200 wounded. After a while the Palestinians that threw stones decreased instead Palestinian gunmen took place, launching attacks on the IDF and on settlers.

By the ending of December 350 people had been killed, mainly Palestinians. All attempts to end the violence failed and the violence increased and became more aggressive. The deficient conditions that Palestinians lived in became worse; power and water supplies were frequently cut off, citrus orchards and olive trees were uprooted, roads were blocked by check-points, trenches or soil-piles blocked the daily traffic, preventing ambulances and medical supplies to pass through. Homes were searched and many were destroyed in the process. The frustration grew and hope became linked only to violence. The PA were absent in the eyes of the Palestinians. Arafat appeared occasionally stating that the Palestinians should restrain from violence, the PA did not make any statements stating their perspective when it came to the resistance. The PA would not let the 40 000 policemen defend the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{128} This has been opposed by the PFLP who believe that this has left them, along with others, to act instead of them.

Many Palestinians were used as human shields. Facilities of the PA were destroyed systematically; computers and information were destroyed as well as art collections. All but one PA security installation was destroyed. Medical aid (personnel and ambulances) were targeted as well as journalists. In the beginning of 2002 the Palestinians were placed under a total curfew.\textsuperscript{129} In Nablus (West Bank) during the curfew the air force bombed many of the buildings while at the same time there were ground forces operating while the total curfew made it impossible for people to leave the buildings when they were bombed.\textsuperscript{130}

In February 2002 the Israelis launched “Operation Journey of Colors,” a strategy made to disarm and destroy the facilities of the “terrorists.” The operation was focused on areas under PA control, destroying or damaging everything in the streets, shooting at all official Palestinian buildings as well as international ones such as the UN and Red Cross installations and other buildings such as homes, schools and so forth. Curfew was placed on the

\textsuperscript{128} Rubenberg, C, p. 324, 332.
\textsuperscript{129} Rutenberg, C, pp. 350-355.
\textsuperscript{130} This period has also been called “earthquake in Nablus.” See www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/ipc_e-1/infograph/nablus/Nablus-text.pdf.
Palestinians and arrests made of thousands of males between the ages 14-45. After two weeks 170 Palestinians had been killed and over 1 000 wounded.\textsuperscript{131} By the time the operation ended, 15\textsuperscript{th} of March 2002, 242 Palestinians had been killed and 642 were injured, approximately 4000 Palestinians were arrested during this nearly one month long operation. After this operation there were numerous attacks on the Israelis by Palestinian militant organisations. One of the attacks carried out by Hamas on the 27/3-2002, was one of the largest attacks ever carried out: 30 people were killed and 105 injured. The attack was used as a justification to re-invade the OPT and a new operation was launched: “Operation Defensive Shield.” The official goals for the operation were to destroy the Palestinian “terrorist infrastructure” as well as to isolate Arafat. During the operation every city, refugee camp, and Palestinian area in the West Bank was “reoccupied” and the population was placed under curfew. Tanks and bulldozers destroyed, once again, everything in the streets and many homes.

**Summarising Analysis of the PLO and the PFLP**

The general Palestinians tactics have differed from time to time in response to Israel. Since the Six-day war in 1967 when the Arab coalition was defeated, it became clear that the Palestinians would fight their own battle “without” help from outside. After the defeat, an increase in the use of hijackings appeared as a tactic conducted by a minority of the Palestinian organisations primary by the PFLP. Since the beginning of the first Intifada, tactics have changed mostly towards negotiations but also in terms of civil disobedience and violence where the IDF and civilians are targeted.\textsuperscript{132}

It is not the strong political leadership of certain organisations that has generated a climate in which the Palestinians organise themselves. Rather it is the discrimination that they have been exposed to since the creation of the Israeli State. This is shown in both Intifada where there have not been any clear leaders rather it has been the uprising of the people opposing the discrimination and demonstrating for a Palestinian state.

There is a distinct group identity within the Palestinians; they see themselves as Palestinians first (not Arabs) and this self perception is above all other perceptions. The discrimination suffered is generally the same for all Palestinians but in the case of the PFLP additional

\textsuperscript{131} Rubenberg, C, pp. 347-348.
discriminations have also been at hand, since they have been exposed to a further discrimination within the Palestinian society carried out by the PA. The PFLP differs from the PLO as well as other Palestinians since they also identify themselves as socialists/anti-imperialists. Gurr and Harff uphold, if many members of a group sense discrimination and identify themselves as part of the discriminated group, the will to react intensifies. Such is the case for the PFLP as well as for many other organisations and individuals. The PFLP also uphold a frustration towards the Palestinian leadership whom they view as submissive to the Israelis.

The cohesion is also shown in the form of a society where what affects one affects the whole group.

There have been numerous negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli part but not much has done to improve the situation for the Palestinians. Negotiations have foremost been imposed by third parties. The conflict regulation method used by Israel has been of mixed character when it comes to the PLO; foremost a method to eliminate differences has been at hand along with negotiations with hegemonic control. In the case of the PFLP, the Israeli part uses method to eliminate the differences as well as eliminating the organisation; between the years 1991-1995 Israel attacked the PFLP forcefully. The extent of brutality carried out by the Israeli part is large; Israel uses brutal means to curb the Palestinians. The Israeli part has carried out most of the brutality, but in the case of the PFLP the PA have carried out further brutality. The frustration has grown since the Al-Aqsa Intifada and hope has become linked to violence. The PA is absent in the eyes of the Palestinians and the PFLP believes that this has left them as well as others to act instead of the authorities. Criticism against the paralysed Palestinian leadership in combination with the brutality carried out by the Israelis leaves no other choice than carrying out violent attacks according to the people that I interviewed. One of them states:

“When the Palestinian leadership is not doing anything to prevent the ongoing killings, arrests, expelling, lost of freedom of movement and so many other things, there is nothing else to do than to try to respond in the same way as the opponent. Because of the absence of arms we have no other methods than the ones we use. Civilian is a concept that does not exist in Palestine; we have learned that nothing and no one are free from being exposed to violence. Furthermore, the Israelis are not only accepting what Sharon is doing in Palestine they are supporting it. Of course there is a small minority that is against it but they are a very small minority.”
The periods of time when violent attacks on civilians were much higher relative to other periods were 1993-1996 and 29/9-2000\textsuperscript{133} -2003; in the period of 1997-28/9-2000 violent attacks against civilians were fewer\textsuperscript{134}. During the period of 2001-2003 violent attacks were the highest, compared to the period before (1997-2000) by over 700\% altogether. In the case of the PFLP, the increase is also remarkable, the organisation did not carry out any violent attacks against civilians during the period 1997-2000 which they did both in the period before and the period after.

In the period of 1993 – 1996, 456 Palestinians were killed all except for 18 were civilians. 368 of these were killed by the IDF and security forces and 56 by Israeli civilians. In the same period, 209 Israelis were killed, 151 of them were civilians, and 103 of them inside Israel. Sixteen of them were killed by Palestinian security forces.

During 1997-2000 69 Palestinians were killed 67 of these were civilians, 8 were killed by Israeli civilians. In the same period, 48 Israelis were killed 42 of these were civilians and 27 inside Israel; none were killed by Palestinian security forces.\textsuperscript{135}

Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada through the end of November of 2003, 2581 Palestinians were killed; almost all of them were civilians (approximately 500 where not), 31 of them were killed by Israeli civilians, 24 055 have been injured. In the same period 931 Israelis were killed, 572 of them were civilians,\textsuperscript{136} and approximately 4 000 Israelis have been injured.\textsuperscript{137}

During the Al-Aqsa Intifada there were phases when the violent attacks against civilians carried out by Palestinian organisations had increased I studied these phases more closely and found that they follow a pattern. The pattern I found is that when the Israeli side carries out an “operation” using brutal means, following the operation armed Palestinian organisations such as the PFLP carries out counter-strikes. Most attacks target military goals but many target civilians; the attacks targeting civilian’s increases after every “operation” carried out

\textsuperscript{133} The Al-Aqsa Intifada started this date.
\textsuperscript{134} www.ict.org.il. The source includes violent attacks made by anonymous perpetrators, as well as cases where no one has been injured or killed I have examined all of the cases and have not included the “questionable cases.” What one should keep in mind is that the government of Israel defines most of their citizens as civilians whether they are in the army or not; what one can use as an indicator is the age of the victims when there is no other information. What also becomes problematic is the question of the settlers in large parts, since many of them are armed and use violence against the Palestinians. Many of the settlers can be described as paramilitary, in many settlements they have formed their own volunteer corps which according to the Geneva Convention should be regard as non-civilians (see the definition in section 2.1).
\textsuperscript{135} www.btselem.org. (Total casualties)
\textsuperscript{136} www.phrmg.org. And www.palestinercs.org/Database/Date/
by the Israeli part. During the Israeli “operations” as well as attacks carried out by Palestinian organisations civilians are the major causalities.

In the two week period before the “Operation Journey of Colors” there were 11 Palestinian attacks on Israelis. Seven of these had military targets and four civilian targets. The casualty in total was 22 people, seven of them were civilians. In the two weeks period after the operation there were 14 attacks in total, ten of these targeted civilians. The casualty in total was 65 persons, 56 of them were civilians.\textsuperscript{138} Attacks targeting civilian had increased by 57 percent since the period before the operation.\textsuperscript{139}

In the two week period after the Operation Defensive Shield the Palestinian side launched 16 attacks on the Israeli part. Nine of them targeted civilians, 32 of 50 killed during these attacks were civilians.

In period of 16/3-2002 to 18/6-2002 the Palestinians carried out 38 attacks on the Israeli side, 22 of these targeted civilians. The attacks killed 185 people, 123 of them were civilians. Once again the consequence of the Israeli operation resulted with increased attacks targeting civilians rather than decreasing them.

Shortly after the “Operation Defensive Shield” was ended, which had supposedly wiped out the “terrorist infrastructure,” Hamas carried out an attack in Tel Aviv killing 14 and injuring approximately 60.\textsuperscript{140} The Israeli part once again invaded Gaza and the West Bank, though the IDF had not left the areas, they remained outside the cities and refugee camps. Sharon stated that the IDF would remain in the Palestinian cities and in the refugee camps for a long duration of time.\textsuperscript{141} Once again, the Palestinian armed organisations launched a new wave of attacks on the Israeli part.

In the beginning of 2001 suicide bombings began to feature the Palestinian resistance. The possible cause of this was that almost all Palestinians know someone that has been killed\textsuperscript{142}, and is exposed to humiliation in everyday life with no hope for a better life. Consequently,

\textsuperscript{138} I have added this myself using information from International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. I have not counted deaths or injuries caused by clashes between the parts. www.ict.org.il.

\textsuperscript{139} Rabbani, Mouin, “Sharon’s Journey of Colors,” MERIP Press Information Notes, PIN no. 85, 15/3-2002.

\textsuperscript{140} www.ict.org.il.


\textsuperscript{142} One example of this is the case of Hanadi Jaradat, a 27 years old lawyer who carried out a suicide bombing in Haifa on the 8/-2003 who killed 19 Israelis. Before this 16 of her relatives had been killed by the Israeli side.
despair, revenge, no hope for a better future, as well as an absent leadership leave many to take personal responsibility which has created a will to respond/act through violent means.\textsuperscript{143} Furthermore an examination of “Martyrs statements” for this period shows that revenge taken for relatives and friends of the Palestinians in certain territories (after an invasion) as well as the perception that there is no other way and that the humiliation would then end and as well as a step to end the occupation.\textsuperscript{144}

Members of the PFLP uphold that the policies of Sharon consist of nothing but the expelling and murdering of the Palestinians. In addition, the PFLP regards the silence of the world as a form of acceptance of the brutality that Israel carries out on the Palestinians. A situation where the opponent only understands “the language of blood” has therefore been created where revenge for the continued offensive carried out by Sharon is the only method that is heard by the Israeli part. The people that I interviewed upheld that the Israeli part kills Palestinians of all ages and gender, indiscriminating as to whether they target civilians or not. Furthermore, they sense that they live in a situation of constant humiliation. The procedures of checkpoints are viewed as one of the main factors of the humiliation. Most of the people that I interviewed had no faith at all in a possible political solution of the conflict and believed that there is no other option left than that of an armed struggle. There is a mixture of despair and resistance as well as revenge in the explanations given by the persons that I interviewed, which is also upheld in the “martyr statements” made by members of the PFLP. The “martyr statements” generally give a more personal and detailed perspective, such as revenge for family members, friends, as well as other aspects that have occurred in special incidents. The prospect of revenge is supported by an Israeli research; the research found that revenge alone motivates a suicide bomber.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{143} All of these aspects were stated by the 32 people that I interviewed.
\textsuperscript{144} www.fateh.tv. (In Arabic).
The Algerian Crises and History of the Conflict

French soldiers entered Algeria in 1839, by the end of that year all of Algeria was occupied; this was the beginning of what would become one of the longest colonisation in world history. France described this as a “civilizing mission,” thus the rural colonisation became the most important factor in order to dissolve the “traditional society.”

The Algerian resistance began immediately but became more successful in 1836 under the leadership of Emir Abd Al-Qadir, a man who also was part of a “religious brotherhood” called Muhyi ad Din; by late 1839 the resistance controlled over two thirds of Algeria. The army of Al-Qadir had a bureaucracy that: collected tax, public work, supported education, and stimulated the economy by establishing agricultural and manufacturing cooperatives. However, in 1839 Al-Qadir was defeated but signed a favourable peace treaty. The peace treaty was broken later that year by the French part. In 1840, one third of the French army was present in Algeria and by 1849 the “Muslim state” that had been upheld by Al-Qadir had collapsed.\textsuperscript{146}

In 1845 a so-called Royal ordinance was implemented in Algeria, placing three types of administrations at hand. In areas where Europeans constituted the majority of the population there were colonisers, elected mayors and councils for self-governing. In places where the Algerians (Arabs) constituted the larger part of the population, the governing was held by appointed and some elected officials, as well as French administrators and representatives for the “great chieftains.” For the indigenous communities the governing was held by so called “regimes du sabre” with some self-governing permitted. In the regimes du sabre the settlements was most concentrated.\textsuperscript{147}

During the ongoing colonisation both the violence and the discrimination expanded and grew stronger. There were institutionalised forms of discrimination in all aspects of the Algerians life; economic, religious, as well as political and cultural. Land was confiscated from the Algerians and given to settlers and soldiers. The Algerian culture, which can be described as a Muslim culture, was regulated by the French who wished to see the Algerians convert to Christianity, transforming mosques to churches and so forth. A system that can be described as apartheid took place under the implementation of the “1881 Code de l’Indigénat,” the

\textsuperscript{146} \url{http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dztoc.html}. Under invasion of Algiers.

\textsuperscript{147} \url{http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dztoc.html}. Under Abd al Qadir.
native code, a collection of 41 laws that only applied to Muslims. Islamic social services that had been implemented by Al-Qadir was dismantled or outlawed along with the Islamic judiciary. Muslim education was only permitted in a very few schools, France started to handle the clergy of the imam’s and thereby became responsible for the worshipping in the mosques. During the colonisation the French police and military systematically used torture, executions, collective punishment, and forced resettlements as means to defeat the Algerian rebellion. A smaller Algerian elite who spoke French was also created who acted like facilitators between the two groups.148

The Algerian nationalism increased since the launching of the resistance in the 19th century but was strengthened during the 20th century. Throughout the 20th century the nationalism had different focuses such as equality, autonomy and later on, resistance. After an uprising in 1945 the voices for resistance grew stronger and the Comité Revolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (CRUA) was founded. The goal of this organisation was to liberate Algeria from colonisation by creating a network consisting of different units. Supported by Egypt, CRUA tried to secure foreign support to build an arsenal as well as create a field for further recruitment to the armed resistance. CRUA renamed itself in 1954 as the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and launched the Algerian liberation war on the 1st of November that same year – a war that would lead to independence.149 After eight years of battle and two years of negotiation the liberation war ended in 1962 and thereby a 132 years long colonisation was brought to close. Up to one million lives had been lost in the liberation war alone.150 The negotiations gave France permission to keep some military bases in Algeria and advantages in the gas and oil field after the liberation.151

After the independence, when the colonisers where fleeing from Algeria, they destroyed key parts of the infrastructure such as factories, hospitals, schools, communication facilities, and libraries. Because the French had been the elite for over 100 years, holding the positions of power and the bureaucracy, Algeria stood in a problematic situation as they now had to reconstruct everything. The FLN, the party that held the power carried on with the same system of administration (except for the discriminating aspects) that had been used by the French only now placing Algerians in the positions of power. At the same time there was a

150 The numbers differs from source to source, Algerian sources estimates over 1 000 000 dead.
struggle within the FLN because differences in ideology now had become visible and over 15000 persons where killed in this process. After the struggle Ahmed Ben Bella, a socialist, became the leader of the party and in 1963 he was elected to become Algeria’s first president. At the same time all other parties were banned and would remain banned until 1989. The majority of the population lived in poverty and many suffered from illness as a result of poverty that had left many Algerians without any means to provide for themselves. Ben Bella introduced reforms towards a socialist society and nationalised all agricultural, industrial and commercial properties that had been owned by the Europeans. Later on, he launched “autogestion,” a reform that would allow workers to take control over enterprises in order to keep them operating. This failed however, mainly in the agricultural sector. In 1965 a leading military official during the liberation war, Houari Boumedienne, carried out a military coup. He was though elected in 1976 and held the power until his death in 1978.

When liberation comes people expect to have the freedoms that they did not have during the era of colonisation. This is part of a process that can be called a “mental democratisation wave” and is expected to come with liberation; so it was for the Algerian people. During the colonisation the Algerian identity as well as other aspects had been oppressed and controlled by the French and this was now expected to change. It was through the Arab/Muslim identity that mobilization against the French had arisen. Since the beginning of the colonisation, the French language had been used in political life as well as in business and in education. This created a French speaking indigenous elite during the colonisation and thereafter. In the 1980’s Arabic replaced French at secondary level, but French was still used within the government, in official events, and in large parts of the media leading to problems for students as this meant that numerous professions could not be attained by non-French speakers. This raised further criticism of the government and a call for “Arabization” began. At the same time the Islamic movement started to grow as an opposition to the other political parties. At prayer meetings some imams that belonged to the independent mosques preached in favour of an “egalitarian society” that would end the corruption in the government, business and religion – in some parts referring to the still expanding usage of French as the elite language. They questioned the legitimacy of the

152 Though several persons could run for presidency.
154 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dztoc.html, Under Aftermath of the war.
155 The Islamic Revolution in Iran had just been carried out, this influenced parts of the movement.
Algerian government calling for an Islamic republic that would build a constitution based on the Quran rather than Marxist ideology. The movement at this time was the Algerian Islamic Movement (MIA) lead by Mustapha Bouyali. Confrontations started in 1982 between “Islamists” and Marxists at the University of Algiers. After the confrontations the government prosecuted students, imams, and teachers that were linked to MIA. Bouyali had formed an armed force that was engaged in clashes with the security forces at this time. In 1987 Bouyali was killed in one of these clashes and the MIA was disbanded.156

In 1988 there were demonstrations against the high inflation and commodity shortage. Violent clashes broke out, resulting in over 500 deaths. After that, soldiers had fired against the demonstrators using live ammunition, over 3 500 persons where arrested during these clashes. Allegations against the government emerged, accusing the government of arbitrary arrests, torture, and unfair trials. This was one of the factors that lead to an approval of a new democratic constitution after a referendum was made in February 1989.157 This period also lead to an extent of the political crises. The approval of a constitution included reforms for a wider public, allowing new parties to participate in the political life.158

A new party was formed after the reforms; created as an instrument for the Islamic movement and as an opposition against the FLN – *Front Islamic du Salut* (FIS). The party was determined to be a legitimate political party and was supported by the working class.159 During the municipal and regional elections of June 1990, the FIS received a majority of the votes, between 51.3 and 57.4 percent. 65 percent of the eligible voters participated in the elections.160 In the regions where the FIS won, they immediately began with reforms such as creating a tax system based on the Islamic Zakat – the Islamic tax form. They also forced liquor stores, video shops, as well as other stores that they considered immoral to close down and began forcing female civic employees to wear veils.

In March 1991 a new system had been introduced, consisting of a two-round voting system which meant that if no party received an absolute majority, the two top candidates would

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160 *Le Monde*, 16/6-1990 and 22/6-1990.
participate in a second run off. In June 1991 the candidate campaigns for the first multiparty parliamentary elections started but demonstrations against the government erupted because of the implementation of the electoral reform that many saw as favouring for the ruling party the FLN. The FIS called for a general strike and the army was called in to restore the order. The military declared a state of emergency, dismissed the government and postponed the elections. During the process, the army arrested thousands of protesters and among them the two FIS leaders, Abbassi Madani and Ali Benhadj. The two leaders were charged with inciting Algerians in order to overthrow the government.\textsuperscript{161}

The military called for the resignation of the Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche and his cabinet, and they named Sid Ahemed Gozali as the new Prime Minister. In September the state of emergency was lifted and the elections were set for December 1991 and January 1992. The two leaders of the FIS were still imprisoned at this time. This was seen as a deliberate move in order to manipulate the structures of the FIS so that the more moderate leader, Hachani, would become the sole leader. The government and the military did everything to secure their victory in the coming election; in the eyes of the FIS they banned all the FIS newspapers and forbid them to speak in mosques and in quran-schools. The elections were carried out but were banned by some newly founded Algerian parties. When the results came, the FIS had won 49.8 percent of the votes and the FLN was the third largest party. The FIS had won 81 percent of the seats\textsuperscript{162} that were to be distributed after the elections in January 1992; it was clear that a shift of power was to be expected. The military immediately started to announce that they did not want to see power handed to a political party that they considered a threat to the security and stability of the Algerian state. Shortly after, a statement was made and the army called for the resignation of the President Chadli Benjedid and postponed the elections. The president resigned because he believed that there were widespread election irregularities as well as a risk for further instability. Benjedid was replaced by Mohammed Boudiaf, a man with a past in the Algerian liberation movement (CRUA/FLN). Boudiaf was assassinated in June that same year.\textsuperscript{163} The army-backed coup was lead by the minister of defence major/general Khaled Nezzar who intended to keep the

\textsuperscript{162} Algérie-Actualité, 2-8/1-1992.
\textsuperscript{163} It is said that “Islamists” assassinated him but this is dubious since he had started to move towards a rapprochement with the FIS.
FIS from the power. The coup was initially unchallenged since the leadership of the FIS did not want its followers to provoke clashes with the military.\textsuperscript{164}

In 1993 the conflict escalated and violence became a feature in the Algerian society. By 1997, massacres of civilians were carried out frequently and in January 1998 the largest massacres of civilians in one night occurred; 412 persons were killed in four small villages 180 km west of Algiers. The conflict has cost the lives of at least 150 000 to 200 000 people and at least 4 000 are missing, most of them civilians.\textsuperscript{165}

During Ramadan in 2000 (late November), the violence escalated once again but can be seen as low compared to the 90’s. The conflict still mainly claims the lives of civilians; over the past two years an average of 125 persons have been killed every month, most of them civilians.\textsuperscript{166}

Pretext to the cases

This case study is more complicated than the previous one since it is not clear whom is behind the violence every time. Neither are the goals or the strategy clearly given by the Algerian government or the military.

Apart from for “given” actors such as the FIS, the GIA and their opponent the government/military, in some cases criminal gangs without any political or ideological motives have stood behind the violence. Many crimes that have been carried out by these groups have later on been ascribed to the armed groups; this becomes further problematic in cases where criminals have fled to the mountains where some of them were later on “adopted” by the GIA.\textsuperscript{167}

The case study is also problematic in the sense that no group or organisation has taken responsibility for the majority of the violence. A lot of the violence is assumed to have been carried out by certain organisations and have mainly been assigned to them by the government/military. In many cases, the organisations have opposed responsibility for the

\textsuperscript{167} Many people that I spoke with during my stay in Algeria stated this, as another aspect that complicates the question further. Many people believe that there is no one to blame and at the same time everyone is to blame; they feel caught in the middle and used by all parts. Therefore it is “easiest not to blame anyone and fear everyone but still live all the time,” as one of the persons that I interviewed said. See: Martinez, Luis, The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998, London: Hurst & Company, (2000), pp. 75-76.
attacks assigned to them. Another aspect is that the military has been accused numerous of
times of dressing in clothing associated with the actual organisations\textsuperscript{168} and carrying out
violent attacks against civilians.\textsuperscript{169}
Therefore, it has not been possible to follow the escalation of the organisations’ when it
comes to violence in different phases as I have in the previous case study.

The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS)

\textit{Front Islamique du Salut} (FIS) was founded in 1989 as an opposition party against the FLN.
The party goals are stated in the party programme as well as in a “program” made by
Abbassi. The goals are to create an Algerian state where Islam constitutes the social order of
the society and to implement the Islamic law – Sharia, as well as an Arabization\textsuperscript{170} of the
society. They uphold that the government has mismanaged the economy and needs to be
replaced in order to end corruption, monopolies, and waste. Furthermore, they promise a job
for every father in each family.\textsuperscript{171} The organisation also stresses the importance of
segregation between the genders. They see democracy as inconsistent with the Arab culture
and describe it as the “enemy of Islam.” For the FIS freedom is rather tied to the Sharia and a
“truly Islamic regime.”\textsuperscript{172}
The reform that the FIS desire can be seen as a reaction against “modernity” that is seen as a
different expression of “colonisation.” It is also an expression against corruption and the
failure of “left oriented” organisations to reform in a way that the individuals are the priority
as well as the entire country and not the interests of other countries.\textsuperscript{173} The FIS had also
declared that they would eliminate the French language from Algeria intellectually as well as
ideologically. This aspect appealed to all the graduates that did not speak French so well and
could not get a job therefore.

Violent means are accepted by the FIS in the fight for an Islamic state. One of the leaders Ali
Benhadj, has identified the “obstacles” of a just government as follows; journalists, authors,

\textsuperscript{168} Typical Afghan clothes.
\textsuperscript{170} Arabisation is a form of nationalism.
\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Front Islamique du Salut}, 7/3-1989. \url{www.ccfis.org}.
\textsuperscript{172} Benhadj, Ali, Algérie-Actualité, \textit{El Mouquid}, No. 23, 4/6-1990
artists, *Ulama* – “Islamic scholars” who are associated with the government, secular political parties, but foremost, the Algerian state and members of the security service.174

The organisation had an armed division, the *Armée Islamique du Salut* (AIS). The creation of the armed division was partly a tactic so that negotiations with the government would be initiated, as it would give them some military balance. The AIS consisted mainly of the so-called Afghan veterans, Algerian fighters that fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union during the war. There was approximately 2000 Afghan veterans in Algeria at the beginning of the conflict, they were trained and experienced in battle. The “Afghans” had high status both in Algeria and in other Muslim countries because many of them came to Afghanistan with earlier experience in battle against the French. In Algeria they had high status because of their experience during the liberation war as well as the war in Afghanistan. The first attack carried out by the FIS targeted an army post in the end of 1991 (28 November). The attack was lead by the Afghan veteran Tayyeb al-Afghani; he was later arrested, tried, and executed. In the beginning of the 90’s the FIS attacked police, military, and regime figures.175

In 1992, when FIS was banned, thousands of its supporters were arrested under the state of emergency. Before this, the FIS, had not acknowledged links to any group that was dedicated to violence; after the arrests, FIS declared that the violence of the state now justified means other than dialog176. Within days FIS started to use violent measures targeting the government, the military, and police through their armed force the AIS. In 1992 the organisations’ division became more apparent; the political division wanted the organisation to proceed with democratic means while the other division, the AIS led by the Afghans, wanted an armed struggle. The AIS have since the creation of another division the GIA177 wanted to distinguish the violent attacks carried out by them from the attacks carried out by the GIA. They have repeatedly stated that they do not attack civilians or target anything that contradicts Islam, thereby women, children, adults, Muslims or not.178 They have openly rejected the warfare carried out by the GIA. At this time, large parts of the FIS and the AIS had been forced underground since they were not allowed to be openly active.

174 *El Mounquid*, No. 9.
177 See section 4.2.
178 Martinez, L, pp. 202-203.
The organisation dissolved the armed division as well as the armed struggle in 1999 after the amnesty offer that the current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika had made, although FIS does not acknowledge the amnesty offer. The offer stated that everyone who laid down their weapon and had not killed anyone or committed any sexual crimes against women or had not been engaged in any of the bombings would be pardoned. The government also made a special offer to the AIS.

The FIS and the GIA do not use the term civilian instead they speak in terms of innocent and non-innocent. They justify the killings of civilians as legitimate since those targeted are not “innocent.” Their main targets have been security forces and were engaged in a “war” with a special force designed as an anti-terrorist force. The FIS have not taken responsibility for any violent attacks that have targeted civilians with few exceptions. In 1994, the FIS stated that they do not target people that work with administrative matters within the government or the different departments in the government. Even though this is the official position of the organisation, they have targeted civilians or at least justified the targeting of some civilians. The organisation explained that the killing of a psychiatry professor was legitimate, as they believed that he had instructed the security force in how to conduct torture. Therefore he was part of the military security system and cannot be seen as an “innocent” person. They have also justified other killings of civilians by stating that they had helped the Sécurité Militaire (SM), leading them to civilians that were thereafter killed and therefore cannot be seen as civilians but rather as justified targets.179

The Radicalisation mechanisms in the case of The FIS180

(i) The discrimination of the Algerians and the FIS

Since colonisation, discrimination has been a reality in Algeria. After the liberation many Algerians expected this to change since their oppressors were gone but many Algerians still felt oppressed. Many aspects of the discrimination were eliminated after the liberation, but in 1982 grievance became visible mostly as a consequence of the poverty and corruption. Poverty and the high unemployment, along with the high inflation emanated in a call for

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180 Parts of the radicalisation mechanisms presented under the FIS are also to be seen as background for the following study of the GIA since the GIA is a split organisation from the FIS.
changes. Most Algerians expected changes for the better after the de-colonisation but the poverty and oppression were still something that the Algerians suffered. The political and the cultural discrimination continued after the liberation. The French colonisers had controlled the mosques and after the liberation this was in large part carried on by the government. Many Algerian youth felt discriminated against since they could not attain many professions that they were qualified for because of insufficiency in the French language, just as it was for the Algerians during the period of colonisation.\(^{181}\)

There were/is political discrimination in Algeria and it was the political liberation rather than oppression that initiated the mobilisation, as many believed that the answer to several of the problems was an “Islamisation” of the society. After the coup in 1992, other forms of discrimination became visible; foremost there was a mixture of religious and a cultural discrimination since many mosques were closed down. Freedom of speech was also undermined after the coup. Many journalists that had criticised the government were imprisoned and deported and some were killed. Demonstrations were forbidden later on.\(^{182}\)

(ii) **Strength of the Algerian Group Identity and of the FIS**

The common traits shared by the organisation are foremost the language and direction of the religion. In this aspect the FIS (as well as the GIA) differs from the Algerian majority since they do not use the French language and have focused on the implementation of the Sharia. They also share a common history and a joint territory with the other Algerians in general. Gurr and Harff uphold that if discrimination is exposed to a group and they also have numerous shared traits, the strength of the group identity is strong. The group identity of the Algerians is strong mainly as a result of colonisation. Both the FIS and the GIA believe that the heritage from colonialism has formed the Algerian identity, in large parts of the country, to a western identity that is closely linked to the colonisation. Both the FIS and the GIA see the secularisation of the country as a channel, which has promoted the interests of external groups through the former colonels and through the religious minorities in Algeria. Through this channel the possibility to establish a dominant position in the society have arisen for external groups.\(^{183}\)

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The identity of the members of the organisation is a Muslim identity rather than an Algerian one. This can be directly linked to the colonisation when Algerians were referred to as the Muslims when primarily the French aim to strip the Algerians out of their identity as Arabic Muslims; the French wanted to “civilise” the Algerians. In the beginning the FIS were described as a Muslim organisation by the Algerians but after time this description has changed to the FIS.

The channel for the collective grievance was primary the demonstrations. In 1991 this channel was undermined when demonstrations were forbidden, before that the army attacked demonstrators, creating an environment in which many Algerians believed that their religious identity was threatened. Islam was identity that mobilised the resistance against the French, not the “ethnicity.” Once again, the channel used in the calls for reforms as well as the mobilisation became the Muslim identity. The FIS proclaimed that Islam was the religion of the state and that Islam was the religion of the Algerians. Arabic was their language and Algeria the motherland just as the FLN had done during the liberation war. Arabization in Algeria is generally synonymous with Islamisation.

(iii) The Cohesiveness and the Political leadership of the FIS

The FIS is not and does not claim to be a democratic organisation in the sense that individual rights are placed above the rights of the group. The organisation sees democracy as something that belongs to western society and not to the Algerian society. The FIS has a council, which serve as the controlling part of the organisation; the council has between 30-40 members. The organisation had two leaders (Benhadj and Madani) when it was created and in 1991 Abdelkader Hachini became the third leader of the organisation.

Benhadj and Madani were both teachers before they where engaged in the forming of the FIS. Benhadj was a teacher in high school, Madani a professor in psychology and Hachani was an oil engineer. The three leaders can be seen as belonging to two different lines; Benhadj and Madani belong to a more traditional line promoting the implementation of the Sharia and Hachani belong to a more moderate line promoting a form that interprets the Quran in the contemporary and the existing culture.

Hachani was the only leader who was not imprisoned in the first period of the crises. He was impersonated later on in 1992 for eight years without any charges. After the coup, he refused

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to endorse violence; following the imprisonment of Hachani the violence escalated partly because all of the FIS senior leadership were imprisoned which lead to protests partly because Hachini was the one that had pleaded for calm.\textsuperscript{185}

The group cohesiveness within the FIS is relatively strong because the leaders have been imprisoned throughout the majority of the organisations’ existence. The leadership is strong and unified especially between Benhadj and Madani (Hachini was assassinated in 1999). Even though they were imprisoned for the greater part of the conflict, the two leaders are the accepted leaders and are supported. According to Gurr and Harff, a cohesive group is a group in which the leadership and the people are unified. The unification between the group and the leadership can be seen as dissent after 1992 when the senior leaders had been imprisoned. There were though, other midlevel leaders that kept the same line as the senior leadership. There was a strong unification between the FIS and the Algerian people in the beginning of the conflict since the majority of the Algerians voted for the FIS. The organisation split in 1992 and the more radical leaders and members of the FIS left the organisation and formed the GIA. This led to a stronger cohesiveness within the FIS since members that did not agree with the methods of the FIS left the organisation. The leadership can also be seen as strong because the group preferences are placed above individual preferences. Before 1999 there was a division within the FIS, the armed division. The two divisions had however “always” agreed on when and how to use violence. However, differences between the two divisions became explicit when the AIS accepted the Civil Concord and made an additional agreement with the government without consulting the FIS. The FIS criticised the AIS for this since they opposed both the agreement and the form of the amnesty offer. In the beginning of 2000, the AIS was dissolved in accordance with the Civil Concord and the FIS can thereafter be seen as a cohesive organisation again, especially since some members that wanted the acceptance of the amnesty offer left the organisation in connection to the amnesty.\textsuperscript{186}

The FIS activists are generally well educated and desire to solve the problems in Algeria; they believe that the solution lays within Islam\textsuperscript{187}. For many Algerians, FIS represented hope, prosperity, justice, and dignity in the early 1990’s. The economic situation in Algeria served

as a recruiting ground for the FIS as well as for other armed groups. Unemployment in the beginning of 1990 was at 23 percent and rose in 1998 to 28 percent; by 1999 it had risen to 30 percent. In the years 1989-1994 the real GDP per capita declined every year by 2.5 percent. In the years 1995 and 1996 GDP improved some but declined again soon thereafter. During the years of 1989 – 1995 purchasing power fell by 20 percent and by 1998, 40 percent of the population was under the poverty line.

Many Algerian youth had to make a choice either, to do their army service and be engaged in combat against the armed groups or join the organisations and become engaged in a combat against the army. The youth chose what they believed was least “depraved” in some cases and in others what they believed would eventually lead to a better future. This also contributed to the high numbers of membership in the armed groups especially in the case of the FIS and the AIS. In 1995, the AIS was believed to have about 12 000 –15 000 men. The organisation is believed to have grown after that time until the dissolving of the organisation in accordance to the Civil Concord in 1999/2000.

(iv) Political Environment and the Algerian Conflict Regulation Method
The conflict escalated after the military coup in 1992. The government has since repressed political rights. Gurr and Harff uphold that the less democratic a state is the more likely it is that the opposition use non-democratic means. Since the eruption of the conflict the government has used non-democratic means to curb the grievance; basic democratic values such as political rights and equality within the law, as well as freedom of speech have been repressed. Therefore, Algeria can not be seen as a democratic state.

The government, the army, and the society are divided between conciliators (those who wanted negotiations) and eradicators (those who did not believe in compromising but believe

188 http://www.imf.org/external/country/DZA/index.htm
190 I conducted twelve interviews with men who had returned home, since they had surrendered in accordance with the amnesty, after living in the mountains for a long time. All of them were part of the FIS/AIS struggle and tried to live a “normal” life now. Responding to the question why they became engaged in the struggle five of them answered that they did not want to be part of the army or part of the GIA since they believed that the army foremost was responsible for most killings. The other seven answered that they believed that the struggle of the FIS was the struggle of the Algerian population and was in that way the responsibility of all Algerians. For three of them the timing depended fully on the army service; one added that he would probably never join the AIS if he didn’t have to carry out the army service.
mainly in repression of the FIS and the other groups). The army has a close linkage to other institutions of the government. The army is divided between the *Etat major* – the high command, and SM – the security military. Since the outbreak of the conflict the two divisions have mainly agreed on the strategy to be taken against their opponents. They both rejected the Sant'Egidio initiative.\(^\text{192}\) During the later years of the conflict, the conciliators have been the stronger part within the military. One possible explanation for this regarding the army is that the army’s credibility has been undermined; allegations against the army have been constant since the escalation of the conflict. The part that is for eradication is the SM, they have wanted to weaken the FIS which was one of the reasons why they launched the negotiations with the AIS. It is mainly the SM that has been accused of carrying out massacres in order to blame the AIS. The government upholds that a “fundamentalist” regime would eliminate political pluralism and democracy and would impose an inflexible totalitarian order based on the Sharia.\(^\text{193}\) The army sees itself as the guarantor for the stability in Algeria.\(^\text{194}\)

After the conviction of Madani and Benhadj there were waves of demonstrations all over the country. Hachani, the third leader of the FIS, pleaded for peaceful means. He stated that even if they were imprisoned or killed, one day they would reach their goal – to create an Islamic state. One of the spokespersons also appealed for peaceful means and asked their members not to fall for provocations.\(^\text{195}\) In March of 1992 the problems escalated to a situation that can be described as civil war; FIS began to strike back at the government and the military. Once again, a state of emergency was implemented and the FIS was banned. The communal and municipal assemblies were dissolved since they were controlled by the FIS in most of the communes. The new government also forbid all political activity around the mosques, closing thousands. Thousands of FIS supporters were arrested; many were tried in military courts that ruled harsh sentences and hundreds were sentenced to death and many to lifetime imprisonment without any possibilities to appeal. Customarily, the military tribunals try espionage, state security matters, and other offences committed by military personnel. The military tribunals are activated in times of martial law. The criminal justice system is

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\(^{192}\) The Sant’Egidio process was an agreement between the FIS and legalised political parties that pledged an end of violence and for a “return” to multiparty and democratic process.


normally independent of the army except for cases that involve public order or security. Since 1991 this independence has mainly been circumvented. Many advocates in the larger cities of Algeria began to boycott the military tribunals because they do not believe that the accused received fair trials. Later on some advocates that represented the FIS were arrested.

In 1992 approximately 20,000 FIS supporters were detained and around 9,000 people, mainly Demonstrators, were sentenced to detention camps in the Sahara desert, the same detention camps that were used by the French during the liberation war. These were reopened and used by the government to imprison demonstrators and the supporters of the FIS. Members of the organisation were also expelled. Torture was reported frequently and thousands of FIS members were forced underground as neighbourhoods were closed down in the search for members of the organisation while a strict curfew was imposed. From there they waged guerrilla warfare and took refuge into the mountains. Some of the FIS leaders took refuge in other countries, mainly in France, were they recruited fighters and other means such as money to pursue the armed struggle in Algeria. January of 1992 about 200 people were killed, most of them members or supporters of the FIS and over 100 persons were sentenced to death. Fractions of the organisation were created at this time mainly because of differences that had arisen and other radical groups were formed such as the GIA. In 1993 the violence further intensified and civilians were targeted by the FIS; professors, doctors, journalists, and teachers that “supported” the military. At the same time Redha Malek, the Prime Minister, promoted a harder line against the FIS and the GIA.

The leader of the FIS in exile, Anouar Haddam, called for an end of the killings of Algerians and foreigners that were not engaged with “security operation.” One of the conciliators that wanted a negotiation with the FIS in 1993 — the head of intelligence and Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah was assassinated. The assassination was attributed to the armed groups but many believed that security forces who opposed any form of negotiation had killed him.

The government had implemented methods to eliminate the differences since the start of the conflict and the military explained that they would not let the FIS reform the country. In 1994

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197 www.algeria.org.
199 Using the same tactics that had been used in the liberation war.
this changed and a will to start negotiating was more visible in the government and in parts of the military. 
Since 1994 the FIS had requested to negotiate with the government in order to reach a solution. In 1994 attempts to dialog were made both by the FIS and Lamine Zeroual. The first negotiations started in February though they faced a lot of criticism.\textsuperscript{202} Later in August, secret meetings between Zeroual and the two imprisoned FIS leaders took place. The first negotiation led to the release of two midlevel leaders under the condition that they would work against violence. Later the same year, the two senior leaders were transferred from prison to house arrest. Zeroual was pressured to end the talks by Defence Minister Lamari. A third initiative took place in 1995 after Madani had written a letter to Zeroual proposing a three stage plan; the first step was that Madani would call for an end of the armed struggle and after this, the government would release all of the prisoners. The second step was that the government would give amnesty to everyone who laid down their weapons. The third stage was to allow the FIS to reform under a new name once the two first steps were carried out. Madani agreed to this but had to consult with the other leaders who said that they would not agree to the plan unless the government first released all the FIS prisoners unconditionally. The plan failed and in 1996 a new constitution was implemented in Algeria, banning all parties that described themselves as religious or ethnic.\textsuperscript{203} After the elections in 1995 when Lamine Zeroual was elected president, differences within the army became apparent. General Bêchéine, a member of the Etat major, contacted the FIS representatives for negotiations while the SM contacted the AIS and initiated the negotiations that lead to the unilateral cease-fire in 1997.\textsuperscript{204} The role of the army has become more critical as it is engaged in the political life of Algeria and they guard their own interests. Furthermore, the army has shown that they do not want reconciliation with the armed groups since they disapproved of the Sant’Egidio process. The military wing of the FIS was still determined to reach a solution and in 1997 the government and the AIS made a unilateral truce agreement. 
In 1999 Adelaziz Boutflika was elected as the new president of Algeria. He introduced a limited amnesty for everyone who would surrender to the authorities before the end of

\textsuperscript{202} Redha Malek, the Prime Minister who belonged to the eradicators did not want negotiations. The post of Prime Minister has always been very close to the army. The following negotiations were possible after the sacking of Malek and the Interior Minister and Saadi who also opposed negotiations.


\textsuperscript{204} \url{www.icg.org}, The Algerian Crises: not over yet.
January 2000. The amnesty granted impunity for everyone that had not committed murder, rape or bombing along with a monthly allowance. In January of 2000, Boutflila granted a special amnesty for the AIS which meant that “all” of their members would be included in the amnesty; for other groups the amnesty did not apply to defectors from the army. About 4 200 took advantage of the amnesty of which 2 400 belonged to the AIS and the rest where members of other groups, among them members from the GIA\textsuperscript{205}. The amnesty also meant that many of the prisoners that had been sentenced for supporting the FIS and/or other armed groups would be released. According to the FIS only 1 000 of the 2 400 were really released.\textsuperscript{206}

Almost 2000 members of the organisation accepted the amnesty. The AIS was dissolved, which was a process that had been ongoing since 1996. The FIS senior leadership that had not been consulted in the matter opposed the settlement even though the FIS leaders in exile supported the settlement. Furthermore, the FIS believed that the amnesty offer was an offer to surrender rather than of reconciliation, especially since the President Boutflika declared that he would launch a merciless campaign against those who did not surrender under the terms of the amnesty. \textsuperscript{207} Hachani was against the Civil Concord Law altogether since it did not provide a forum for reconciliation, rather it stated the terms of surrender and excluded the factors that had led to the current situation. The FIS sees the amnesty as a “hollow” offer and will therefore not make any concessions nor will they give up on their basic principles. According to the FIS the Civil Concord law was not designed for amnesty as something that offered them reconciliation rather it stated the judicial aspects in form of conditions that the armed groups would surrender within. The amnesty provides a sliding scale of penalties; for example, people that have been engaged in massacres and bombings would be sentenced for up to 20 years. It does not provide a base in which the responsibilities of the actors are taken but it merely sets the terms for surrendering. The FIS also states that the amnesty ignores the political nature of the conflict and furthermore, they believe that a just and long lasting peace must include “memory, truth, and justice.” They do believe that Boutflika can accomplish this but without the military that “poisons the political life of Algeria.”\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{205} Al-Khabar, 18/1-2000.
\textsuperscript{206} www.weekley.ahram.org.eg/1999/441/foc2.htm.
\textsuperscript{207} www.weekley.ahram.org.eg/1999/441/foc2.htm.
\textsuperscript{208} Mourad Dina a spokesman of the FIS, ICG, The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, 20/10 – 2000, p. 9.
Madani sees the amnesty as a resolute monologue carried out by the regime that does not desire a real solution of the conflict. For the FIS, reconciliation must establish confidence and be based on good intentions such as those of freeing the political prisoners as well as a removal of the state of emergency that he sees as constant because there is no political freedom. The FIS maintains that peace can only be attained through a political solution where there are no secret negotiations with other armed groups instead of with them. Madani also states that peace

“…involves all responsible parties and honest witnesses, with powers of political discernment, moral integrity and credibility, with no intention of manipulating each other, a dialogue which will unite Algerians and foreigners, if necessary, as happened in Evian or in Ireland, in an environment with the requisite objective conditions as far as security questions are concerned.”\(^{209}\)

The root of the conflict is that the FIS was banned and therefore peace cannot be achieved without the return of the party in the formal political arena. Two of the people that I interviewed during my visit to Algeria have worked with the negotiations and stated they did not believe that the Civil Concorde would lead to a stable long term period of peace and also stated that the criticism that the FIS have directed against the bases of the amnesty are accurate and justified. They also believed that the conflict would escalate again because of the poverty, unemployment and the low standard of education. The grievance is highly visible in Algeria where an atmosphere of discontent is very apparent.

The AIS as an organisation as well as members from other organisations accepted the offer. By the end of January 2000, many members of the organisation returned to their homes. Some of them faced new problems: having to confront neighbours that had been attacked by the groups that they had been members of and in some cases, people who had survived attacks that the person was involved in.\(^{210}\) By accepting the amnesty many members of the organisations could still work towards an Islamic state through peaceful means. According to Boutflika, members of the FIS can be engaged in political life by joining other accepted parties through negotiations with the FIS can not be held because it is banned and does not

\(^{209}\) *ICG*, p. 10.

\(^{210}\) Interview in Algeria, October 2003. The three people whom I interviewed about this had neighbours that had been engaged in violence against civilians and had returned home facing problems. One of these “amnesties” did return to the mountains.
exist in the eyes of the government.\textsuperscript{211} Even though this is the official line of the Algerian government there is a lot of information that contradicts this, partly because of the negotiations that were carried out during the second half of the 90’s and partly because of the discussions that have been ongoing between the two parts.\textsuperscript{212} Madani and Benhadj were released from imprisonment in June 2003. They are forbidden to speak to media, vote, or participate in any political, cultural, social, or religious activities for five years.

Even though moves toward negotiations have begun to become more apparent, the problems remain. The Algerian government has not listened to the criticism directed towards them from the FIS, nor have they tried do change the situation since political discrimination is still at hand. The violence escalated again in the end of 2000 but has not reached the levels it did during the 90’s. The FIS have shown that they are open for negotiations with the government. The conflict regulation methods have changed some, shifting towards handling with the differences in the case of the FIS though there are still strong voices for eliminating the differences. There is dissatisfaction with Boutflika especially within the military. In September 2003, Ali Ben-Flis,\textsuperscript{213} the Prime Minister at the time, abandoned the co-operation with Boutflika and announced that he would run against him in the elections of 2004.

\textbf{(v) Extent of The Algerian State Brutality}

The conflict escalated after the army used brutal methods as an answer to the grievance. The military used brutal means to shatter the FIS and many were killed; in some cases their families were killed\textsuperscript{214} when the army encircled neighbourhoods. The security forces have killed civilians as an alternative to arrests or in retaliation for an earlier attack committed by groups like the FIS. There are many witnesses to the security forces carrying out reprisals attacks, killing civilians and in some cases, using violent measures against the families of the person wanted as well as on others. Many of the areas that voted in majority for the FIS have been targeted and in some of them the “major” massacres have occurred. These killings have

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{211} \url{www.weekley.ahram.org.eg/1999/441/foc2.htm}.
\item \textsuperscript{212} During my stay in Algeria in October of 2003 there were talks between Boutflika and Madani. According to the FIS talks between the two parts are still ongoing. See \url{www.ccfis.org}.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Benflis is closely linked to the military and can be described as eradicator. He is a member of the FLN and his resign from the government has caused an official split within the party.
\item \textsuperscript{214} One example of this is 4 February of 1992 in Bouakal à Batna. The army encircled the neighbourhood and opened fire, 52 persons were killed, among them seven children. See Chronologie d’une tragédie caché 1992, \url{www.algeria-watch.org}.
\end{itemize}
in many cases been attributed to the FIS. This has caused questions; many people believe that it is the army that has carried out most of the massacres as revenge or in order to receive acceptance for the methods that they use.\textsuperscript{215} I have not found any data stating that the FIS has carried out violent attacks against civilians after 1996.\textsuperscript{216} The FIS sees these killings as something that is mainly carried out by the army in order to alienate the people from the Islamic parties. In 2001 Habib Souaidia, a former officer of an elite unit in the Algerian army, wrote “\textit{La Sale Guerre}” – the Dirty War, a book where he describes his years in the army from 1992 – 1995. He writes about the violence and claims that the armed groups as well as the army are responsible for the violence. He upholds that the army carries out the violent attacks against civilians and executions of suspects. According to Souaidia, the army offered protection in exchange for money to some villages. If the villagers declined, the army would later on attack the village and the attack would later on be blamed on the armed groups. It became apparent that the police and military are engaged in reprisal attacks after ten bodies from the same village as some policemen that had been killed by the FIS some time before appeared.\textsuperscript{217} Many people that were arrested have later on turned up dead; in April 1993 the bodies of a school class and their teacher was discovered. The class had been arrested a month before. The police claimed that they had been released and that they were probably killed by terrorist. This has occurred frequently and has intensified suspicions of the army. Between 1993 and 1998, approximately 3 000 people have disappeared. All were taken away from their homes, work, or elsewhere by the security forces.\textsuperscript{218}

Algeria’s counter terrorism approach has been criticised by the international arena for being a pretext to justify mass human right violations. Furthermore, many of the attacks and arrests have been conducted in indiscriminate ways. Arbitrary arrests and unfair trial are the general complaints against the government by Amnesty International. Human Right Watch (HRW) has mainly criticised the government for their handling of detainees and the legal procedures in Algeria. Many members and supporters of the FIS are sentenced to jail for “terrorist activities.” In “most” cases, this meant that they were sympathisers of the FIS and were active in demonstrations. Close to 1 000 people have received the death penalty since the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This is something that many people see as obvious, despite of what they otherwise think of the violence in Algeria. See the section by Robert Fisk in \textit{Algeria and the International Society. The Crises of Violence}, Oslo: Norways Institute of Human Rights, Are Hovdenak edit., 1999. pp. 8-16.
\item See \url{www.algeria-watch.org}.
\item See summary of Kouba and Saoula for 1993-1994. \url{www.algeria-watch.org}.
\item \url{www.amnesty.org}. Who are the “disappeared”? Case studies. Published in 1/3-99.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
eruption of the conflict. Furthermore, extra-judicial executions and killings are repeatedly used by the SM. Torture is used frequently, the reported methods being; electric shock, burning with blowtorches, sexual abuse with bottles and sticks, and drilling the persons back, feet or legs. Another method is the “chiffon” in which the victim is tied down on a bench and garment is stuffed in the mouth of the prisoner and dirty water and, in some cases, chemicals are poured in. Judges have accepted confessions that have been made during the torture. Many protesters have also been killed by the SM during the demonstrations. Between April 2001 and February 2003 about 120 people were killed in demonstrations.

An environment where fear is a feature in the society has been created in Algeria, the youth fear the army and the police mostly, as they move a lot and are most frequently stopped and searched. Allegations of supporting any of the armed groups are common, especially if the youth are from certain parts of a city or country where the army believes that youth are engaged in or support armed groups. In the end of February 1992, girls that did not wear a veil were killed by the armed groups. Later on, a division of the police (La Police Politiquè) announced that they would kill 20 girls in veil for every girl killed that did not wear the veil.

The Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA)

*Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) describes themselves as an armed “Islamic movement.” It is the GIA that is behind much of the violence in Algeria. The GIA are responsible for the greater part of the violence against civilians that is carried out by the armed groups. The organisation was formed after the banning of the FIS in 1992 and first appeared as an active part in the conflict in the beginning of 1993. Many of the Afghan veterans split form the FIS and formed the GIA. The organisation wants to implement the *Sharia* as well as an “Islamic governing” in Algeria. The GIA also opposes the school system that is still in line with the one used during the colonisation of Algeria. The organisation opposes democracy as well as solving the conflict with “democratic means” since democracy it self is seen as a western

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220 Martinez, L, pp. 116-118.
creation and a blasphemous in the same way they believe that people who believe in democracy blasphemous. Their aim is to fight what they claim is a justified war against the Algerian government. Since the government is seen as non-Islamic and corrupt along with the fact that the army has chosen to use violent means to seize the power. They have stated repeated times that the fight will not be over until the government is expelled. In later times the organisation has stated that they would carry on with their armed struggle until Algeria liberates itself from the domination of the former colonisers, their politic and military, that all are according to the GIA (as well by the FIS) bound to the interests of French companies and politics. They also aim to expel all Jews and Christians as well as other “infidels” from Algeria. The GIA issued an ultimatum to the embassies of some “western” countries threatening to kill them if they would not leave the country by November of 1995. The GIA has carried out attacks targeting civilians not only in Algeria but also in France, the attacks against France were “justified” as retaliation against the French government for their support of the Algerian government. In August of 1992 the first attack that clearly targeted civilians were carried out; bombs exploded at the airport of Algiers, at the agencies of Air France and Swiss Air killing nine and injuring 128. Before this military, police, and the government had been those who were targeted. In 1993; the killings of civilians was put into system mainly by the GIA since foreigners were thereafter systematically targeted.

In 1993 the GIA started to threaten journalists and family members of soldiers, proclaiming that they would uphold an armed struggle against all “infidels.” Others who were threatened by the organisation were intellectuals that spoke French. The GIA also stated that they would kill the wives, sisters and daughters of governmental workers along with others that work with the government. Many journalists and editors received letters that stated their death sentence from the GIA. Others that worked within what the GIA considered to be “immoral professions” were also targeted. The Algerians were forbidden by the GIA and the FIS to listen to the radio, men were forbidden to do their army service, and women forbidden to work or go to school. Many of those who refused were killed. An actor and one of the most popular musicians in Algeria were killed because they were engaged in “non-Islamic”

222 I use the terms “justified war” since the meaning is closer to the meaning of the Islamic/Arabic term jihad that the GIA claims to be engaged in.
224 Huband, M, p.47-62.
226 Stone, M, pp. 192-194,
activities.\textsuperscript{227} The GIA targets those who oppose their agenda, viewing them as infidels and have imposed curfew on some villages. The organisation has killed foreigners and has carried out attacks against chapels, killing seven monks. They have burnt down schools, and killed over 200 teachers.

The GIA consider the FIS as well as their strategy as defeated and believe that they have a justified right, according to the Sharia, to continue an armed struggle.\textsuperscript{228} One of the leaders, Layada, divided the Islamic movements into those who have joined the “godless” government and those who have not joined the government. For those who had joined the government, he stated that God had condemned them to death and therefore it was “halal” – blessed, to kill them since they had therefore become one of the godless. For those who had not joined the government, he pleaded to join them in what he believed was a “god-blessed” war, which had become the responsibility of the GIA since the FIS had failed.\textsuperscript{229} Layada was arrested in Morocco in May of 1993 and was succeeded by Djafar Al-Afghani. During the leadership of Al-Afghani the violence escalated; he was killed later the same year. He tried to get support from groups outside Algeria and was behind the foundation of the GIA journal, Al-Ansar, published in London. The paper published mainly explanations for various GIA actions and propaganda regarding the organisation. The organisation attacked other Islamic groups as well; they kidnapped one of the leading figures in the Algerian Hamas Party and later on assassinated him after he had refused to sign a paper “blessing” the tactics of the GIA.\textsuperscript{230}

The GIA believes that they are the only organisation that has the right to be engaged in a “righteous and justified” armed struggle. They have since 1997 repeatedly stated that this war is a war where no one can be neutral and if people don’t support the GIA they will be seen as opponents and thereby deserve to die.\textsuperscript{231}

In 1997 the GIA released a communiqué claiming responsibility for many massacres the same year which they justified by declaring that all of the Algerians that had not joined them were “ungodly.”\textsuperscript{232} This among other aspects once again led to major criticism against the

\textsuperscript{227} www.algeria-watch.org.
\textsuperscript{228} Al-Shaahada, Interview with Layada, March 1993.
\textsuperscript{229} Taken from a tape made by the GIA in 1993, with Layada speeches.
\textsuperscript{231} Huband, M, p. 47 and 100.
\textsuperscript{232} Al-Ansar, Statement by Zouabri, 17/9-1997.
GIA. Al-Ansar, who first published this communiqué, also published criticism against it in which the publishers stated that they no longer support the GIA and closed down the journal.

The Radicalisation Mechanisms in the Case of the GIA

(i) Group Discrimination of the Algerians and of the GIA
It was the arrests of Madani and Benhadj, as well as the aggression carried out by the army that allowed for the creation of the GIA. Many of the more militant members of the FIS believed that the army had shown that they would never allow the “islamists” to come to power. The GIA did not see an end of the political discrimination. Gurr and Harff uphold that the stronger the discrimination the more likely it is that the discriminated against organise themselves and begin to mobilise. The perception of the discrimination is that the political discrimination as well as the cultural and religious discrimination had been ongoing since the start of the colonisation in the 19th century. The economic discrimination was seen as something that was still carried on by foreign interests just as it had during the colonisation. Castels and Davidson maintain that when the cultural rights, equal rights, and the needs are repressed, a further mobilisation occurs; this was the case for the GIA. Even though the organisation rejects democracy in theory, the repressions of democracy lead to the creation of the organisation as a tool for expression.

(ii) The strength of the Group Identity of the GIA
The governments’ repression of the FIS, in addition to the attacks that were carried out by the army in the beginning of the conflict, affected many Algerians and led to an intensified will to react. More Algerians started to identify themselves as part of the struggle for an Islamic society. Members of the GIA identify themselves as Muslims primarily. They were reminded of who they were during the beginning of the conflict when the army attacked them as a Muslim rebellion movement. Other identification traits they share with the FIS are the importance of the Arabic language and the history as a trait is also upheld by the organisation since they often refer to the colonisation which shared with both the FIS and most Algerians. The group identity within the GIA is strong partly because of the discrimination that the members experience and partly because of the life that they live. They live isolated in the

mountains and have “constructed” their own identity, viewed themselves as different from the rest of the Algerian population. Since the second half of the 90’s this belief has grown stronger. Members of the GIA have created a sense of “us” and “them” where they consider everyone that is not part of their struggle as their opponents. The organisation also sees itself as a protector of Islamic values.

(iii) The Cohesiveness of the GIA and their Political Leadership

The GIA consists mainly of former volunteers trained in guerrilla tactics by the “Afghan freedom fighters” as and by the CIA during the 1980’s. About 2000 Afghan veterans returned to Algeria in the ending of the 80’s and became engaged in the armed “Islamisation” of Algeria carrying on with what they saw as a justified war just as they had done in Afghanistan years earlier. Younger men had also been recruited. The GIA members are usually poor and mainly from the northern parts of Algeria. Because of high unemployment, the possibility to recruit young men has increased. The organisation is controlled by different cell, previous experience in battle determines what cells the member becomes engaged in. There are two leading networks; one consists of the former “militants” of the MIA and “leading” Afghan veterans, among these Djafar Al-Afghani, and the other network consists of former members of the FIS that had been expelled from the organisation such as Said Mekhloufi (a former officer in the army). The whole leadership of the GIA consists of men with either a military past or in different forms of guerrilla warfare. The leaders hold the title Emir. Other grouping within the GIA is based on a division over ideology. One “line” follows the teachings of Sayyed Qutb and the other follows the teachings of Mustapha Bouyali’s (the former leader of the MIA).

Many of the organisations’ members had escaped from the army in 1991 and 1992 and saw their opportunity for revenge and an armed struggle as justified. Most members and sympathisers have spent time in jail and in the detention camps and have thereafter become more radical. Many of them were exposed to cruel treatments such as torture. Others that joined the GIA did so because of the dissolved the FIS in 1993 or left the FIS because of

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234 Stone, M, p. 182.
235 Emir means a command officer, governor, or prince.
236 Qutb was an Egyptian theolog; he was the spokesperson for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 50th. He wrote the book Signposts Along the Road where he describes the societies of the world as partly Islam’s and partly the “ignorance” – jahiliyya where the jahiliyya is the enemy of Islam. In this book he also describes when a call for war is acceptable.
differences concerning the usage of violence. Many of the “djezarists,” an association of theologies and academics, turned to violence and joined the GIA in 1994 mainly because they had given up on reforms by peaceful means.  

In October of 1994 Djamel Zitouni became the leader of the GIA after a coup within the organisation. The leadership was formally given to Mahfoud Tajine, a “djezairist.” Many members of the other division opposed the nomination and an armed coup was carried out, replacing Tajine with Djamel Zitouni. The former leader had succeeded to unify the GIA but after the coup a dissension within the organisation had arisen. The violence escalated after the internal GIA coup while at the same time the FIS was planning and preparing for a peace treaty that later on led to the (non- implemented) Sant’Egidio initiative. The GIA criticised the FIS for this, claiming that the FIS leadership had sold the blood of their fighters in order to satisfy their own political ambitions. Later on the GIA published that they had exclusive right to carry out the armed struggle. Further dissensions within the GIA grew under the leadership of Zitouni, who also assured that betrayal against him would lead to death. During this period many GIA members left the organisation and joined the AIS. Some of them were killed after announcing their will to join the AIS, among those two midlevel leaders. Their death was first blamed on the army though later members of the GIA confessed to the killings. After this, more members of the GIA left the organisation and even more followed after the killings of seven Christian Monks which was criticised by many of the leaders both within the organisation outside the organisation. It was shortly after this that the publishers of Al-Ansar announced that they would close down the journal. Many other groups that had earlier supported the GIA now withdrew their support mainly from Zitouni because he had killed many of the members that had criticised him for going too far. He was killed in July 1996. After this period some splits occurred but the GIA is still active, in 1997 they re-launched the armed struggle and their journal. The violence escalated once again in 1997 and again the GIA was behind a large part of the violence. The next leader, Zouabri, issued a statement saying that the Algerian population had forsaken their religion; he made it clear

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239 Abdelkader Hattab and Sayah Attia.

240 Monks have always been looked up to with respect in Algeria by all parts of society.

241 One of the splits is the Groupe Salafiyiste de Daw’a et Djjahad (GSID/GSPC); the organisation has promised to stop the attacks against civilians but target the government and the military. They also attack western interests such as gas and oil companies.
that the population would be punished on counts of “betraying” hopes that were placed on them. He issued this warning in part because elections were to be held in Algeria.\textsuperscript{242} In October the elections were carried out, and the National Democratic Assembly won most of the seats and Zéroutal became the president. The period after the election was filled with violent attacks against civilians. It was under the leadership of Zouabri that the absolute massacres when no one was speared began. Zouabri had eliminated all of his opponents. He, like Zitouni, ordered killings of “Islamic” fighters that did not recognise him as the leader of the struggle.\textsuperscript{243} After he had issued this statement a series of massacres took place. He had allowed the members of the GIA to do as they pleased which resulted in the kidnapping of girls that were treated as slaves. In 1998 it was possible to follow the “treks” of Zouabri through the western side of Algeria when he was fleeing from the army, the trek consists of massacres. The security forces killed Zouabri in February 2002 and he was replaced by Rachid Oukali (also called Abou Tourab). In the last two years, the struggle carried out by the armed groups has lost many of their supporters. An additional explanation for the declining membership in the GIA, beside the amnesty and the dissension of the GIA, is that many of the supporters have grown tired of the violence and their way of life. They have been living in the mountains, which has left them only to launch attacks or to gather food, which is often made at the same time as the attacks.

The organisation and the army have killed leaders and members of the GIA. The leadership within the GIA has mainly been authoritarian throughout the history of the organisation. The leadership has not been linked to the Algerian population and therefore the leadership can not be seen as strong. In the case of the FIS there was a clear link to the population because the FIS had won the elections. For the GIA, the leadership has been questioned and a coup has been carried out. The organisation does not implemented democratic procedures and they oppose democracy in general. There is an internal shattering with many divisions over ideology. The organisation is concentrated in the western area of Algiers and shares the same traits and supports an authoritarian leadership. The members have also been exposed to discrimination and feel grievance which, according to Gurr and Harff, are signs of cohesiveness within a group.

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Al-Ansar}, Statement by Zouabri, 17/9-1997.
\textsuperscript{243} \url{www.eurolegal.org/terror/terror3.htm}. 
(iv) Political Environment and the Algerian Conflict Regulation Method

The GIA does not see the struggle as a tactic to reach negotiation and have criticised the FIS for wanting to negotiate. The GIA holds an absolute hostility against the government and has rejected all forms of dialogue with them as well as truce or reconciliation; the government is seen as a tyrant. The organisation refuses to be engaged in any form of discussions that might lead to an agreement with the government. Mid-level leaders who have wanted to negotiate have been executed.\(^\text{244}\) The GIA as an organisation did not acknowledge the amnesty that was presented in 1999. The government has not shown any will to negotiate with the GIA rather they have taken methods in order to eliminate the GIA since the creation of the organisation. In 1993 the army killed 851 “Islamists,” many of who were in some ways connected to the GIA. At the same time, the GIA (mainly) killed approximately 200 police officers and military officials. In the period 1995-1999 when Liamine Zeroual was the president of Algeria, the government launched many brutal “operations” against the GIA by mass arresting and torturing many members and others suspected GIA sympathisers. Some of the leaders of the organisation have been imprisoned and others have been killed. In 1993 one of the leaders, Mohammed Arezki Houmine, was tortured to death in prison.\(^\text{245}\)

The government provided civilians with weapons so they could protect themselves, creating a situation where it became difficult to separate civilians from non-civilians. Many “private” military sanctioned armed groups emerged since the security forces have been grown in size: there are about 500 000 Algerians engaged in security in some way. This has been questioned since it can be seen as a motive for these groups to ensure that the violence is maintained, especially since there is a high unemployment rate in Algeria. Furthermore, paramilitary groups were created in some Algerian parts in the middle of 1990 supported by the security forces. Since 1998 new accusations of the army have been raised. They have been accused of passivity as well as collusion with the armed groups since hundreds of civilians had been killed close to the army barracks.\(^\text{246}\) In February 2001 allegations against the Algerian army were once again raised concerning their engagement in violent attacks against civilians. The allegations where based on an army report that was published. The report that had been leaked to the media supported the early allegations against the army and proclaimed that until


the year 2000 the army had killed about 9 200 people.\textsuperscript{247} In the case of the GIA, the government and the army have used methods to eliminate differences.

The government has broadcast confessions and some arrests that have been carried out and their explanation is two folded; one explanation is that the population sees who is responsible for the violence and the other explanation is that the people can see that they are arresting the right persons. This began after the army stated that they had killed some of the GIA leaders, which was often contradicted by the GIA. To prove this, the government started to film the dead and broadcast it so that the people “would have evidence.” This also had a psychological effect since they showed pictures of men who have lived in the mountains for a long time in order to create a sense of fear; partly for joining them and partly of them.\textsuperscript{248}

Amnesty International has repeatedly asked the Algerian government to improve their judiciary system, fully investigate the killings, bring the perpetrators to justice, and investigate the disappearances. In September 2003 Boutflika presented an “ad hoc mechanism” to look at the disappearances, which enclosed an interface between the families of those who had disappeared and the authorities. The figures, according to Amnesty International, of disappearance is over 4 800 people who disappeared after being arrested by members of the security forces.\textsuperscript{249} In March 2000 there were reports of relatives to the disappeared who had been arrested and threatened with imprisonment during a demonstration.\textsuperscript{250} Many of those who have disappeared are related to members of the GIA and the other organisations.

(v) Extent of the Algerian State Brutality

It was mainly the brutal means that the army used to curb the grievance that lead to the creation of the GIA. According to Gurr and Harff, this can create a situation where the organisation will use the same methods. The GIA has adopted this and uses brutal means, targeting both the army and civilians. The brutality that the government and foremost the army carries out includes arbitrary arrests, torture, expelling, extra-judicial killings, and

\textsuperscript{247} www.ppu.org.
\textsuperscript{248} In 1992 the government broadcasted trials. During my visit the media broadcasted at least three “major” arrests/clashes and were allowed to interview the arrested people.
\textsuperscript{249} www.amnesty.org. Algeria: New “disappearances” mechanism must lead to full investigations. 22/9 2003,
\textsuperscript{250} www.amnesty.org. Algeria Mothers and other relatives of the disappeared, 15/3-2000.
executions. In 2002 a military official announced that they had killed 15 200 “Islamists” during the conflict. In 1994 at least 2305 “Islamists” were killed; it was during this same year that the attacks against civilians began in the most brutal way, when entire villages were completely wiped out\textsuperscript{251}.

Several judges have been dismissed for corruption since August 2000.\textsuperscript{252} Defence lawyers that protested against unfair trials were replaced with lawyers that the military appointed.\textsuperscript{253} Currently there are problems with the judiciary system in Algeria. I studied some cases that were on the agenda during my visit in autumn of 2003 and there were disruption matters in the trials against “terrorist accused” compared with other crime trials.\textsuperscript{254} Torture is still used to force confessions and leads to sentencing. This is mainly applied on people who are accused of association with armed groups such as the GIA and the FIS as well as of “terrorism”\textsuperscript{255}.

Human rights violations are used systematic at the hands of the government. The oppression has been carried out as collective punishment for relatives and neighbours of anybody accused of being a member of the GIA or the FIS. In 2000, the violence escalated again and approximately 9 200 persons were killed. The government aims for a military solution rather then a political solution, maintaining the continuance of violence; Boutflïka has stated that those who did not surrender in accordance with the amnesty offer will be exposed to indiscriminate attacks. According to some of those interviewed, the method of the government is responsible for the continuance of violence. In 2002, 1500 persons where killed: 44 percent were civilians, 27 percent police or military, and 29 percent members of the armed groups, mostly members of the GIA. The GIA has claimed responsibility for many of the killings of civilians\textsuperscript{256}.

\textsuperscript{251} In Constantine as well as in the villages surrounding the city there were 200 human corps shattered everywhere.
\textsuperscript{252} ICG, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{253} Amnesty International, \textit{Algeria: Deterioration human rights under the states of emergency}, March 1993.
\textsuperscript{254} I also studied four previous law-cases where the charges were “terror associated crimes”; all four of them where in their early twenties. There was no evidence that they had committed any crimes but all of them were sentenced for over eight years. I also looked at two other law-cases one of the charges was burglary and the other charge was stealing. In these cases there where witnesses.
\textsuperscript{255} I also interviewed four lawyers concerning this matter; they all said that little has changed when it comes to the trial system concerning suspects of “terrorism.”
\textsuperscript{256} \url{www.algeria-watch.org}, Algérie Guerre, émeutes, Etat de non-droit et déstructuration sociale, Situation des Droit Humains en Algérie Année 2002.
Some of the renewed violence can be explained in terms of the failure to reach economic reforms, which would lead to reduction in poverty. This is something that has effected the recruitment of members to the organisations. Unemployment has risen to 28 percent and is even higher among youth; 60 percent of the population is under 30 years. Dozens of members of the GIA who did surrender in accordance with the amnesty have been reported to rejoining the armed groups. Some persons that did surrender in accordance to the amnesty have later on been arrested.

**Summarising Analysis of the FIS and the GIA**

Since the colonisation, discrimination has been a reality in Algeria. After the liberation many Algerians expected many changes for the better since their oppressors were gone but the poverty, and in some aspects the oppression, was still something that many Algerians felt and calls for changes erupted in the 1980’s. The political discrimination was placed above the other discriminations because many believed that the answer to the problems was an “Islamisation” of the society. After the military coup in 1992 other forms of discriminations became visible, foremost a mixture between religious and cultural discrimination as many mosques were closed down. During the coup the two FIS leaders were arrested and it was after this that the GIA was formed. The GIA was formed partly as a result of the aggressions that were carried out by the army while at the same time the FIS leadership pleaded for calmness. This was opposed by many of the FIS members partly because the more radical members of the FIS (foremost the Afghans) believed that the army had shown that they would never allow them to come to power. The armed struggle was initiated after the army had used brutal means to curb the opposition. The tactics imposed by the government in order to undermine/eliminate the Islamic opposition have violated human rights in harsh ways. This has led to violence in extreme forms where civilians are targeted on the basis that they are related to anyone connected to the government or the army.

The common traits shared are foremost the direction of the religion and the language. In this aspect the FIS (as well as the GIA) differs from most Algerians since they do not use the French language and have focused on the implementation of the Sharia. The GIA also has an additional distinct identity, which emanates from the isolation of the members. Furthermore,
the GIA uses the dichotomy of “them” and “we” where everyone who is not part of the GIA is seen as “them” and is therefore a legitimate target.

The group cohesiveness and the leadership within the FIS are relatively strong; the two leaders are strongly supported by the members of the organisation. The organisation has been diminished since the Civil Concord when their armed division, the AIS, was dissolved. The leadership of the GIA has mainly been authoritarian. In 1994 an armed coup was carried out within the GIA, which led to dissension within the organisation and an escalation of violence. Since 1994 the leaders of the GIA have used brutal means to hold their position, killing many. The leadership of the FIS consists of men with different backgrounds and professions while the whole leadership of the GIA consists of men with either a past in the military or in different forms of guerrilla warfare, mainly former volunteers trained in guerrilla tactics by the “Afghan Freedom Fighters” and by the CIA during the 1980’s.

Another fundamental difference between the two organisations is that the FIS have a will to reach a solution in order to end the conflict, which has been demonstrated since 1994. The government had used methods to eliminate the differences since the beginning of the conflict and the military explained that they would not let the FIS reform the country. In 1994 this changed and a will to start negotiating was more visible within the government and in parts of the military.

Since 1994 the FIS have asked for negotiations with the government in order to reach a solution while the GIA have since 1994 categorically stated that they will not negotiate with the government and that the struggle will not end until the government is expelled. The government have not shown any will to negotiate with the GIA, rather they have taken methods in order to eliminate the GIA since the creation of the organisation.

The killings in Algeria are carried out indiscriminately by all parts. The brutality of the army is often questioned by international human right organisations as well as by others. The brutality consists of extra-judicial killings, torture, and unexplained disappearance. The army is also questioned on the basis of the many massacres that have been carried out close to the army barracks without any intervention from the army, despite the fact that some of the massacres were going on for hours and were heard by villages even more distant than the army barracks. The army has also repeatedly been accused of carrying out many of the massacres, some ex-military have testified that the army has carried out many deeds in part to
justify the continuance of the brutality and in part as retaliation for killings carried out by the GIA. The victims have mainly been poor Algerian Muslims, many of whom voted for the FIS in the elections 1991, and some of the villages that were known for sympathising with the FIS have also been targeted. The FIS have accused the SM for architecting the massacres and asked for an independent investigation. Many of the persons that have been executed by the army were civilians who had been accused of being a “terrorist.” In 2002, a military official announced that they had killed 15 200 “Islamists” during the conflict.²⁵⁷

The situation for the Algerian population is harsh because they are not protected. They are used as tools in a struggle over power between the GIA and the SM. In 1999 about 9000 persons were killed, 75 percent of them were civilians. The official number of disappearances is 4 800 but, according to an Algerian organisation that works with the cases, there are at least 7000 files of persons that have been reported missing.

Analyzing Summary of the Radicalisation Mechanisms

The organisations within the same context
In the case of the Palestinian group the *discrimination* is in general, something that is exposed to all Palestinians by the Israeli part so therefore it is mainly the same. The difference is the further discrimination that the PFLP is exposed to by the PA. For the Algerian organisations the discrimination is generally the same.

*The strength of the group identity* is strong for the Palestinians, the PLO and the PFLP shares the same common traits with the rest of the Palestinians. The PFLP has an additional perception that is that they describe themselves as socialists/anti-imperialists. For the Algerian organisations the group identity is also generally the same but, just like the PFLP, there is an additional trait in which the perceptions of themselves as “we” i.e. – the guardians of Islam. The “we sense” has grown stronger with time because they are in large parts isolated from the rest of the Algerians.

*The group cohesiveness* is strong in general for all organisations in this study. In the case of the PLO, the link between the leadership and the population has diminished since the eruption of the AL-Aqsa Intifada. In relation to the PLFP, the PLO is a more cohesive group in the sense that the PLO has a larger support from the Palestinians compared with the PFLP. The leadership of the PLO consists of Palestinians with diverse backgrounds, while the leadership of the PFLP mainly consists of Palestinians with a background in warfare.

In the case of Algeria, the FIS is more cohesive than the GIA and has a stronger leadership in the sense that it is more stable than the GIA leadership. The leadership of the FIS consists of men with diverse backgrounds while the leadership of the GIA consists of men with a background in the military or other forms of warfare.

*The political environment* of the Palestinian organisations differs. The PLO is recognised internationally as the representatives of the Palestinians; from time to time they are also recognised by the Israeli part, while the PFLP is classified as a terror-organisation. *The conflict regulation methods* that the two Palestinian organisations are exposed to also differ. The PLO has been exposed to methods of eliminating differences but has mainly been exposed to hegemonic control in form of negotiations during the last decades. The methods used against the PFLP are to eliminate both the differences and the organisation. The leaders
of the PFLP have been assassinated and imprisoned. Some PLO leaders have also been imprisoned but they have not been exposed to the same harsh means as the PFLP leadership. In the case of Algeria, the government has used methods of elimination in relation to both organisations. The methods used after 1994 in the case of the FIS have changed towards methods of handling differences, even though this is made under hegemonic control. The negotiation in the second half of the 90’s led to an agreement between the government and the AIS, the armed division of the FIS. In 1999 the Civil Concord was presented; although it is strongly criticised by the FIS it has resulted in the dissolving of the AIS. The FIS and the GIA differ from each other in the negotiation context; the FIS have shown a will to negotiate in order to solve problems while the GIA have since 1994 stated that negotiations are not a part of the organisations goals.

The extent of the brutality that is carried out by the Israeli part is high and affects all Palestinians although members of the PFLP as well as other armed groups are targeted in a larger extent than members of the PLO. The IDF attacks the members and extra-judicial executions have become more and more common. Furthermore, the PA is responsible for additional brutality. Some members of the PFLP have been sentenced to long imprisonment without trials and extra-judicial executions have been carried out by the PA.

In Algeria it was foremost the brutality of the army that caused the emergence of the GIA and the armed division of the FIS (the AIS). The AIS was created in order to achieve some form of power balance. Both organisations have been subject to the brutality of the army. Since 1999 the GIA announced that not only was the government and the army their opponents but everyone who did not support them. The counter strikes of the GIA have been brutal.

The PLO and the FIS – Organisations That Do Not Carry Out Violent Attacks on Civilians

The organisations that do not carry out violent attacks against civilians are the PLO and the FIS (after 1995). The similarities as well as the differences between these organisations in relation to the radicalisation mechanisms will be analysed in this section.

Both the PLO and the FIS are exposed to discrimination and feel that they are discriminated against. This is something that they share with the two other organisations that do carry out
violent attacks against civilians (the PFLP and the GIA). The cohesiveness within the group is strong in general for both the PLO and the FIS, as it is for the PFLP and the GIA. The strength of the group identity is strong within both organisations that do not target civilians. The group cohesiveness is also strong in the case of the two organisations. The PLO and the FIS leadership are linked to the population since the population has elected both organisations. The support has declined for both organisations. A further similarity concerning this aspect is that the leadership within both organisations have different backgrounds. The conflict regulation methods that the organisations are exposed to also have similarities if one look beyond the context of the two conflicts. The PLO as well as the FIS is exposed to mixed methods. For both organisations, methods to eliminate differences have been the main method that they have been exposed to. Leaders of the organisations have been imprisoned but in relation to other organisations the leaders have not been exposed to harsh methods. The methods used in order to handling the differences have mainly been hegemonic control in the form of negotiation. Both the FIS and the PLO have expressed a will to solve the problems through an agreement. The brutality that the two organisations have been/are exposed to are similar in the sense that their opponents have used brutal methods to curb their grievance. The brutality that they are exposed to is still something that is suffered by everyone who shares their grievance. Since the DOP, the PLO has maintained a stance that is more pacifistic overall, while the FIS have acknowledged the struggle against the military and the government. Since 1999 the FIS have given up the armed struggle.

The PLFP and the GIA – Organisations that carry out Violent Attacks on Civilians

The PFLP and the GIA are the organisations that carry out violent attacks against civilians. The differences as well as the similarities between these organisations in relation to the radicalisation mechanisms will be analysed in this section.

The emergence of these two organisations is similar; both organisations were formed as a response to the discrimination, which had grown stronger. The GIA was created after the coup in 1992 and the PFLP was created after the defeat in the Six Day War in 1967. Both the PFLP and the GIA started attacking civilians almost immediately after they were formed. Though, others including the PLO and the FIS also suffered the discrimination that the PFLP
and the GIA were exposed to. The strength of the group identity is strong within these organisations. They share the same traits as the PLO and the FIS though both the PFLP and the GIA have an additional trait. In the case of the PFLP, the additional trait is their political perspective as socialists/anti-imperialists. And in case of the GIA, the additional trait is their perception of themselves as the guardians of Islam. The group cohesiveness has weakened during the conflicts. The leadership of the PFLP is authoritarian while the leadership of the GIA is best described as an autocracy. The entire leadership of the GIA consists of men with backgrounds in warfare similarly to the PFLP, though they differ in that some of the mid-level leaders of the PFLP have alternative backgrounds (and gender).

The political environment for these organisations is that they are both classified as terror-organisations, as well as the PLO and the FIS, and their opponents have not showed any interest in negotiating. Both organisations uphold that they will not negotiate with the opponent. Still, the PFLP have negotiated with other organisations and been part of truce even though they have not negotiated directly with the Israeli part. They have also made open statements that can be seen as truce offers. The conflict regulation methods that the organisations are exposed to are methods to both eliminate differences as well as the organisations. The extent of brutality used by the opponents is high. The two organisations are attacked more frequently than the PLO and the FIS. Both the PFLP and the GIA have leaders that have been executed without any trial. Furthermore, a membership or some form of association with the organisations is seen as an adequate reason for imprisonment, and in many cases for, execution. In both cases their opponents have killed their family members.
Conclusion

My purpose with this study has been to bring forth causes that lie behind the usage of violent attacks against civilians to focus. I have looked at the radicalisation process that led to violent attacks against civilians. The study shows that when discrimination has been at hand for a long time and when people feel discriminated against a call for a change takes place and the group that suffers the discrimination mobilises. If the opponent (i.e. the discriminating part) tries to curb the grievance with brutal means the discriminated group tends to respond by the same means. This does however not explain why violent attacks against civilians erupt. Organisations that are created in this process seem to take a more radical position and tend to use violence against civilians. Both of the organisations that target civilians (as well as non-civilians) the PFLP and the GIA were formed as a response to their opponents’ usage of brutal means. The strength of the group identity does not appear to give any clear explanations, but the two organisations that target civilians have an additional common trait compared to the other organisations that did not target civilians. Whether the group is a cohesive group or not seems to be something that affects the outcome in the sense that in groups where the leadership is closely linked to the people did not carry out violent attacks against civilians. Furthermore, whether the leadership of the organisation has a mixed background appears to affect the choice of action that the organisation will take. Organisations that had mainly a leadership with a background in warfare tend to use violence against civilians, while organisations that have leaders with various “professions” did not tend to use violence against civilians. The political environment also seems to affect the outcome; if the organisations are not recognised by their opponent the will to negotiate ceases to exist. It was not until 1994 that the GIA stated that they would not negotiate with the government. The government has not, throughout the duration of the conflict, tried to initiate negotiations with the GIA. The conflict regulation method that the opponent adopts also appears to affect the outcome. If the opponent exclusively uses methods to eliminate the differences, it is more likely that the organisation responds by using extreme forms of violence. If the opponent implements a large extent of brutal means as an answer to the differences and to the grievance, the organisations will respond in the same manner\(^\text{258}\). If the

\(^{258}\) Gurr and Harff claims that if the brutality is “far too rough” and extensive the results may be that the discriminated group will not respond at all. This research differs with this claim, since both the PFLP and the FIS as well as others sharing their grievance have been exposed to harsh and highly brutal methods and are still organised and strike back at their opponents.
brutality is very high and has been ongoing for a long time and the discriminated feel humiliated, do not see an ending to the violence and if the brutality involves indiscriminately violence by the opponent it is very likely that the discriminated part will answer in the same way.

These conclusions support the conclusions that I made in my C-level paper in which I studied organisations active in the Northern Ireland and Kashmir conflicts. These results are to be seen as indicators rather than absolute answers.

259 See section 2.2.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Armée Islamique du Salut</td>
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<td>ANM</td>
<td>Arab National Movement</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Alliance of Palestinian Forces</td>
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<td>CRUA</td>
<td>Comité Revolucionaria d’Unité et d’Action</td>
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<td>DOP</td>
<td>The Declaration of Principles – The Oslo Accord</td>
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<td>Front de Libération Nationale</td>
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<td>GIA</td>
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<td>Groupe Salafiyyiste de Daw’a et Djihad</td>
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<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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