Acknowledgement: I would like to direct a special thank you to the J9 team at KFOR during the summer of 2010 for their assistance and cooperation. To Elmedina and Jehona, thank you for your help and hard work, without you I would not have been able to do this research. My thoughts also go out to all of you who welcomed me into your houses to answer my questions and shared your stories with me. I will also take this opportunity to thank my supervisor Jan Ångström at the department of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University for comments on my work. Finally but not least, I want to acknowledge all my loved ones who always stood by me and supported me.
Abstract

Current literature on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has focused on how to ease and improve the relationship between international civilian and military actors. Whilst the aim of CIMIC also is to contribute to peace and stability, the lack of research on how the local population perceives that these activities may contribute to this goal, is a significant gap in our knowledge. By investigating how CIMIC is carried out by the peacekeepers and by asking the local population of how they believe CIMIC can contribute to peace and stability this study enhances our knowledge in the effectiveness of CIMIC as a tool for keeping and creating long-term peace in an ethnic post-conflict society. A division of the concept into three mechanisms; communication, force protection and enhanced better living conditions will also allow the possibility to discern the most effective aspects of CIMIC.

Key words: CIMIC, local perceptions, Kosovo, NATO, sustainable peace, peacekeeping, enforcement mission
# Table of Content

Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 1

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4

2. Previous research ........................................................................................................... 6
   2.1 Civil –military cooperation ......................................................................................... 7
       2.1.1. Humanitarian space ......................................................................................... 7
       2.1.2. Force protection- support for the force .......................................................... 9
       2.1.3. Long-term development/sustainability ......................................................... 11
       2.1.4. Structures of military versus humanitarian organizations ........................... 13

3. Theoretical framework ............................................................................................... 15

4. Research design ........................................................................................................... 19
   4.1. Method ..................................................................................................................... 19
   4.2. Case selection .......................................................................................................... 19
   4.3. Material ................................................................................................................... 21

5. Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 23
   5.1. The Kosovo Conflict ............................................................................................... 23
   5.2. NATO definition of CIMIC .................................................................................... 27
   5.3 How is CIMIC carried out? ...................................................................................... 28
       5.3.1 Background - The KFOR mission, 1999- ....................................................... 28
       5.3.2. CIMIC from the view of deployed NATO soldiers and civilian organizations in Kosovo during the summer of 2010 ........................................................................... 30
   5.4 People’s perceptions on CIMIC .............................................................................. 35
   5.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 45

6. Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................ 48

7. Reference list: ............................................................................................................... 50

Annex 1. Questions to the population .............................................................................. 55
1. Introduction

In line with the recent more complex intrastate wars in the 1990s, there has been an increased deployment of enforcement missions, which lack the consent of the warring parties. This has also entailed a wider understanding that it is vital to adopt a more comprehensive approach to peaceoperations, one which include not only traditional military peacekeeping activities but also peacebuilding activities within the social, economic and political sphere and which thereby connects and interact different actors (Abiew 2003:36; Pugh 2000: 230-231). This development has stimulated the interest in the concept civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)\(^1\) (Egnell 2010:233, 237).

In research CIMIC is centered on the coordinating relationships between the peacekeeping force (military force) and the civilian actors (referring to Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national development agencies and intergovernmental organizations) (Franke 2006; van Baarda 2001; de Coning 2007; Ankersen 2008). But in practice this concept has a wider scope, where CIMIC also aims to “win the hearts and minds” of the population to contribute to force protection and peace and stability. This is operationalized through reconstruction projects, billboards and flyers announcing that the peacekeeping force is there for the host population, to protect them and help them. The development organizations are very critical to this development, fearing that aid becomes a tool in the conflict, that the interaction with peacekeepers might jeopardize their security, or restrict their ability to carry out their activities and in the long run the whole development process. While this has been an important and heated debate for especially the last decennium, there has hardly been any research done from the perspective of the local population on these kinds of activities, so the belief in the effectiveness of CIMIC is merely based on assumptions. There is consequently a significant gap between the conduct on the ground in the field and our current theoretical knowledge. This means that peacekeeping forces are conducting and expanding activities which we do not know the effect of. These activities expose the peacekeeping forces and potentially also aid workers of great risk while engaging in society, and could also in worst case scenario create future tensions in society if not conducted properly and thereby prolong

---

\(^1\) The concept CIMIC is from the beginning a NATO term referring to the section within the military structure that deals with liaison and support to the civil society and civilian organization with their area of operations (AOR). The goal is to create an environment beneficial for the commander to carry out the mission (FOI 2003:18, 79-81). The UN term CMCoord, Civil Military Coordination refers solely to the coordination between the international actors (FOI 2003:18, 79 -83) Civil-military cooperation should not be confused with civil-military relations (Huntington 1957 and Janowitz 1960), which refer to the relationships between the military and the political sphere within the national government. CIMIC will in this study refer to above NATO definition.
and jeopardise the international engagement. Consequently, there is a pressing need to investigate local populations’ view of the efficiency of CIMIC projects on peace and stability. The research question to be examined in this paper is therefore: From the view of the local people, how can CIMIC influence perceptions of peace and stability? My research will enhance our knowledge on how CIMIC is conducted in practice and whether this practice has the intended effect and thereby can be an effective approach in creating and keeping peace after conflict.

The theoretical framework that will guide this study posits that CIMIC projects contribute to peace and stability through three mechanisms. First, civil-military cooperation allows greater communication between the peacekeeping force and the local population and allows the peacekeeping force to observe and better understand the local culture and behavior. Second, CIMIC projects will portray the peacekeeping forces as engaged in society and will enhance the populations’ views on the peacekeeping force as a force for good and increase their support in them and thereby contribute to force protection. Finally, by reconstructing houses, schools, roads, CIMIC projects contribute to local perceptions of better living conditions. This will decrease people’s incentives to resort to violence and instead look to the future.

This gap in our knowledge will be rectified by a structured focus comparison, conducted with a semi-structured questionnaire in four villages in Kosovo. Kosovo is the appropriate case since it was an ethnic conflict and the enforcement mission KFOR (Kosovo Force) aimed to prevent ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population. Since the peacekeeping force is thought to be perceived differently by the Albanian and the Serbian population, the villages were chosen with a variation in their ethnic composition which allows comparison of perceptions of CIMIC. Since the Albanian population welcomed the intervention by NATO to stop the repression from the former Yugoslavian government, they are more likely to be positive to the peacekeeping force. If the people in the Albanian village therefore perceive that CIMIC activities have no effect on peace and stability it is a sign that CIMIC is not an effective approach for a peacekeeping mission. The Serbian people on the other hand, ought to be more negative since NATO intervened in their internal affairs. This design conduces yet another aspect, in that it illustrates that the population is not one entity as is many time perceived in literature, but that there are many different groupings within society which may have different views.
After outlining the two different approaches in previous research, which either highlights the benefits of CIMIC or the risks that it may imply, this thesis will set out to elaborate on the three mechanisms in the theoretical framework, which are developed from lessons and recommendations from previous research. The section on the theoretical framework, which will provide the guiding backbone of the thesis, will also define the key concepts in this study: CIMIC and peace and stability. Thereafter, a section on research design will describe how I will examine the relationship between CIMIC and peace and stability. The analysis section is divided into five parts; after the first part which provides the background to the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, the second will outline how CIMIC is intended, as presented in the NATO doctrine and internal instructions. Since CIMIC is a fluid concept with different meaning to different people it is vital to account for how CIMIC is and should be conducted according to the soldiers present in Kosovo during the summer of 2010, in order to clearly illustrate how the conclusions in the last section has been reached. The fourth section will analyze how CIMIC is perceived from the locals. The final chapter of the analysis section, before summary and conclusion will discuss general implications and observations from the study.

2. Previous research

The research on civil-military cooperation is divided into two strands, with the first acknowledging the necessity of CIMIC in order to effectively keep, sustain and build peace, whereas the second understand the future complications to be greater than the benefits. Previous research on civil-military cooperation has mostly centered on the cooperative arrangements between civilian, humanitarian or development organizations, INGOs and the military peacekeeping force. The effect on the local situation is only touched upon in one aspect, the long-term sustainability of the efforts. Despite the many problems highlighted in previous research most, regardless of their base in the humanitarian sphere or the military sphere agree that coordination at least, is vital for a sustainable peace. This section of previous research will first provide a short paragraph to outline where in the peace- and conflict literature civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is located.

Recent research has found that multidimensional peacekeeping missions are more likely to sustain peace than traditional consent based, chapter VI missions, since their mix of political and economic activities enables them to smoothly transform conflict into a sustainable, peaceful situation (Fortna 2008:174; Sambanis 2008:30-31). Doyle and Sambanis follows the same approach and encourage greater initiatives for setting off economic growth in countries
emerging from war, since economic stability will reduce peoples incentives to return to violence. They further state that there is a need to more effectively align and connect peacekeeping activities to development assistance actors to produce a smooth development process (2006:132). In order to do this, civilian and military organizations need to cooperate and coordinate activities among each other.

2.1 Civil–military cooperation

2.1.1. Humanitarian space
In complex intrastate missions it may be impossible to separate the warring parties from the civilian population and thereby create a neutral humanitarian space for the humanitarian organizations to work in, independently from military influence (Roberts 2010). In the worst case scenario this might lead to a situation where all international organizations, peacekeepers as well as humanitarian organizations are seen as invaders and thereby “legitimate targets” (Egnell 2010:246; Harmer 2008: 528-9). This change in the security situation may hamper the humanitarian organizations ability to reach out and provide relief to the population. The situation forces organizations to either reject association with the military peacekeeping force or employ peacekeepers to protect humanitarian workers and relief supplies in warehouses to prevent theft from belligerents, which otherwise could prolong the conflict (Abiew 2003: 27; Byman 2001:99; Bollen 2008:58). As peacekeepers possess the adequate transportation and logistics support needed in these extreme circumstances (Knight 2008:28; Bollen 2008:58) they can be an asset when distributing aid and reaching out to as many people as possible as fast as possible and also to gain control of the situation quickly (Bollen 2008:54; Byman 2001:99; Abiew 2003:28). But the need for cooperation is also demand driven from both sides; from the humanitarian perspective, there might not be a need for the peacekeepers to assist them as the conflict situation changes (Bollen 2008:59) and as for the military, their main mission is usually to protect international or local civilians, or sustain peace so they may refuse to cooperate in certain activities if they believe they do not have the ability due to time, resources or security restraints. But the military may also need the civilian organizations knowledge and insights they have gathered during their extensive relationships with the local society. If there is no cooperation between civilian and military organizations the military analysis of the situation may not be accurate and risk jeopardizing the support to return to normality (Jenkins 2003: 129; Roberts 2010; Egnell 2010:243). But International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs may also be reluctant to distribute information to, or work too
close with the peacekeeping force in fear of impairing the trust of the local community (Aall 200:134) or their own neutrality and impartiality. The problem occurs when the lines between peacekeepers and humanitarians blur, when the population have trouble discerning who is who and who is tasked to do what (Franke 2006:12; Braem 2007:44). The risk is that aid becomes politicized and used as a mean to achieve a military objective which may have damaging consequences for the future (if for example the humanitarian space is viewed as a confidence trick and used to find belligerents) (Gordon 2007:120-121; Roberts 2010:17) or inhibit humanitarian organizations ability to deliver aid to both sides of the conflict, as happened in Kosovo (Van Baarda 2001:105). Civil-military relationships may also change the views of the host population on the humanitarian organizations, not only in the present situation but also in conflict situations in other parts of the world (van Baarda 2001:103; Braem 2007:44.) History has also shown that humanitarian organizations have felt forced to leave projects they have been working on for a long time, in order to avoid duplication, when the military engages in the same project area e.g. in Liberia and Afghanistan (Rana 2008: 232; Bollen 2008: 59; Gordon 2007:115, 123).

Two studies, one by Overseas Development Institute from 2006 and one by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs concluded that integrated missions do not entail a greater risk to humanitarian workers than separate missions. But the security behavior of aid workers may change with the arrival of peacekeeping forces because aid workers now assume that the peacekeepers provide security and that the humanitarian space is better protected (Harmer 2008: 528-9, 533-5). On the other hand, other studies highlight that the local communities believes that the internationals, both military and aid personnel, are more concerned with their own security than ensuring the security of the locals. The study also established that the three different actors have divergent expectation of what security is and how it shall be conducted (Donini 2005:52; Welch 2006:232).

While previous research has shown both pros and cons of the relationships between civilian and military organization, it is hard to find evidence for a causal link between civil-military activities and the restraint on humanitarian space (Gordon 2007: 119). With a few exceptions the above debate are rather based on perceptions and fears from the humanitarian point of view than evidence that it will inhibit the work of civilian organizations.
2.1.2. Force protection- support for the force

From the perspective of the military, CIMIC operates as a force multiplier (Mockaitis 2004), in two ways. CIMIC projects (infrastructure reconstruction, humanitarian assistance) and communication (explaining what they are doing and why) are approaches to winning the hearts and minds of the local population and facilitates intelligence gathering which makes it easier for the force to be prepared for uprisings and thereby ensure a safe environment (Egnell 2010:242-243; Rana 2008:230; Franke 2006:19; Braem 2007:39). The projects are assumed to create stability by improving the daily lives of the people and provide them with something to start rebuilding from and thereby reduce their incentives to turn to criminal activity to survive (Egnell 2010: 243; Braem 2007:39; Jenkins 2003: 134-5). Jenkins states that “stability and steps toward normality are essential before the military leave. At the lowest level this means that the population and every village must have some physical and economic security. In any village or town that does not have the beginnings of some (rebuilt) government and social fabric, there is likely to be ongoing stress between individuals and a likelihood of crime, if not renewed civil war” (2003: 134-5). By engaging in these activities the peacekeeping soldiers show their willingness to engage in society and also gain some understanding over how people live and behave (Fitz-Gerald 2000:8-10; Braem 2007: 39). If the peacekeeping force has the support of the population it is easier to disseminate propaganda and the host community will also be more receptive to information from a peacekeeping force they trust (Mersiades 2005: 218). Another benefit of CIMIC is that their personnel can perform post-operation visits if the force have searched for weapons and destroyed things, the team can compensate the families and thereby repair the image of the peacekeeping force (Voget 2008:153). “As one brigade commander noted, no one likes having his house searched, no matter how polite the soldiers are, but if the home owner sees that those same soldiers also provide running water for his village, he may be more cooperative” (Mockaitis 2004:11). But if the peacekeeping force lack the cultural understanding of their actions, these might instead have unintended consequences. One incident in Bosnia highlights how letters of information specifically targeting certain ethnicities of the population, failed to reach the intended population, but instead became a sign of ignorance perceived by both interpreters and local villagers (Fitz-Gerald 2000: 10).

Few articles discuss the assumption, but rather take it for granted, that reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance provided by the peacekeeping force will lead to a more positive view of the force. One exception is Rietjens (2007), who set out to examine the effectiveness
of these activities. Rietjens show that there was a mismatch between requested and supplied information, and that most of the activities that ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)\(^2\) contracted to local companies, contributed little to a safe and secure environment or the military mission. In terms of intelligence gathering, situational awareness was not increased and belligerent groups or key leaders were seldom taken into account. The activities did however meet the needs in society (Rietjens 2008:95). But Rietjens ensue the course of the rest of the research field; he focuses on the agents, the international military forces and their humanitarian partners.\(^3\) He mentions that “the impact on the perception of the local population towards ISAF was not large.” (Rietjens 2007:95). But how he has reached this conclusion is impossible to deduce, since he did not interview the people. His results therefore need to be complemented with more research to find out what the host community thinks of these activities.

Another report concerning the Swedish battalions humanitarian aid, note that humanitarian assistance can have a decisive impact on stability and future prospects because according to the report, if children have the ability to go to school they have something else on their minds, while their society develops. Another example in the report was the refurbishment of the infirmaries which increase services in the village and thereby improve the belief in a future for the village and stimulate returnees. Furthermore, the interviewed respondents from the battalion claim that the activities had created “good will” for the force (Broberg Wulff and Ströberg 2001:18). But Broberg Wulff and Ströberg have only interviewed five recipients of this support (five village leaders from three villages) and these projects were all carried out during the year 2000, a year before the study was published, whereas it is impossible to accurately draw the above conclusions that Broberg Wulff and Ströberg does.

Mersiades (2005), Byman (2001) and Fitz-Gerald (2000) provide an alternative explanation of how to attain the support of the local population. According to Mersiades, the way to gain local legitimacy for the peacekeeping mission is to fulfill the expected tasks, a.k.a. the social contracts. The problem is that there are many divergent expectations of what their tasks are; by NGOs, the local population, the warring parties, the UN Security Council and other international actors (Mersiades 2005: 207; Byman 2001:106), making it difficult to support all social contracts without destroying any of the others. If the expectation is for the force to

\(^2\) NATO force in Afghanistan

\(^3\) Rietjens did 13 interviews with the peacekeeping force in 2003-4 and examined situation reports, diaries, detailed project information, notes of the meetings, internal memoranda’s, memory books, evaluation reports and scored of photos (2008:77).
create a safe and secure environment, their ability to do this may positively influence the support for the peacekeeping force. If the peacekeeping force and the international community fails to create safety and stability the local population is unlikely to support them and may be scared of working against the belligerent forces in the country (Fitz-Gerald 2000:4). If the peacekeepers on the other hand show that they are in control over the situation, through effective patrolling and resolving riots when they occur it might be that this is more likely to gain the trust of the population than engaging in reconstruction projects (Fitz-Gerald 2000:8). But on the other hand, an excessive emphasis of security measures by the peacekeeping force when not necessary may instead create a feeling of insecurity and that the peacekeepers fails to understand or lack the ability to manage the situation at hand (Fitz-Gerald 2000:8).

2.1.3. Long-term development/sustainability
Short, quick impact projects may have positive military effects but may have negative humanitarian effects and thereby jeopardize the entire long-term goal of the mission (Egnell 2010:244, 250). Due to cultural differences; activities may not be interpreted in the intended way, so assumptions about positive effects can be dangerous to make (Egnell 2010:323,243,250; Gordon 2007:126). The sustainability of CIMIC projects has been questioned as military projects tend to be quick fix, infrastructural projects, intended to create a positive view of the peacekeeping force, but the long-term management of the project is rarely considered nor potential local capacity benefits (Aall 2000:134; Mockaitis 2004:17). Gordon frankly states that there is no point in building a school if there are no educated teachers that can teach in the school, i.e. there has to be support for also rebuilding the social structures in the community (Gordon 2007:122; Rietjens 2007:93). If the projects fails to contribute to build local capacity and ownership over the projects or take into account absorptive capacity they are unlikely to be sustainable. The key is to engage the local community so that they feel respected and treated as equal partners when rebuilding their societies (Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger 2008:552; Bollen 2008: 60-3). In Rietjens study, mentioned above, 40% of the projects did not function as intended. Schools have instead been used as shelter for homeless families and fire stations lack water supply (Rietjens 2007:93). He further argues that there were instances of duplication of efforts (Rietjens 2007:93). The study by Rietjens (2007) also presents contradictory results, considering local capacity, whereby he both claims that it did increase since the activities where contracted to local contractors, but then claims that some ISAF battalions initiated and carried out reconstruction projects themselves, instead making ISAF a competitor to local companies and humanitarian
organizations. Humanitarian organizations were rarely involved in these activities, since they considered something else as more important or were not approached by ISAF (Rietjens 2007:92-93, 95).

The military have furthermore been criticized for its lack of knowledge of social development assistance, local norms and social groupings (Gordon: 122; Rietjens 2007: 92-93) as the military tend to treat problems as logistical without considering the socio-economical conditions existing in the country (Mockaitis 2004: 28). Furthermore, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities are very different from the combat missions they are trained for and the additional restrictions that are put on the commanders in a peacebuilding mission may place them in situations they are unfamiliar with (Welch 2006:233). Hazen (2007) and Rietjens (2007) are skeptical to peacekeepers capacity to engage in social and economic activities while Pugh (2001) highlights that missions usually consist of soldiers with capacities in engineering, transport and communication and Braem (2007) adds that training and education in the local culture can ease the problem so that they can manage civilian projects and effectively negotiate with local stakeholders (Rietjens 2007:92-93; Bollen 2008:59; Braem 2007:39; Pugh 2001: 236) A report investigating seven humanitarian/development projects conducted by the Swedish battalion in 1999, confirms that the battalion had managed to carry out the activities to all beneficiaries satisfaction and if the capacity was lacking within the battalion, they had hired local entrepreneurs (Broberg Wulff and Ströberg 2001:14, 23). The report further acknowledges the advantage of having a troop consisting of soldiers who worked as teachers, engineers and entrepreneurs back home (Broberg Wulff and Ströberg 2001: 15).

This also ties into the issue of cost-effectiveness. While some claim that military forces carry out more expensive and inappropriately exclusive projects (Rietjens 2007: 92-93) others state that they are more cost-effective since the military assume labor cost and overhead cost themselves. Thus all funds are put into the project without operating expenses and the soldiers are more efficient than hiring locals (Voget 2008:152; Pugh 2001:236). Rietjens also show that in those cases where local contractors were contracted the costs were relatively low (2007:96). But what might seem like low cost can easily be explained by the fact that these are projects, as oppose to training programs, capacity building programs and structural reform programs that many aid organizations’ engage in. While humanitarian and development organizations might be right in their criticism of military capability in carrying out projects, aid from humanitarian and development organizations are neither impartial undertakings nor
always have the intended consequences, as this literature frequently present it has. Aid organizations also have their own agenda, regardless of whether the money is channeled straight from the government or not. They also want to be present in the spotlight of the world’s news, to gather more money for their organization.

A possible negative side effect is that projects may instead create discontent and hostility towards the military if not all companies, all communities nor all people are supported and benefits from the activities (Voget 2008:161; Fitz-Gerald 2000). This is a central concern, especially in ethnically divided conflicts, if there are differences in the conduct of a multinational mission. In the missions in Kosovo (KFOR), Bosnia (Stabilization Force - SFOR), and Albania (Albania Force - AFOR) national governments were channeling aid through their national contingents, outside the framework of “integrated military command and control”. According to Van Baarda this meant “differences in level and quality of humanitarian assistance in the respective areas of operations of the battalions concerned” (2001:105). Rietjens study confirms that there was no common approach to CIMIC within ISAF (2007:97). This might create injustice across different villages and increase tensions between them, especially if the neighboring villages are composed of a different ethnicity.

Only a few studies take into account the evaluation and report aspect of the conducted projects. Even though the projects in Rietjens study (2007) were monitored by technical support teams, many projects that had been carried out were not reported (Rietjens 2007:92-93). Often, evaluations were done verbally with humanitarian organizations. If local contractors were involved, evaluations were made concerning the technical aspects of the project but not whether “it contributed to force protection” (Rietjens 2007: 94-95). But yet again, CIMIC, albeit being an important part in peace operations, will always be considered as secondary activities of the peacekeeping force (Egnell 2010:247, 250; Bollen 2008:59). Peacekeepers are deployed to ensure peace and security, and if their mandates are expanded to support the security of the humanitarian organizations it might take away troops from their overall mission (Egnell 2010: 245).

2.1.4. Structures of military versus humanitarian organizations
The literature also extensively account for the organizational differences between military and humanitarian organizations. While the military is hierarchical structured, where rules of command are based on strict discipline, where logistics and training is prioritized and where the organization have a redundancy of staff in order to achieve the goals as quickly as
possible, humanitarian organizations rely on a flat organization that emphasizes the process (Franke 2006:13; Byman 2001:103-104; Aall 2000:134). The short-term deployment of peacekeeping soldiers prevents the creation of long-term relationships, in-depth knowledge, adequate reporting and further inhibits evaluations and efficient handovers (Egnell 2010:247; Voget 2008:162). On the other hand the large amount of NGOs that is present in the area at different stages in the conflict creates problems of cooperation and coordination (Byman 2001:105; Abiew 2003:29; van Baarda 2001:102). The organizational differences have entailed problems of trust between the partners hindering effective cooperation (Abiew 2003:30; Bollen 2008:59).

Even though controversy still exist between the extent of cooperation or integration, there is a widespread understanding that some exchange between the different actors in a post-conflict situation is necessary in order to build lasting peace (Abiew 2003:25; Byman 2001:107; Aall 2000:136; Bollen 2008:56; Rana 2007:239; Knight 2003:253; Franke 2006:17-18). If the activities are uncoordinated it may not only risk undermining and overlapping each other’s activities but also jeopardize the fragile peace (Abiew 2003:36; Franke 2006:17; Byman 2001:101; Aall 2000:121). Furthermore without initiatives to build trust between the actors it may polarize them even more (Bollen 2008:60). Despite this, little effort has been put to preserve the experience of previous cooperation (Byman 2001:106; Abiew 2003:33). Civil-military cooperation is today rather a reactive ad hoc approach. Bollen state “there is little to no monitoring, process evaluation or performance measurement of outcomes of civil-military cooperation. They seem to be learning independently from each other and there is no sharing of innovations between them” (2008:51). They have common goals but they also have their own objectives, which might thwart the other (Bollen 2008:52). History shows that CMOCs (civil-military operations centers) have not served as coordination centers but rather as a venue for briefings and avenues to share information (Bollen 2008:60-3; Gordon 2007:124, 125; Aall 2000:134).

Numerous scholars have set out an exploratory stance on how to improve this relationship between military and humanitarian actors (Rietjens 2007, de Coning 2007). While some emphasizes the need to create more formalized, institutionalized relations between actors (Abiew 2003:35; Mockaitis 2004:27) others emphases that every context is different and therefore one set structure will be impossible to implement. Important is thus to be flexible during different stages of conflict and improve communication and planning, share conferences and training and increase the overlap period between rotations to create smoother

Finally, it is important that there is cooperation also at the national political level, because that is where the decision to engage in peacekeeping and development assistance is taken (Rana 2007: 235, 238).

But since there is no systematic evaluation done on the effectiveness of comprehensive peace operations, Egnell argue that “without further empirical evidence, and with weak theoretical underpinnings, the concepts of integration and multifunctionality largely rely on assumptions of increased effectiveness from integration” (2010: 238–239, 250). From the above review of previous research on civil-military cooperation, it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion. The focus of debate concerns the dilemmas that these relationship pose in the field positioned either from the humanitarian perspective or the military perspective. There is subsequently a lot of research on how to improve the relationships between the humanitarian organizations and the military force (Rietjens 2007; de Coning 2007; Gourlay2000; Abiew 2003; Franke 2006; Rubinstein, Keller, Scherger 2008) whereas there are few studies that actually focus on what effect this relationship has had in the conflict environment. Furthermore, even though previous research acknowledges the importance of including the target population in the activities there is little research done on how the local population perceive the activities of the peacekeeping force.

3. **Theoretical framework**

The overview of previous research on civil-military cooperation has shown that CIMIC is considered to be one of the means to achieve the broad goal of ensuring sustainable peace. However its positive impact on peace and stability is based on mere assumptions or a supposition about a positive result of peace and stability, if the relationships between civilian organizations and military organizations had been managed better. But whether it really can be an effective tool in changing the situation on the ground is rarely discussed. This section will hypothesize how CIMIC can contribute to peace and stability.

The trend to create more comprehensive approaches to peace operations springs from the enhancement of the concept human security as introduced by UNDP in 1994 (Human

---

4 Humanitarian organization and civilian organizations are used interchangeably in this paper as referring to all relief and development aid agencies, regardless of NGO or INGO or national agencies, if not mentioned otherwise

5 Military organizations will in this study solely refer to peacekeeping missions.
Development Report, HDR). The new definition of human security changes the focus from states to people and includes not only physical security but also security in the sense of a sustainable living situation (UNDP, HDR 1994: 22). It acknowledges peoples opportunity to make decisions for their own lives (UNDP, HDR 1994:23-24). UNDP identifies seven components in their report; community security, health security, economic security, personal security, political security, environmental security and food security (UNDP HDR: 24-25). The introduction of this broader notion of human security was a result of an inquiry the field offices of UNDP conducted, on the local host populations’ perceptions of security. Security for these people meant, to have a job and an income, to live in an area free from crimes and violence, free from repressions from the government, in a society tolerant of different ethnicities, free from repression based on gender etc. (UNDP HDR 1994:22-23). While important to find a way for the different international actors to collaborate in order to address all these different components and to smooth the transition from peace and stability as recognized by previous research, there seems to have been a tendency to forget about the host population in research regarding CIMIC.

In this study this wider notion of human security will guide our analysis when assessing the dependent variable perceptions of peace and stability. The reason to this broad measure of peace and stability in this paper is necessary in order to capture how the individuals in the host country feel about security. The dependent variable, perceptions of peace and stability, will only be measured from the point of view of the individual, from the answers from the field interviews with the local population. The independent variable civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is in academia often defined as the relationship between the peacekeeping force and international humanitarian organizations. But in practice the concept CIMIC also includes those activities that the peacekeeping force carries out to affect the views of the host population, such as communication campaigns (flyers, billboards, house visits) and CIMIC projects (humanitarian relief aid, infrastructural assistance, society development and economic development) in order to win the locals support and ensure peace and stability. It is this second view of CIMIC that is the focus of this study.

CIMIC is thought to contribute to enhance local people’s perceptions of peace and stability through three mechanisms. First, CIMIC allows greater communication between the peacekeeping force and the local population which improves understanding of each other’s actions and which thereby can be mitigated to sustain peace. By engaging in society, by communicating with the population and talking to them about why the peacekeeping force is
there, they can also make the population aware of what their mission entails, and why they are doing certain things in a certain way, e.g. why they have to search their houses etc. By communicating with the local society they can also get a sense of what the local society need and how the local population behaves. This will allow the peacekeeping forces to get a better understanding of the culture, the local situation and be better prepared to deter a violent uprising. This will also make the population feel more secure since they know the peacekeepers better, who they are and what they are doing there and what might happen in the future. If the population perceive the peacekeepers to be in control of the situation they may thereby be more willing to give up their weapons, since they trust that someone is there to protect them, in case something were to happen. In this way, CIMIC functions as a bridge between the peacekeeping culture and the local situation. In order to isolate the effect of the CIMIC projects on perceptions of stability, people were first asked if the peacekeeping force had been able to ensure that they felt safe and how they thought that the peacekeeping force contribute to security. Civil-military relationships are also to a large extent subjective to personal relations which influence the trust in the force. When the peacekeeping battalions rotate usually every 6-12 months these relationships may change and may obstruct fruitful relationships and consistency in the conducted work. There is a subsequently a risk that the project will not be finished if the next peacekeeping battalion is unaware that the project existed. The villagers were therefore asked whether they fought it was a problem that the soldiers change every six months. Another factor influencing the relationship between the peacekeeping force and the local society can be the nationality of the troop contributing country. Relationships between different countries at a national state level may also influence the relationships in the field, so the respondents were asked whether it mattered what nationality the participating country in the peacekeeping force was.

Secondly, CIMIC projects will enhance the populations’ views of the peacekeeping force as a force for good and will portray the peacekeeping force as engaged in society. This will increase the peoples support for the force which will enhance force protection and also improve the possibilities for the peacekeeping force to keep the environment peaceful and thereby fulfilling their mandate. Development projects communicate that the peacekeeping force invest in society and care about the development. If the peacekeepers are seen as distributing aid or helping a family to rebuild a house, people are more likely to support the peacekeeping force because they have helped them. But on the other hand if the projects fail to work out as planned or if they are left unfinished it is more likely that they actually hurt the
people’s perceptions of the peacekeeping force than improves it (Rietjens 2007: 94). In order to assess this effect, people were asked whether they knew what kind of projects/activities the peacekeeping force had performed in the village. If they were unaware of whether the peacekeeping force had carried out any project in the village it is considered a sign that the projects had no effect on the perceptions of trust of the people in the peacekeeping force. In order to create a comprehensive understanding over how peacekeepers gain the support of the people we also examined whether the force had done anything to increase versus decrease the peoples trust in them. A potential risk is if people perceive that the projects are not distributed equally across the villages and ethnicities. If people see that the peacekeepers are partisan it might provide spoilers with grievances which may be used to mobilize people for violent uprisings. The respondents were therefore asked whether they fought the peacekeeping force treated everyone equally or whether they favored someone. If the aim is force protection, aid can also be conditioned on compliance or in exchange for information, which on the other hand will not contribute to improve the support of the people in the force.

Finally, by reconstructing houses, schools, roads, CIMIC projects contribute to improve the local perceptions of a better living situation which reduces their incentives to resort to criminal activities and provides positive prospects for a new future. Perceptions of improved living conditions will make people less revengeful and make them look to the future instead of taking revenge on their neighbors for the horrible things in the past (UNDP HDR 1994: 23). Welch (2006), Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Lyon (2005) all emphasize the importance of a comprehensive understanding of security and the importance of economic growth as it will raise incentives for keeping peace. Donini (2005) and Welch (2006) argue that people have a broader notion of security than just absent of war and that food, and other basic things for a decent living situation are equally important for sustainable peace (2005:53; 2006: 230-231). In the interviews conducted in the field, people were asked whether they fought these activities contributed to peace and stability. Since peacekeepers have been criticized for their lack of knowledge in conducting development work, the villagers were also asked whether the project was needed or whether something else was even more important. When the peacekeeping force takes on a larger responsibility, the risk is that they crowd out local entrepreneurs or local bodies or institutions and instead create a dependency in terms of reliability on the peacekeeping force. Therefore questions were asked about whether people from the village were involved in any phase of the project and whether the bridge/school/sewage system is still in use or still functions properly.
4. Research design

4.1. Method

A qualitative case study method is most suitable in order to investigate this research question. The reason being that case studies allows the examination of a concept that is difficult to measure statistically (George and Bennett 2005: 19; Höglund and Öberg 2011: 186), such as people’s opinions. Case studies are helpful in disaggregating the concept of interest and thereby identify what triggers the effect and also explore intervening and contextual factors (George and Bennett 2005:19, 22). The applied method in this study is structured focus comparison, which means that the same questions are asked to all of the cases (George and Bennett 2005:67). The appropriate approach for investigating the local perceptions of CIMICs effect on peace and stability is by conducting interviews in areas where CIMIC projects have been carried out. The interviews were conducted with a semi-structured questionnaire that consisted of both open questions and multiple choice questions in order to accurately be able to compare the cases. The questionnaire was based on factors identified in previous research in order to examine current theoretical assumptions.

4.2. Case selection

Certain criteria were established in selecting my units of analysis. In order to see the greatest, possible effects of CIMIC it is beneficial if these activities have been carried out for a longer period of time, i.e. the longer the peacekeeping force has been in place the better because the higher is the likelihood of a positive effect. CIMIC is not a new phenomena and quick impact projects have been conducted by UN in various settings, but it’s role of winning the hearts and minds of the population, especially in enforcement missions has received much more attention in conflicts such as Afghanistan and Kosovo since peaceenforcement missions tend to be more political complicated than traditional peacekeeping missions (Pugh 2000:239). To study the effect of CIMIC on sustaining, building peace, Kosovo was chosen as a field study case since the country is relatively stable today. Since the mission has been stationed there for more than ten years, there is a higher likelihood that people will know about the CIMIC projects, their impact in society and the long-term sustainability of the projects. This may also provide more accurate answers since people may not be dependent on the peacekeeping force for security anymore so they may not feel that they have to answer positively. Four

Kosovo will in this study be referred to as a country since the government of Sweden acknowledged their independence on March 4th 2008.
villages were chosen as unit of analysis since people tend to know what is going on in villages to a greater extent than in bigger cities. A CIMIC project that benefitted the whole village should have been carried out in the village where interviews with the local population were conducted. The villages were selected out of project documents provided by the Multinational Battle Group Center (MNBG C), thus all projects have been carried out within their AOR. Considering CIMIC as fixed the cases vary in their ethnic composition. Among the four villages, one is inhabited by only Albanians and another by only Serbs, the other two consists of mixed ethnicities (Serbs, Albanians and Romas). 20 respectively 21 interviews were conducted in the mixed villages, 15 interviews in the Serbian village and 20 in the Albanian dominated village. This design in my case selection is suitable because it was an enforcement mission in an ethnic conflict which means that KFOR (Kosovo Force)\(^7\) was welcomed with open arms by the general Albanian public but rather resented by the Serb population. KFOR subsequently had to convince the population of Kosovo that they were there to protect them from violence and prevent another war. By applying this design it is also possible to see if there are any perceived differences in homogenous societies compared to heterogeneous societies. Since heterogeneous societies may be more integrated and tolerant it might have an effect on the sense of peace and stability. The Albanian village in this design function as a most-likely case, since we would suspect an outcome in line with what the theory predicts (George and Bennett 2005: 121). If the answers from the people in the Albanian village are negative towards the peacekeeping force and/or stability, we might suspect that the theory is wrong. The Serbian village will in this design thereby pose as a least-likely case, whereby a positive view of the peacekeeping force or of stability would “strengthen support for cases where the theory should be weak” (George and Bennett 2005: 121). The mixed villages will function as control cases. The reason for this design is that KFOR has been present over the whole country whereas it is impossible to isolate a village from any KFOR presence or assistance. Though, this set-up requires extensive consideration of alternative theories and scrutiny of alternative explanatory factors (George and Bennett 2005:121). In this study this problem is managed by including various potential influencing variables, in the questionnaire. There are multiple factors that can influence the causal story of how the local people view that CIMIC can contribute to peace and stability, which needs to be controlled for in order to isolate the effect of the independent variable. The notion of perceptions of peace and stability can for starters be influenced by various factors. In the questionnaire respondents were asked

\(^7\) The NATO force
what they thought was the reason to stability in Kosovo. To find out their expectations of KFOR, the respondents were asked what they thought the tasks of the peacekeeping force was and were given the following alternatives: A) Only keep peace and stability, B) Keep peace and stability and help to rebuild society, C) Provide humanitarian assistance, D) Other, E) KFOR should have left after 1999/2000.

4.3. Material

Interviews following a semi-structured questionnaire\(^8\) were conducted in Kosovo during the summer of 2010, with ministry employees in Obilic municipality and Gracanica municipality, and 76 respondents in the four villages in order to gain insight into their perceptions of the effect civil-military cooperation can have on peace and stability. In consideration of the still fragile political environment in Kosovo, and thereby the need to respect the anonymity of the respondents, the villages will not be mentioned by name in this paper. Instead the homogeneous Albanian village will be referred to as Albanian dominated, the homogenous Serbian village will be referred to as the Serb dominated, and the heterogeneous village consisting of 35% Albanians, 60% Serbians and 5% Romans will be called Village A, and the other heterogeneous village consisting of 42% Albanians and 57% Serbs will be called Village B.

The use of an interpreter, who was fluent in both Serbian and Albanian, was necessary, so that all respondents would feel comfortable to speak to her. This was also important in order to ensure our safety. I always trusted and put the decision to leave an area to my interpreter in those circumstances where we felt a bit unease. When working with interpreters it is important to remember that the interpreter might conclude or interpret the answers when translating. Another problem of conducting research with people as respondents is that of reliability. Answers to different questions may be contradictory if they fail to understand the question or if they answer something that they think the researcher wants to hear. We approached the respondents on the street or as they were working in their gardens, thereby evading the possibility of them making up or planning the answers in advance. The respondents answered the questions in a direct but sincere way and some also exemplified with actual events to make their argument clear to me. According to Wood (2006) it is the researcher’s responsibility to inform the respondents about the objective of the interviews, what organization the researcher represent, and the respondents’ risks and benefits from

\(^8\) See annex 1.
participating so that they can make an informed choice (2006:379). This notion of informed consent was put into practice by informing the respondents about me being a Swedish student who was not in any way affiliated with either the peacekeeping force or any NGO and made clear to them that they could not benefit in any way by participating in the project. We informed them that they could refuse to participate or refuse to answer certain questions. In order to protect the respondents, no names were taken. This might complicate reliability in future studies but was considered essential in order to ensure trustworthy results. No taperecorder was used in the villages because the decision was made that it might frighten them from speaking the truth. Instead notes were taken, and complemented later in the evening. The only exceptions were the interviews with the municipality which were set-up by KFOR and for which I used their interpreters and recorded with a tape recorder. The peacekeepers were not present in the room when these interviews were conducted and the interpreters of KFOR were locals. Even though twelve years have passed since KFOR was deployed to Kosovo, tensions still exist in the country and some of the questions and thereby answered may be politically charged or biased. But on the whole, people were eager to tell me their story.

In-depth interviews were also conducted with aid organizations; ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and European Commission Liaison Office (ECLO) to understand how they perceive that the relationship with the peacekeeping force has progressed during the mission. Interviews were also conducted with the J9, JEC (Joint Effect Coordination) branch9 in NATO Headquarters (HQ) in Pristina10, and group interviews with the responsible CIMIC soldiers from French, American, Austrian, Portuguese and Italian battalions and individual interviews with Swedish LMTs, Finnish and American CIMIC project teams, to get a better understanding of what the concept CIMIC entails to them, how they work with CIMIC and what they believe it should contribute to. This allows me to compare their views of the effectiveness of CIMIC to the local perspectives. I also had the opportunity to accompany the peacekeeping missions in their work and at a JEC conference.

---

9 J9 section constitutes the CIMIC section of NATO HQ. They are each responsible for one section of CIMIC; PsyOps, LMTs, CIMIC projects, infoOps.

10 Pristina is the capital in Kosovo
In analyzing the responses, certain level of interpretation was necessary. In order to present the results as neutral as possible, a lot of quotes are used in the sections about how the peacekeeping force conducts CIMIC and in the section about how the villagers perceive the effect of CIMIC. Considering the amount of respondents, if the majority of a group in each village has provided the same answer it is considered sufficient to draw general conclusions from. The questions are also added as annex 1, in this study.

Reports have been made on the subject of civil-military cooperation, conducted by research institutes\(^{11}\) and other organizations. Surveys by UNDP on local trust in the institutions in Kosovo have also been conducted since 2002. These will be used to compare, contrast and strengthen the findings from the field study in Kosovo. Unfortunately some of the conclusions in the review by the consultancy firm for the Finnish Foreign Ministry are based on loose speculations about potential effects in society, which makes the projects look better than they have evidence for and the same goes for the report by Swedish Defence Research Agency. Moreover, some of the conclusions in the CSSP report are outright contradictory.

5. Analysis

To understand the difficulties and the importance of careful consideration in adapting CIMIC to the special circumstances of an enforcement mission in an ethnic post-conflict country, where ethnic discrimination has been the rule rather than the exception for centuries there is a need to briefly present the history and the prelude to the Kosovo conflict and subsequently the involvement of the international community. The following sections will thereafter outline the NATO doctrine on CIMIC, followed by sections describing how CIMIC has been conducted in Kosovo and how the peacekeepers believe their activities contributes to their mission and peace and stability. The fourth section will ultimately analyze how CIMIC work is perceived by the population. The last section will tie the parts together, summarize and discuss general implications from the analysis.

5.1. The Kosovo Conflict

The year 1389 and the battle of Kosovo Polje, is usually the starting point when unfolding the ethnic dimensions and the reasons for the war in former Yugoslavia and specifically the Kosovo conflict. According to the legend, this is where Prince Lazar instigated a serious uprising against the Ottoman Empire. He lost the battle but tales of his great courage was

\(^{11}\) FOI- Swedish Defence Research Agency, CSSP, Indufor
composed and used as propaganda for centuries afterwards. Unlike the influential Orthodox Church among the Serbs, the Albanians did not at this time have a dominant church which lead many to convert to Islam during the Ottoman Empire, which has become yet another distinction between Serbs and Albanians. At the end of the 19th century the vision of a `Greater Serbia´ began to form. Serbia struggled for its emancipation and tales of the great battles to romanticized Serb nationalism and dehumanize the Albanians was produced and spread. Serbia first became an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire and in 1878 gained its full independence (Judah 2002: 4-9, 12, 16; Gow 2003:34-35). Albanian houses were burned and people fled to the south, to Kosovo, which remained Ottoman until 1912, from which Serbs fled north due to similar treatment. 1878 is also an important year for the Albanians, as this is the year of the creation of the League of Prizren, which was created in part by those who wanted to defend Albanian and Muslim traditions but also by those who wanted an autonomous state of Albania (Judah 2002:12).

In 1912, Serbs retook Kosovo, which was disastrous for the Albanian population who now was unable to join Albania, as they struggled for. Three years later when Austro-Hungary invaded Serbia, Albanians took their revenge. In 1918 Serbs retook Kosovo again, and created the Yugoslav state in 1929. The Albanians resisted, as language schools were closed and Serbs and Montenegrins were encouraged to resettle in Kosovo. But the rebellion was fought brutally and the Serbs massacred thousands of Albanians (Judah 2002:21). When Serbia was invaded again in 1941, by the Germans, Kosovo was split between Italy, Germany and Bulgaria and Albanians again took revenge on the settlers (Judah 2002:26-27). At the end of the Second World War, Tito managed to align the Slav people and the Albanians within the former Yugoslavia to fight together. Communism was installed after the war and Kosovo became an autonomous region of Serbia, but was never allowed to become the seventh nation of Yugoslavia it strived for (Judah 2002:31: Ker-Lindsay 2009:9). The Albanian population continued to be controlled with violent means and lacked political freedoms up until 1966. At the end of the year 1966 as Pristina University was established, an educated unemployed group of young adults emerged, instilling greater opposition as the majority of the jobs went to Serbs. The inflow of remittances from abroad facilitated the creation of opposition groups and provided the means to buy off Serbian properties. The demographic change started to make Serbs feel threatened (Gow 2003:40-42) and the Albanian opposition continued to be violently suppressed. But in 1974 Kosovo was upgraded from an autonomous region to an autonomous province, which in practice entailed all the rights as a republic except the right to
self-determination (Ker-Lindsay 2009:11). During the leadership of Tito, a breakdown of the federation was avoided, but after his death in 1980 it became evident that the various regional leaders could not agree on how to solve the lingering economic crisis of the federation. After Milosevic was elected president he released a memorandum stating that Serbs had been discriminated and called for the Serbian pride to be restored and in 1989 revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo, which again was met with great hostility in Kosovo (Gow 2003:40-42, 35, 38; Ker-Lindsay 2009:11). Ibrahim Rugova, the opposition leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, encouraged non-violent protests but these measures was instantly suppressed by Serbia (Gow 203:40-42). After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, Rugova was elected the unofficial president of Kosovo and started campaigning for independence for real. When Kosovo’s claim for independence was neglected in the discussions concerning the Dayton Agreement, people had lost faith in the non-violent approach and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)\textsuperscript{12} was created. In line with the escalating attacks, KLA confronted a real backlash as the US special envoy to the Balkans branded them as terrorists. This on the other hand, proved to be a sign of confirmation for the Serbian government to take action against KLA. While the international community condemned the acts of the Serbian government and NATO threatened with intervention, KLA increased its attacks with the hope that Serbia would retaliate and the international community would intervene. After reports of the Racak massacre of 45 Albanians in January 1999, the international community designed the Rambouille agreement, which included autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia and revision of the autonomy in three years and free passage for NATO troops within the area. While signed by KLA, Milosevic refused and NATO subsequently initiated its bombing on the 24\textsuperscript{th} of March 1999. What was thought to be an unproblematic intervention turned into a humanitarian disaster when Milosevic ordered the escalation of attacks on Albanians (Ker-Lindsay 2009:11-15). The war lasted 78 days. On June 10\textsuperscript{th} the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1244, which decides that international civil and security presence shall be deployed to Kosovo (UNSC Resolution 1244). The civilian presence was composed of four pillars; UNMIK (civil administration), OSCE (institution building), UNHCR (humanitarian assistance), and EU (reconstruction) (Minear, van Baarda, Sommers 2000:7; Mockaitis 2004:7). Annex 2 to UNSC resolution 1244 specifically states that the security presence shall consist of substantial NATO involvement. The security presence is partly governed by the resolution and a military technical agreement

\textsuperscript{12} UÇK - Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës — in Albanian.
(MTA) signed between Serbia and NATO on June 9th. MTA state that Serbia understands and agrees that KFOR shall be deployed in line with the UNSC resolution and be able to freely move around within Kosovo and take all necessary actions to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens. The security presence was given a chapter VII mandate in order to deter hostilities, maintain and enforce a ceasefire, ensure withdrawal of Yugoslav/Serbian forces, demilitarize KLA, ensure public safety, supervise demining, “supporting, as appropriate and coordinate closely with the work of the international civil presence”, ensure freedom of movement and conduct border control (UNSC Resolution 1244). More than 500 international organizations arrived in Kosovo, in the wake of the bombing campaign, creating serious difficulties in coordination, due to gaps in authority (Mockaitis 2004:3, 7). The many organizations that were forced to leave when NATO started the attacks faced great difficulties in reentering the area, since they feared that they now would be associated with the military intervening force (Minear, van Baarda, Sommers 2000:7, 45). Since NATO was politically associated in the conflict, the ability for both humanitarian and military actors to reach Roma and Serb areas was severely obstructed (Van Baarda 2001:105; Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers 2000:11). Wolfgram (2008) and Pugh (2000) states that NATO's reluctance to put their soldiers life in danger and their decision to side with KLA in the beginning of the mission to gain control over the territory led to their inability to protect non-Albanians (2008:462, 473; 2000:230). Pugh further states that the unequal distribution of assistance to the Albanian population was a strategy to justify for the world that it was a matter of a humanitarian intervention (Pugh 2000:232,239).

Also UNHCR was criticized for relying and transferring too many refugee activities to NATO, instead of effectively coordinating the activities themselves (Minear, van Baarda and Sommers 2000: 14-15). Minear, van Baarda and Sommers acknowledges that the humanitarian society was in general content with KFORs ability to ensure a safe environment for them but when it comes to direct assistance, the humanitarian organizations stated that NATO could have transferred the activities concerning direct assistance to the civilian organizations more quickly. But within NATO, civic action was encouraged as their visible approach gathered political results (2000:26). This view is still shared by the interviewed organizations in Kosovo during the summer of 2010.
5.2. NATO definition of CIMIC

Mockaitis once said that “defining CIMIC is like nailing jello to a wall”. The quote still captures the current confusion around the concept CIMIC (Zaalberg 2008:5). The broad concept seems to entail miscellaneous meanings to different researchers, nationalities, soldiers and civilians. The term CIMIC is from the beginning a NATO concept that refer to the section within the military structure that deal with liaison and support to the civil society and the civilian organizations working within their area of operation (Asplund, Beausang, Hartoft and Wahlberg 2003:18). But the concept civil-military cooperation can have a narrower meaning to others, entailing only the relationships between the military and the civilian actors. Since the aim of this thesis is to find out what effect the population believes that these CIMIC activities can have on peace and stability, it is more relevant to apply the definition by NATO, as it is also the force responsible for the security in Kosovo.

When NATO at the end of the 1990s revised and further elaborated on its policy and doctrine concerning CIMIC, NATO choose to limit the operational objective of CIMIC, instead of contributing to an overall political objective and encourage cooperation, the purpose of CIMIC should according to the doctrine solely be support to the military mission (Zaalberg 2008:16-17; 23). But in practice CIMIC has other than involving small reconstruction projects for winning hearts and minds, also come to play a part in both nationbuilding and counterinsurgency operations in missions such as Kosovo and Iraq (Zaalberg 2008: 8).

NATOs view on CIMIC is established in two documents; Military Committee document MC411/1 from 2001- though as the policy is not a formally agreed document, it is not ratified by all the member states (NATO webpage 2011) - and the most recent NATO doctrine from 2003. The CIMIC definition in the doctrine is as follows: “CIMIC is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”(webpage of KFOR 2008; Doctrine 2003:1-1).

Three core functions are outlined in the first chapter; 1) Civil-military liaison (facilitate and support the planning and conduct of operations), 2) support to the civil environment (will generally only take place when it is necessary to create conditions for the military mission to carry out its tasks or where civilian agencies are unable to reach. “Decision on depth, duration and extent of this support should be made at the highest appropriate level taking into account political as well as military and civilian factors”), 3) support to the force (the force may need
the support of civilian resources and information to coordinate efforts concerning population
and resource control to minimize disruption to military operations) (2003: Chapter 1 p.3,4).

5.3 How is CIMIC carried out?

5.3.1 Background - The KFOR mission, 1999-
“...I seek a hearts and minds campaign at low level, creating trust and mutual understanding. As
relationships build, so will the flow of information allowing KFOR to pre-empt conflict. [...] It is an operation amongst the people, whose perception is the Center of Gravity: that all inhabitants of Kosovo are better off with the UNMIK in Kosovo/KFOR than without, that we jointly offer a better future” were the words of the first KFOR Force Commander General Sir Mike Jackson, to brigade and battalion commanders in 1999 (Zaalberg 2008:20). The CIMIC plan from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels outlined three broad aims: “provide CIMIC support to the force, provide temporary civil administration and maximize IO/NGO capability to assist Kosovars to establish a self-sustaining civil administration” (Mockaitis 2004:27) and from the beginning of the mission in 1999, commanders were forced to take over parts of the civilian administration, e.g. policing, infrastructural reconstruction, assistance with refugee return and the delivering of humanitarian aid because there was no one else (interview HQ 0709; Jeong 2005:197; Mockaitis 2004:27).

CIMIC is organized by the JEC, J9 section at the headquarter (HQ) in Pristina and in separate
sections in the different battle groups. J9 consists of a team with one person responsible for
each aspect of civil-military cooperation: Psychological operations (PsyOps), Liaison
Monitoring Teams (LMTs), InfoOps, CIMIC projects and a responsible commander. In its
current structure, KFOR have divided Kosovo into five multinational brigade (MNBG) areas;
North, South, East, West and Center. There is also a specialized police agency with military
capability called MSU with substantial CIMIC assets (NATO webpage, MSU projects
081111). CIMIC centers were to be created within each brigade area so each commander
could target the specific problem within his AOR as seemed most appropriate according to the
local conditions (CSSP 2010: 28). The situation is further intricate by the fact that it is 31
different nationalities constituting KFOR, each with their own view on CIMIC and with their
own developed practice, approaches and capabilities (Zaalberg 2008:6, 21-22) 13. The

13 There is a lot of literature on how different nationalities have organized their national structure around CIMIC, i.e. the army of the United States of America make a distinction between Civil Affairs (CA) and Civil-
homepage of KFOR bear witness of this; “many NATO nations have their own structures and procedures in place to deal with most aspects of CIMIC” and CIMIC projects are mostly funded by governmental money from the KFOR contributing countries (CIMIC webpage 20081029). Since the projects do not need to be approved by the KFOR HQ in Pristina before they are realized in their respective battle groups (0717) there is no way to ensure that KFOR have a comprehensive and consistent approach in the whole country. There is only a CIMIC actionplan (the white paper-see below) that they are ordered to follow (0712). But history has shown that NATO directions are not always followed. Even from the beginning, different battalions had different approaches and funding for CIMIC activities (Minear, van Baarda and Sommers 2000: 29). In a study from 2004, Mockaitis present the different approaches taken by the national contingents. He states that whereas the British perceived CIMIC as `every soldiers job´ and made an effort to build up relationships over a cup of coffee before getting down to business the Americans were considered to be more robust and wanted to get things done without small-talk (Mockaitis 2004: 10-14,17,25). Interestingly enough this view is not confirmed by the population, who describe almost the opposite relation to these two nations. This is just one indication of the fact that what soldiers say and promote is not always perceived in the intended way.

Approaches by the different MNBGs have also been subject to national agendas. The Germans had an apparent national interest in rebuilding the society in the south in order for refugees who fled to Germany to be able to return to Kosovo. There were also reports of a reluctance to help Serbs return, as it might jeopardize the status quo in the area (Mockaitis 2004: 19, 20; Voget 2007:156). Reports have also pointed to instances of duplication among the different battalions, since they were not informed by their superiors of what other battalions within KFOR were doing because HQ failed to coordinate CIMIC with the MNBGs (Voget 2007: 162, 156).

In the latest CIMIC white paper from 2009, which provides internal guidance for CIMIC in Kosovo, it is possible to deduce certain problems with the development of CIMIC in Kosovo. After emphasizing the leading principles; that CIMIC should be connected to KFOR tasks, find local ownership over the project, and contribute to a sustainable development - the paper goes on to encourage revision and future direction of KFORs CIMIC activity. The white

---

military cooperation, while the British army state that CIMIC is every soldiers job, and the Netherlands have elaborated on the three Ds approach; Defence, Diplomacy and Development. To read more about this discussion see Gaag, Vries and Hogeven (2008); Zaalberg (2008). This paper will only relate to the literature that specifically deals with Kosovo.
paper states that “Far too often CIMIC has been recognized to be nothing else but projects. Projects without connection to KFOR tasks /…/ are not necessarily CIMIC”. Therefore there is a need to refine “revision of guiding principles, unity of command to ensure national CIMIC units adhere to KFOR CIMIC doctrine, identification of areas for coordination, delineation of tasks between civilian – KFOR entities, clarification of non-permissible civilian-military interaction” (2009: 1). The white paper underlines more than once, that activities that are not related to KFOR tasks should not be done, that no national agenda is allowed and that projects should only be supported on request by the civilian organizations, if the appropriate knowledge and capacity exist within KFOR and if there is no one else to carry out the task, to avoid creating local dependency on KFOR (2009: 2,3). These highlighted aspects are all very serious issues and points to the fact that guidelines and roles are not always followed and may have sinister consequences for the mission and for the future development of the country. But when HQ at the beginning of the year 2010 removed the CIMIC part in their approach and sent it for approval to SHAPE and Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, they received it back stating that CIMIC should continue to be a part of the mission since it is part of the NATO doctrine. But the focus in the future should be on liaison, and all CIMIC projects should be handed over to organizations or municipalities by the end of this year [2010] (0712). The homepage of NATO state: “CIMIC plays an important role across the spectrum of conflict. It contributes towards the establishment of a stable environment within which the mission may be completed more easily“(KFOR webpage 20081029).

5.3.2. CIMIC from the view of deployed NATO soldiers and civilian organizations in Kosovo during the summer of 2010

1) Enhance relations through communication

A vital part of CIMIC is communication. The KFOR commander has an arsenal of CIMIC tools (PsyOps, LMTs, Liaison National Officers - LNOs and CIMIC projects) to create better relationships with the population, to be used at greater or lesser extent during the phases of the peacekeeping mission. “First we have to enforce peace to oblige the warring parties to reach a peace agreement. The non-kinetic measure is only combat-PsyOps e.g. radio transmission and distributing flyers telling them to give up fighting. Please understand we won’t kill you we are not against Serbians we are against what is happening in Kosovo.” “After you reach a peace agreement the mission turns into a peacekeeping mission, you have normal PsyOps with the message believe on us, we are here to ensure peace, to ensure a future, a normal development, freedom of movement, future for your children and of course you have CIMIC.
You use your assets, engineering assets, military assets, to build bridges, reconstructing roads. In the beginning this is done by military personnel” (HQ 0709). PsyOps continues to be useful during the entire mission, as they display that KFOR is still present. The aim of PsyOps is to promote peace and tolerance and affect people’s belief in this direction. At this stage of the conflict, peace sustaining, it usually materializes as billboards for example with a Serbian and Albanian guy smiling at each other (HQ 0717). PsyOps is also a tool to acknowledge the work of the CIMIC project teams (HQ 0709).

After the riots in 2004, Liaison monitoring teams (LMTs) were introduced to avoid another similar incident.¹⁴ They meet with municipalities, village leaders, NGOs and walk around the cities and villages to be available for people to approach them with questions, to “feel the pulse of the population”, to create a common situational picture and interpret tensions quickly before they escalate (HQ 0717). LMT pass on information from KFOR that they want the municipalities and the people to be aware of (0722) and sometimes also of the needs in the villages (HQ 0717). The number of LMTs will increase as KFOR is restructuring, creating a closer connection to the population rather than a strong military presence (0707).

One CIMIC team member was surprised over how little the CIMIC teams work together with NGOs and IOs and there seemed to be little interest from either IOs, NGOs or the military to establish closer relations. This might not only create confusion and problems of coordination but also risk duplication and increased corruption.

2) Support force protection and better view of the force

Within NATO, when referring to CIMIC the commanders and soldiers usually mean the projects and continuously state how important CIMIC is in the beginning (HQ 0709; 0722). According to one of the soldier one part of their mission is to win the populations trust. “When people think we are useful for them, we provide security, we provide freedom of movement for them, we are impartial, always” it will increase their trust in them (HQ 0709).

This is confirmed by the Early Warning Reports conducted by UNDP since 2002, which ascertain that satisfaction with KFOR has from 2002 received a fairly high percentage

¹⁴ Major riots originating from a rumor, which was hard to confirm, that three Albanian boys where chased into the Ibar river and drowned. This happened the same day as demonstrations took place against the UN indictment of KLA leaders. The anger towards the UN was now directed towards the Serbs as well. Violence soon spread across the country and caught KFOR off guard. The riots lasted approximately 3 days before KFOR was able to regain control over the situation (Ker-Lindsay 2009:20-21). There were reports of KFOR soldiers hiding in their camps as they were outnumbered and unable to handle the situation.
According to the peacekeepers CIMIC contributes to peace because “it has shown a humanitarian side of the military too, as the military is usually associated to be robust. CIMIC allow us to tell them that we had to do this intervention today but we are also here to help you” (0712).

As the main purpose of CIMIC is to be a tool for the commander to carry out the mission, to use the information collected to make the right decision, all activities should be related to the mission; safe and secure environment (SASE) and freedom of movement and contribute to NATO image (HQ 0709, 0712). However, while mentioned by the peacekeepers as the first objective it appears that this was not always on their mind when they initiated the projects but rather that the project would help society. Though, safe and secure environment can be interpreted widely: “If we are participating in the renovation of a school, basically they have a school building they can use, the parents they can send children to school and in my opinion that is part of the safe and secure environment” (0722). One of the peacekeepers felt that “we are not always guided and do not receive information about what kind of information he [the commander] need and wants” so “there is a danger or there is a risk that CIMIC becomes kind of a side product for the operations so that it is not considered as operational asset but rather as a humanitarian aid organization” (0722).

Even today, there are clear differences between the battle groups and national contingents, in how they perceive CIMIC. In the west, the Italian battalion is still spending large amounts of money on humanitarian assistance and so is the MSU, which are doing CIMIC all around Kosovo and in this case there is no one to take over the projects when they leave (0712; 0722). The Turkish battalion for example specifically supports a Turkish village in the southern part of Kosovo (0707). While the battalions in the north have suspended all CIMIC projects, the ongoing projects in the east and the center are being transferred to CARITAS, USAID and Mother Theresia, as instructed in the internal instructions to KFOR CIMIC teams (0712). According to the interviewed peacekeepers in KFOR, it is absolutely a problem that they have different strategies and they acknowledge that people on the ground might not see the difference between different battle groups (0712). There is a risk that these unequal approaches result in renewed tensions in society if people see on news on TV or hear on KFOR radio that Albanians in the south receives more than the Serbs in the center.

Differences in the conduct of KFOR were discussed in the media in the beginning of the mission (Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers 2000:29) but the current LMTs have not received any signals about people feeling discriminated or mistreated in any way, other than that
people sometimes refer to ”but we got computers from you before”, which was from another battalion (0707). Despite the acknowledgement of this problem, NATO seems to be unable to do anything about it. The head of HQ J9 Section says that he is no position to intervene in what national governments channel their money to but that “It is beginning to be a political issue” when one country wants to support a certain area. He believes that the money should be coordinated at HQ level. All the contributing countries should say: we have this much money, and then the HQ should distribute so that not one part of the country is helped more than the others (0717).

While some civilian organizations are skeptic to whether these projects do in fact increase the trust in KFOR others even suggest that the image of KFOR is so good that their label on a project actually increases the support from the population on the project and yet another local employee with an international organization said that the projects helped KFOR maintain a close connection to the population (0727; 0702).

3) **Enhance perceptions of better living conditions**

“When we start operations, humanitarian part is very important to help people. In the beginning there are a lot of Quick Impact Projects. For example distribution of food, firewood and drinking water. The local society is not able to build up bridges and therefore military repair roads for them and for the military and also help to build up medical facilities. These are concrete ways to help. The longer time we are here the more we link CIMIC to civilian organizations; ECLO, USAID.” In the bigger perspective this is helping to build peace because “the more money we can in a sensible way use in Kosovo is a benefit for the Kosovars and for the local society and for local business and then we come to the simple facts in life, if people are doing well they have a feeling that they are economically safe they don’t have to worry so much about that, they can concentrate on other things” (0722). The goal is always to “Help them to help themselves. So that’s in a nutshell. We do the work so they understand it. The main way of working towards this goal is that we do it with the municipalities and local administration” (0722). The project can be initiated by CIMIC personnel, LMTs, or by request from the municipality or from the people (0712) and usually takes place in places where the civilian organizations do not work (0709). Projects are discussed with the municipality, which set up the tender and make the contract with the lowest bidder in order to ensure sustainability and local ownership. Some battalions say that they have a lot of faith in the municipality and trust their judgment, while other CIMIC teams
have a more active role in choosing the company who will receive the contract (0712; 0722). One CIMIC soldier said that that their contracts include a timeframe with an end date after which the project will be inspected before the company receive the last 50% of their payment (0722). As mentioned above, there are different approaches in how the different battle groups carry out their CIMIC work. The CIMIC team can consist of medical persons, firemen, engineers, with a military service background or which have personal skills in computers, automotive maintenance, digital camera surveillance system, electrification or social sciences which are needed when assessing projects and tender applications, and during monitoring and set up (HQ 0717: Indufor 2010: 9). This was confirmed by one of the organizations who were positive to engage with the military because there were engineers in their battalions that could monitor the projects (0727). Other civilian organizations share the view of KFOR saying that “if people can see that their lives are improving no matter how small, I would like to think it increases stability” (0802) and “creating a community spirit helps the situation a little bit.” (0702). Infrastructure reconstruction also increases free movement and enhance the economic possibilities which are important for the wellbeing of the local people and stability in Kosovo (0727). “Without employment people would get bored and will get into trouble. The resettlement program of KPC has therefore been worth the money and it’s a much more inexpensive way than to deploy large number of troops here” (0702). In some instances the military is also perceived to be the only actor capable of doing something since they are men of women of action who rather act than discuss a pressing issue that needs to be solved quickly (0702). While others are more skeptical, while it might be good in some cases to carry out these kinds of projects, they may not always be firmly established within society (0706). Funds that normally might have gone to an NGO or humanitarian agency have now been channeled via the battalions (Minear, van Baarda and Sommers 2000: 28) which may risk local dependency if the force is not working with the local institutions or if the local institutions are corrupt and the peacekeeping force is unaccustomed to deal with corruption. Since the beginning of 2010, NATO should no longer conduct CIMIC projects, but should connect those who are in need with those who are capable to do the work to ensure sustainability and local ownership and decrease local dependency on KFOR (0712; 0722; 0717). In most of the MNBGs, with the exception of the west, this seems to be the prevalent approach at the moment and it seems like people starts to understand that they should turn to the local authorities if they encounter any problem (0712).
In regards to follow-up, a study by Minear, van Baarda and Sommers in 2000 state that neither NATO in Brussels, nor the CIMIC units in their AOR could provide aggregate numbers of projects conducted or the amount of funds committed for the specific period of time they were investigating. Another report from 2010, reveal the same results; current CIMIC and LMT soldiers were unable to convey what kind of projects had been carried out in their area (CSSP 2010:11). When asked about the CIMIC projects, the current peacekeepers knew that projects have been carried out, especially in the beginning, but could not say then and there of what kind they were or where they had been carried out. There were no evaluations made or database over all the projects, neither at the headquarters level nor at the MNBG level as far as I was told. In one of the MNBGs, where they still had a CIMIC function in 2010, they had some unsorted and incomplete documents about the projects in their area. These merely consisted of recital recognition of the fact that the projects were conducted –including end date, sometimes with a picture. Though, there seemed to be no system, or database were ALL projects were included. Documentation seemed to depend on the procedure of the various rotations. Follow-up and success was according to the peacekeepers measured by LMT reports and their own visits during their deployment. The follow-up most likely ceased when they rotate home and new troops arrive, so there was a maximum of 6 months to a year follow up (0712; 0722). A mid-term review concerning the official development assistance from the Finish ministry of Foreign Affairs to their battalions shares this finding; follow-up was done in a non-systematic manner without indicators or performance measurements (Indufor 2010: 9). However, handover was not considered a problem. According to the battalions they have shadow training or a 10 days handover period (0712) so that the next group can continue the work of the leaving battalion.

5.4 People’s perceptions on CIMIC

The villages are situated within the area of responsibility of Multinational Battle group Center. At the beginning of the mission in 1999, this area was under British command but in 2010, the battle group consisted of six nationalities; Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia and Ireland. Finland has for the last couple of years been in charge of the CIMIC section, which quite recently was reduced from five to four people. This area was chosen as it still constitutes a mix of Albanian, Serb and mixed villages. The four villages in this study are situated within the municipalities of Pristina, Obilic and Gracanica and vary in their ethnic composition; one is Albanian dominated, one is Serb dominated, and two villages
are mixed. The two mixed villages are called village A and B and consist of 60% Serbs, 35% Albanians and 5% Romas, respective 42% Albanians and 57% Serbs.\textsuperscript{15}

The projects chosen, the renovation of a school, the construction of sewage systems and a bridge, were projects that should benefit the whole village and were also visible in the sense that the villagers should have been able to see that someone was working on this specific project. Even so, humanitarian assistance, such as reconstruction material for houses, clothes, food and firewood, had most likely also been given to individuals in these villages during the years of KFOR presence. A small business enterprise project had also been carried out in one of the villages, where sewing machines were distributed to a sowing association. The CIMIC team in the MNBG C state that of their budget of approximately 400 000€ per year, 50% is today spent on small business enterprise support, 25% on improvement of infrastructure and social development such as school renovation, health care and water pumps, and the remaining 25% is spent on various donations (0722).

Guided by the theoretical framework the following sections will analyze how people in Kosovo believe CIMIC can influence peace and stability. Since there are many factors that can influence how people perceive stability there is a need to start off with controlling for how people perceive the situation in Kosovo. In general Albanians respond that the presence of KFOR is the reason to stability and partly also the declaration of independence. While Serbs in all villages, are more hesitant to whether there really is stability in the country, but those who consider it to be stability state that this is due to the presence of KFOR. There are also a reasonable amount of people in each village who say that it is the people who make stability and that relationships between the different ethnicities recreates the trust they had before the war and thereby enhances their perceptions of stability.

1) **Enhances relations through communication**

To be able to accurately assess the relationships between the peacekeeping force and the people there is a need to know how KFOR is perceived in the villages. As argued by Mersiades, fulfilling social contract is one way for the peacekeeping force to gain the trust of the population. In this case the expectations of the population on KFOR are that they should ensure a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{16} Subsequently there is a

\textsuperscript{15} These numbers are based on estimates as no reliable census is available.

\textsuperscript{16} On the question, what is the task of KFOR, 86% of all 76 respondents answered that they should keep peace and stability or keep peace and stability and help to rebuild society.
need to examine whether people think KFOR has contributed to their safety and how they have contributed to it. In general, people in all the four villages were happy that KFOR was present and stated that they have a positive influence on peace and stability. Several people mention that the presence of KFOR is the only reason to why they still dare to live there or still are alive today. While all Albanians are positive to KFORs influence on peace and stability, Serbs both in the homogenous and in the heterogeneous villages were more negative to KFORs achievements. In the mixed village B 53% of the Serbs declare that KFOR has not been able to ensure stability or that they feel safe. In the other heterogeneous village 30% feel that KFOR have been unable to ensure peace and stability. In the Serbian dominated village, 73% thinks that KFOR has an influence on stability but they also mention that they still are afraid and do not want KFOR to leave. The reasons for their lack of faith in KFOR to ensure stability was because they felt that KFOR turns a blind eye to problems when they pass by in the villages or rarely stops and asks about the situation. Some even said that they rarely visit the village at all: “They are just in their camps” and “They are only here for the money”. Others expressed discontent that KFOR have not done enough to create better relations between Kosovoalbanians (KA) and Kosovoserbs (KS). These statements indicate that they felt that KFOR could have shown greater interest in their society. Furthermore, some respondents were worried that the force was too small, and believed it would be better if it included more countries, while another person said that “it is not a good feeling when you see the uniform and the army”. Many have also had bad experiences from when KFOR (the British soldiers are specifically mentioned) searched their houses using excessive violence right after the war. Most Serbs also mention the violent escalating riots in 2004 as an instance which decreased their trust and in some cases damaged their trust in KFOR forever. One respondent is surprised how NATO, one of the strongest forces in the world could be unaware about the escalating tensions or be unprepared for it when she knew about it 1-2 months in advance.

More or less all of those who were positive to KFORs influence on security mention that they do this by their presence, by visiting and patrolling the villages. KFOR soldiers talk to them about stability and are interested in knowing if they have any problems, and tells them to call them if there is anything at all they want to discuss or tell them. The villagers also mention that KFOR asked them if they needed help with anything. These findings are supported by interviews for another study with ethnical leaders from the three major ethnicities in Obilic municipality, which states that KFOR contribute to security by their clear, visible presence
across the municipality and their willingness to listen to people (CSSP 2010:10). According to the local leaders, KFOR's biggest contribution was their ability to move between societies and “pass on their message” (CSSP 2010:12). In one of the villages (B) the mayor said that KFOR organized a meeting between the leaders of KA and KS. This was also acknowledged in the other heterogeneous village (A) where KFOR had organized multiethnic activities for the children. Finally, others mention that KFOR have influenced security because people have faith and respect for KFOR and because they cooperate with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

One of the problems in building relationships between the peacekeepers and the local society is that peacekeepers rotate home after 6 months, and a new set of soldiers are in place. The relationship that was built up now has to be rebuilt again. But this does not seem to have been a big problem according to the inhabitants in the villages. They state that all the peacekeepers have the same mission and therefore share the same tasks. One respondent even suggested that it was a good thing that they change because new people can come in with new ideas and new energy. Only a few of them mentioned that it might be a problem since they have to get to know the new troops and the old ones knew the situation in their village. There was also one case where KFOR helped a family to rebuild their house, but the troops rotated home before the project was finished and the family had to finish it themselves. This does not seem to have been a problem in this case but it might have been in another family, if they lacked the money to finish the reconstruction of the house. This could also result in a detrimental image of the military force if the family and villagers instead start to resent the force for their inability to keep their promises and finish the projects.

Another issue which might have an effect in a multilateral, enforcement mission is that the relationships between different countries on the national level can influence the trust people have in the force on the ground as they base their level of trust on prejudices. In Kosovo, while the majority responds that all KFOR soldiers have the same mission, a fairly large number of respondents say that it matters what country the soldiers originate from. A number of Albanians responded that they have a higher level of trust in those soldiers originating from countries that supports the independence of Kosovo, than those who have not recognized their independence, for example Russia, Greece and Slovakia. Serbs on the other hand do not trust French, Americans, Norwegian and British and German troops. Because “German KFOR helped too much to Prizren to some churches and Muslim buildings. Germans are here for the Albanians. They made a strategy for independence: Germany and America.” A few also
reveal that they lost their trust in the British troops as they were arrogant, rude and violent in 1999 when they searched their houses for weapons.

The above answers point to some interesting conclusions. Trust on KFOR depends very much on the relationships established between the force and the individual respondent. The support for KFOR therefore depends very much on who you ask. If you ask someone who was visited by KFOR you are more likely to get a positive result about them being there for them and supporting them, while if you encounter a person that have not had a visit from KFOR they say they are just passing by. One respondent said “In 11 years, KFOR have not been to this garden to drink coffee, tea and explain what they are here for. They pass here all the time but they don’t stop and ask to get to know the situation. Therefore I have no trust in them.”

Another responded that they came and ask `what do you need help with?’ but then didn’t help them, implying that lack of continuity or broken promises needs to be explained in order not to damage relationships or the support for the mission. That Serbs are more negative to KFORs achievement is understandable since KFOR forcibly intervened but at the same time the variations in perceptions of safety are noteworthy. Village B, which is most negative, is majority Serb and the village is situated within a Serbian municipality, very close to other Serb villages. These circumstances could suggest that KFOR is still perceived as an occupying force. While the results from the other villages are a lot more positive to KFORs ability to ensure their safety, it could be explained by their proximity to Albanian villages and that they recognize KFORs important role in ensuring their security as they live in enclaves where they might feel outnumbered by the Albanian population.

It seems as it is rather their professionalism and KFORs approach and not them as persons that create these fruitful relationships since the people do not believe it matters that they rotate. But when it comes to the perception of the importance of nationality of the soldiers it seems as if these perceptions are more based on people’s prejudices about certain countries than actual events, with the exception of the British soldiers. Even so this could be something to take into consideration when placing troops within different areas of responsibility. To sum up the above responses, it is clear that communication and investing time in talking and meeting the local population is vital for how the locals perceive the force. Since Serbs state that one of the reasons for their lack of trust in KFOR is because they never visited them, it may imply that relationships would have been better if they had had more communication with KFOR. This could also mean that even though it was an enforcement mission, the peacekeeping force can enhance support for the mission through communication. This quote
will conclude the above discussion: “Even KFOR, even EULEX cant provide safety without talking, making conversation with, all ethnicities, so they should cooperate with all population to get clue of how to get stability of Kosovo. Just talk to people.”

2) Force protection and support for the force

By engaging in CIMIC activities, such as the reconstruction of a house, bridge or a school the peacekeeping force is presented as a force for good. In order to see the effect of this we have to know whether people in the villages know what kind of projects have been carried out in the village and whether they know that KFOR was one of the partners of the project.

Across the villages, a lot of people mention the humanitarian aid peacekeepers provided them after the war and a lot of other projects they have carried out in the village, such as the reconstruction of a road and water provision to a youth center. When questioned about the specific project (school, sewage system, bridge) in the respective village many people could not answer who funded it or whether KFOR was part of the project. If we compare the two heterogeneous villages; in village B, only 23% knew that KFOR was part of the project, while all in all 38% knew they had done something for the village. In village A 30% knew that KFOR was part of the project, while all in all 40% knows about the project but don’t know who financed it. In the Serbian dominated village, 46% could mention something that KFOR had done for the village. In the Albanian dominated village everyone knows about the project carried out in the village, but only 50% knew that KFOR was one of the financers of the project. As KFOR has done a lot of CIMIC activities since the beginning of their deployment the above numbers might be considered reliable if we take into account the political role of KFOR and the fact that the villagers might not always know about everything that goes on in their village. However it is still considered remarkable that so many still say that KFOR have done nothing for their village. One respondent even said that KFOR could “build something or to do something. Im angry at KFOR because they didn’t do anything.” Another was positively surprised when he was told about the project in question and said: “Okey, very good. I didn’t know about this. I feel much better. We need someone to support us”. This quote shows that the locals are very positive to these projects but also that it does not really matter who is supporting them. In those cases where they knew about the project but was unsure about who carried out the project, the majority thought that it was the municipality who had done it. Even though this suggests that CIMIC fails to support the military objective of force protection or good will for the force, it instead creates a positive view about the local
government, which is good in the long-run. This is also a good sign as the risk of local dependency on KFOR has been highlighted in various memos, interviews and previous studies (Mockaitis 2004:12) which showed that people in the past first have turned to the military brigade before they turn to their local institutions if they need any kind of help.

Apart from the fact that the projects do not seem to benefit KFORs view, another troubling feature is if the projects are not distributed equally across the area, as this may instead generate new tensions in society. In this setting it might be difficult to get a straight and correct answer since the villagers may not have accurate information about what is going on in other villages but it is possible to capture their perceptions since KFOR is visible on news reports on TV and radio and of course in their own PsyOps campaigns. Of all the 76 respondents just above the majority believes that KFOR treats everyone equally, while 16% don’t know. While this clearly is a politically sensitive issue it is considered rather plausible that a majority state that they treat everyone equally. The mixed villages may provide more accurate information since they can see KFORs treatment of different ethnicities with their own eyes. In village B, 50% of the Serbs believe they do not treat everyone the same, while only one of six of the Albanians responded that they do not believe they treat everyone the same. In the other heterogeneous village, only 33% of the Serbs believes they treat them differently and only 1 of 6 of the Albanians. The Serbs across the villages responded that they thought that KFOR thought bad of them from the past and therefore treated them differently and that they favored Albanians especially in the beginning but that it is better now. A Serb respondent believed that KFOR was in Kosovo to create an Albanian country and that they only provided Albanians with work. But also the Albanians expected KFOR to treat them better than the Serbs since the Serbs had done horrible things in the past. In the Albanian dominated village a few also responded that KFOR seems to be more polite to Serbs, saying “please do this” and “please don’t do that”. In a study interviewing the leaders from the biggest ethnic groups, there was one respondent who expressed clear frustration that other communities had received more business grants and more computers than his community (CSSP 2010:12). Another report, on the contrary, suggests that minorities were more frequently selected than their proportion of the Kosovo population in selection of small business enterprise grants (Indufor 2010: 8).

Another important aspect is whether the population feels that the force is doing the project for them or if it is only part of their mission to ensure safety for the soldiers. But from the
responses in the villagers, there seems to have been no conditions for the population to fulfill before they were given assistance.

Lastly, in order to create a comprehensive understanding of how KFOR influence the trust of the people, there is a need to find out if there is anything else that can have increased versus decreased the level of trust people have in KFOR. Notable, according to the people KFOR have increased their trust in them, in the same way as how they create stability, e.g. through their presence, by patrolling and talking to people. This is yet evidence to the expectation that KFOR should create peace and stability. This also supports the predictions made by Mersiades (2005), Byman (2001) and Fitz- Gerald (2000) in that ensuring a stable environment may be the most important aspect for winning the support of the population. But some of the respondents also highlights that KFOR have provided them with humanitarian help; provided material for houses, built sewage systems, contributed to the reconstruction of a bridge, brought them presents during bajram, organized multiethnic activities for children and provided water, which has increased their trust in them. The Serbs further mentions that KFOR has helped to save monasteries. But Serbs in the mixed village (B) more frequently (73%) states that KFOR have not done enough or nothing at all to increase their trust in them. On the other hand, when asked about whether KFOR have done anything to decrease their trust in them, the majority of all the people across the villages say no, while many Serbs mention the incidents in 2004 and a few state that they never had trust in KFOR so they therefore could not lose it.

In summary it is possible to conclude that while a significant number of people were unaware of the fact that KFOR was part of these projects most of them seem to be positive to the idea of assistance from KFOR and also suggest that it would help the relationships between the population and KFOR, while most people know that the main mission of KFOR is to provide a safe and secure environment rather than provide humanitarian assistance. This was the response by a Serb in one of the mixed villages “We don’t have water during summer, or telephone, basic things for normal living. If they give us this, we will get more trust in KFOR. They will not have trust if we don’t have this, we can’t rebuild trust in KFOR.”

In the mixed village B, there was a higher percentage of people who did not know that KFOR had done any project for their village, a higher number of people who felt that KFOR had not done anything to increase their trust in them and at the same time there were a higher number of people who did not believe KFOR contributed to stability and safety, compared to the other
villages. This finding suggests that there could be a link between CIMIC projects and support for KFOR as it would show that KFOR is engaged and care about the situation in the country. In the homogenous societies, there seemed to be no difference in the extent to which they believed that KFOR had engaged in society and conducted projects which suggests honest answers, which are not influenced by politics, and that they honestly do not know whether KFOR has conducted these projects. It is therefore apparent from the above study that if KFOR should continue to engage in these kinds of activities and if the purpose of these projects is to win the hearts and minds of the population; the projects and KFORs connection to them needs to be better promoted, if they ought to have the intended effect of support for the force and force protection. Yet again, it seems as if the most important way to ensure trust and support for the force is by ensuring a safe and secure environment.

3) Improved perceptions of living conditions lead to a more secure environment

In order to examine whether improved living conditions leads to a more secure environment we need to examine whether people believe that the project can increase stability in living and whether the project was important for their living situation. To understand the long-term implications of the projects it is also necessary to know if these projects involve the local society in any phase of the project.

The respondents were in general positive to the projects carried out by KFOR. In all of the four villages there was at least one person who responded that it will increase stability because the projects helps to create better relationships between the ethnicities and that the situation will be easier if it is better for both. One said that “they will not be angry and will not have problems with each other” and another responded that “KFOR should do something so citizens see that they do something and then it is more helpful for society to get to know each other.” According to the assessment by Indufor: “various projects have increase ethnic interaction and inclusion of minorities to the municipal decision making process.” (2010:11).

Then again, most people responded that the projects had no real effect on stability in terms of safety but were good for increasing stability in living. But stability in living can also be closely associated with stability in safety as the following quotes bear witness of; “if we live better, stability will increase” and also “If you establish a village, you need functioning system. He is grateful for them. So he don’t have to go to Pristina. So problem will disappear. They won’t be nervous.” and “Water, electricity basic thing for living for us and them. Important things for living. /…/ It also brings stability.” The projects also seem to have
contributed with giving the inhabitants hope of a better future and with opportunities for recreating a new life. “Everything, every project that do good things, it will give us opportunity for good life.” According to some it felt good to know that there was someone who supported them. While people in general where positive to the projects, there were some respondents who did not believe it would have any affect. In village A, both Albanians and Serbs said that they did not have any problems so the project would be ineffective. Others explained that “We need political help, not material. The financial help they give is nothing”, and “Make schools don’t bring safety” and “Doing one thing I think is not sustainable.” Others appealed for jobs and said that employment is what will increase stability. “You cant live from humanitarian aid and not from criminal work. Open new jobs, give opportunity to people. Future of all people is work to have money, to make family. Unemployment leads to criminality. I got a loan from the bank for the store, so I don’t have to do bad things. KFOR should do these things”. Another troubling feature that was mentioned by more than one respondent, was that the projects are carried out during nighttime and that they were not informed about who is working in their village; “too many international organizations and they don’t inform us about what they are doing”. This might instead create a sense of insecurity and thereby have the opposite effect of what is intended. Another respondent was worried about the outspread corruption in the municipality, “KFOR just go to municipality or parallel structure and give donation to municipality and get signature but don’t make sure it reaches the one in need.”

A factor that has been highlighted in previous studies, that might jeopardize the long-term sustainability and local ownership of the project, is that peacekeepers have been criticized for their lack of knowledge of development projects and thereof their lack of capacity to identify what is the most important project to engage in. To uncover this criticism we need to know if people in the villages thought the project was important or if they thought that something else was an even more necessary project. In the Albanian dominated village most people say that this was the main problem in the area, and thereby this was the most important project. However, this was the only village where the inhabitants outright say that they requested the project. In the other villages most people say that the project was important but also that there were other things that they needed, such as running water, etc. In one village one respondent said “they just came and asked “where can we put the sewage system?””. Interesting to note is that there are still a few people that say that stability would be more important than this
project, eleven years after KFOR intervened and when they are restructuring, which is evidence to the fact that KFOR should focus on security first.

The inhabitants were in general not directly involved in the construction of the projects even though most of them were asked about their opinion about the project in meetings held by either KFOR or the municipality. But not everyone agrees, one respondent said that it didn’t matter if they were consulted, KFOR did what they had planned. Two respondents said that the constructors just came with the project without consulting them or letting them know about it in advance. Private companies, who won the tender in all four villages, carried out the projects. In the Albanian dominated village two people state that they have been hired and paid to help them build the project, in village A three Albanian people say the same and one person in village B. On the other hand, a lot of people state that they helped out with the project, in any way they could, e.g. by translating or guarding material.

The sewage systems are up and running but functions poorly. Since not everyone has connection to it, they try to connect to it anyway and overload the system. The school is renovated and is used for education. The last project, the bridge was not finished at the end of the summer 2010 and the villagers were starting to get worried that it would not be finished before the winter which thereby could destroy not just the new bridge but also the main road.

The above answers show that the inhabitants believe that these kinds of projects can enhance perceptions of better living conditions but may have no direct influence on stability, while some answers suggests that if the situation increases for all ethnicities the road back to normality may be smoother. The results suggest that people believe that stability will increase with greater economic prospects and security but if the projects are to achieve this they need to be more encompassing and also increase employment. However, the villagers do not seem to feel involved in the projects which may hamper the sustainability of the project since there is no real local ownership. A serious issue highlighted by a few respondents was that they were not informed about what was going on in their village which instead can increase perceptions of insecurity in their living situation. The level of importance of these specific projects can also be questionable, but they do seem to have contributed to a need in society.

**5.5 Discussion**

When comparing, how CIMIC is described in doctrine, to how it is carried out and finally how it is perceived by the local population, it is possible to discern major discrepancies. The
narrow stance taken in the NATO doctrine is not followed in practice. The more expanded approach seems to have been taken due to necessity in the beginning but also due to lack of guidance from commanders. The stated CIMIC goal of contributing to the mission seems to be able to include everything, which also has lead to divergent approaches within the battle groups. While no serious implications of this so far in the case of Kosovo can be observed, more research needs to be done in this area, that compare the views from villages situated on the border, or within other battle groups AOR. On the other hand, to some extent it matters what countries the soldiers originate from. In previous studies the British soldiers have been presented as conducting their work in “an easy going, non-confrontational style that defused tension” (Mockaitis 2004:26). However, the Kosovo people have a different view. The violent British manner renounced the trust of the population. In other cases, high-level politics influenced the support in the force on the ground, i.e. those countries that recognized the independence of Kosovo had the support of the Albanians and those countries that didn’t, had the support of the Serbs. Does this then mean that political enforcement missions will forever be resented by one part of the population or can CIMIC change and improve these relationships? The level of trust in KFOR was according to the respondents in this study dependent on their ability to ensure a safe and secure environment, which is created by patrolling and communicating with the local people. Good communications between the peacekeeping force and the local population could thereby avert tensions. Even in the Serb areas, which were more negative to KFOR in general, Serbs complained that KFOR had never visited them, implying that they would have liked them to come. This would mean that even though it was an enforcement mission, the peacekeeping force can enhance support for the mission through communication and by showing an interest in the people and their living situation. This shift from a traditional understanding of a peacekeeping mission, whereby the soldiers should have no connection to the country they are deployed to and merely separate the warring parties, to a view which promotes a closer connection and greater involvement with the local society is a noteworthy observation, which seems to be increasingly promoted in both theory and practice by both internationals and local actors. This would imply that the peacekeepers should receive greater knowledge of the social situation in the host country before they are deployed. More updated documents concerning projects and activities would facilitate smoother handover and ensure continuity. This would also entail that they can distribute activities more equally and also respond to villagers and municipalities if they complain that KFOR is not doing anything.
On the other hand, this positive finding of peoples support for the force in Kosovo may be dependent on the fact that there has been negative peace more or less since 1999. The reasons to stability may also be as some respondents suggested that it is the people who have decided to stop fighting rather than KFOR influencing stability. Creating support for the force through communication may also only be possible in situations which are relative stable. While some support for the force would be won through communication it might not be enough for the people to side with the peacekeeping force unless they also ensure some kind of stability in the country. The question is whether we would have received the same results in a conflict situation? This issue would be interesting to pursue in a future study.

The effectiveness of CIMIC projects can only be evaluated in relation to what is to be considered to be the main aim of these activities. If the aims of CIMIC projects are to contribute to the military mission of a sustainable peace through a better living situation then the current conduct with close cooperation with municipality seems appropriate, as it would ensure continuity and local ownership. But if the purpose of CIMIC projects are to contribute to force protection and “good will” for the military force, then there needs to be more promotion of KFORs role in the projects, and projects such as rebuilding a road or cleaning a lake may be more relevant since this reconstruction period makes KFOR frequently present in the field and thereby enhances their visibility for the population. Even if they just fund the project together with the municipality they may need to consider who is doing the project and how it is done in order not get bad publicity in case something goes wrong. The reputation of UNMIK among the population is a proof of this, as “UNMIK only taught the public servants how to take as much money from the public treasury as possible”.

Nonetheless, from the view of the people, KFORs ability to create stability seems to be the most important part and it seems like the first mechanism of communication is more important than the projects in winning the support of the population and creating stability in the country. However, people suggest that stability will increase with employment and economic development but that the reconstruction projects by KFOR are too small-scale. As bigger projects are more likely an issue for the development agencies it proves again the importance of civil-military cooperation in order to effectively manage a comprehensive approach in keeping a sustainable peace after conflict.
6. Summary and Conclusion

How can CIMIC contribute to peace?

In the last decades, civil-military cooperation has been on the lips of policy advisers, military and humanitarian workers from conflicts such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, but the research conducted on this concept generally only concerns the international actors. If we are unaware of how the activities of the peacekeeping force are received at the local level, by the people it is impossible to determine whether they really are successful. My study on the perceptions of the local people on how CIMIC can contribute to peace, has contributed with greater knowledge in the effectiveness of using CIMIC as a tool in conducting peace operations. It seems like personal connections with the force and the force ability to ensure a safe and secure environment are more important than reconstruction projects when it comes to winning the hearts and minds of the population, regardless of ethnicity. Since Serbs state that one of the reasons for their lack of trust in KFOR is because they never visit them, it may imply that relationships would have been better if they had been able to engage more with KFOR. This could also mean that even though it was an enforcement mission, the peacekeeping force can enhance support for the mission through communication and by showing an interest in the host population and their living situation. It could therefore be suggested that peacekeepers deployed within the CIMIC section should have a deeper knowledge of the social situation in the country they are going to in order to understand what implications certain activities may have in society and also to be able to accurately approach the locals and avoid misunderstandings.

In one of the mixed villages (B), there were a higher percentage of people who did not know that KFOR had done anything for their village and at the same time there were a higher number of people who did not believe KFOR contributed with safety. While this is a very interesting finding which may suggest a link between CIMIC projects and people’s positive perceptions of KFOR, more research needs to be done to draw accurate conclusions. While certain general conclusions can be made from this study, it is also important to highlight certain limitations. The ultimate research design would have included one unit of analysis where KFOR had not engaged in any way with the people compared to a unit of analysis where KFOR have been present. Alternatively, that the perceptions of the people are compared across time. This requires that there are databases where projects and activities of the peacekeeping force are documented. With updated information it is also possible to draw more certain conclusion as it would be possible to know how much effort has been put into
each of the villages. Further research into other geographical areas around the world would also enhance our knowledge of the effectiveness of CIMIC.

However, this shift from a traditional understanding of a peacekeeping mission, whereby the soldiers should have no connection to the country they are going to and merely separate the warring parties to a view which promotes a closer connection and greater involvement with the local society is a noteworthy development. Civil-military cooperation is an important aspect of peacekeeping operation and one that seems to become more important in line with the more complex conflicts in the world. It is therefore imperative that more research is conducted within this field.
7. Reference list:


Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo/Hong Kong: United Nations University Press


Judah, Tim (2002). Kosovo: war and revenge. 2nd ed. with new material. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Nota Bene

Ker-Lindsay, James, 2009. ‘Kosovo: The path to contested statehood in the Balkans’. London: Tauris


Mockaitis, Thomas R, 2004. `Civil-military cooperation in peace operations: The case of Kosovo´, Strategic Studies Institute, United State Army War College


Wood, Elisabeth J, 2006. ‘The ethical challenges of field research in conflict zones’, *Qualitative Sociology* 29: 373-386


**Internetpages:**

NATO, CIMIC

[http://www.nato.int/kfor/cimic/cimic_org/index.html](http://www.nato.int/kfor/cimic/cimic_org/index.html), updated 2008-10-29

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC): International Military Staff,

NATO, CIMIC Projects, MSU, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/cimic/projects/msu_081107.pdf](http://www.nato.int/kfor/cimic/projects/msu_081107.pdf), 2008-11-11,


Guiding Documents:

Military Technical Agreement (MTA), 19990802,
[http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm](http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm),

NATO, AJP-9: NATO civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine, june 2003

White paper, Internal Instructions, HQ Kosovo Force, 20091023
Reports:

Asplund, Maria, Beausang, Peter, Hartoft, Percy and Wahlberg, Maria, 2003, `Civil-militär samverkan vid internationella insatser: från koncep till praktiskt genomförande´, FOI-R-0727-SE, FOI, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,

Broberg Wulff, Maria and Ströberg, Karin, 2001. `Utvärdering av svenska bataljonens humanitära insatser i Kosovo´, FOI-R-0171-SE, FOI, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut,

CSSP Project for integrative mediation, 2010, "The role of KFOR in Kosovo and its contribution to peacebuilding”,


Indufor, Midterm review of civil-military cooperation projects in Kosovo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20100209.


Annex 1. Questions to the population

1) Have KFOR always been able to ensure peace and stability, i.e. that you feel safe?
   A) Yes          B) No : Why not?

2) How do KFOR influence security?

3) What do you consider to be the task of KFOR?/What should they do?
   A) Only keep peace and stability
   B) Keep peace and stability and help to rebuild society
   C ) Provide humanitarian assistance
   D) Other
   E) KFOR should have left after 1999/2000

4) Have KFOR done anything that increased your trust in them?

5) Have KFOR done anything that decreased your trust in them?

6) What is the reason to stability in Kosovo?
   A) Presence of KFOR
   B) Independence
   C) KFOR projects
   D) Ethnical homogeneity
   E) Peacebuilding activities of the NGOs, International organisations
   F) EULEX mission
   G) UNMIK
   H) Other

7) Who do you turn to if you have a problem?
   A) KPS
   B) KSF
   C) Municipality
   D) KFOR
   E) EULEX
   F) UN
   G) Other

8) What has KFOR done for your village?

9) Have this project increased stability?
   A) Yes : How?          B) No          C) No effect on stability

10) Was the project important?
    A) Yes          B) No          C) Yes, but something else was even more important
    D) It destroyed more than it served.

11) Was your village or people from the village involved in any phase of the project?
    A) Yes          B) No

12) Were you consulted?

13) Was it people from the village who carried out the project?

14) Is the school, well, house, i.e. project still in use?
    A) Yes          B) No

15) Have KFOR set up conditions for you to accomplish before you are given the assistance?
If yes what kind of conditions:

16) Are KFOR treating everyone equal?
   A) Yes    B) No they favor the Albanian areas C) No they favor the Serbian areas D) Other

17) Does it matter which country is involved in KFOR?

18) Is there a problem that the soldiers change every six months?
   A) Yes    B) No

19) What could the international community do to keep and build the peace in Kosovo?

20) Do you think KFOR should do activities that build trust in society?