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Religion, Emotions and Conflict Escalation

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Introduction

The contemporary interest in studying *religion* in International Relations (IR) is particularly important, because it can offer insight into the exact characteristics that led to its exclusion from IR in the first place. These characteristics are its appeal to what most people instinctively would describe as the “irrational”, more specifically to emotions, and their ability to infuse a high degree of passion and devotion into a political cause. This chapter deals with the relationship between religion, emotions and conflict-escalation. I show that *collective emotions* are interlinked with cognitive processes and representational practices in which religious ethics, or conceptions of right and wrong, good and evil, play a role. Collective emotions - sometimes also referred to as higher order, cognitive or moral emotions - are of particular value for understanding justificatory practices embraced by violent religious movements and the dynamics of conflict-escalation.

Dealing with religious affection and the concept of emotion appears to be a methodological challenge for a field like IR, where concepts such as interest and rational choice have been central to explaining the dynamics of international relations. As Hutchison and Bleiker (2014, 507) put it, emotions have been taken for granted and “seen as a phenomena that rational policy makers deal with or react against”, which points to the difficulties for the field of IR to access emotions.¹ Perhaps one of the explanations for this void is the foundational assumption that emotions refer to abstract inner states, and that they are isolated from more relevant behaviors that have a “rational” explanation. Even the allegedly “softer” side of IR, which addresses the construction and impact of ideas and culture, has not dealt explicitly with the emotive dimensions of politics and violence.

This chapter challenges the assumption that emotions belong unambiguously to an irrational category, in line with some of the recent contributions on collective emotions and IR.² In this context, I argue specifically for the significance of considering collective emotions in the analysis of religion and conflict-escalation/de-escalation. The point I seek to make by linking religion, emotions and conflict escalation is threefold.

First, I argue that religion is particularly interesting for IR, not only because of its instrumental relevance, or even because of its significance for identity and culture. Based on empirical research on

militant religious movements, I assert that aside from fear, moral emotions - strongly held convictions about right and wrong – can guide behavior and have an enormous mobilizing capability.

Second, I illuminate why a focus on what sociological studies have labelled collective emotions (which overlap the ideas of moral, higher order, and cognitive emotions only stressing the social aspect) is relevant for conflict-studies in general. This part of the chapter also highlights the link between ethics, which is the thematic focus of this volume, and collective emotions. The argument is that the type of emotions that are often cultivated in conflicts has an ethical frame of reference that requires a higher degree of cognitive processing than other types.

This leads me to the third part of my argument, where I outline how a focus on collective emotions can add to the theory of securitization, and thereby to our understanding of how conflicts escalate or de-escalate. I show that a focus on collective emotions can both add breadth to the theory's conception of the securitizing actor, as well as depth to its conception of the audience. Taken together, such a focus can illuminate the premises on which a successful securitization can take place. This part will also elaborate on why the study of representation can remain the methodological entry point to study the “emotional climate” of successful securitization.

The X-factor of religion

In spite of the fact that emotions are under-theorized in IR, they still have an implicit role in some of the core ideas and theories of the field. Most notably, fear – one of the emotions that psychologists would describe as basic and instinctive - is a human emotion that is part of the foundation of conflict escalation theories, such as the dynamics driving a security dilemma.³ Anger, indignation, revenge and resentment of certain actions or values in the literature on conflict are also drawn into the equation, though more sporadically, in order to explain patterns of conflict behavior (Hutchinson and Bleiker 2014).

The classical realism of Hans Morgenthau acknowledged the importance of emotions in international politics and shows that emotions have not been completely marginalized in IR thinking (Ross 2013).⁴ Going further back, the political philosophies of Hobbes and Machiavelli, which inspired much of the development in modern IR each emphasized fear and passion as important drivers of the political. Even Aristotle was preoccupied with the persuasive influence of a powerful orator's identification of danger as well as representations of both the subjects and objects of threat. In many of these conceptions the power of emotions becomes an almost invisible hand that can incite the masses and

justify policies and political acts, without becoming the center of analytical attention. Hence, on one hand, emotions have gained relatively little notice in modern elaborations of IR theory due to their being viewed as abstract inner states that are not easily observable, while on the other hand, many of the analyses that underpin IR are based on the idea that human beings are driven by emotions such as the lust for power, the fear of losing territory, identity, and status, or the drive for revenge.

My task here is to link these instinctive ideas about the power of emotions to debates about the relevance of studying religion and ethics in IR, and to propose a framework in which we can analyze the dynamics of religion, emotions and conflict. Religion brings into the picture not only “negative feelings” (anger, resentment, fear etc.), but positive ones as well, such as commitment, passion or affection for particular values or visions of society. One of the paradoxes and characterizing features of religious violence is precisely that there is a strong linkage between positive feelings of commitment and affection to religion and the negative feelings of resentment and anger that can result in violence.⁵

In the growing body of literature on religion and IR it has been argued that one of the main reasons religion was exiled from the social sciences was its conceptualization as something irrational and non-verifiable; as belief and superstition in contrast to science. Like the case of religion, Craig Calhoun has described how emotions fall on the “wrong” side in a number of dichotomies in western thought, such as body/mind, nature/culture, male/female, public/private (Calhoun 2001).⁶ IR, shaped by a dominant enlightenment discourse, placed both religion and emotions on that side of these boundaries, which was regarded as non-scientific and non-rational for decades (Sheikh 2012).⁷ These dichotomies, the secular ethos of the field, and the disregard of religion were however strongly questioned after 2001 by scholars of IR, motivated by the fact that religion was suddenly making headlines in news about international politics and terrorism (Philpott 2002).⁸ The debate within the field quickly moved from being focused on whether religion matters at all (as more than a strategic instrument or a rhetorical gloss over something “more real”), to becoming a debate about exactly how religion matters for the field, and the methodological repercussions of including religion *as religion*. The last type of literature on how religion matters has made a convincing case for considering cognitive, cultural, and interpretational aspects of religious thinking and doctrines as motivational forces.⁹

The work of Mark Juergensmeyer, in particular, shows how religious imagery and visions of the just society are part of the political aspirations of violent religious groups.¹⁰ Transgressing the boundaries

of religious traditions and sub-traditions, some shared patterns in the justification of violent religious movements include the vision of doing good, creating just societies, fighting a just war, and being wronged by an aggressor. These patterns also apply to the Pakistani Taliban, which I have studied for the past decade. Two observations in particular stand out, with relevance for the topic of religious ethics.

First, like much of the literature on comparative religious violence shows, the Taliban frame their violence in terms of both a defensive battle and a more offensive one, which is about pursuing their vision of the just society in which only the Almighty is given the mandate to define laws. While the fear that religion or Islam will be eradicated is a dominant part of their narrative, so is their affection for religion and particular religious doctrines. The Pakistani Taliban frame themselves as do-gooders who are motivated by their vision of the just society, with a well-functioning justice-infrastructure. They also see themselves as, resisting the assault on Islam by the West and its allies, which in this case is the Pakistani government and army. They frame their violence as justified, with many similarities to the western just war discourse in their discussion of issues of proportionality, necessity, intentionality, sufficiency, legitimacy and efficiency (Sheikh 2016).¹¹ The core proposition of the corpus of just war discourse is the idea that, under the proper conditions, states have moral justification for resorting to armed force. The idea of the “higher purpose” that justifies violence is in the Taliban’s case related to their religious imagery.

The second observation that stands out is the Taliban’s reference to a mythic past and apocalyptic future, and the ability of their religious imagery to reinforce the strength of their commitment and motivation. The widespread use of religious imagery and myth adds a transcendental layer to the explanation of jihad and thus also ascribes to it a special spiritual significance. Among the themes I have identified in the constitution of the Taliban jihad is the willingness to sacrifice oneself for religion, which is framed as a specifically pious trait that enhances one’s religious standing in the eyes of God (Sheikh, 2016). The willingness to sacrifice oneself for religion, with the particular meaning that legitimizes undertaking a suicide mission, is framed as a sign of devotedness to God. While it is relatively easy to describe the content of the imagery that they draw upon in justifying violence and their apocalyptic vision through an analysis of their narratives and communication materials, the religious experience that is “felt” or reflected in the imagery, and the effects of the jihadi anthems on the actual mobilization of violence is more difficult to explore using these strategies. It is important to recognize that the emotional mobilization is intimately tied up with the belief and imagery that are cultivated through anthems and legendary myths, which in turn are shared

at social gatherings. This religious passion is difficult to capture if one only looks at narratives and framings without considering how they are linked to emotions. This challenge is described by Goodwin et. al, who argue that, that science tends to be the dominant language of legitimation, which makes us overlook the significance of feelings. As they write, regardless of whether a movement defines itself as secular or religious, “science not feeling is the dominant language of legitimation and persuasion....measurable costs and benefits, atmospheric data...work well” (Goodwin et al 2001, 15).¹²

The challenge is that the justificatory narratives and framings that are linked to a particular moral code and ethics (e.g. a particular ethics of just war) are typically approached as purely cognitive phenomena without consideration of the emotional dimensions of mobilization. This tendency has also been dominant in the field of cultural sociology where the attempts to approach the individual through frames, narratives, and discourses have generally been silent about emotions (Goodwin et al 2001, 6). The reason why this void requires attention is that frames, narratives and discourses that avoid including emotions can end up gaining too much explanatory power. In addition, the absence of attention to emotions reinforces the tendency to focus on leaders and their way of framing events or manipulating the masses, leaving out the all-important issue of the social dynamics of the masses and their receptiveness to particular framings.

The emotional or affective dimension that accompanies the framings and discourses of the religious movements is what I call the “x-factor of religion,” the special thing which makes religion a sui generis phenomenon. Today, some aspects of religion are studied in IR under the rubric of culture, identity, ethics, or organization, without including ‘religious’ as a qualifying adjective (Sheikh 2012). As I have argued elsewhere, while the field of IR is surely concerned with the functionalist interest in the effects (on peace, war, and order for instance) produced by religious commitments, their ability to affect behavior, legitimacy, and conflict dynamics simultaneously require a better sense of the sui generis aspects of religion, particularly the affective. This requires taking into consideration how different religious traditions interpret, legitimize or condemn acts such as terrorism within the same faith community. Analyzing these interpretations and traditions can point to particular ethical considerations about the common good, including what constitutes a just war, which are concerns at the heart of IR theory. As Lynch (2009) has pointed out, one of the characteristics (or definitions) of religious actors is that they act out of ethical considerations about the common good. This focus on the ethics inherent in different interpretations of religious tradition, however, also requires a similar insight into the collective emotions that lead to actual action on behalf of the ethical stances.

Studying cases of religion and religious violence can add important insights to the study of emotions and conflict. Such cases highlight the fact that it is not only negative emotions such as hatred, fear or humiliation that can lead to conflict, but that “positive” ones such as religious commitment, affection or love for particular values and figures of authority can reinforce commitments that lead to violence as well. This resembles what Michael Young (2001) describes as “affective” emotions in his analysis of evangelical Protestants and their view on slavery: the change from embracing slavery as part of a Christian vision to framing it as a sin was possible because it resonated with a broader pattern for affective commitments unique to evangelicals born after the American Revolution.¹³ It is worth noting that affective emotions that could also fall under the category of being moral emotions, because they are related to other human beings or visions of society, do not necessarily have what we consider to be a “morally acceptable” outcome. The wish to see the enemy suffer can be based on a moral emotion, for example, but would not result in a “moral” act.

Collective emotions and conflict

Having argued that the emotional dimension of religion is one of the essential elements of the x-factor that makes religion particularly interesting to study in its own right, I elaborate here on the questions of why and how emotions can be brought into IR.

The authors of *Passionate Politics* (Goodwin et al 2001) have shown how emotions are central for social movement theorists who study politics and conflict. This compilation of essays demonstrates that emotions are intimately involved in the processes by which people come to join social movements. This literature emphasizes how the culture of protest movements in particular cultivates affective feelings through rituals, songs, heroes, denunciation of enemies and folktales.

This recent focus on emotions in sociology, which is also relevant for IR, treats emotions as a crowd-based phenomenon, in contrast to Freudian approaches that deal with emotions as something that is interior to the human psyche. A basis assumption is that a member of a society, group or movement shares collective emotions, not necessarily because of some direct personal experience that is shared with others who have experienced exactly the same thing, but also because of identification with the society, group or movement as a collective (Bar-Tal et. al 2007, 455). Hence, by dealing with emotions as a social rather than individual phenomenon one acknowledges that all collective identities have an emotional element, which upholds the identification. In line with this notion, Randall Collins describes how pride is a central emotion of strong social bonds (Collins 2001).¹⁴ The process of developing a collective emotional orientation can reflect shared norms or common experiences (Bar-

tal et. al 2007, 442). Aside from being an aspect of collective identity, another reason why a focus on collective emotions is relevant for conflict studies is that the dynamics of the group can amplify or even transform the initial feeling into something stronger. Collective attention to a particular issue can, for example, strengthen feelings of outrage (Goodwin et al 2001).

One part of the social science literature on collective emotions is focused on the transformation from individual to collective emotions, as if the development of emotions always moves in that direction (e.g. Hutchington and Bleiker 2014, who theorize the processes through which individual emotions become both collective and political). Another part of the literature looks at how social interaction and expectations can shape emotions, also in predictable ways, which challenges the idea that emotions are always instinctive, irrational and undisciplined (Goodwin et al 2001, 16). For the field of IR, it makes sense to adopt the social perspective on emotions where interaction and not methodological individualism is the starting point. This does not mean that emotions cannot be individual or internal, but rather that the social or moral emotions, those that are responsive to the situation of other human beings, are relevant for the study of the political. One of the assumptions behind studying emotions as a collective/social phenomenon is that affect constitutes social networks and social networks constitute affect. The inside-outside dichotomy between the internal and the social is dissolved.

At the same time, the focus on collective emotions also challenges the idea that there is a radical difference between emotions and cognition or emotions and rationality.¹⁵ Instead, some emotions require more cognitive processing than others, since they strongly depend on our understanding of the events around us (Goodwin et al 2001, 13). In contrast to instinctive emotions, the more processed emotions are less immediate, and this points to a link between framing or discourse analysis and emotions. As Calhoun (2001, 50) argues, it is important to bring the relationship between cognition, emotion and perception to the forefront because emotional response, and not cognitive agreement alone, results in action (Goodwin et al 2001, 6).

The kind of emotions that are particularly relevant for conflict studies and IR are moral emotions like indignation or pride. As Goodwin et. al. puts it, “Moral outrage over feared practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities or the pride of refurbished ones, the indignation of perceived encroachment on traditional rights, the joy of imagining a new and better society and participating in a movement toward that end – none of these are automatic responses. They are related to moral

institutions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects...” Goodwin et al 2001, 13).

Here ethics enters the picture, because moral emotions depend on possessing certain kind of beliefs. The adherents of a movement like the Pakistani Taliban have clear directions to do what they find mandatory for Muslims – to fight what is unjust and defend religion whenever it is attacked. At the same time they are driven by a particular vision of the just society where, as I was told, “A woman could walk all the way to Herat [a city in western Afghanistan], and nobody would even dare to look. You could have a briefcase full of dollars, and no one would try to rob you” (Sheikh 2016).

The communication and recruitment materials of the Taliban movement also include information about “the expected effects” of their violent activism: namely, the transformation of injustices into a just society with no crime or hierarchy among human beings. The study of the framings and discourses of violent religious actors are hence not irrelevant to the study of collective emotions. However, frames and discourses should be deployed to explain why and how the emotions of indignation or outrage, or the passion of religious belief, can be so strong.

Connecting emotions to securitization

The idea of securitization was both a contribution to the conceptual debate on how to understand security among a range of options, but it also developed into a theory about why the survival of some objects gain prominence and calls for extraordinary measures more than others (Wæver 1995; Buzan et. al 1998).¹⁶ It can also be applied to conflict theory, since it deals with the escalatory dynamics of speech acts. This section looks at the intersection between collective feelings and the process of securitization and conflict-escalation. Religious violence can reflect successful securitization, understood as the process by which a powerful actor (the securitizing actor) manages to convince an audience that some dimension of religion is existentially threatened, and extraordinary means are therefore necessary in order to avert the danger (Laustsen & Wæver 2000; Sheikh 2014).¹⁷

Securitization theory is relevant in this context because of its insight that the securitization of particular dimensions of religion (its doctrines, material manifestations or legal dimensions) mobilizes conflict behavior. I have argued elsewhere (Sheikh 2014) that this general dynamic, which is applicable in a variety of contexts, requires sensitivity to the multiple ways that religious communities can be conceptualized, in order to avoid ethno-centric concepts of the “religious” (and the “political”). Ethno-centrism should be avoided because it can lead to problematic conclusions

about how to de-escalate conflicts with religious dimensions.¹⁸ Similarly, when approaching emotions, it is important to acknowledge that culture, ethics and norms have an impact on emotional expressions (Bar-Tal et. al 2007, 444).¹⁹

Securitization theory (ST) has described three elements necessary for securitization: the successful framing of an issue as a security challenge that demands extraordinary measures, a securitizing actor and object that is claimed to be threatened, and an audience that accepts the claim of the securitizing actor. Again, however, these three elements do not sufficiently explain what mobilizes audience actions or makes an act of securitization successful.

I suggest that the emotional climate is also critical to analyze. Emotional climate is a term that can be mounted to securitization analysis as a way of conceptualizing the audience, as it “refers to the predominant collective emotions generated through the social interaction of a group’s members in a particular milieu” (Rivera and Páez 2007, 235).²⁰ The social sharing of emotional experiences constructs convergence and similarity and reinforces the emotions, as do collective rituals.

Though the founders of securitization theory have chosen to blackbox actors’ psyches due to the theory’s particular interest in speech acts and their effects, I argue that collective emotions are a major part of the explanation of why a securitization process is successful. This is not a radical challenge to the theory but an elaboration of why securitization can take place. Looking into the dynamics of collective emotions could illuminate what characteristics and abilities the securitizing actor has, and what the requirements for securitization and escalation for the recipients of the discourse of threat might be.

Successful securitization requires that the securitizing actor is able to convince the audience being addressed that the emergency situation requires extraordinary measures and that ‘normal’ behavior is insufficient to face the threat. For states that are democracies, the audience is the state’s population, but for militant movements opposed to the state, the audience comprises co-ideologists and potential recruits. Successful securitization in the latter case – measured by for example, the mobilization capability of a militant religious movement – reflects the resonance of the framing narrative among the target audience. Consequently, it also reveals something about how deeply rooted is the audience’s attachment to the referent object the actor is claiming to defend.

ST has previously been criticized for being too silent about the cultural context in which the audience is situated, instead attributing too much power to the speech-act of security. According to Balzacq

(2005)²¹, ST usually describes security both as a self-referential process and as an inter-subjective process. He argues that effective securitization remains audience dependent and that successful securitization only occurs when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common, structured perception or interpretation of an ominous phenomena/the threatening nature of the referent object (Balzacq 2005, 177, 181). This implies that the analysts must take into consideration the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and the power that both the speaker and listener bring to the interaction (Balzacq 2005, 172), in addition to the discourse of the securitizing actor. The ability of securitizing actors to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests or to capture the *Zeitgeist* based on collective memory, social views, trends and ideological and political attitudes is thus important because these elements constitute the cultural context in which the audience is situated (Balzacq 2005, 186). Hence contextual and non-linguistic factors need to be incorporated, that is, the social field in which the rhetorical game takes place.

In their analysis, Cox and Wood point to the importance of group leadership in the processes through which emotions are collectivized.²² By having the ability to frame the danger and the appropriate response, Cox and Wood describe the characteristics of a group leader/securitizing actor (Cox & Wood 2016, 119). However, they add that the group leader also displays an emotion, which can have an effect on observers when they identify with the actor and share the same cultural dispositions (Cox & Wood, 119). This means that an act of securitization can only be successful if the actor manages to frame the danger and response in a way that is in concordance with the emotional climate in which the audience is situated.

Snow and Benford (1992) focus on the process of mobilization to protest movements, which is also relevant to the study of religious violence. They assert that during recruitment, an organization and potential recruits align their frames, thereby achieving a common definition of a social problem and a common prescription for solving it (Snow and Benford 1992).²³ Again, similar to securitization theory, they describe how a diagnosis of the situation that needs to be acted on, a prognosis about the appropriate strategy, and the expected output of the action (e.g. the transformation of society, aversion of danger etc.) are prerequisites for mobilization. But they also add a motivational component, which draws the crowd into the activities that are proposed by the recruiters or securitizing actors. The last element demands a closer inspection into how cognitive meanings, classifications and frames are linked to feelings.

Securitization is a good entry point to study the relationship between collective emotions and conflict-escalation because it is focused on representation. In light of the above, representational practices do not only create emotional climates but they are also reflective of emotional climates. Representation is also the process through which emotions become political (Hutchington and Bleiker 2014, 506).

Concluding remarks: The study of ethics is also a study of emotions

The debate about whether ethics is primarily a matter of reason or emotion is an ancient philosophical one. Increasingly, scholars from various disciplines have embraced the idea that emotions play a role in ethical decision-making, hence also in motivating action. Studies of religious violence show that ethical judgments can often be highly emotional acts, reflected in the fact that militants sometimes express their strong approval or disapproval of various ideas or visions of society through violent means.

This article has called for integrating a focus on collective emotions on one side, and studies of discourses, framings and representational practices on the other. For instance, fear involves the belief that bad things will occur and that one is not fully in control of warding them off – unless action is taken. Fear is thus both a feeling but also a speech-act that can be studied through a focus on how the fear is represented.

An important implication of conceptualizing emotions as part of the rational/cognitive realm is the idea that changes in the relevant beliefs entail changes in emotion: one who learns that danger is not an “objective” fact will for example cease to fear. This opens the door to thinking about de-escalation through changing cognitive patterns or representational practices. Anthropologists have stressed the role played by social norms in shaping the emotion-categories of different societies. These accounts raise questions about the extent to which an emotional repertoire is malleable; if we see that emotions transform with the learning of social norms and ethical standards, then a fruitful area for conflict studies could be to look for ways to transform the emotional climate that enables securitization to occur and conflict to escalate.

¹ Emma Hutchinson and Roland Bleiker, ‘Theorizing emotion in world politics’, *International Theory*, 6:3 (2014), 491–514

² E.g. Jonathon Mercer, ‘Feeling like a state: Social emotion and identity’, *International Theory*, 6:3 (2014), 515–35; Ty Solomon, “‘I wasn’t angry, because I couldn’t believe it was happening’”: Affect and discourse in responses to 9/11’, *Review of International Studies*, 38:4 (2012), 907–28; Andrew A. G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014); Lloyd Cox & Steve Wood: ‘Got him’: Revenge, emotions, and the killing of Osama bin Laden, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 43, part 1 (2016), 112–129.

- ³ Within the discipline of International Relations, a security dilemma traditionally refers to a situation wherein states are drawn into conflict over security concerns, even though none of the states actually desire conflict. The security dilemma occurs when states fear for their security vis-à-vis other states, and as each state acts to make itself more secure, the other states interpret its actions as threatening. A cycle of unintended provocations emerges, resulting in an escalation of the conflict. Hertz, John H. (1950): "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, no. 2.
- ⁴ Ross, A.A.G. (2013) 'Realism, emotion, and dynamic allegiances in global politics', *International Theory*, 5(2), 273–299.
- ⁵ Juergensmeyer, Mark, and Mona Kanwal Sheikh. 2013. 'A Sociotheological Approach to Understanding Religious Violence'. *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*. Oxford University Press.
- ⁶ Craig Calhoun 'Putting Emotions in Their Place'. In Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (2001) *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ⁷ Sheikh, Mona Kanwal (2012) 'How does religion matter? Pathways to religion in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 38(2), 365–392.
- ⁸ Daniel Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations', *World Politics*, 55 (2002), 66–95. Other important contributions have been made arguing that the global resurgence of religion challenges hegemonic western concepts and thought patterns of IR by showing how the 'constructedness' of the religious/secular division affects established theoretical approaches to understanding international relations, e.g. Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Elizabeth Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); 'Theorizing Religious Resurgence', *International Politics* 44 (2007): 647–65. See also Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
- ⁹ See for example Cecelia Lynch, 'A neo-Weberian Approach to Religion in International Politics', *International Theory*, 1:3 (2009), 381–408.
- ¹⁰ Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State: From Christian Militias to Al Qaeda*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. Mahmood, Cynthia K. *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996. Jerryson, Michael. *Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- ¹¹ Mona Kanwal Sheikh. 2016. *Guardian of God – Inside the Religious Mind of the Pakistani Taliban*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- ¹² Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (2001), 'Why emotions matter'. In *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ¹³ Michael P. Young, 'A Revolution of the Soul: Transformative Experiences and Immediate Abolition'. In Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (2001) *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ¹⁴ Randall Collins, 'Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention.' In Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (2001) *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- ¹⁵ Interestingly, modern neuroscience suggests that emotion and cognition are inextricably fused. See Todrov, Fiske Prentice, *Social Neuroscience: Toward understanding the underpinnings of the social mind*. Oxford University Press 2011.
- ¹⁶ Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
- ¹⁷ Mona Kanwal Sheikh, The Religious Challenge to Securitisation Theory, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 2014, Vol. 43(1) 252 –272.
- ¹⁸ The critique I raise in reaction to the Copenhagen School theorization of religion in an article in a special issue of *Millennium* published in 2000 (Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Wæver, 'In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2000): 705–39). This critique is important, I argue, because of its repercussions for the thinking on de-securitization, and because the applied definitions of religion and religious securitization create a challengeable theoretical link between religion and violence.
- ¹⁹ Daniel Bar-Tal, Eran Halperin, Joseph de Rivera, 'Collective Emotions in Conflict Situations: Societal Implications', *Journal of Social issues*, vol 63, no 2, 441-460.

²⁰ De Rivera, J. and Páez, D. (2007), Emotional Climate, Human Security, and Cultures of Peace. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63: 233–253.

²¹ Thierry Balzaq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context', *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–202.

²² Lloyd Cox & Steve Wood: 'Got him': Revenge, emotions, and the killing of Osama bin Laden, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 43, part 1 (2016), 112–129.

²³ Snow DA, Benford RD. 1992. Master frames and cycles of protest. In Morris AD, Mueller CM, eds. 1992. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 133–55.