Our country-month (cm) forecasts are presented in the maps above. Our models yield results in line with mainstream studies of conflict at the country level. For instance, we forecast a higher risk of state-based conflict in countries with large populations, in non-democracies and countries with recent regime change, with low or negative growth rates, and with low education levels or other indicators of low socio-economic development.
We continue to forecast a high probability of state-based conflict (sb) in countries that have a recent history of conflict or protest events. Particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, South Sudan, DR Congo, Somalia, and Egypt the risk of at least one conflict event is high. We continue also to forecast a high probability of state-based conflict in Cameroon, as the recent separatist violence and clashes between government forces and IS (often referred to generally as Boko Haram in this region) continues. Despite weekly mass protests in Algeria throughout March calling for an end to President Bouteflika's regime, we forecast a lower probability of state-based violence in May 2019. Although Bouteflika has since resigned, growing protests in April against the transitional military regime were repressed and may escalate in May.
The forecast maps for non-state conflict (ns) and one-sided violence (os) follow partly the same patterns as state-based conflict, but the patterns of past events do differ across conflict types. Cameroon and Egypt, for instance, have not had much ns conflict, whereas Libya and Kenya have continued to experience it in recent months. Notably, the risk of non-state conflict has reduced in Ethiopia, while escalated ethnic violence in central Mali as well as Nigeria continue to put the countries at high risk in May 2019. In Mali, at least 173 people were reported to have died in March as a result of violence between Dogon and Bambara farmers and Fulani herders. DR Congo, Kenya, and Libya remain at high risk too, the latter being reflective of the advance into the south west and recently on the capital Tripoli of east-based Libyan National Army (LNA), which the UCDP codes as a non-state actor.
The forecasts for one-sided violence respond to about the same factors, but are less clearly related to protests and regime change. They also in general occur more frequently in newly independent countries. The probability of one-sided violence events is pronounced in Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Cameroon (predominantly given Boko Haram), DR Congo, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Somalia and Kenya (predominantly given Al-Shabaab). The risk of one-sided violence continues to be pronounced in Burundi, too, which has experienced recurrent violence against real and perceived political opponents since 2015. Also striking is the elevated risk in Zimbabwe, resulting from violent repression of political opposition and protests earlier this year. Compared to last month's predictions, finally, the risk of one-sided violence in Libya is more elevated in May, likely given the recent escalation of armed conflict in the country.
For more information see, see the monthly forecasts report for May 2019
- Country-level forecasts, May 2019, state-based conflict
- Country-level forecasts, May 2019, non-state conflict
- Country-level forecasts, May 2019, one-sided violence
Please cite: Hegre, Håvard, Marie Allansson, Matthias Basedau, Michael Colaresi, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde, Frederick Hoyles, Lisa Hultman, Stina Högbladh, Naima Mouhleb, Sayeed Auwn Muhammad, Desiree Nilsson, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Gudlaug Olafsdottir, Kristina Petrova, David Randahl, Espen Geelmuyden Rød, Nina von Uexkull, Jonas Vestby (2019) ‘ViEWS: A political violence early-warning system’, Journal of Peace Research, 56(2), pp. 155–174. doi: 10.1177/0022343319823860.