Our country-month (cm) forecasts are presented in the maps above. Our models yield results in line with mainstream studies of conflict at the country level. For instance, we forecast a higher risk of state-based conflict in countries with large populations, in non-democracies and countries with recent regime change, with low or negative growth rates, and with low education levels or other indicators of low socio-economic development.
We continue to forecast a high probability of state-based conflict in countries that have a recent history of conflict or protest events. Particularly in Mali, Nigeria, DR Congo, Somalia, and Egypt the risk of at least one state-based conflict event is high. We also continue to forecast a high probability of state-based conflict in Cameroon, as the recent separatist violence and clashes between government forces and IS (often referred to generally as Boko Haram in this region) proceeds.
Compared to last month's forecast, we forecast a higher risk of a state-based conflict event in Malawi, where in July 2019 thousands went out to protest against President Mutharika's allegedly fraudulent re-election. Risk also shows an increase in Ghana, but this appears to be the result of an unclear event erroneously coded as a state-based dyad included in the July candidate events dataset. Note that the risk of state-based violence remains relatively low for Ghana. Risk has also slightly risen in Angola, where reportedly up to ten people were killed in clashes between Angolan security forces and Armed Forces of Cabinda (FAC) in Cabinda Province.
The forecast maps for non-state conflict follow partly the same patterns as state-based conflict, but the patterns of past events do differ across conflict types. Mozambique for instance has experienced little non-state conflict, yet has seen significant one-sided violence, whereas for Libya the inverse has recently been true. Nigeria, DR Congo, Kenya, and Libya in particular remain at high risk of non-state violence this month, the latter being reflective of expanding hostilities between the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), which the UCDP codes as non-state actors.
Compared to last month's forecast, the risk of non-state conflict has increased in Mozambique in particular, where one person was killed in an attack assumed to be perpetrated by dissidents from former rebel movement RENAMO. Conversely, in Mali the risk of non-state conflict is on the decrease. Although communal violence continues, both the government and civil society have recently launched several peace initiatives that are starting a dialogue between warring non-state groups. On 1 July, Dan Na Ambassagou and Fulani militia in Mopti signed a peace agreement.
The forecasts for one-sided violence respond to about the same factors as non-state conflict, but are less clearly related to protests and regime change. They also in general occur more frequently in newly independent countries. The probability of one-sided violence events remains pronounced in Mali and Burkina Faso, Nigeria (predominantly given Boko Haram), DR Congo, Sudan, and Somalia (predominantly given Al-Shabaab). Mozambique continues to be at high risk of one-sided violence as well, given persisting civilian killings in Cabo Delgado Province by Islamist militants.
Compared to our August forecast we find an elevated risk in Morocco, where on 19 July a civilian was killed by security services trying to disperse people celebrating Algeria's victory in the Africa Cup of Nations. In Ghana, one student was killed by police responding to a campus riot at Sandema Senior High Technical school on 16 July, increasing the predicted probability of one-sided violence in September. South Africa, too, shows a slight increased risk this month due to an unclear event in the July candidate events data in which a person died under custody in a police van. Libya is at higher risk of one-sided violence, finally, particularly given an airstrike perpetrated by the LNA on 2 July on a migrant detention center in Tajoura, leading to at least 53 people killed.
For more information see, see the monthly forecasts report for September 2019
- Country-level forecasts, September 2019, state-based conflict
- Country-level forecasts, September 2019, non-state conflict
- Country-level forecasts, September 2019, one-sided violence
- Country-level forecasts, September 2019, change maps, state-based conflict
- Country-level forecasts, September 2019, change maps, non-state conflict
- Country-level forecasts, September 2019, change maps, one-sided violence
Please cite: Hegre, Håvard, Marie Allansson, Matthias Basedau, Michael Colaresi, Mihai Croicu, Hanne Fjelde, Frederick Hoyles, Lisa Hultman, Stina Högbladh, Naima Mouhleb, Sayeed Auwn Muhammad, Desiree Nilsson, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Gudlaug Olafsdottir, Kristina Petrova, David Randahl, Espen Geelmuyden Rød, Nina von Uexkull, Jonas Vestby (2019) ‘ViEWS: A political violence early-warning system’, Journal of Peace Research, 56(2), pp. 155–174. doi: 10.1177/0022343319823860.